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SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates the relationship of trade unionis~ to 
the American political system from 1919 to 1924. It does so by 
studying the state of industrial relations and the effects of 
contemporarJ events on their conduct. The President's First Industrial 
Conference is employed to examine the state of industrial ~lations at 
the end of the First ·":orld ~iar. Changes caused by the rise of the 
Engineering movement, the Open Shop Campaign, the recession and 
recoverJ and by successive crises are then traced to reveal the 
nature of the proble:n Hith "'hich politicians had. to ;lrestle. 
The rest of the thesis studies the response ·)f Congress and the 
administration of ~-1ilson, P.ardi."1g and Coolidge to what .. las :·:no;;"n 
euphe~istical:y as the 'labor probl;ffi' and analyses any tren~3 L~ 
political outlook occasioned thereby. The research relied hea.vily on 
the ~rivate ~a?ers 0:: contenpora=-J politicians a."1d official gOV8r=l::ent, 
businers and union docu:-:lents fallin~ ,.ithin the dates ;;hich delineate 
the thesis ani concentrat8s on the relationship as~ect rather than 
purely ?olitical or labour issues. 
The thesis contributes to knowledge of the period by 
emphasising the complexity of the political landscape. It 
contributes to the understanding of trade unionism's role within 
politics. The major themes are the continuing development of 
progressivism during the early twenties, the consequent diminution 
of the im~ortance of traditional partisanship and the political 
ctalemate which resulted. The other major theme is the debate 
among unionists regarding their movement's political implications 
and the ef:ect of this on the nature of unionism's relationship 
with progressives. 
The conclusions are that progressives remained a force in 
these years and drifted leftwards as Progressives understood and 
expounded the economic power struggle underlying industrial 
disputes. Unionists had many friends; economic factors, not 
:9olitical hostility, ,.,ere its r.lost damaging enemy. But the 
friends and enemies policy submerged unionism's political identity, 
hurting its own cause by contributing to the. ambivalence between 
unionism and progressives and thus aggravating the political 
confusion betHeen 1919 and 1924. 
ACKNOWLEDGEr1ENTS 
I should like to express my thanks to the following for their 
help in the completion of this thesisl Dr Eruce Collins of 
Glasgo~'" University; Dr H BroNn of Georgetown University and 
Professor )lilliam Brock for their thoughtful suggestions and 
valuable guidance: the staff of the LibrarJ of Congress; the 
National Archives; Glasgow University; Edinbu=gh University 
Library; GeorgetoHn University; the University of Virginia Library; 
the Pennsylvania Historical Association; the Mitchell Library, 
GlaSg01,i for their kind assistance and, finally, my wife who typed 
the ll'.anuscript. 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNO'W'LEDGEMENT i 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 1 THE FIRST INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE 17 
CHAPl'ER 2 THE ;aLSON ADMINISTRATION 55 
CHA.Pl'ER 3 CONGRESS 1919 - 1920 1~ 
CHAPl'&tt 4 THE HARDING ADMINISTRATION 152 
CHAPrER 5 CONGRESS 1921 - 1922 190 
CHAPTER 6 BUSINESS AND LABOUR OPINION TO 1923 232 
CHAPTER 7 FROM HARDING TO COOLIDGE 1923 - 1924 276 






The third decade of the twentieth century bas tradi tiona11)" 
been regarded as one in whioh prosperity and oonservatism oombined 
to triumph over an exhausted and disintegrating reform impulse. 
This triumph is reprded as having been due in large part to a 
diminishing ooncern about politics among a general public distraoted 
by the benefits bestowed on it by the rapid growth in the .Amerioan 
mass production industries and new technologies. In such an 
atmosphere the appeals of trade unionists for justice and equality 
fell on preoccupied ears. Politicians, aooording to tradition wers 
most concerned with seeking tranquility in a retuxn to 'normalcy'. 
~e purpose ot the theais ia to retine this 8tereotype with 
resard to the years immediately following the oonclusion of the 
Firat World War, the contention being that conservatism was far 
from entrenched and trade unionists far from being ignored. The 
study attempts to ahoy that United Statea politics were in a period 
ot gestation and change and that heated political debates continued 
to take place. Moreover, the thesis seeks to demonstrate that the 
nature of many of theae debates reflected positions derived from 
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attitudes towards the role and responsibilities of the federal 
govermnent for the welfare of the people rather than the traditional 
demarcation of Republicans and Democrats. It is argued that this 
development of the nature of the political debate was strongly 
influenced by the claims of the trade union movement and all the 
issues which became termed collectively in America as the 'labor 
problem'. It is intended that this will lead to a refinement of the 
interrelated questions of the position ot the trade union movement 
within the political system and the nature of that system. 'lbe 
intention is to demonstrate that in the years 1919-1924. ths trade 
union movement provided the American political system with a 
dynamic which contributed to the continuing development ot political 
attitudes. 
Tbere are three particular and related reasons why histories 
of .American Labour have failed to reveal more than "the mere 
1 inanimate carcass without the spirit" of the movement's impact 
upon the politics of the period from 1919-1924. Firstly, works on 
labour history do not tackle these years as separate entities. The 
most obvious eDllple of this neglect ot the years wi thin the decade 
can be seen in the major works in labour history. Irving l3erna te in 's 
'lb. Lean Y,8.%'8, Phillip Taft's '1!le A. F. of L. in the Time of.' Gompen 
and J. Rayback's A. IUstory of American Labor treat these years as 
constituent parts ot the decade and subject to the generalisationa 
made about the decade as a whole. 2 In such major histories the fate 
of trade unions 13 ineVitably compared to the fortunes of the movement 
under the Presidenciel of Woodrow Wilson or Franklin Roosevelt. One 
therefore receivel only broad generalisations for the decade as a 
whole which, in comparison, tend to be unfavourable ones. 
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Secondly, labour historians concentrate, by detinition, on the 
history ot the trade unions, which is in itselt a complex and 
disparate subject. Consequently, the treatment ot politics is 
necessarily summary. Since unionism i8 the central topic and 
because ot the lack or space which is granted politics, the political 
attitude to trade unionism is condensed into the question of whether 
at any given time trade unionism's political demands were • tailing' 
or 'succeeding'. The end re8ul t and its consequences for labour is 
the understandable rirst concern. Politics becomes a catalogue or 
lava passed or lava which required passage if the position of 
unionists was to improve. Bernstein tor instance explains his 
comparison or 1920 and 1928 election results by saying that the 
La Follette candidacy in 1924 makes those tigures "leaa meaningful".) 
Be concludes that a labour vote was in any case impossible to 
discover and touches little on the nature of politics at the time • 
.u though Tatt admits that "non-intervention is larsely a mythll4 with 
reprd to go'ftrnment policy, he does not examine the political 
aituation in these years. The defect ia not confined to the larser 
historical works, but is also apparent in labour histories with 
particular themes and subjects. In David Montgome~s Workers 
Control in !merica, the pursuit or his theme precludes attention to 
contemporary politics. Similarly, many labour histories cover large 
time periods in 8 tud"ing individual unions. 5 
Finall" and arising largely from the nature of the works 
themselvea and the problems that causea, the hiatory of labour in 
the politics or the period 1919-1924 conaista of isolated statements 
and incidents that ha'ft become acceptad as rerlective ot the tone or 
these years. The consequence 1s to ignore the process or inter-act10n 
J 
and development in politics which is as important to a proper 
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understanding or histor,y as actual legislation and actions. 
This tendency to minimise the political aspect is echoed in 
the treatment ot labour in political hiatories ot the time. In 
John Hicka' Republican Ascendancy, Georp Mowrr's The Urban Nation 
1920-1960 or William Leuchtenburg's Tn. Perils ot Prosperity 1914-
.l.2.3£, the etrects or trade unionim and the crise. caused by 
industrial action gain little mention. Leuchtenburg, vbi1e 
admitting the continued exi.tence ot progressive retorm demand., 
characterised the.e as "gwtrrilla eniping at the coneenative •• who 
mew what ther wanted". 7 Thia m1n1mal treatment ot labour vu 
perpetuated by the biocraphie. and autobiographies of men involved 
in the period. 8 . Generalisa tiona also abound in these hiatorie. of 
the decade which tend to lump the decade &8 a Whole topther. It 
11 the consequent oversimplification which hae thua developed 
which this thesis proposes to moditr by a synthesis ot the •• 
historical .traina and by concentrating on the events and 
attitudes or the years !rom 1919 to 1924. 
Th.re are turther reasona why IUch a work as thil 11 t.l t to 
be neceslary. The yearll following the First World War .... ra likely 
to be extremelr volatile politicallr in America, as they had been 
in hrope. D~SCU8Sion ot the nature ot the BOvernment'. role in 
the nation and the various dependent and particular i.suss vere 
hiibly important debates which grew out ot the var-time expansion 
or the sover1'llD8nt. '!'be idea that these debate. ended with the 
election ot Barding in 1920 18 queationed here. '!'be.e 1 •• uel vere 
crucial to the future nature or the American poll tical system 
and continued to be debated in the f1rat rears of the decade. 
Within this broader political context the position of trade 
unionism becomes an important indication ot political developments 
and a significant influence upon them. ihe war-t1me experience 
of industrial relationa bad similarly resulted in questions baing 
raised about the nature these should assume in the post-war years. 
'lhesa tvo important and interrelated i •• uea are de.erving ot 
reassessment. 
In purely political terms, such a reassesament also involvwa 
a closer study of the na tun of the progress i ft a tti tude to the 
problem of induatrial relations. In turn therefore the attitude of 
Woodrow Wilson and his adminiatntion is re-eDlDined. 'lh18 wUl 
lead on to a furthsr refinemsnt of the prevailing view of the 
Barding adminiatration's attitudes on industrial relationa. To 
imply that the early twenties witnessed a return to 'no%m&lcy' 
beliee both the natu:re of pre-war and post-war progressivism and 
of the influence of post-war conservatism. Transition bas long 
been the accepted conclusion as to the nature ot the American 
economy in the decade. 'lbe politics of these years, hovsftr, 
were also in the process or transi tiOD and it 1s this process which 
is here under reView, in particular the way in which the iSlues 
surrounding industrial relations &trected and illuatrated that 
transition. 
The purpose as outlined abo .... , and the areas in which it is 
tel t further ltudy i. required imposes certain precondi tiona on the 
structure of the thesis. The need to appreciate the political 
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context, and the limits which appeared to contemporaries to be 
possible requires that the thesis proceed in broadly chronological 
tashion. In addition to the contemporary context, however, it is 
recognised here that the nature ot institutions imposes a logic 
upon ott ice-holders which is an important influence upon actions 
and attitudes. This context vas also given wei8ht in structur1."lg 
the thesis. The chapters are broken down by focusing attention 
upon the process of poliCT formulation wi thin 1nstitutiona in order 
to identify, where possible, the influences upon policies advanced 
and in order to understand better the political difterences within 
these inatitutiona. Thus, chapters are devoted to the Wilson 
administration, the Harding administration, Con&ress at certain 
points, the nature ot industrial relations and the Supreme Court, 
in chronological order where at all possible. Tilie structure ot 
iteelflarply signi!ies the basic areas which are analysed and 
discussed in the thesis. This work does not undertake an 
analysis ot rank and tUe opinion, but it is intended that b,. such 
a scrutiny ot institutions, the static and somewhat monolithic 
impression ot political institutions will be broken down and a 
more nuid account ot the his tory ot the period preTided. 
This said, there are ke,. themes which recur thrOU6hout the 
period and which form the main basis of the analysis of these ,..are. 
The themes arising direotly trom the industrial situation in 1919 
are treated in the first chapter. These in effect define the 
nature ot the problem with which the political system in America ws 
to deal in the following years of this stud,._ Upheaval and 
disruption vas the keynote ot the first year toll owing the Great 
Wu. The trade union moft.ent and leadlnB sectors ot the American 
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business communit1' vere deep11' anxious that the nature ot industrial 
relations in the post-war era be conducted on a basi. most conducive 
to their interests. Industrial action which erupted during the year 
in Seattle, New York and Boston indicated the determination ot 
these two sides to succeed in their aims. In its simple.t terms 
the business oommunity wished to eradicate all .ouroe. of 
interference with ~ts abilit1' to conduct its attaire to tullest 
advantase. It theretore sought to denude the trade unions ot 
an1' power which miibt hinder them in that purpose. 'lhe unions 
on the other hand wished to .ee their power grow and wished what 
the1' belie..,.d to be their riahts upheld in order to do so. The 
purpose ot this was to proteot and advance the interests ot their 
membership. 
The ke1' areas ot dispute which arose trom this clash ot aima 
were the claims ot unionists tor the riaht to strike, organise, and 
ba.:rsain colleoti..,.l1' and to do so throU&h representati..,.. chosen 
treel1' by the employees. It these rights were guaranteed and 
aocepted by employers then the mo..,.ment could carry out its 
purposes. Buaines. cballenced th.se riibt. by a call for 
indi'Tidual libert)". Unions misht well oreanise but 1 t was up to 
'bwI1nes. whether it should treat with them. This vas a matter tor 
indi'Tidual choice. Similarly-, individual. must be allowed to 
barsain tor themael..,.s. Unions olaimed that the1', and the power 
the1' exerci.ed, assured the employees ot justice and equality in 
the modem industrial 'Y'Stem. Bwsinessmen olaimed that individual 
liberty enBu:red these basic soaJ,s ot American societ,-. UnionB 
damaged the atta1Dment ot this goal b)" their oolleotive organisation 
suppressinB libert)". The.e entrenched positions are detailed b7 the 
'irst Industrial canterenee ot Ootober 1919. 
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The thesis does not attempt to argue that both sides were 
unanimous with regard to the most propi tioUB means of achieving 
these ends. The point which merits emphasis however is that 
despi te internal difterences, the industrial conflict ot the 
p81"iod set the tone of industrial relations and therefore 
dominated the attention of politicians. lihU. agreements vere 
reached in 1919 in the electrical and gament trades, it vas the 
strikes ot 1919 which characterised the labour problem. Chapter 6 
returns to the ltudy ot industrial relations from 1920 awards, when 
the split in the labour movement becomes more palpable. Samuel 
Compere embraced co-operation with the engineering movement as the 
means to win union recognition while disaffection reached a 
auf'ficient pitch in other unions to result in the toma tion ot the 
C.P.P.A •. This does point to the obvious split in the union 
movement between those who tel t outwi th the economic and political 
systems to a greater or lesser degree. Apin this is not analysed 
in detail here since much has been written elsewhere about 'the 
:14eolo87 of unionism. '!he C.P.P.A. seized the initiative on 
unionism's political stance in 1922 and whila therewre difterences 
it defined the substance of the political relationship. It is taken 
up here however aa a modifying tactor in the relationship between 
trade unionism and politics. 
Unionists had pa%ticular demands, in addi tioD to the rishts 
mentioned above, such as Supreme Court reform, the ending of 
injunctions in industrial disputes and the reform of the Railroad 
Labor :Board erected by the Each-Cnmmins 'l'ransportation Act. Some 
unionista claimed these to be the extent of the movement's interest 
in politics. Other unionists believed that only a movement in 
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whiCh unions vere directly involved in politics and with a broader 
consciousness ot unionism's implications could provide the setting 
tor the rest or the unions' demands. This involved disputes 
between the vie" that unionism JDU8t be independent and those who 
aav it aa increaaingly dependent on the actions ot government, aa 
,-
in the call tor nationalization trOll coal and railroad uni0D8, and 
in participation within the C.P.P.'!. trom 1922 onwards. 
This division is explored to a •• e •• its erreot on the 
conduct ot industrial relations and the political po.ition ot 
trade unionism because any chan.8es would have a bearing on the 
attitudes towards ind'WItrial relations. 
While the.e chapters set out the reality or industrial 
relations, and the political outlook ot trade unionism, which 
detined the nature ot the problem vi th vhiCh poli tioiana had to 
de.l, the other chapters in the thesis study the political 
oonsequence.. The seoond chapter analyses the response ot the 
Wilaon adm1n1atration to industrial relations during the tinal 
years ot hia administration. In dOing 80 it is hoped that the 
nature ot Wil.onian progressivism will be retined and the basic 
poll tical the_a or the thesia revealed. 
The progresslve movement had dl'V8rse constituent motlfttions. 
The primary one, however vas a perceptlon that the busine ••• ystem 
which had developed in the post Civil War period had distorted the 
fundamental aims of the American democratic system. Theae were 
that justice, equality and liberty vere buio to the nation's fabric 
and inherent rights ot the populace. This had been the machine 
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which powered the progressiva reform movament. Trade unions had 
tound tavour from it in the pre-war years. The question in the 
post-war years vas whethsr the continuing agitation for consideration 
by unionists would continue to receiva a favourable response from 
the Wilson administration. What emers-s from the administration's 
response is that the basic tenets ot progressivism embraced unionism 
originally but could not support unionism's aims entirely. The 
purpose of the progressiva movement had been to diminish e::rtra-
parliamenta:y power in the shape ot business agglomeration. It 
did not intend to give support to another extra-parliamentary power 
group. Indeed, paver and economic justice were not basic progressive 
concernJl, therefore creating an ambiftlence between the Wilsonian 
style ot progressivism and the aims of trade unionism. Thus, the 
Wilson response was to launch a polior ot compromise institutionalised 
in a board of conciliation. The theme which 18 pursued is whether 
progressi .... s could modity their outlook in order to embrace unionist 
demands. This required a reassessment ot the priorities ot the 
reform impulse and its baais. Progressives had to ask of their 
movement whether union agitation and industrial disruption signitied 
a need to re-det1ne the ba,i, ot justice and equality in more 
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concrete economic and political terms. 
Chapter three anal,..e, ths response ot COn&r8ss to the problem 
of induatrial relations. The anal,..is of progressives' attitude 
towards union1am is continued to examine the spectrum of progrBssiva 
opinion, lince procressiviam vas a hiahly individualistic and 
varissated movement, and to study any dUrerences between these and 
Wilson'. outlook. Indeed the chapter analyses the response or 
Congress as a whole and thus hopes to refina prevailing v1ew of 
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the balance ot power in Congress, that is the strength ot 
conservatism in Congress and the attitude ot conservatives 
This chapter also deals with the broader question ot the role ot 
the tederal government in post-war American society. A.s with the 
issue ot union power, this question again pressured progressives 
into a reassessment ot the nature ot their movement. 
In 1920 Warren G. Harding was elected President or the 
United States. 'lbe tourth and fifth chapters analyse the Harding 
administration's attitude to labour, ita conservative outlook and 
its abUity to act upon its opinions. This is done in the context 
ot responses to the eftect on industtial relatioll8 and the crisis 
brought on by the strikes in the coal and rail industries. 
The great majority ot unionists supported Senator La Follette 
in the 1924 election race. Both the I triends and enemies I non-
partisan campaign and the unionists in the C.P.P.A.. could support 
this candidate. Indeed I triends t or labour were invariably 
progressives and yet the American Federation of Labor denied its 
political implications. In fact this stance was largely in order to 
avoid being identified with either Republioana or Democrats. This 
indeed provides another incid.ental theme arising trom ttle general 
poli tical development or the pariod in the question ot the extent 
to which traditional party loyalties were politically relevant by the 
end ot the period. By 1924 this division certainly appeared to be 
diminishing in political significance in the developments 01' these 
years. 
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The themes which run throughout the thesis are therefore 
few in number. The issues which exercised the business and labour 
worlds were based on the need for power. This included all the 
issues such as the rights to strike, organise and bargain collect-
ively on behalf of the membership's interests in wages, hours and 
conditions. These demands and their denial by business form the 
core of the industrial problem throughout these years. The methods 
of unions in seeking to achieve these ends, direct action, co-
operation or political action form a second important theme and are 
also important for politicians as indicators of the political 
outlook of trade unions. 
These are the problems which faced politicians from 1919-1924 
and thereby act as important factors in political development. The 
third major theme is how progressives reacted to these problems and 
how this chansed the nature of politics in America. This involves 
the analysis of the other important theme, the outlook of 
conservatives and their power in this period. It is hoped that such 
themes satisfy the purposes of the thesis as described at the 
; 
beginning of the introduction. 
The thesis ends with the election of 1924, in order to study 
more closely the events and developments of these years. To define 
a larger time period might well result in the kind of problems which 
the thesis hopes to modify. It is also chosen deliberately 80 
that the decade of the twenties, as an historical period, may become 
less prey to over-generalisation. The year 1924 also marked an 
end in some respects. Samuel Gompers, the Pl'esident of the A.F. of L., 
since its birth in 1886, died in December of 1924. Inevitably a man 
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in a position of leadership for such a length of time leaves his 
imprint upon the organisation. His successor will not, however much 
he may have admired the man, be able to duplicate his policies, 
style or priorities. This was an important date therefore in the 
history of the A.F. of L. 
Similarly, 1924 was the first year in which the A.F. of L. 
had declared officially for a candidate in the person of 
Robert M. La Follette. This in itself marks a further important 
reason why the year marks a stage in the history of the A.F. of L. 
The La Follette candidacy serves as a stopping point for the 
further reason that it serves to mark the state of progressives at 
a speoific time. Since it was an independent campaign, it also 
provides a clearer expression of radical Progressive policies 
than might otherwise have been available. For these reasons 1924 
has been deemed an apt oonclusion for the clarification of the themes 
of the thesis and its attempt to offer a refinement of knowledge of 
the nature of American politics from 1919 and the role of the trade 
unions wi thin it. 
1J 
1. Mills, J.S., Essays on Politics and Culture, p.1. 
2. This criticism is most easily levelled at general histories 
which summarise trends ar~ use time-periods as means c~ 
~efinition. See, for instance, Cohen, S. Labor in the United 
states, Dulles, F.R., Labor In America, Lornin, L.1., The 
American Federation of Labor, or Pelling, H., American-Labor. 
While these works are prone to the same conflict/consensus 
dialogue, the factuality of their books diminishes its influence. 
Commons, J.R. The History of Labor in the United states 1596-19,2 
is perhaps the most notable example and is certainly the most 
compendious. 
3. Bernstein, I., A History of the American Harker Vo1.1: The 
Lean Years 1920-1933, p.78. It is in the major interpretive 
works such as this that the cor£lict/consensus historiographical 
debate has the greatest influence on historical treatment. 
Bernstein argues that the A.F. of L. would only gain satisfaction 
through the support and espousal of a left-wing political 
philosophy. Thus the 1924 election, with its overtones of 
Progressive radicalism; and the obvious discomfort of the A.F. ofL. 
leadership alongside the commitment of radical unionists to this 
Progressivism might well prove 'less meaningful' to his basic 
argument. 
4. Taft, P., Organized Labor in American History, Introduction 
p. xvii. Taft takes the view that the A.F. of L. 's non-partisan 
position was simply the most common sense approach to the 
American situation, maximising labour support in both parties. 
He does not deal however with the problem of what to do if such 
maximum support is ineffective in securing trade union aims. 
Taft's interpretation comes perilously close to Hofstadter's 
fear that 'consensus' was becoming celebrated as the natural 
tradition of American politics. Ultimately, interpretations 
of unionism's political position has been derived from the 
study of trade unions with a minimal concern for the political 
situation. Rayback J.G., A Histo;y of American Labo~ is 
admirable in its neutrality in this respect. The alternative 
has been to remain strictly factual as in (lolrran, IJ., The 
Growth of American Trade Unions 1880-1923, Helbing, A.T:: 
The )emrtments of the AIr. of L. or Douglas, P., Real '{iages in 
the United states 1890:1920. 
5. The alternative to major interpretive and narrative works has 
been the detailed works of analysis on particular themes and 
events such as Montgomery's stimulating work. It is not the 
purpose of such theoretical works on trade unions to study the 
political context. See also Burns, C.D., The Philoso~hy of 
Labor, Hoxie, ~.F., Trade Unionism in the United state!'l or 
Tannenbaum, F., A Philos~hy of Labor. Similarly, studies of 
indiVidual unions or issues such as toner, ?S., The I .... I.·N. 
and the Black rlorker, Journal of ~eKfo HistorJ Vol. 55, 1970 
or Foster, N.Z., The ~reat Steel Strike are by definition 
limited in scope. However Fink, G.H., Labor':3 Search for 
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Political Order: the Political Behaviour of the Missou-~ 
Labor 110vement l8Q()..1Q40 is notably successful in making 
observations upon the subject with wider implications. 
6. The few books which ostensibly do tackle the political context 
in which industrial relations existed are largely disappointing. 
Most deal with the structural nature of the situation as in 
Childs, H.L., Labor and Capital in National Politics or are 
too general to bear particular relevance to the situation in 
the twenties. See Vale, V., Labour and American Politics and 
Rehmus, Mclaughlin and Nesbitt, Labor and American Politics. 
Zieger, R.H., Renublicans and Labor, while an excellent Hork 
on the policies of Hoover is not particularly informative on 
the broader situation out~ith the Republican administration. 
7. Leuchtenburg, W.E., The Perils of Prosperity 1914-1932, p.l)7. 
This comment typifies the general political histories' treatment 
of the early twenties, the progressives' significance is 
minimised and union disruption is unconnected to the body of 
political development. The progenitor of this historical 
tradition was Allen, F.L., Only Yesterdays An Informal History 
of the Nineteen-~~enties. Link, A.S., ~hat happened to the 
Progressi ve 110vement in th'J 1920' 91 American Historical Review 
Vol.64, 1959 served to confirm this view. With few exceptions 
studies of progressives and reform appear to confirm rather 
than refute this traditional view of the twenties. The 
classical example of this is Mackay, K.C., The Progressive 
Movement of 1924, where La Follette and the P.L.S. are 
portrayed as a small band of visionary men struggling against 
ovenrhelming odds. More typical are works such as Nye, ~.B., 
The Mid-west Progressives which concentrates so much on these 
men 'The Farm Bloc' that the wider political perspective is 
lost, and Holt, S., Congressional Insurgents and the Party 
System 190Q-1916. 
Burner, D., The Politics of Provincialism remains a major work 
on the period and does give the sense of political change and 
development taking place in the Democratic party but which was 
obscured first by the ',.alson legacy and secondly by the 1924 
debacle. Buenker, J.D., Urban Liberalism and Progressive 
Reform continues to develop the theme of urban influence on 
reform thinking. Graham, O.L., Encor~ for 'Refo!'!"1. also hel~s 
to highlight the sense of change and develoument in U.S. 
reform politics. Many of the progressives who were opposed to 
the ~Tew Deal however can already be seen to be uneasy ~.i th the 
La Follette effort in 1924. Although these works do point to 
the process of change in the twenties none rAS been concerned 
to place trade unionism in this political process. 
3. Biography and autobiography are by their nature unlikely to 
provide the broad context and sense of development Hhich is 
pursued here. This is the case in Zinn, H., La Guardia in 
Congzess, for instance, which never attempts to broaden the 
subject to reflect on why urban liberalism failed to develop 
significan~ly within the Republican ,arty. Lowitt, ~., 
George NO!'l'is 2 'loIs. which also ultimately fails to place 
Norris's efforts in the broader political context. 
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Sinclair, A., The Available }!an does provide a sympathetic 
account of the Harding administration while T,.,rhi te, h.A., 
A Puritan L~ Babylon remains a perceptive and illumirAting work 
on the Coolidge administration, which cannot be said for 
Coolidge's own Autobiogra'Ohy, Hoover,H. (-remoirs 2 VOls., 
Baruch, B., The Public Years or McAdoo, W .G., The Crowded Years. 
9. Progressives are defined here as those who had been or were 
prepared to countenance reform. A Progressive is only used 
here with ~gard to the Independent movement of 1924; 
prog::essives only appeared. more coherent during the 'r'iilson 
administration due to the reality of exercising power. Even 
then, however, it Has a fragmented coalition which defied 
adequate definition. It never claimed any desire to un1ertake 
systematic social change, an assumption which underlines all 
the criticisms of the movement made by Kolko, G., in ~ 
Tri~~'Oh of Conserlatism. Expectations of reformers' intentions 
have been avoided in this work as far as possible, nostalgia 
and progress were ir.tertwined in the progressive mind. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE FIRST nmUSTRIAL CONFERENCE 
In the opinion of Professor P. W. Slosson, the American people 
never accepted the First World War as part of their national 
tradition. ''Ten years after its close they remained still irritated 
and bewildered by it."l To two major sectors of American society, 
the consequences of the nation' s intervention in Europe signified 
much more than an aberration. The trade union movement and 
America.' s employers regarded the war-time expansion of the federal 
government into the national economy as so startling that it broke 
entirely the natural development of the economy. 
The wrench was such that it led both groups to regard the 
period of readjustment as a golden opport'lmity to remodel the 
economy, and industrial relations in particular, according to their 
own views. This chapter examines the consequences of this 
perception which shaped the attitudes and actions of both these 
commtmities during the year 1919. The First Industrial Conference, 
where those attitudes were stated bltmtly, is subjected to close 
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study as the climax to a year of upheaval. As such it is important 
to the clear exposition of what was known in America as 'the labor 
problem' • 
Two issues were regarded as the key indicators of what shape 
the post war economy would take; the first was the basis upon which 
industrial. relations would be conducted; the second was the role which 
the federal government would assume. It was apparent that the first 
question would be dependent to a large extent on the outcome of the 
second. In February 1919, the National Industrial Conference Board 
issued a report on the problems envisaged in the readjustment of the 
economy to peace-time operation. The key to this being carried out, 
an opinion which the trade union movement could endorse fully, was 
"a sound determination and delimitation of the relations of the state 
and industry". 2 At this point the agreement between business and the 
labour movement ended. Although couched in diplomatic language, the 
report went on to ma.ke clear what the business community regarded as 
a 'sound' relationship between federal government and industry I 
The relinquishing of personal liberty as a patriotic 
duty in the stress of a great national emergency • • • 
is not to be construed as a voluntary movement towards 
socialism and a demand for government control of 
private industry in peacetime. J 
It was abundantly clear that the business community sought a return 
to the pre-war rela.tionship of government to the economy. It wished 
the government to dismantle the war-time agencies and divest itself 
of a.ll notions of continuing control or regula.tion. They had a.ccepted. 
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the economic reform of the Wilson administration largely because those 
efforts actually strengthened the economy without threatening their 
interests. Despite this modification they continued to advocate a 
return to an unfettered economic system - ~e accumulation of new 
4 
wealth ••• to provide for the improvement of social life" - in 
the post war period. They remained wedded to their belief in a 
'natural' economy and this determined their attitude towards indus-
trial. relations. They remained committed to the credo laid down by 
the National Association of Manufacturers in 1903 that they were 
opposed to any "illegal acts of interference with the personal 
liberty of employer and emp1oyee".5 They regarded unionism as a 
threat to the efficient management of industry. strikes as an 
interference in the production process which were too costly to 
condone. and wages as a fixed. cost of production. 
The labour movement was also committed to having its demands 
met. At the Southern Labor Congress its President, Jerome Jones, 
posed the question which was most vital to labour. "After the 
reconstruction period what will be the workers' social and industrial 
sta.tus?"6 The status of workers and of tmions themselves had been 
the priary concern of the American Federation of Labor since its 
inception in 1886. In order to clarify the position of this 
organisation in 1919, it would be useful to describe briefly its 
development. The labour movement was concerned with the whole gamut 
of factors which defined the social, economic and political position 
of the working _Ill his wages, working conditions, terms of employ-
ment. a.nd, most important of all, the rights of a trade union to 
negotiate for its membership and carry out industrial action in 
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Ol:der to secure their demands. The ultimate aim was to establish the 
independence, self-respect and equality of the working population 
within society. It was important to the nature of American trade 
unionism that the emphasis be on the status of the worker, thus 
establishing the trade union movement as an ostensibly apolitical 
movement. This was the role which Samuel Gompers, the President of 
the A.F. of L. sought for trade unionism throughout his lang career. 
As he maintained. in his autobiography; "I have been jealous that the 
American labor movement should retain the character of a. crusade for 
human justice".7 
It was a humanitarian crusade for which. Gompers believed. trade 
unions had. specifica.lly evolved in industrial society. Unions were 
an industrial phenomenon which had emerged to ensure the well-being 
of their membership within the workplace. Trade unions were also 
eminently qualified for the task since they were the direct instrument 
of the workers' will. They were highly responsive to the desire of 
workers for the improvement of immediate surroundings. Thus, 
"true trade unionists contend that the trade unions are pa.ra.motmt to 
any other form of organization, or movement of labor in the world". 8 
The thrust of Samuel Gompers' argument was that unionism was an 
industrial organism. close to the workers a.nd designed to give them 
strength to succeed in bargaining with employers I this wa.s the 
purpose of trade unionism. he argued, not political activity -
"Trade unions or voluntary associations of wage earners constitute 
one of the essential agencies for establishing procedures of control". 9 
By control Gompers was referring both to the complete organisation of 
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the workforce and the power to force employers to acknowledge and 
satisfy their needs in the workplace. Control had no broader meaning 
other than the power born of organisation to have a voice on issues 
pertaining immediately to the job. 
As America entered the twentieth century, however, that 
organisation, control and. power were clearly not being established. 
The various weapons used by employers - injunctions, strikebreakers 
and bl~k1ists - were forcing unionists to question whether a large 
enough organisation could ever be established without political 
reform. Some unionists believed that the rights of trade unions 
required political confirmation if control were to be wrested from 
the employer. 
Gradual acceptance of this opinion led to the publication in 
1908 of Labor's Grievances. From this was drafted a BUl of 
Grievances which was presented to both Democratic and Republican 
conventions. It called for union exemption from anti-trust laws and 
the injunction process, and also included a demand for the right to 
organise. Labor Representation Committees were set up to conduct a 
non-partisan 'friends and enemies' campaign. The results were 
largely disappointing but political activity by the union movement 
had begun. 
Politics and indeed the role of the government continued to be 
regarded by unions merely as a means to an end. This attitude was 
modified only marginally by the reforms of the first WUson 
administration. Political activity, however, had become an 
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increasingly respectable and important part of trade union policy. 
Gompers' 'friends and. enemies' policy continued. to hold sway, due 
primarily to the split in progressivism between the Republican and 
Democratic parties, and Gompers' determination to keep as much 
distance between trade unions and the political system as possible. 
He did net wish to see the union movement embroiled in issues such 
as prohibition and broader political questions. Moreover his claims 
for the Clayton Anti-Trust Act also had some basis in his hope that, 
with union legitimacy secured, unionists would return to the 
original Gompers' model. Political action however had become a 
matter of course. 
The war put a severe strain on Gompers' policy as did the 
faUure of the Clayton Act to live up to Gompers' expectations. Not 
only did it involve the labour movement in the issues revolving 
around. American entry, but it brought the government to the centre 
of the industrial system through price controls, the take-over of 
the railroads and its policies on industrial. relations through the 
National War Labor Beam. The result was an increasing a.wareness 
among trade unionists of the possible benefit to its own abs of 
an interventionist government. The most obvious examples of this 
were t.he deuand.s of the Un! ted Mine Workers of America and the 
railroad brotherhoods for nationalization of their respective 
industries. The hope which the Southern Labor Congress held out 
far the post war status of the working population rested mainly on 
the assumption that, 
The workers wUl continue to have all the machinery 
of government created. as a war measure to which to 
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appeal and through which to adjust all labor grievances 
that _y arise. There will be no retu.-ning to the pre-
10 
war status quo during the peace conference period. 
They clearly believed, as did the movement in general, that 
the N.W.L.B. policies would. continue in effect at least during 1919. 
time enoUgh for those same policies to be implemented in peace-time 
by the government and consequently far the tmiens to increase their 
membership. Such hopes were fuelled by lmionists' increased sense 
of self-worth as a result of their co-operation in the war effort. 
They felt entitled to widespread public sympathy and a supportive 
govemment for their contribution. 
The war increa.sed awareness among trade unionists of the 
benefits of a sympathetic government. The call of the U.M.W. 
and. mUroad brotherhoods for nationalization represented. only 
the most extreme of a widespread. perception. Under the umbrella. 
of a government agency, lmionists believed that the time was ripe 
for expansion and. they began to push employers for a definitive 
acceptance of their organisations. The time seemed to have 
arrived when tmions would be able to establish their power base 
throughout industry on the Gompers' model and achieve self-reliance. 
The mpid dismantling of the N.W.L.B. early in 1919 was a 
considerable blow to the hopes of the labour movement. It in no 
way diminished their determination to see those hopes realised in 
the immediate future. At & time when both sides were convinced of 
the need to act to establish their views and were highly sensitive 
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to any threat to their position, the disappearance of this mediation 
was likely to have serious consequences. 
It would be a mistake to suggest that all disturbances in 
industry in 1919 flowed. from these fundamental perceptions. A 
welter of disputes grew out of immediate conditions, notably over 
wage claims. yet even these disputes were embittered by the 
broader difference between the two sides. Indeed the rash of 
strikes of 1919 combined with the ending of the N.W .L.B. to submerge 
almost entirely any thoughts of government 'backing. Increasingly 
during the year the unions and business community were locked with 
each other in a 'battle of wills I a struggle through direct action 
to force their views on the other. Rocketing inflation caused 
strikes by New York's longshoremen, the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers and. the United Textile Workers' unions I all three of which 
were successful. During the year the elevated, subway and street 
railway systems of New York, Boston and Chicago were also 
paralysed. RaUroad shopmen in Chicago and. the North East walked 
out in protest against the 165 million awarded to other classes 
of railroad workers. In addition to these _jor strikes, a welter 
of requests poured into the A.F. of L. headquarters in Washington 
D.C. for strike funds. Suspender akers in New York, Hairspinners 
in Chicago and Rubber Workers in Ohio carried out industrial 
action for wage rises. These were local strikes which the A.F. of L. 
Executive Council had. agreed to fund. A great many more strikes 
were either avoided by sending A.F. of L. conciliators or by 
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denying funds. The latter was particularly true of recently 
organised locals. It was the A.F. of L. policy that no local could 
receive strike funds tmtil it had been affiliated with them for one 
year. This created the curious situation of the AS. of L. 
frustrating the very purpose for whim the new members had joined. l1 
Clearly the strikes which took place were much fewer than might 
have occurred. The disruption of 1919 was never co-ordinated. The 
A.F. of L. was constantly short of funds and in any case had no 
power of control over constituent lmions. Thus the mood of 
bitterness in 1919 developed out of the disputes in which each union 
was involved. Indeed the mions, autonomous bodies jealous o£ their 
independence, were notoriously unable to present a un~ied voice. 
Although other strikes had created a powerful mood of antagonism and 
a deepening sense of crisis, the key disputes which united the 
labour movement centred on the issue of mion 1egitima.cy. 
The first uajor strike involving this issue was in Seattle in 
February 1919. It demonstrated that, in this city, unity had. been 
achieved. The metal workers in the Seattle shipbuilding industry 
had. organised a Metal Trades COWlCU and the demand. of the COlmcil 
was for ~l per clay rise throughout the yards. The cause of the 
strike, however, was not the immediate demand but the about-turn of 
the Shipping BCII:'I.rd·s West Coast Director, General Piez. He agreed 
at first and then refused to negotiate with the Seattle unions over 
their demands. Piez refused to negotiate with the mions because he 
claimed they were tied. by a contract covering all yards on the 
Pacific coast engaged in work for the government. The mions, 
however, believed that Piez aimed to break the unions • Given that 
the shipyards were the b1.sis of the Seattle economy, general. 
25 
concern in the central labour councU was to be expected. The 
overwhelming support which the council received for an appeal 
made in support of the Metal Trades encouraged it to call for a 
general shut-down. It was this general action which caused a. brea.ch 
with the A.F. of L., a breach which was ensured by Mayor Hanson of 
Sea.ttle dubbing the strikers as "anarchists" .12 Gompers was 
unable to endorse the Sea.ttle action. In fact, a.lthough Seattle 
did have radicals in its \mions, the editor of the Sea.ttle Times 
confirmed the conservatism of the unions in the shipyards and 
squarely blamed. the strikes on Piez' s action. Indeed the Metal 
Trades Strike Committee wrote to President Wilson that "We ••• 
reaffirm our' allegiance to your principles of democracy • • • 
Nonetheless Gompers and the A.F. of L. Executive Council, aware of 
their new status, remained aloof from the dispute which finally 
collapsed on 11th February. 
Similarly, a strike by the telegraphers in the North East of 
the nation was caused by the demand. for recognition and collective 
bLrgaining. The core of the row far the union, part of the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, was the dismissal 
of staff' for joining the union. Postmaster Genera.l. Albert Burleson' s 
argument was that they had been sacked for striking without going 
through the proper negotiating procedure. The original negotia.tions 
involved a. pay demand but again the industrial action was taken 
primarily to gain fa.ir treatment. The strike dragged on for almost 
a month before finally being settled. In the hitter opinion of the 
telegraphers "Nothing favorable to our side will get thrOugh,,14 to 
the President giving their view of the matter. They also bl&med the 
postmaster Genera.l for allowing Western Union to employ strike-
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breakers. In this ca.se the A.F. of L. did not involve itself in 
the dispute although it did put a resolution before the President 
calling for Burleson's resignation in July 1919. 
Perhaps the most notorious strike of 1919 was that in Boston 
by police officers who demanded the right to organise a union and, 
after the dismissal. of severa.l officers, struck for their demand. 
The consequent chaos catapulted the Governor of Massachussetts 
to fame and persuaded the nation that a police force should never 
be allowed to carry out strike action. Despite the widespread 
condemnation of the police action, Samuel Gompers on this occasion 
publicly endorsed the strike. By August 1919 when the Boston 
police strike took place, the AS. of L. was slowly swinging behind 
the efforts of unionists and their struggle to establish the right 
to organise. The upheaval of 1919 was gradually radicalising the 
movement. The steel strike completed this process and laid naked 
the root of the dispute between labour and business leaders and 
the depth of the antagonism between the two groups. 
Since the crushing of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, 
Steel am Tin Workers' Union early in the century, the steel 
industry and. especially the plants of U.S. Steel had been a major 
symbol of business antagonism to trade tmionism. This situation 
had been allowed. to continue by the trade union movement untU the 
First World War. The task, they believed, was simply too enormous. 
The war, the resultant shortage of labour and the increasing 
stature and responsibility of unions during it gave unionists a new 
confidence and determination. This combined with the need to 
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destroy the anti-tmion symbol which the steel industry was. The 
success of the organisation of the packing industry in Chicago 
tmder the government's aegis convinced William Z. Foster that the 
OJ?portlmity now existed. to organise steel "such as might never occur 
again. ,,15 Foster thus Ilresented a. resolution to the Chicago 
Federation of Labor on 7th April 1918 calling on the A.F. of L. to 
convoke a general conference and to inaugurate an organising 
campaign in the steel industry. The A.F. of L. took the matter up 
with the A.A. of I.S. & T.W. but things were moving too slowly for 
Foster a.nd the Chicago Federation. They consequently sent the 
A.F. of L. conference the m-adopted resolution on loth Jtme 1918. 
This resolution was adopted unanimously and. Gompers called a. 
conference of all lmions interested in the organisation of the steel 
workers to meet in Chicago on 1st August 1918. The fifteen unions 
present agreed that only a joint campaign could succeed and for 
that purpose a National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel 
Workers was set up, with Gompers as chairman while Foster, as 
the moving force, was elected Secretary/Treasurer. Twenty-four 
unions joined the campaign representing some two million tmionists. 
These unions however assessed themselves only one hundred dollars 
each. The call1p9.ign had been intended by Foster to swamp the steel 
industry in a matter of weeks. This minimal funding punctured the 
hope Foster held that this would present Judge Gary, President of 
the U.S. Steel Corporation, with a fait accompli and. make strike 
a.ction unnecessary. The campaign was therefore la.tmched only in 
the steel districts around. Chicago in the first week o-r September. 
The fact that this contradicted the unions' Illedge not to a.ttempt 
to expa.nd their organisa.tion during the war troubled none of the unions 
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unduly. It was clear that Foster wished to use the N. W .L.B. codes 
to legitimize union organisation. In October 1918 the campaign 
was also opened in the Pittsburgh environs. the steel industry's 
heartland. By the spring of 1919 the campaign was ready to enter 
Pittsburgh itself. By this time the steel industry was becoming 
increasingly a.la.rmed by the success of the recruiting drl ve. Gary 
had in September 1918 agreed to pay overtime rates on work done 
beyond eight hours in a daUy shift. With this decision he hoped to 
defuse discontent. Since then widespread. lay-offs of union members 
had also taken place. 
Immediately following the armistice. the steel industry began 
to increase its campaign. They imported strikebreakers, used armed 
guards to carry out evictions and pressured local town councUs to 
bLn union meetings. Increasingly union meetings were disrupted by 
company guards and union leaders were arrested for incitement or 
breaking city ordinances. Tales of indiscriminate police violence 
abounded. The violent reaction of the industry and the co-operation 
of city fathers with them made it obvious that in order to break 
the industry and finally establish the tmions. something more than 
organising would be required. It was argued that Compers should 
present Gary with a call for a conference. This step was taken to 
avert local strikes to keep the organising campaign moving and to 
hold the A.A. of I.S. &: T. in line. Gompers' request never received 
& response from Gary. Gompers. on 20th June 1919. resigned his 
chairmanship of the National Committee which John Fitzpatrick, 
President of the Chicago Federation. now took up. 
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This stalemate forced the National Committee to take a 
further step to hold membership in line and continue the momentum 
of the campaign. Given the unbending position of the steel 
industry, on 20th July 1919 the Committee decided to call for a 
strike vote which was to be carried out over the next month. The 
fact that Fitzpatrick was a more militant unionist also precipitated 
this decision. Their demands were formulated at the same meeting. 
The key demands were for the right of collective bargaining and 
the recognition of the right to join a trade union. Also demanded 
were the eight-hour day, reinstatement of a six-d.a.y week, a wage 
rise and check-off. There was a 9~ vote in favour of strike 
action. !he NaticmaJ. Coaitteeset, itself & deadline of 10 days to arrange 
a conference with U.S. Steel. In a letter to Gary on 27th August 
requesting a conference, they wrote. "Surely reasonable men can 
16 find. a common ground upon which we can all stand and prosper." 
There was again no reply from Gary to this communication. In view 
of the situation, the Committee went to Gompers in Washington where 
the Executive CotUlcil delegated him to go to the President to have 
him bring the steel industry to the conference table. In this the 
President failed. Wilson, however, urged the eommittee through 
his secretary Joseph Tumulty to postpone the strike until the 
Industrial Conference set for 6th October in Washington D.C.. The 
Committee set the 9th of September as the date when a final 
decision was to be made. Tumulty's telegram of 6th September, 
offering no hope of a conference with the steel industry, left the 
Committee with no alternative. With the steel company by now 
laying off thousands of members, the strike was set for 
22nd September. Only two days after the strike call Tumulty's 
telegram arrived asking for a postponement pending the Conference. 
JO 
Samuel Compers, removed from the situation, urged the Committee to 
agree to this recommendation. 
Although the decision to hold an Industrial Conference was 
made before 9th September, no connection was made between it and a 
possible settlement in the steel dispute. A telegram sent as ea:rly 
as 2m. September from Foster to Compere made clear that it was 
"imperative that we take defensive action at once. ,,17 A decision 
to strike was practically inevitable as far as Foster was 
concerned. The Executive COl.mcil emphasised the critical situation 
in its lett~r of 4th September to the President. Now, once the 
decision was made and broadcast, the Committee was being asked. to 
reconsMer by the President of the United. States with the support 
of the President of the A.F. of L. In addition to the recommend&-
tion made in Tumulty's telegram of 11th September, Compers 
telegrammed. Fitzpatrick on the 12th and John Tighe. President of 
the A.A. of I.S. & T. on the 16th. He strongly urged. postponement. 
In the telegram to Tighe he questioned what the result of the strike 
might be - clea:rly implying defeat. Moreover. Compers felt that in 
avoiding a strike which U.S. Steel were deliberately attempting to 
foment. the unions would win support from the President and the 
public. "A strategic and ftmdamental fact that is not tmderstood is 
when to strike am. pa.rticularly when not to strike.,,18 He went on. 
"Inaamuch as the iron and steel workers have been disorganized. . . . 
for so many years. what grave wrong or injury can occur if the 
matter is held in abeya.nce. ,,19 Compers was in a deeply ambivalent 
position. Having argued. throughout his career for independence. he 
disapproved of this strike action. He was in fact strongly 
supportive of Wilson. and anxious to avoid emba.rra.ssing the 
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administration. He was now conscious of politics and hoped for 
government backing in the organisation of steel. 
Foster and the rest of the National Committee believed that 
postponement would destroy the entire campaign. Momentum would be 
lost, hope would disappear and. mass sacking wonld continue. Their 
first consideration was the steelworkers, not Presidential or 
public opinion. Isolated strikes would still occur spasmodically 
ani be stamped out, and all hopes for the tmionisation of the steel 
industry would then disappear. Moreover, Foster wrote angrily to 
Samuel Gompers on 12th September I "You may not be aware that seven of 
our organizers have been brutally murdered and. the campaign of 
20 terrorism on the part of the steel companies is beyond. deSCription." 
As a letter to the President explainedl "Delay is no longer possible. ,,21 
Of' the major union figures only William Johnstone of the International 
Association of Machinists swung to Gompers' position but, despite 
his and. Gompers' pressures on Tighe, Fitzpatrick and. Foster, the 
decision was confirmed on 18th September 1919. 
The actions of the steel industry from the outset of the 
strike prevented a. more serious internal dispute. The use of 
thousands of extn. deputies, strikebreakers, armed guards and their 
indiscriminate violence towards the strikers and. their families 
ga.lvanised the entire union movement. Three hundred. and sixty-five 
thousand steelworkers joined the strike. Both the labour and business 
communities discovered a solidarity which was unprecedented. The 
issue on which the sides clashed so violently was the right of 
workers to join tmions and to have that right recognized by 
employers entering into collective bargaining agreements. 
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The crisis in industrial relations had reached its most 
serious point. Both sides became intransigent over their demands: 
both were as united as possible. The steel strike laid open what , 
had gradually been developing since the end of the war: the 
dispute was over power. The unions had. sought the continuation of 
the N.W.L.B. codes in order to establish -its organioation and power. 
The movement continued to try to esta.blish itself throughout 
the nation even when the N.W .L.B. 'umbrella' disappeared. Their 
method would be direct action. The business community was deeply 
opposed to any increase in union organisation; a position rooted in 
their belief in the management prerogative which also governed their 
call for a return to the pre-war economic structure. Many strikes 
were over wage demands and here too deep antagonism was engendered 
to a point where, in common with strikes over legitimacy, they 
became disputes not on issues but between two power groups. The 
steel strike was the climax of this developing situation. 
It was a.mid the violence and hatred of the steel strike and. 
with the background of a year of increasing tension and confrontation 
between the labour movement and the business community that the 
First Industrial Conference met on 6th October 1919. Its purpose 
was to end the bitterness which then existed and to discover a 
basis on which more sta.ble relations could be fOllIlded in industry. 
The Conference, it was hoped, could begin to reconcile the two 
groups who were as radicalised and as united as they had ever been. 
Their attitude towards the Conference was to use it frankly as a 
means to achieving their ends. This attitude was reinforced by the 
fa.ct that this was an administration initiative; business and 
labour having never been consulted. The A.F. of L. Executive 
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CouncU, in keeping with this purpose, called for a meeting of 
their delegates to the Conference on Lvth October in order that they 
might "discuss, consider and determine upon the policy which we 
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shall a.dvocate and maintain at the conference". Although the 
business community did not have a communications network as 
coherent as the tmions', it would soon become apparent that their 
attitude towards the Conference was similar to that of the unions. 
The structure of the Conference only served to formalise the 
antipathy between and unity among these groupe. It conferred 
control of all resolutions on the three groups which constituted 
the Conference, Business, Labour ani the Public. This further 
encouraged. both business and labour to present their claims in a 
self-interested. way as a platform upon which to present and justify 
their aims. 23 The success of the Conference depended. on its being 
a.ble to overcome these probleDlS. 
It faUed. to do so and collapsed three weeks later, because 
the olaims of each side fundamentally reneoted. deep-seated political 
perceptions which neither side could allow to be compromised. 
Although the purpose of the Conference was not a.chieved. its 
importance as a. formal platform of the fundamental aims and 
attitudes of both business and labour lends it significance as a 
starting point and was important as a definition of the terms of 
reference of wha.t was known in American politics as the 'labor 
problem' • The Con:ferenee demonstrated that both groups' demands 
were expressions which derived from more fundamental attitudes 
towa.rds the nature of the economio system. 
It took only four days for the Conference to reveal the extent 
of the gulf between business and labour. The labour group, 
Samuel Gompers explained, felt it incumbent upon itself to offer 
the Conference "those principles and actions which we believe would 
contribute most to the accomplishment of the purpose indicated in 
the letter of the President of the United States invoking this 
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conference." 
These principles when they were submitted to the Conference 
amotmted precisely to the aims of the trade tmion movement. It was 
not compromise but the recognition of their demands which would 
satisfy labour and bring industrial peace. The full panoply of 
union demands were thus included I the eight-hour day , five and one-
haJ.f day week; a minimum wage adequate to support the worker and 
his family in reasonable comfort and security, equal pay for women, 
the prohibition of immigration for two years and the prohibition of 
child labour. In themselves these demands were the cause of much 
bitter antagonism between unions and management but three further 
prinCiples went to the heart of the difference between the two 
sides a.nd revealed. the fundamentally political nature of their antag-
onisml these were the demands for the right to o:r:ga.nise trade 
unions J the right far workmen to have representatives of their own 
choosing and the right Df·. collective bargaining. In effect they 
were denanding the recognition of trade tmionism per see The 
steel strike was at that moment demonstrating that business could 
not accept such a demand. 
:3.5 
Importantly, the labour group called for the installation of 
a nationwide system of conciliation and for the Department of 
Labor to instal the same where none existed. In effect this was a 
call for the continuation of the National War Labor Board and the 
government's protection of trade union rights. This final 
resolution went further to assign these boards the task of carrying 
out Ita systematic review of industrial relations and conditions".25 
The import of this was that the boards would have a role far beyond 
mere conciliation and would also be empowered to investigate and 
report on conditions throughout America. Such a board would be a 
powerful weapon for continuing trade union expansion. The labour 
group presented these resolutions en bloc and with the group's 
unanimous support. In fact this call marked a significant shift for 
Gompers. For the first time he was adding his voice to a call for 
continuous government intervention in industrial relations. The 
earlier purist policy had been abandoned. However, the group's 
proposals did not end here. Wishing to demonstrate their "sincere 
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and. fair desire to prove helpful" they resolved that the Conference 
should appoL"lt a committee of six members, two from each of the 
three groups, to adjudicate in the steel strike. Once more this 
would be tantamount to recognition and acceptance of unionism in 
the steel industry. The purpose of the labour group at the Conference 
was thus the recognition of trade unions. 
The Conference did not have to wait too long to receive the 
considered response of the business group and its views as to the 
bIlsis for improved industrial :relations in post-war America. On 
the following day, Harry A. Wheeler of the Union Trust Company in 
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Chicago presented the Conference with these views. In stark 
contrast to the labour gro'~'s emphasis on rights and reforms, the 
business groU];)'s preamble confirmed its belief that the main 
purpose of the industrial system was to produce as efficiently and 
plentifully as possible in order to provide a continually improving 
standard. of living. To this end it submitted the following 
principles I that an increase in the quantity and quality of 
production was the responsibility of men and management so that 
inefficiency and restrictive practices were to be condemned; that 
as the basic productive unit, individual plants and factories were 
the proper units in which co-operation between workforce and 
management could take place ; that wages were primarily determined 
by supply a.Iui demand. and should be viewed as reward for individual 
effort and reflect local conditions; hours could not be too 
drastically reduced or production would fall. The right to strike 
was granted but could not be allowed where it was an attempt to 
coerce others to deal with or join the striking organisations. The 
right to associate was also granted but could not override the 
principle of iMividual liberty. No right of strike or association 
should be allowed in the public utilities or government service. 
The underlying theme of the statement was that "the duty of 
the management,,27 was to make the decisions on hours, wages and 
working conditions and to exercise the "essential function of 
28 judgement and direction" of the plant, factory or industry. 
Management must be free to manage. The statement ended by upholding 
the principle of the 'open shop' as the best means of fostering 
industrial harmony. 
Both the statements of the business and labour groups were 
referred to the various committees set up to deal with the 
individual points raised. It was clear however that compromise was 
a practical impossibility. Both had presented what amounted to 
manifestoes for industrial relations. The points laid down by the 
two groups at this Conference were at the root of the dispute 
between the trade unions and the business community. Both intended 
to include the entire working population in their schemes. 
The aims of the two groups were deeply antagonistic at every 
turn. For the unions the right to organise was crucial. This was 
countered by the business community's claim that this was an 
invitation to coercion and could never be guaranteed. Collective 
bargaining was similarly crucial to the recognition and power of 
trade unions. Again the business group claim ei that striking to 
win this was coercion of the liberty of employers to choose whether 
to bargain or not. The tmions dema.nd.ed that workers have 
representatives outwith particular plants while business held that 
only the individual plant could form the base of industrial 
co-operation. Business's insistence on attention being paid to 
local conditions also challenged the unions' aims of nationwide 
agreements. At dispute was the recognition by business of trade 
union structure and method. 
The dispute over industrial relations had its roots, however, 
in the differing attitudes towards the nature of the economic 
system. The basic question was whether industry should be run 
entirely at the discretion of management on purely financial grounds 
or whether industrial policy should take cognizance of the workers' 
wishes. The lmiens sought a democratic industrial system. Business 
regarded. the system as purely practical; a productive process under 
the imperatives of finance and profit and as such not open to 
negotiation with the tmions. It was in this sense of conflicting 
views on how the economy should work for the benefit of the 
population that the differences between business and labour demands 
ultimately derived from deep-rooted political beliefs. Labour viewed 
the economy as a flexible mechanism which could be successful while 
catering to their needs. Wages would be based on a greater 
recognition of the contribution of workers to the wealth of the 
nation. They also denied that this view actually affected its 
working verJ grea.tly. Business, however, viewed labour as a cost 
of production which must be minimised. The economy was 'natural' 
and would not perform if interfered with unduly. The well-being of 
the population would be achieved. by cheap production, making goods 
available to all, and through high profitability, encou:raging 
greater investment. The economic impbtion of the various demands 
previously enumerated was that labour sought a demand-led economy 
while business sought a supply-led economy. 
At the Industrial Conference it now fell to the public group 
to discover some basis for agreement between these two attitudes. 
The public viewed its responsibilities differently from the other 
two. They felt that the group's purpose was merely to screen 
resolutions to determine their relevance to the Conference. If 
they felt that the resolution was relevant then it was allowed. to 
be presented by the individual who proposed it. The group never 
attempted to form an identity or a policy of its own and. did not 
wish to. 
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The resolutions, when they were presented, revealed the real 
difficulty in finding any compromise in the dispute. Two 
resolutions by Henry Dennison, a mill owner in Framingham, 
Massachussetts, called for recognition of the workers' need for 
self-respect and accomplishment as a central policy in the conduct 
of industrial relations through the erection of works committees. 
These were committees set up within factories to enable consultations 
between men and management. Dennison's second resolution called 
for equal bargaining power and the recognition of representatives of 
the workforce from external organisations. These resolutions simply 
echoed the two sides' views on the structure of industrial relations, 
as did a resolution from John D. Rockefeller calling for closer 
personal relations between employer and employee which could be 
best achieved by organisations within individual plants. 
On the same day, Thursday 9th october, two other resolutions 
were submitted reflecting a similar solution to the 'problem'. The 
first from Gavin McNab, a major Democratic contributor from San 
Francisco, called for a nationa.l conciliation board in the belief 
I 
that it was "the duty of our National Government • • • to assume 
the leadership in this most important of issues". 29 McNab cited 
the success of the N.W.L.B. as grounds for his hope that such a 
board might ameliorate industrial disruption in peace time. The 
other resolution from the Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, 
was to create conciliation boards in each industry. Unlike McNab's 
board which would comprise the Secretary of labor and ex-Presidents 
and House and Senate choices, Wilson's boards would be comprised 
equa.lly of employers and. employees. If this board failed to 
reach a unanimous decision there would be a national board and 
40 
finally an U1!1pire to which any disputes could be referred. Any 
decision reached would be binding and equal in power to that of a 
trade agreement. 
At the end. of the first week it was already clear that the 
dis~ute between business and labour demanded a political decision. 
Even among the public group compromise appeared unlikely upon the 
principles involved because any solution would be based on attitudes 
to the economy which were ultimately determined by political thinking. 
The resolutions of the public group had already demonstrated this 
problem - it could fudge the issue by embracing the aims of both 
sides, as in Dennison's resolution, or it could squarely support one 
or other of the groups, as in the Rockefeller resolution. Anyone 
who believed in a free market economy would find it impossible to 
accept that wage levels could be decided on anything other than 
financial imperatives. This was a political belief. The only 
other course was to avoid dealing with principles entirely through 
conciliation boards which would defuse the anger and solve disputes 
piecemeal. 
The public group, whatever choice it made, still required 
the support of the other two sides in the Conference before there 
was any possibllity of recommendations being initiated. The 
discussions of the following week were to show how little either 
side was prepared. to compromise on any solution. This was 
particularly true where the key issue of union recognition was 
involved. Unforttmately, this issue now dominated th::: Conference 
and caused. its collapse. As far as both business and labour were 
concerned. there was no reason for further discussion until this 
principle was decided. 
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On Tuesday 14th October the steel strike resolution came 
before the Conference. It symbolised labour efforts to gain its 
demands for recognition ana collective bargaining. An amendment 
was submitted by Thomas Chadbourne, a Democrat close to Wilson, to 
have a steel committee set up with its decision to be binding. This 
was voted down by all three groups at the Conference and prompted 
Samuel Gompers to give an impassioned speech explaining the 
significance of the steel resolution to the assembly. The key to 
the dispute, he said, was that steelworkers wished "men who were 
representatives of the workers to speak in the name of and by the 
right of the workers".:3° This wish was being denied them by the 
steel industry who claimed that to do so would mean a closed shop. 
Gompers maintained that employers were using a scenario of complete 
union power in industry to justify their opposition to any 
acceptance of trade union rights whatsoever. He went on to say that 
such an attitude was akin to the disdain of the International 
Workers of the World for compromise and would indeed make the 
I.W.W. 's revolutionary assertions more credible to millions of 
workers. The purpose of the A.F. of L. was not revolutionary, but 
it might become so if it was not allowed to represent workers fully, 
incluiing strike action, in pursuit of justifiable aims. 
J..le demand a voice in the determination of the 
conditions under which we will give service • • • we 
demand that the workers shall have that voice not only 
as supplicants but by right. 31 
Gompers' view was that the sense of belonging which recognition 
bestowed would diminish the mdica1ism among unionists and it was 
from this position that he could argue that a strong unionism 
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within the system was better than a revolutionary unionism outwith 
it. The A.F. of L. endorsed the strike on 22nd September in order 
b hold the steelworkers within its purview •. Trade unionists looked 
to the Conference to bolster their status and grant them 
recognition both for the justice of their demands and to avoid a 
further radicalisati en of workers. Trade unionism was not only 
asking these rights for itself but for the good of the nation. 
Gompers presented the Conference with the alternatives - socialism 
or a reformed industrial system with tmiens countervailing the powat' 
of business. Union recognition went hand-in-hand with the conservation 
. of the contemporary economic system. They were not a threat but 
an important development. Gompers' argument was giVEn some credence 
by the events of 1919, from Seattle and Boston and by the Iron Age 
quoting Fitzpatrick as having said ''We are going to socialize the 
'tasic industries of the United states".:32 
The future turn of events however was not the concern of public 
or business groups. The former simply wished to solve the problem 
of industrial disputes in the present. For the latter it was a 
question of power. To allow power over industrial policy to pass 
from their hands was an tmthinkable future. They trusted the A.F. of L. 
as little as the I.W.W. to use power in a way which did not damage 
their interests. Gompers himself was committed to constantly 
increasing sta.ndards of living, so that even the AS. of L. 
ultimately threatened their economic position. In any case it 
felt that had Gompers been truly in control and out of sympathy 
with the steel strike it could have been stopped. Either he was 
weak, they concluded, or only marginally less radical than the 
strikers themselves. They were therefore determined that unionism 
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would not gain de tacto recognition through consideration ot the 
strike is.ue. J. comaittee to adjudicate the strike, whether 
tawurable or not, would give the strikers recognition. To.any 
ellployers the A.l. ot L. and the I.W.W. were ot a piece a th:reat 
to the econaio l)"IIte. which they sousbt. A wte on the .teel 
.trike resolution vaa postponed 1mtil 'l'buredaT. 
In the aea:a.t!ae the Conterence cont1nuad to be .. broiled in 
the dialectic ot recognition. !he row shitted to a resolution on 
collsctive bargaining which the labcur S:t'QlP had subaitted. The 
Con£erence ccaaittee o~ titteen, which wa. the vetting cOIIIlittee 
tor the Conference, now returned the resolution. It called tor the 
risbt ot mde unions to orpnise and bargain while recognising the 
individual's risbt not to join. The comaittee al.o reterred an 
aaendllent trOll ThODlU Chadbourne to the tloor subati tuting the word 
associations tor mde or labour unions. J. third lublti tute trom 
Wheeler stated that it W&8 the prerogative ot .anapaent as to 
whether repre.entati'fts tro. outside the plants would be recoenised. 
SpeakiDe' tor the labour sroup, in the absence ot Suuel GoIJpera, 
Matthew Woll attacked the libeeler substitute a. representatiw ot the 
suppression by ellplo,..rs ot the workera' treedOil ot choice. He went 
on to pUlory the buainess group's paranoia that this demand tor 
reoopition would. lead to the olosed shop throusbout America. All 
that this res.lution .. ant, Vall oontinued, W&8 respeot tor the 
wiahes ot the workforce by una .... nt and "the ri&bt ot equUibriUlltt ,33 
ie representati,..s outvith the tim or work and job pressure. who 
were tree to pureue the aiaa ot its .aberahip. Thi. was exaotly 
what buaines. wished to awid. The likelihood was that the.e aias 
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would not accord vith their own prioritie. ot .iniaua coata and 
.ax~ produotion and as little eztraneous interference vith thea. 
as poaaibl.. A.A. Landon tlatly detended the idea ot aanage.ent 
prerocative. It vas they vho ran the busines. and their deciaiona 
could not be coloured by union pre •• urea. 1!le businea. group alao 
applauded the N.W.L.B. policy 'Which torbade the eztension ot union 
organisation during the war. 1!le businea. co.-unity aav no reaaon 
to allow unions to grow atter the war. 1!le 1mpaa.e cOlIplete, the 
Conterence adjourned until 20th October. 
When the Conterence reconvened, the voting demonstrated that 
there had Hen 'no behind-the-scene. di.CUBaione and little in the 
way ot .odi!ication ot attitudes the.e ieausa vere too crucial to 
c.,roaiee. 1!le Wheeler aubstitute vas deteated by a coab1nation 
et labeur and public groupe, the Chadbou:rne aaendaent voted down 
by bus1ne.e and labour groupe and the initial resoluticn deteated 
..". the business and public groupe. 1!le labour group's steel str11te 
relolution which val up tor reconsideration vas voted down by the 
busine •• and public groupe. The public group in •• eJdnc coaproaiee 
could not baok either ot the other croups' positions. Busine.s and 
labouz:o could not .acrifice their po.1 t101U1 in COIIproaJ. ••• 
'l'hat 18 not to say that the publio group va ... ooherent and 
11111 ted u vere the other two. It V8.II not. 1!lil vae 'Why there vas 
no atteapt to deolare ita oolleotive Tiew. The group vas in taot, 
to SOll8 eztent, a receptacle tor turther representatives ot business 
and laieur including :sart Jewell, ot the Hailft1 Baployees nepartaent 
ot the A • .,. ot L.; John SparlO and Charles 1I1.B.ua.ell, both ranowned 
sooiali.te among the ranka; A.A. Landon, a railr0a4 aDcuti.,..; and 
mUl oW1l8rs Dennison and Full.r Calloway. y.t the majority 
controll.d and continued to •• arch tor coapromi... l3y 20th Octob.r 
trustration had grown in the public group and polari.ation began to 
occur. Labour .J1IP&tbi •• rs vere Mccaing increu1nBly willing to 
back the labour group and busin ••••• n ".re al.o reftaling their 
."apathi ••• 
On W.dneada,. the 22nd., S .. wtl GoIapers _d. one tinal attempt to 
break the deadlock b,. reintroducins a resolution on collective 
barpining oaitting 8n7 .. ntion ot trade unions. .1. Gompera .aid, 
it. purpo.e was 11aply to haft the Cont.rence declare tor the 
principle ot collective barsaining, irrespective ot the orsani.ation 
tbroU&h vhich the workers were repre.ented. '!biB compromi.e w.nt 
tar enoush to win the .upport ot tne public gr:oup. The re.olution 
did not inTOl va union racosni tion per .e and could thus accomaoda te 
works' coai tte.. and. bwtine •• '. insistence on pJ.a.at..Oased barsaining. 
It wa. clear, howver, that aucb a resolution would in the cae. ot 
the .te.l strike haft put the emplo,..ra in the eabarraasing poei tion 
ot haTing to accept the men who had been orpnis.d. 
1h. realit,. vall that earplo,.rs did not wiab to n.gotiate with 
trada unions or even gi .... an implicit acceptance which might allow 
.xp&Dllion. No re.olution which called tor &n7 .ort ot reooS'lli tion 
oould be appro ... d by them and .ince any resolution required unanimous 
agreement th.,. TOted it dow:a.. .la th.y arped when .xplaining th.ir 
vote, the re.olution wu still too 'ftpe'. 'l'hoU&h unions wera not 
mention.d specifically it would BtUl .. an a co_itHnt to barpin, 
ahould th.)" demand it. J'urthe1'll0ra in talling to prohibit uni8n1 •• 
in go ... rment s.nice the re.olution vas incoapl.te. 11nall~ ud .oat 
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crucial to the buaine •• group, it included no aention of the right 
of •• aaa-.ent to decide whether or not to recosnJ,ae an)" repre.entati.,.. 
ot the workers. Several me.bers ot the public group attacked the 
'bwlineaa group tor bein8 obstructionist and tor de.'tr07in8 the 
Conference i t.elt. lIarr)" \lheeler denied this and _inta1ned that 
the 'busine •• group would .upport "e"r)" re.olution looking toward 
the uking ot a program that .hall consi.tentl)" repre.ent 
constructi" and progre •• i" industrial relationa in the United 
State.".34 
Since it appeared that onl)" a re.olution exactl)" .. etins 
'busine •• '. neve would be endorsed, the labour group wi th4rew tro. 
the Centerenee. Ccapera vaa not about to pre.ent a re.olution wbich 
would endorse busine •• •• attitude to labour. Onl)" a re.olution which 
p"" ~nt the preropti" ot recognition would win busine •• 
acceptance. Sue a re.olution vaa of no use to mde unions. It 
P" the. no 80re .ecurit)" and. no buic right of recocnition. .u 
Saauel GoIIpera wrote to WUliaa B. WUlon in explaining the 
withdrawal of the labour group "\Ihen the prinoiple ot oollecti" 
barpining wu denied then there vas nothing turther that labor 
oould do, .. that principle 18 t'tmd ... utal. "3$ 
!be J'1rst Industrial Conf.rence torcibl1' deaonatrated that 
the diapute between the labour .o .... nt and the busine.. oo_uni t)" 
vaa about power and 1 • ..,.1. ot control. Bwl1ne •• beli • .,.d that 
trad.e unioD8 tAZ'eaten.d sazw.c-ent·. handliDc ot di.cipline, 
_nning le"18, conditioD8 ot • .,lo)'Hnt and vap. and that theY' 
theretors po.ed a 1'1md.aaental threat not onlY' to the control of the 
producti ft proce.. but to the broader financial policies of industry'. 
As the National Industrial Conference Board put it, "The stand 
taken by the Employer's Group was predicated on the maintenance of 
the open shop, which they saw endangered by the type of collective 
'targaining insisted on by the Labour Group". J6 
The issues of trade union recognition, collective bargaining 
and the right for workers to have representatives of their own 
choosing was the key battleground between business and labour. The 
Conference demonstrated that neither side could afford to compromise 
over them. In spite of differences within the labour movement, on 
these questions the A.F. of L. could lead the trade unions confidently 
even if it was powerless on most other issues. As the steel strike 
showed, the A.F. of L.· s reluctance to encourage industrial action 
gradually dissolved in the face of increasing grassroot militancy 
and the tactics of employers until it realigned with the mood of 
those members directly involved in industrial disputes. 
strikes which did not concern these key issues in 1919 and 
in the following years were generally over immediate issues such as 
wages. Thus, taking place in industries where unionism was already 
established, they did not involve these political implications directly. 
Yet wage demands inevitably highlighted the question of the economic 
implications of trade unionism as far as employers were concerned. 
Whether disruption was caused by basic issues or wage demands, in 
. 
1919 the atmosphere was suffused by a sense of confrontation between 
two bitter antagonists. 
The 'labor problem' by 1919 was apparent on three separate 
yet intimately related levels. Firstly, disputes between workers 
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and eaployers aro.e froll immediate issues; hours and condi tioll8 of 
work and vages. SecondlT, disputes were breaking out oYer the 
question of whether eDlployers should recQpise and bargain with 
nevly organised unions. This caused strikes in steel in :r.entueky 
and West Virginia coal fields and in the Boston police service. 
l1tlbtately, aluhee on these i.s'U8. were predicated on deeper 
perceptiona regardins the purpo.e and vor]dng of the econOll7. 
Trade unionist. argued that workers needed an organisation to end 
their exploitation and needed to feel that they were partners in the 
eoona.y vith their contribution being recopised. They also belieftd 
that va.s should take greater cO&'l1izance of this contribution. 
Strikes, boycotts and blacklists were .. rely weapons throu&h vhich 
this oould be achie""d. The d.1!terences wi thin the trade union 
aoft_nt vere caused bT different vievs on the extent to which the 
eoonomic and political s,..te .. accepted this arguaent. Gompera and 
hia supporters felt that recognition could be achieved through 
oo-operation and the demonstration ot the responsibUity and benefit 
of tmiOll8. Other unioniat8 belie.,.,d that only the exercise ot 
power could achie.,. reoo&'l1i tiOD, or that political retom vu required. 
In 1919 this diverpnce was .ubaerpd because business disagreed with 
labour on these basic issues. '!'he,. did not have zioni •• '. IMchan1at1c 
nev of the economic s,..tea, nor could they over-ooncern theaelve. 
vi th .aking the induatr1al. enviromaent aore pleu&Z1t. lUsher vaps 
simply deprived industry ot inwstment capital and thus .apped the 
'fiB'Our ct the economy. Strike. and boycotts, by interfering with 
the rmming of the 800110117, actually lovered standards of living. 
lIIIlployera opposed nev uniOD orpn1sationa 011 the ba.is that 
busine .... n were tree u individuals to choose whether or not to 
reoosnise them. Moreover they argued that their workforce did not 
seek to join and were in f'act being coerced. The depth of' the.e 
beliefs varied among employers, but the antagoni81ll of business 
leaders in key sectors of the economy had already set the tone of 
po.t-war industrial relations. 
J.tti tudes towards the economy were the prime determinant of 
political loyal ties. In the case of' business there was no ambi va-
lence about their attitudes being predicated on political perceptions. 
They tacitly admitted that their system would leave economic power 
entirel7 in their banda. Where contusion arise. is in the denial 
of trade unioniatetbat their mo'ftll8nt threatened either the free 
enterprise system or the e:dsting political system. They were above 
all concerned with having their demands met. The broader conseQ.uences 
tor the economy was a secondary consideration. Arguments for higher 
eftecti.,. demand were supporti'ft of mUon vap claims. They also 
argued that better conditions would actually ~ove productivity. 
Iconomic attitudes were derived trom unionists' demand tor 
reo06l1ition rather than vice V81'8&. Implications did not concern 
trade unionists and therefore they could deny any broader intent. 
'l'J::IAIy also made much play of' their 'friends and enemie.' policy towards 
the political parties as evidence of' their loyalty to the basic 
economic and political syatems. 
Yet reprdless of' trade unionists' denials of' any conscious 
intent to change the nature of the economy, the business community 
feared this possibility and therefore were deeply opposed to 
unionism. Indeed the likelihood was that, it unions were to win 
their aims, this m&bt well happen to some extent. Despite union 
caveats, the issus was basically over economic power. This vas 
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tacitly admitted by Fitzpatrick in the quote cited earlier and in 
two industries at least - coal and railroads - the demand tor 
nationalization also signitied the recognition among some unionists 
tha t sa tis taction eould only be achieved by major economic retorm. 
The potential divergence wi thin the labour movement between this and 
the position or Sanel Gompera was avoided in 1919 by business 
opposition to their basic aims, which gaTe unionists a common cause. 
The collapse ot the lirst Industrial Conference revealed that 
the experiences ot 1919 had radicalised both aides to a point where 
compromise en any issue had become impo8sible, althoU8h this was 
due largely to business tSarB ot the consequences ot unionism 
rather than azr:r declarations ot their purpose by lmionieta. It 
allo demonstrated that tor both groups the power ot their ow 
organisations were major considerations. General issues in 
industrial relations such as hours, vages, the right to barpin and 
the rigbt to organise became submerpd in the charpd atmosphel:tt ot 
a broader olash between imcoapatible opinions. It remained to be seen 
whether President WUson could pick up the pieeel ot the Cont.renee 
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CHAPl'ER 2 
THE w'ILSON ADMINISTRATION 
The years of the Democratic administration of Woodrow Wilson 
were a watershed in the brief history of the American trade union 
movement. The Department of Labor began its work concurrently with 
that of the administration. Created to deal with issues pertaining 
to working people, its brief as specified by its organic act was 
the fostering, promoting and developing of "the welfare of the 
wage-earners of the United states, to improve their working 
conditions and to advance their opportunity for profitable 
1 
employment." Also important was the fact that the wage-earners had 
a voice in the Cabinet. The Act gave the working people a new 
status as an integral and recognized part of the political process. 
As the only organised voice of the working people, it was a de facto 
political recognition of the trade union movement. 
This development was reinforced in 1914 with the enactment of 
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. Hailed by Samuel GOlill'ers as labour's 
Magna Carta, section 6 provided that "nothing contained in the 
anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and 
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operation of labor organizations •• or to restrain individual 
members from carrying out the objects thereof". 2 In addition to 
this recognition of trade unions as a legitimate organisation per se, 
section 20 of the Act further provided that there would be "no 
restraining order or injunction granted by any court of the United 
states • • in any case • • between employers and employees • • 
involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions 
of employment •• ") The unions believed, and the administration 
intended, that this Act not only made trade unions and their 
organising legitimate but also protected strike action from legal 
interference where it arose from a dispute over immediate terms of 
employment. This intent was confirmed by an amendment to the 
Sundry Civil Appropriations Act dmying funds to the courts for the 
pursuance of injunctive proceedings against unions involved in 
. industrial action. 
These reforms conformed to the Wilsonian theory of equality by 
which the grant of power to the trade unions would enable them to 
win the rights they sought from the business community. It was 
essentially a liberal policy of equality of opportunity under law 
and without the need for government action. In the final two years 
of the life of the first administration, however. it demonstrated a 
willingness to lay down policies specifically in favour of working 
people. This was the case in the enactment of the La Follette 
Seaman's Act in 1915 and in the passing of the Adamson Act in 1916. 
In both acts justice and dignity called for affirmative government 
action in the Wilsonian progressive theory. The eight-hour day, 
upheld in the Adamson Act, was a goal which surpassed the demands 
of the unions and was as such a just reform of the standard of 
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life in America which "Tilson felt was worthy of federal confirmation. 
Wilsonian progressivism was a mixture of traditional legal and moral 
liberalism combined with a new acceptance of governmental 
responsibility to improve the quality of life of the nation. 
Wilson's government, sympathetic to some union goals, in fact 
benefited trade unions as a result of its own progressive beliefs 
rather than from pa.~icularist reforms. 
American intervention in the First i'; orld War brought the 
government's reforming policies to a premature end. For the 
duration of the war, necessity was to be the arbiter of government 
policy. Nonetheless, when strikes erupted in the Pacific shipyards 
and at vital tractor, iron and steel plants, the government 
. 
"preferred. to smooth out these difficulties ••• rather than to 
4-pass any general laws against war-time strikes." The result of 
the continuing sympathy for the trade union movement was the recog-
nition of the unions as a full partner in the productive process, 
rather than condemnation and proscription. The government decided 
to protect the welfare of the workforce in return for co-operation 
in the war effort. This it did through appointing Samuel Gompers 
to the Council of National Defense and giving labour a representa-
tive on each war-time board in which labour issues arose. The 
government also agreed to set up the National War Labor Board to 
act as an arbitration service as recommended by the National iiar 
Labor Conference and which also laid down the code on which Board 
decisions were based.S In return for a voluntary no strike or 
lock-out commitment the Board ruled that collective bargaining 
should be used, that the eight-hour day be adhered to and. that 
there should be a wage sufficient to provide for the minimum needs 
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of a f.amily. The other commitment made by the unions was that no 
organising efforts be attem!'ted during the war. In effect a truce 
was called on the basis of Board mediation. The code itself was not 
initiated b,y the administration but the res!,onse to the 1917 strikes 
!,la.ces this, albeit through necessity, within the administration's 
labour !'olicy. 
The war-time res!,onse of the administration was tremendously 
favourable to trade unions. The code gave unions full recognition, 
tied employers to collective bargaining procedures and ensured the 
eight-hour day. In the case of the meat IJacking industry it-meant 
the workforce gained an agreement without an enormous organising 
drive. Almost overnight trade unionism achieved a legitimacy shored 
u!' by the federal government and thereby accepted by em!'loyers, 
something which had not occurred under the Clayton Act. This 
apIJarent stability and status caused the tension in the post-war 
years as enq;>loyers sought to end the code while unions expected that 
it would become the !'eace-time norm and thereby moved to win new 
membership to establish unionism throughout the nation. This 
ambition born of the war-time ex!,erience was,as we have seen,at 
the root of the steel strike and the bitter dispute between business 
a.nd labour in 1919. The unions gained a status during the war 
which they wanted to maintain through their own power. The result 
was in 1919, as the Secretary of Labor Wilson reported to the 
President, the war-time agreements were "terminated in s!'irit.,,6 
This termination was intensified by the scrapping of the WilLB 
almost immediately after the armistice. 
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Both sides recognized the importance of gaining the support, 
whether tacit or active, of the administration if they were to 
achieve their post-war aims. As the dominant force in the 
direction of policy the President's own thinking on the 'labor 
problem' would clearly be the arbiter of the government's post-war 
attitudes. This chapter studies the nature of Wilson's thinking at 
the outset of the year, what his intentions were and how the 
growing crisis modified this view and those of his advisers. Finally 
the response of the administration in its direct action in indus-
trial disputes is analysed in order to reach an understanding of 
the broad nature of Wilsonian thinking on the 'labor problem', as 
alreadY defined, during the remainder of his administration. 
On his return from Paris the President took the opportunity in 
a speech to the nation's Mayors and Governors on Jrd March 1919 to 
re-emphasise his concern for the welfare of the working people; 
The whole matter of the prosperity of peoples • • • 
is not completed by the success of great enterprises -
it is only completed by the standard of benefit it 
confers upon those who in the obscure roads of life 
contribute to the success of those enterprises. 7 
Three days later the President set sail for Europe again and was 
thus largely cut off from direct control of industrial relations 
problems. 
Twnulty had to inform Wilson on 27th March that Burleson, in 
his dispute with IBE'r'l telegraphers in New England, was "out of 
8 harmony" with the President's own attitude. Although 'Nilson 
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urged Burleson to negotiate with the unions the dispute was in fact 
resolved before Wilson could exert pressure on the Postmaster 
General. Similarly, the dispute leading to the Seattle strike was 
being dealt with by the Shipping Boari and was also removed from 
Wilson's control. Departmental independence was always a 
likelihood, particularly in an area where policy depended. not on 
legislation but to a great extent on the personal wishes of the 
President. When he is ),000 miles away, in an age without 
instantaneous communication, departmental indiscretion becomes an 
inevitability. Nonetheless, Wilson's attitude to~~s labour and 
industrial relations continued to be the basis of the administration' 5 
general policy. Certainly digressions such as Burleson's were 
causing deep concern to the Democratic National Committee's member 
from Massachussetts and further abroad in the party at this time t 
reflecting their support of the President's attitude. His written 
speech to the opening of the new Congress on 20th March 1919 was 
therefore an important indication of the post-war intentions of 
the administration. 
As Wilson's speech of )rd March had indicated, his pre-war 
political outlook remained substantially intact in 1919. The 
President saw no legitimate reason for any further extension of 
federal intervention in the American economy. The touchstone of 
Wilson's reform impulse did not derive from concern about the 
mechanics of the economy but from the abuse of the power which had 
accrued to business leaders from the economy. The abandonment of 
trust-busting for regulation reflected this outlook. In addition, 
concern over the size of industries was focused on tt.3 threat to 
the equality of opportunity, not upon the question of size as such. 
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Wilson's f~her concern with business power was in its threat to the 
functioning of the democmtic system. Individual liberty was vitally 
important to ensure that the political system reflected and responded 
to the wishes of the nation. This in itself would offset the power 
of the business community. These were the primary concerns of 
Wilsonian progressives and with these modifications they had little 
further quarrel with the economic system. 
Wilson stated his geneml approach to the labour problem in 
his speech to Congress as being a question of 
How are the men and women who do the daily labor of 
the world to obtain progressive improvement in the 
conditions of their labor, to be made happier and to be 
served better by the communities and the industries 
which their labor sustains and advances?9 
Any solution he proposed. however. would be dictated. by his broader 
political philosophy. Thus. although he was genuinely concerned 
for the economic improvement of the less fortunate, it was a process 
which he believed could be carried. out without recourse to further 
economic reform or interference by the government. Nor was it a 
process which involved the issue of the relative power of employers 
and trade unions. He believed the process would be best fostered by 
The genuine democratization of industry based upon a 
full recognition of the right of those who work. in 
whatever rank. to partiCipate in some organic way in 
every decision which directly affects their welfare 
or the part they are to play in industry. 10 
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Wilson hoped that the co-operation which had been encouraged 
by the N. W .L.B. could be continued and extended in the following 
years. He hoped that improvement would emerge from a closer 
tmderstanding between employers and their workers. In this way wages 
and conditions would improve as would productivity and performance 
as each recognized the needs of the other. Underpinning this hope 
was Wilson's conviction that the interests of both employer and 
worker were mutual and that this recognition would encourage 
co-operation. In Wilson's view, therefore, the improvement of the 
standard of living of the entire population was an organic processJ 
one which would emerge in a cohesive society which shared mutual 
goals. In turn, Wilson stated that the solution to industrial 
disputes lay with business and labour themselves. The prerequisite 
was that the two groups ceased. to 
Calculate by what form and degree of coercion they can 
manage to extort, on the one hand enough to make 
enterprise profitable, on the other justice and fair 
treatment enough to make life tolerable.ll 
WUson called. on the two sides to abandon their belief that power 
and the single-minded. pursuit of their aims were the most effective 
means of securing satisfaction. The President believed. that the 
broader reform programme of his administration had restored the 
fundamentals of equality and he could sympathise with neither side's 
assertions of their need for power within the economy. W Uson did 
believe, however, that the most important factor in collective 
bargaining was the recognition of the workers' contribution. His 
support of this was unequ1 vocal. The President saw trade unions as 
the emergence of the voice of the working people, and to that extent 
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he accepted them. This is not to say, however, that Wilson regarded 
tmions as the only legitimate vehicle of all workers and he was in 
no way committed to their growth. His first concern was that business 
and workers recognize the mutuality of their aims and benefit as a . 
result. The basis on which consultation should be carried out was 
not Wilson's concern and he was not about to lay down any principles 
in the matter. The President went on to stress that Congress's task 
would be to legislate fundamental guarantees to the people, such as 
the eight-hour day, to improve their quality of life while the 
administration should tmdertake to ensure the efficient working of 
the agencies of conciliation. The government had no further role to 
play in the details of industrial relations. 
Here lay the ambivalence between the outlook of progressives 
such as Wilson and the trade union movement in 1919. Wilson's basic 
philosophy had not changed during his administration, yet the 
experience of the war a.nd the upheaval of 1919 resulted in both~ides 
regarding the endorsement of their points of view a.s vital. Samuel 
Gompers was prepared to a.ccept the Wilson view (as his final 
resolution at the Industrial Conference shows). The specific 
endorsement of unionism was unnecessary as long as the principle of 
collective bargaining was agreed. Yet the business demand to choose 
which people to bargain with implicitly denied this aim. Both sides 
looked for a clear statement from the administration which Wilson did 
not feel was his duty. Although his commitment to bargaining meant 
that the business demand for choice was out of step with his view, 
the President was adamant that the government should not become 
involved in this issue. The administration was prepared to accept 
any kind of agreed co-operation which would bring peace to 
12 industrial relations. 
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In Wilsonian politics in 1919 therefore the labour problem 
existed at two levels; with regard to the working population, the 
humanitarian, liberal impulse was to continue to act to improve their 
quality of life where possible, even through central government 
leadership; the second was the practical issue of attempting to cement 
the trade unions and the rest of the working people with the business 
community in an industrial relations system with co-operation and 
stability as its basis. Both were in fact the continuation of 
Wilson's pre-war policies. Wilson saw little need to exceed the 
Clayton Act in its legal guarantee to unionism. In the case of the 
question of compromise the 'democratization of industry' was given 
added impetus by the apparent stability of industrial relations 
under the code of the N.W.L.B. during the war. The President 
remained loyal to his view of the government as an umpire in society. 
He would not be prepared to endorse the views of either side. 
Neither was he prepared to lay down principles on which industrial 
relations should be conducted, which was a matter for the two sides 
to agree. 
As 1919 wore on, it became apparent that any movement towards 
compromise was unlikely to occur spontaneously, and that a 
government initiative was required to set such a process in motion. 
The policy formulated by the Wilson admL~istration which most 
suited all the prerequisites of the Wilsonian attitude to the labour 
problem as outlined above waa for the calling of an Industrial 
Conference. There businasa and labour could thraah out their 
difficul ties with government bleSSing but without government 
involvement. Wilson had hinted at such an arrangement in his May 
speech when he said that "The new spirit and method of organization 
64 
which must be effected are not to be brought about by legislation so 
much as by the common couneel and voluntary co-operation of 
capitalists, manager and workmen ••• ,,13 The idea of bringing the 
two sides together had been accepted by Wilson as a responsibility 
of the federal government. The idea for a conference had first 
arisen in a telegram from Tumul ty of 9th May. Conform1.'lg as it did 
to Wilson's political philo~ophy the idea held considerable 
attraction. 14 In endorsing such a plan Wilson was also relying 
heavily on the hope that war-time co-operation had formed a bond 
which might now develop without recourse to federal interference. 
The basic idea remained vague. Tumul ty sugsested a labour 
conference, a shop plan or a variation on the Whitley Plan. 1S It 
is clear from the previous quote that Wilson vas not prepared to 
have the government set up a system. This he felt should grow from 
the agreements of business and labour. The Whitley Plan vas not an 
alternative, nor indeed was any basic plan at this stase. A direct 
intervention in industrial relations was not an approach Wilson was 
prepared to consider. A conf'erence, or 80me means whereby industry 
itself could advise the President of its agreed wishes, vas a 
prerequisite ot any policy tOl:'lDulation. The idea was by no means 
definitive administration policy. The calling of a conference was 
never an explicit statement ot policy, it simply took shape as the 
situation in 1919 deteriorated. 
An acceptance of the need for government action grew during the 
summer of' 1919. It was becoming increasingly obvious that only the 
federal initiative could bring the two sides together. In addition, 
the burseoning inflation rate and the nsed f'or a stable sconomic 
performance while readjustment took place served to emphasise the 
vital consequences industrial relations had for the whole of the 
American economy. By' early August indeed Tumulty was so frustrated 
by' the industrial turmoil that he was already shifting to a more 
antagonistic attitude towards the unions. He wrote to the President 
of his oonviction of "the importance of your giving expreSSion to 
some vigorous deolaration with reference to the attitude of the 
Government towards peremptory demands made •• by the labor 
oraanizations throughout the oOtmtry ••• ,,16 This reflected a 
growing desire for action and control, rather than continuing to 
seek negotiated compromise. In his speech of 8th August, Wilson did 
highlight the need for stability in industry if the government were 
to deal with inflation which was hurting the entire population. He 
stopped short of attacking the trade unions but he made olear that 
the administration regarded industrial aotion as counter-produotive 
to the goal of eoonomio improvement. This guarded warning was 
suffioient to dissuade railroad shopmen, whose wage olaim and strike 
threat had necessitated the President'e statement. Over wildcat 
strikes, however, Wilson demonstrated a greater toughness, falling 
in line with the mood of 'l'umul ty and the Director General of the 
Railroads, Wal ter D. Hines. 'l'umul ty was growing considerably more 
extreme in his views than the President. The threatened ahopmen'a 
aotion had prompted 'l'umul ty to write to the Director General of the 
railroads that "Any attempts to enforce these demands by 'direot 
aotion' would be considered an unfriendly act ap1nat the Un! ted 
Sta tes of America. ,,11 So it was, in an atmosphere of increa. ing 
antagonism towards the unions, that on )rd September 1919 the 
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President finally sent out a call for an Industrial Cor.ference to be 
held in Washington on 6th October 1919 in order to 
Discuss such methods as have already been tried out 
and to canvass every relevant factor of the present 
industrial situation •• to work out •• a practical 
method of association based upon a real community of 
interest. 18 
A combination of factors; the disruption of 1919; the relation 
of industrial calm to the general economic performance vital in a 
period of reoonstruotion; and Wilson's oontinuing commitment to the 
stabilisation of industrial relations on a basis of equality and 
justice, in addition to his own political philosophy of oompromise 
and co-operation, intormed his decision. Similar conferenoes had 
already been called in canada and New York State. In the U.K. the 
Whitley experiment had conf!J:med the idea of the government aoting 
to give industrial relations a framework. It could perhaps be said 
that the decision was somewhat belated. In part Wilson'e involvement 
in Treaty-making caused the delay. lven after his return however the 
President hesitated to act until it was almost foroed upon him by an 
increasingly tense nation and the obvious faot that industrial 
relations would continue to worsen unlese the government acted. The 
day prior to the President's call, William Foster had made olear 
that strike action was now the only alternative open to the men 
organiSing in the steel industry. This dispute was so serious that 
the President belatedly attempted to have it postponed, 80 that it 
could be dealt with at the Conferenoe. In this he failed but the 
steel strike emphasised the importanoe of the Conference to the 
administration. 
On 4th September the President left on his fateful Western 
tour. The Con!erence remained apparently ill-defined. All that bad 
been decided was that labour, business and the public should each 
have 15 representatives. The structure and actual personnel remained 
uncleu; what was apparent was that the Conference was pure Wilsonian 
politics. As the President in!ormed B.L. Ferguson, President of the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, its purpose was to find "a genuine spirit 
of co-operation; a practical method of association based upon a real 
community of interest. n19 The Con!erence embodied the liberal belisf 
in the fundamental cohesion within the society based on a recognition 
by all involved that no group could expect to predominate, so that a 
willingness to compromise for the broader good of the society would 
emerge. It was in such a cohesive society that government could 
represent all the people and not any puticulu groups. In its 
conception the Conference was the litmus test of all that the 
New FTeedom and Woodrow Wilson stood for. 
The Con!erence was not merely a test of the Wilsonian credo; 
it was very much his own creation. Thus even his Secretary of 
Agriculture knew little about the Conference in mid-5eptember and 
oomplained of the laok of farming representatives. In his reply 
WUson revealed his deeper, unexpressed expectations for the 
Con!srence I "We expeot this oonference to widen into others, where 
special attention will be given to the several aspeots of our 
indU8trial life. This is just a starter. ,,20 Wilaon was not naive 
enouab to believe that labour and bU8iness could agree on principles. 
Hia main ooncern vas machinery and the hope that, once around the 
oonference table, they would stay there. He hoped that a nationwide 
syatem of conciliation would emerge by mutual agreement among 
employers and employees. 
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The purpose of the Conference was confirmed in a letter which 
Franklin X. Lane sent to the President in September. In it he 
emphasised that ''waffle'' should be avoided and the Conference should 
deal with practical issues. To confirm the importance of this for 
the nation, Lane recommended that the President open the Conference. 
Lane considered that the key to compromise was for labour to achieve 
partnership status in industry. "Satisfy the worker that his 
personality as a thinking man is recognized and much of the present 
dissent will vanish. ,,21 This indeed was the root of Wilsonian 
politics as has been seen in earlier quotes and the President wanted 
to see this implanted in a voluntary system of conciliation based on 
solving disputes; not satisfying principles or demands for power. 
With a system established, prinCiples would be forgotten as 
recognition became reality. This was how Wilson viewed the labour 
question in 1919. This was the basis of his policy and his decision 
to call the Conference. It was now a fundamentally non-political 
attitude. This was a problem to be solved; not a political crusade 
to be participated in or foue;ht against. 
A.s regarda the personnel of the Conference, business and 
labour were lett largely to chooee their own. The government 
intervened only when omissions occurred, such as the A.F. ot L. not 
invi ting any members from the railroad brotherhoods. They were 
included in the publio group, as were men who the administration 
regarded as vi tal to the credibility of the Conference such as Gary 
of U.S. Steel. For the rest, the choice was made from lists 
submitted by each key member of the cabinet. Some Democratic bias 
was to be expected as in the selection of Gavin McNab, Fuller Calloway 
and Thomas Chadbow::ne. Generally, however, the cri tarion was the 
respect which these men might command. Thus Louis D. Brandeis and 
22 Bernard Baruch were both invited though the former refused. 
The Conference convened on 6th October. That there would be 
difficulties was never doubted. On 16th September a letter from 
the National Association of Manufacturers stated bluntly that 
"We will never have industrial peace until the interference of 
government • • is withdrawn. ,,2:3 Moreover it at tacked the A. F • of L. 's 
dominance of the labour group,claiming it represented a small 
minority of the working population. Business remained apparently 
inflexible in its aims. Nonetheless Wilson believed that reasonable 
men once committed to discussion would continue to seek solutions. 
He was therefore bitterly disillusioned when the Conference collapsed 
a month after its opening. Principle, not machinery, had dominated 
discussions from the start. Wilson's plan had never begun to evolve. 
The two groups had. become so entrenched in their positions that no 
consultation could take place without some guarantee of their 
principles. 
In 1919 Wilson still viewed industrial relations in pre-war 
terms. His belief that the Clayton Act ended the issue of trade 
union legitimacy ruled his thinking on labour problems from 1914 
onwards. That Act marked the extent to which the President could 
favour the power of any social group. From that time onwards he 
believed that legal equality had been achieved. The question then 
became one of making that equality work. The disputes over 
recognition and bargaining did not impress Nilson. He believed that 
these were principles which business ought to honour, but further 
legislation on this would, for Wilson, have been coercive and would 
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tip the balance too far towards unionism. Moreover he would be 
quite content for works committees to represent workers. He was not 
committed to ensuring that unions be the only voice of the workforce, 
although he did not personally object to such a development. The 
collapse of the Industrial Conference reflected the political gap 
between Wilson and the two groups •. He could not sympathise with 
the continuing dispute over power in which they were embroiled. 
Now was the time for compromise which Wilson believed would benefit 
unions by allowing a gradual acceptance of their rights. Ultimately 
the Conference revealed that the 'labor problem' was intractable 
because the two sides required a government which had a political 
outlook in agreement with their economic ideas. This Wilson neither 
had nor sought. Wilson could sympathise with the position of 
Samuel Gompers expressed at the Conference that the union movement 
was actually a force for order and stability within the economic 
system. Yet he could not accept that it was the responsibility of 
government to coerce employers. This required a political belief 
that trade union power was actually a component of an egalitarian 
society, which Wilson was unable to accept. Such an acceptance 
had to come from industry. In the short term Wilson remained 
committed to compromise and the hope that union recognition would 
evolve. The gap between Wilson and the unions lay in what Wilson 
sympathised with and what he could accept as a political 
responsibility. The problem for the President, by now a very sick 
nan, remained a practical one to be solved by machinery, not 
political philosophy. For him the collapse of the Industrial 
Conference signified. merely the refusal of the two sides to be 
reasonable; not a basic flaw in the application of his political 
philosophy. 
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Given the inability of the two groups involved. to provide an 
agreed plan, however, he now accepted the idea that the provision 
of machinery was a function of the state necessary to protect the 
public welfare. The President thus asked. the public group to 
continue in conference and to produce a consultative report in 
December. In fact the public group underwent a considerable 
transformation between late October and 6th December when finally 
convened in Washington D.C. Ex-Attorney Generals Thomas Gregory 
and George Wickersham, ex-Governor of New York Martin Glynn, 
Henry Robinson of the Shipping Board. ex-Secretary of the Treasury 
Oscar Strauss and Bernard Baruch, Owen D. Young and Julius Rosenwald, 
all major figures in the Democratic party, had been drafted. in to 
24 participate. The second Conference became, in all but name, 
a brains trust of the administration and was chaired. jointly by 
William B. Wilson and Herbert Hoover. Unlike the first Conference, 
this much more shrewd selection promised to reflect fairly closely 
Wilson's own attitude to industrial relations. The President was 
determined that a general policy would be the Conference's main 
concern when in his letter of 19th November to the body he said 
that "It is not expected that you will deal directly with any 
condition which exists today."25 
This much more homogeneous group was soon able to draft what 
26 Glynn regarded as a "pretty sweepL"lg program". This they released 
on 19th December 1919 as a "suggestion of practical measl.n'es which 
will serve to avert or postpone industrial conflicts". 27 The 
primary goa.l was seen as the restoration of the imi vidual's sense 
of worth and. self-respect. This was required a.s compensation for 
forced specialisation and monotony of automated production in large 
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industrial plants. The only way for this to be realised was 
through the organisation of the relationship between employer and 
employee. Trade unions were a 'hopeful sign' but untU organisation 
was complete the most practical activity would be to provide 
IIB.chinery for 1::argaining on any 1::asis. This machinery must be 
tripartite to include public representation as, in the Conference's 
view, industrial disputes were not merely the concern of the two 
antagonists. The machinery was to be a National Tribunal of twelve 
regional Tribunals based on the Federal Reserve districts with 
panels from which representatives of both capital and labour would 
be drawn. There should be no interruption of the work of public 
utUities or government, though the right of association in both 
was upheld. No abridgement of rights already granted was contemplated. 
This report was the 1::asis from which discussions went on in early 
1920 untU 6th March when the Report was finally issued. 
The final Report embraced any form of co-operation between men 
and management which would lessen conflict and increase understanding. 
In this it muted its clearer support of unionism in the consultative 
document by additionally welcoming works councils and shop committees. 
Where collective agreement could not be reached then the dispute 
could be voluntarily submitted to the Regional Adjustment Board 
consisting of four from each party, four more familiar with the 
industry and agreed to by the parties, and a chairman. A unanimous 
decision when reached would be regarded as a collective bargain. 
Where agreement was not reached the parties could submit the dispute 
to the National Industrial Board or an umpire on whom both were 
a.greed. Where disputes were under review no industria.l action ~ould 
be carried out. However the board would "not submit to 
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arbitration the policy of the 'closed' or 'open' shop" thereby 
leaving open the vital question of the spread of union organisations 
and of whether or not employers could refuse to bargain wit h new 
organisations. This apparent ducking of the key issue was ~odified 
significantly by the declaration on employee representation - the 
employees should be free to choose their representative by secret 
ba.llot, and employers should undertake to bargain with whatever 
organisation was endorsed by the workforce. 
The main concern of the Conference was that a better 
relationship between employee and employer be achieved by whatever 
means agreed. to by both sides. The aim of the Conference was 
entirely practical. The Conference, administration and WUson 
consistently avoided the basic principle at the root of post-war 
industrial disruption; the question of power. 
However, both sides had the power of their own organisations 
as the basis of their aims. Unions wished to continue to expand 
and thus required asSuraJ'lces of recognition. Business denied there 
could be any question of whether the working class should command 
the respect and recognition o£ business at all times as an equal 
element in the functioning of the industrial complex. In this the 
administration was reluctant to make a. policy. Its priority was the 
peaceful conduct of industrial relations. The government itself 
accepted trade union demands for better conditiCJls and pay but again 
did not Bee their achievement as being dependent on the unions. The 
'labor problem' became essentially a question of political perception; 
whether the power of unions should be regarded as a necessary element 
in the readjustment of the balance in society, or whet her this was 
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largely a question which did not involve power or balance but 
rather compromise and agreement. The latter was the progressive 
belief and was a fundamental tenet of their political philosophy. 
Yet while the Wilson administration was unable to endorse the 
view of either side it did recognize that an tnitiative was required 
if compromise were to be achieved. It therefore accepted 
responsibility for the erection of conciliation machinery. The 
clause on secret ballots avoided the need for a political discussion 
by leaving the issue of organisation in the hands of the workforce, 
but free choice of the workfor~e and their access to conciliation 
machinery did go as far as possible to tying business to collective 
bLrgaining without actually laying down this principle. The 
Second Industrial Conference thus demonstrated that, while not 
committed to the power of trade tmionism, it was prepared to 
leave this question with the workforce. It also demonstrated its 
commitment to collective bargaining and the respect for working 
people whldl it bestowed, as was further emphasised by the 
statement that "a strike is not merely a wittrlrawal from employment, 
I 29 it is an effort to secure better terms for the positions held". 
As such this principle struck directly at the idea that strikers 
had terminated their employment and could simply be replaced. 
As a reflection of the post-war labour policy of the Wilson 
administration, this Report was of some importance. There were 
indications that the administration, throughout a year of crisis, 
remained sympathetic to trade unionism's purposes though not its 
power. Both the statement on the nature of a strike and on secret 
ballots went some way to push employers to the bargaining table. 
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However, since it was not to be legislated, the obligation of 
business to accept the ruling remained tmc1ear. Wilson had 
moved forward with his policy, but the problem of power was never 
answered, leaving both sides dissatisfied. Indeed the whole issue 
became academic in practical terms. The President did not press 
the Report for action so that it fell by the wayside. Hearings 
were held in Congress but no further progress was made before the 
end of the session. 
These Conferences and Wilson's May and August speeches 
reflected the general labour attitude of the administration. It 
remained to be seen whether this approach would continue when the 
administration was faced with specific industrial disputes or 
threatened action and whether the rest of his administration would 
abide by Wilson's policy. 
As already noted Burleson had strayed from the administration 
path early in 1919. Tumulty was increasingly bitter towards the 
unions as they threatened to disrupt the inevitably difficult 
period of returning to peace-time work. The responsibility for 
effecting the daily administration of labour affairs, however, lay 
with William B. wilson, the President's Labor Secretary since that 
Department's birth in 1913. In WUson the President had a man 
loyal to his own opinions and who with his union background also 
understood and sympathised with the tmion goals. Thus he was the 
least likely of the Cabinet officers to feel antagonism or 
frustration towards the tmions. Throughout his tenure of office, 
he remained constant to the administration's policy. He upheld 
the President's belief that compromise was possible; in the case of 
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the Secretary more by a stronger emphasis on the need of both sides 
for a vigorous expanding economy. His attitude was best revealed 
in the speech he gave to the A.F. of L. Convention in June 1919. 
Wilson confirmed that the administration recognised that labour 
deserved a full reward for its contribution. The question was how 
the reward. should be decided. The three choices were through the 
power of business, the power of labour, or through negotiation; 
he believed the latter was the best choice. Unions must also 
welcome the new machinery which could provide a mueh higher 
standard of living for the workforce while still producing 
adequate returns on investment. "The employers and employees have 
a mutual interest in seeing the largest possible production with a 
given amount of labor. ,,30 The emphasis the Secretary placed upon 
the economic benefit of compromise, combined with the President's 
more humanitarian outlook to form a coherent administration 
approach to industrial relations. 
As with the President, the Secretary based his thinking on a 
conviction that consensus was a practical reality and that the 
conflict between unions and employers was not deep-rooted. in differing 
perceptions about the nature of the economic system. He felt 
that the economic goals of both could be satisfied by an expanding 
economy in which wages and profits could both grow. Wilson 
willingly accepted that the unions were basically justified in 
themselves and their demands and sputly defended their right to 
strike. Moreover, Wilson and his Division of Conciliation were 
handling most of the labour disputes so that his policy was the 
effective one. In this work the policy consisted of the 
balancing of demands. Thus Wilson termed the work "more diplomatic 
than jud ic W. "31 
77 
From the beginning of 1919 the Division was inundated by 
requests for their help; it handled 1,780 cases by 30th June of the 
year. Nonetheless, the Division left only 111 unsettled. Despite 
the increasing difficulty the Division faced in reaching settlements, 
in his annual report in November 1919, Wilson demonstrated his 
constancy by his plea for "the exercise of the utmost tolerance 
and the maximum of good will and mutual forbearance during the 
trying days ahead. ,,32 It remained. to be seen whether the rest of 
the administration and indeed the President would find it possible 
to exercise the tolerance which the Secretary of Labor called for. 
Although the Division was handling the vast majority of disputes 
those such as the Seattle strike and the Massachussetts' 
telegraphers' strike were handled. by the machinery of the 
Shipping Board and Wire Control Board respectively. other disputes 
such as the steel strike were never referred to the Division. 
Though disquieting, these divergences did not mark any change 
in the administration's policy, although they did undermine its 
authority and highlight the incapacity of the administration to 
achieve compliance. However, it was the clash between major 
administration po1icies and industria1 disputes that most undermined 
the Department of Labor's control. The earliest demonstration that 
Wilson himself was abandoning his policy over industrial disputes 
where they were threatening to damage his broader aims was in the 
handling of a threat of a strike in August by shopmen on the 
railroads in which the right of workers to express their views was 
less important than the control of inflation. Wilson looked to 
the Industrial Conference to establish some basis for compromise 
but until it could convene the administration ha.d. to deal with 
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the difficulties thrown up by industrial disruption. Lacking any 
guidelines and machinery and surrotmded by advisers who were 
emphasising the crisis which faced the administration, Wilson 
was finally convinced of the need for a strong response to any 
further major industrial disruption. Only Mitchell Palmer, the 
Attorney General, and Tumulty were able to gain even the most 
fleeting access to the President L~ the crucial months of October 
and November when the threat of a coal strike loomed. 
Negotiations between the Scale Committee of the United Mine 
Workers and the coal operators had. in fact been going on since 
before the Industrial Conference in Buffalo and Philadelphia. A 
strike call had been issued on 15th October upon the breakdown of 
these negotiations. At this point the Secretary of Labor 
intervened to call a joint conference in Washington a week later. 
The President made clear his own opinion on the situation in a letter 
to William Wilson on the day the conference opened. Emphasising 
that the mines must stay open, he warned that he expected the 
miners and opemtors to conform to this view and demonstrate a 
responsible attitude. "It is a duty that they (miners and operators) 
owe to society to make earnest efforts to negotiate these differences 
• • • "JJ When these talks failed, as Tumul ty wrote to the 
Secretary, the situation was too serious to allow to continue. 
The strike was due to begin on 1st November. T'tunulty was convinced 
"the next move is up to us. ,,34 Two days later that move was made 
with Judge Anderson issuing a temporary restraining order against 
the U.M.H. carrying on strike activities. This was done tmder 
the war-time Lever Act, a decision earlier agreed to by Tumulty 
and Palmer. Tumulty gave the Attorney General a draft of a 
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statement to be issued defending the administration's actions. 
The statement was later delivered practically verbatim by the 
President. It was agreed that the right to strike could not be 
denied "in all ordinary industries and under ordinary circwnstances". 35 
However neither the times nor the industry were ordinary. As in 
the police strike, no action which threatened the public welfare 
could be condoned. The government had replied to the danger with 
"a refusal to surrender to this dictation and an assertion by the 
government itself of the right to protect • • the whole people. 
The government could never be seen to be surrendering its 
sovereignty to a class. ,,36 
By late 1919 the administration needed to re-a.ssert its 
control of the industrial situation. The strike in the coal 
industry would quite certainly have been disastrous J but that 
strike almost certainly appeared to the administration as a test 
where it had to impose its will, not only to avoid the disrupt lor. 
of the strike but also to re-a.ssert its own standing in the eyes 
of the public. The collapse of the Industrial Conference threw the 
responsibility for industrial relations back on the administration. 
They were embittered. by the entrenched position of the two sides. 
In this situation, public welfare meant the protection of the 
comfort of the general public at the expense of the rights of 
working people or business. 
The possibility of a reaction by the government had not been 
overlooked by Samuel Gompers. He was aware that the government 
was reaching the limits of toleration. He had opposed the steel 
strike and wrote to John L. Lewis, President of the United 
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Mine WorkeI'S' Union, in simil.a.r vein urging that there be "an 
endeavour made by all means to avert the strike". J7 More concemed 
with the tactics of the unions and away from gxassroots' opinion, 
Gompers was anxious that the movement did not antagonise an 
administration which he felt had done much for the unions and to 
which he was personally committed. Gompers was thus concerned 
to avoid causing the problems which the administration now faced 
and by demonstrating the unions' responsibility he hoped to keep 
the 1::e.cking of the administration and in this way win the lmions' 
aims. Many members favoured a direct attempt to win its aims. 
The irony of the situation was that Gompers had apparently 
abandoned his early model of the trade union. Reluctantly forced 
to back the steel ,strike he was anxious to avoid a rift with 
Wilson over coal. Lewis and. Gompers had in fact clashed over 
organisation drives at the A.F. of L. Convention. Lewis was 
bitterly critical of Gompers' compromise at this time and later 
wrote that Gompers was "depending upon the federal administration"J8 
far too much. As in the steel strike, however, the administration's 
use of the Lever Act allowed Gompers to swing to the support of the 
U .M.W •• 
On the same day as Gompers wrote to Lewis, the government 
instigated the injunction proceedings in Indianapolis, Indiana.. 
The strike order was not withdrawn and Lewis claimed a major 
shutdown despite the sweeplng nature of the injunction which 
prevented any benefits being paid or any eommunication regarding 
the strike being made. Under this pressure the two sides returned 
to the table with the Secretary of Labor on 14th November. In a 
memo to the President on the following day Wilson outlined the 
the three ways in which a settlement could be reached I by a 
joint scale committee setting rates for the individual districts; 
by each district negotiating their rates independently; or by 
having the Central Competitive Field set a rate as a basis for 
negotiations in the outlying fields. In the Secretary's opinion, 
although the thirty-hour week and 60J' pay rise demanded by the 
U.M.W. was unreasonable, it was impossible to stand pat on the 
issue. It was Wilson's belief that with the cost of living having 
increased by 7~ and miners' wages having risen only .5~, "relief 
ought to be given to these miners on the basis of the justice 
of the situation". 39 He favoured the third option and hoped that 
such a settlement would not increase prices. 
When the talks once more became deadlocked on 5th December, 
Secretary Wilson recommended that the miners ought to receive a 
31.6% rise in yardage and dead work, to which the miners naturally 
agreed. James Garfield, the Fuel Director, then intervened to 
claim that the coal industry could only afford, and inflation 
could only justify, a 14% rise. This caused a furore in the union. 
Garfield's offer was rejected flatly and the Director was regarded 
as an interloper. The operators at once agreed to the Garfield 
offer. 
The following day the President condemned the strike, in 
another of Tumulty's insertions, as being "not only tmjustifiable 
40 . 
but tmlawful". He did however offer to set up a commission to 
investigate the dispute based on the 14% offer. The Secretary 
wrote to Lewis on 8th December urging that he accept President 
Wilson's new offer. A commission had earlier been proposed to 
82 
the miners' President and rejected but with the l~ guarantee it 
seemed more attractive. Moreover, it was clear from Wilson's tone 
that there was little more to be expected. On 11th December he 
wrote to the President that lithe mineworkers are profotmdly 
impressed. by the assurance of fair dealing which you have extended,,4l 
and accepted the offer.of the commission. 
In the final analysis despite the toughness which the Wilson 
administration demonstrated in the dispute, the essential basis of 
the Wilson policy remained intact. The commission signified the 
continuing commitment to negotiated settlement, compromise and 
the recognition of the need of workers to be considered. The shift 
in tone from active sympathy to positive dissuasion, although 
it abridged the claims of unionists for the need to exercise their 
power, was a response to a crisis in the economy • Despite even 
this crisis the core of the labour policy of the administration 
remained intact mainly through the work of William B. Wilson, 
and the consistency of the President. As with any administration, 
control and omer was always the first priority. Therefore the 
President could write to Calvin Coolidge to congratulate him on 
42 his election "as a victory for law and order". 
As a progressive the President had to tread a thin line 
between the prerogatives of office and the policies which his 
administration espoused. In the coal dispute the President's 
ambivalence about the intrinsic goals of tmionism led to the need 
for order and economic stability overriding the question of tmion 
demands for the right to exercise its pOloler. Trade tmionism 
never played a significant role in the President's view of the 
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economic structure of the nation. Indeed economic thought never 
played a dominant part in the President's gene~ philosophy, where 
moral and humanitarian imperatives took precedence. Thus any 
economic future with trade unions as a major factor did not have a 
part in Wilson's thinking. This led to an economic orthodoxy which 
ruled his policy. At the time the President had been primarily 
occupied with the debate over the League and the Treaty. This led 
to a reliance on advisers or on a return to orthodoxy. 
Despite Wilson's earlier dedication to reform, it was now 
clear he did not intend that the war-time arrangements should be 
regarded as the starting point. While ostensibly committed to reform, 
the Wilson administration was simultaneously dismantling the war-
time machinery and a.ttempting to return to a peace-time basis which 
meant in effect a significant contraction in the government's 
1nten-entionist policy. This preoccupation also stood in the way of 
the administration furthering its labour policy. All the war-time 
expansion of the Department of Labor was being contracted as rapidly 
as possible. The United. states Employment Service was reduced to a 
skeleton budget when two million troops were being demobilized. 
Secretary Wilson fought a desperate rea.rguard action against this 
trend, ma.na.ging to at least save some bureaux like the U.s .E.S. 
albeit on reduced budgets. 
The same priority of returning to peace-time, pre-war 
situations dominated the thinking of the administration on the 
question of the railroads. The ex-Direct or-General of the 
Railroad. Administration, William McAdoo, a.ttempted to convince 
the administration of the advisability of retaining the war-time 
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system. The current Director-General, Walter D. Hines, had a 
different priority however; that of stability. As early as 
May 1919 he was making suggestions about the future structure of 
the railroads in which the idea of de-control was implicit. He 
suggested that there be a reserve fund of railroad profits set up 
to help sma.ller roads and a board comprising an equal number of 
employers and employees to conciliate. He also suggested the idea 
of defining a reasonable return and a move to consolidate the 
system. By July, Hines was hopeful that a plan of this sort had a 
good chance of being accepted as a middle route, given the row 
between \mions and the railroad companies over the Plumb Plan. This 
Plan called for worker participation in the management of a 
nationalized railroad system. Again it raised the question of the 
role of management, which was at the heart of the dispute between 
business and labour. 
As with other Departments, the railroads were left largely in 
the hands of the Director-Genera1, and the President depended on his 
opinion. Hines warned the President of the· shop crafts' unrest 
early in July and advised that their request be refused as he 
believed that it would spark off an inflationary wage spiral 
throughout the railroad unions. He hoped this could be put across in a 
general campaign against the high cost of living. In this Tumulty 
and Hines held strikingly similar opinions. In August, Hines 
refused the shop crafts' wage claim of 1.5%. He claimed that with 
local conditions varying he could not give an across-the-board rise. 
Private industry he a.rgued was much more flexible. The way to 
beat inflationary spirals was not to boost wages. This policy 
was finalised by the President's speech of 26th August, penned 
la.rgely by Tumulty. Wilson said that; 
When the Government is taking l.musual and vigorous 
measures to reduce the cost of living, it is not the 
time for organized labor or any part of organized 
la.bor to stay the Government's hand and to insist on 
increased wages, which inevitably will • • be 
multiplied •• in the prices paid by the consumer.43 
There was no mention of the fact that shop crafts had lagged 
considerably behind not only inflation but the wages of other 
railroad workers. The result was that although the strike was 
called off by Bert Jewell, President of the A.F. of L.'s Railway 
Employees Department, wildcat strikes broke out throughout the 
nation. These men had overstepped the administration's patience. 
It was annol.mced. that as of 30th August any men who did not report 
for work would be considered to have terminated their employment. 
This harsh action reflected the balance between sympathy and anger 
in the administration towards the l.mions. By late August 1919 
frustration increased hostility towards the unions, since Wilson 
sought co-operation in his policies which he felt should be 
recognized as beneficial to the unions too. Wilson was also 
relying largely on the opinions of the Director-General which 
were considerably more hardened by then than Wilson's own views 
might have been. Perhaps the most costly effect was the residue 
of deep bitterness felt by the unions. It was bitterness which 
virtually negated all possibility of the Railroad Board being 
successful and was in no small part a cause of the upheaval of 
1922. At the time this did not appear to influence Hines in his 
plans for the future of the railroads, given the dominating quest 
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for a settled industry and economy which drove the administration. 
On 14th November Hines laid before the President the choices 
open to him. He advised strongly against government ownership and 
the Plumb Plan. He could however extend the period of wa.r-time 
control for one year but this would embroil the railroads in the 
election though it was certainly a practical idea. Alternatively, 
the President could set a date for de-control and force Congress to 
act. By December Hines had concluded that "the public interest 
would be best promoted by Congress reaching a decision not to adopt 
legislation at this time". 44 The Cabinet, now meeting fitfully and 
only when the President convened it, disagreed with Hines and it was 
decided to set 1st March as the deadline far the relinquishing of 
government control. With Congress still embroiled in the League 
debate, it is clear that the tactical consideration of having the 
Treaty ratified played some part in the decision. Even 50 the 
decision was one which demonstrated the administration's 
increasing anxiety about relinquishing its war-time obligations. 
It thus fell to Congress to reach a conclusion on the railroads with 
considerable haste. 
Another consideration which shaped. the Cabinet's decision was 
the fact that the railroad. brotherhoods were now becoming increas-
ingly restive. By early February the Brotherhood of Maintenance 
of Way Employees called for a strike. This the President ma.na.ged 
to avert through a promise that the Board to be provided by the 
Transportation Act would look at wages as soon as possible. This 
sufficed to quiet the railroad. unions in spite of their a.ttacks on 
the two bills then in Congress. They resolved to hold their 
judgment in reserve. The Executive Council of the A.F. of L., 
anxious that negotiations with the railroad brotherhoods over 
affiliation should be successful, now decided to protest in order 
to curry their favour. They wrote to the President u-~ing him to 
veto the Esch-Cummins Transport Act. It contained "subtle provisions 
which deprive the railway employees of their rights by providing 
comupulsory arbitration".45 The brotherhoods had also been voicing 
disquiet about the terms of the Board's power. The President 
assured them however that he could see no cause for concern and 
called for a consultative committee to be set up to begin the wage 
investigation. In fact William B. Wilson wrote to the President 
that although the A.F. of L.'s criticisms were general they may 
well have" just grounds,,46for their disquiet. The President was 
determined to throw off war-time obligations and was in no mood for 
second thoughts at this late stage and duly promulgated the 
Transportation Act. 
By spring 1920 the administration had practically completed 
the post-war readjustment. The railroads now had their own 
arbitration board, a commission had been set up in the coal industry, 
the National War Policies Board had been scrapped and the 
Industrial Conference was then attempting to lay down machinery for 
a national system of conciliation. Wilson's administration 
appeared to be close to achieving its goal - a systematic solution 
to industrial relations which would provide a practical means of 
harmony. removed from the purview of the government and without 
becoming involved further in matters of principle. 
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The infamous Red Scare was also now abating, so much so that 
Tumulty now felt it an opportune time to grant amnesty to political 
prisoners. Wilson had. in fact stated clearly that he wished to 
grant "complete amnesty,,47 as early as June 1919. At tl"..a.t time his 
wish had. been quietly ignored by Tumulty and the Attorney General. 
(Tumulty had in fact favoured Palmer's appointment over the 
objections of the retiring Attorney General Gregory.) By 1920 both 
the Socialist and I.W.W. organisations were barely in existence due 
to Palmer's raids in late 1919 and the Immigration Department's 
attempts at deportation. Amnesty was now considered a safe policy 
as well as politically desirable. The A.F. of L. had for some time 
48 been pressing for their release. It was Wilson who now opposed 
the idea. 
If the President and his administration believed that the 
labour problem had been largely quieted they were soon to be 
disabused of the notion. Bert Jewell reflected the increasing 
frustration on the railroads when he wrote to the President stating 
angrily that the Railroad Labor Board wished to conduct an 
investigation of the wildcat strikes when the unions had been 
waiting for a wage adjuStment for 16 months and had been promised 
priority. The unions' acceptance of the investigation could be won 
only if the Board. . considered a national wage agreement. This was 
exactly the kind of action the President abhorred. It undermined 
the chance of compromise. He reacted swiftly, condemning Jewell's 
telegram as prejudicial to the success of the Board and its 
fairness. "The sending of such a message in such circumstances is 
in the highest degree reprehensib1e.,,49 Jewell however complained 
further of the possibility that the Board might recognise the 
"insurgent movement ,,50 on the railroa.d.s. By this he meant the 
works council movement. However prejudicial Jewell's communications 
were, they accurately reflected the anger and frustration of the 
railroad workers. Unauthorised strikes had already broken out in 
Texas, Mississippi and Michigan. 
The raUroad union's position was that wages should be 
increased and seniority rights restored to all striking workers. 
They wished the wage rises backdated to August 1919 when the claims 
were first made. Their opposition to an investigation was based on 
the fear that its purpose would be to break the union's grip on 
negotiations. The Railroad Labor Board's decision was handed down 
on 20th July 1920. It awarded the railroad workers rises of 8 to 
18 cents per hour, backdated to May 1920. some, such as the 
Engineers and. Firemen, were awarded ~l.()+ per day rises. Seniority 
renained an issue to be resolved. 51 
From September 1920 in fact railroad corporations began to 
mount a determined campaign to shake off the power of unions 
through the agency of the Board. Certainly, the workers were 
unhappy with the Board's decision, but at least it had confirmed 
to some extent the justice of their claim and seemed to assure 
them that they were regarded as representatives of the workforce. 
Tacit legitimacy seemed to have been granted. This fact incensed 
railroad executives. They began to impose new rules on the unions 
at a few days' notice. Some companies also began to impose wage 
cuts without negotiations or, where these did take place, without 
reference to the Board. The root of the corporations' campaign was 
-pinpointed by a quotation in the Iron Age from Mr Atterbury, 
President of the Pennsylvania Railroad. He claimed that low rates, 
efficient service and operation could not be given "under national 
agreements or national beards of adjustments •• (or) in any 
other way than the fair and uninterrupted relations between our 
officers and their own employees" .52 He called frankly for the 
ending of agreements with unions and clearly undermined the 
authority of the Board. He did so, he claimed, because the railroads 
were running at a deficit due to a slump in traffic and because 
wage rises had taken up all the extra revenue of rate increases. 
Wages had to come down and ru:Les would have to change. This the 
various companies started to do without reference to the Board, 
and asserted that railroad management must be free from all 
shackles in the interest of the industry and the public. Inevitably 
the railroad unions quickly submitted these grievances to the Board. 
By February 1921 and at the end of the WUson administration 
the Board was awash with disputes. This was because, given the 
attitude of the railroad companies, local negotiation procedures 
were simply collapsing or were never even set up. still more 
problematic was that the corporations, without any notice or prior 
negotiations, submitted claims for wage reductions to a Board. 
already unable to keep pace with the workload. Atterbury was also 
demanding that the Board "enable them by orderly procedure with 
their own employees to develop appropriate rules and working 
conditions" 53 - in other words, to abandon all negotiations with 
unions. 
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The issue of union legitimacy had once more been raised. 
Wilson and his administration had consistently avoided the issue. 
They sought compromise but this required a willingness to concede 
by both sides. As the Railroad Board was discovering, this was 
simply not possible. Atterbury's demands, if granted, would most 
probably result in the wrecking of the railroad unions. The issue 
which had faced the administration throughout the post-war years 
continued. to burn. It was now in the railroad industry that the 
dispute was most evident and where hostility continued to exist. 
In the coal industry it was also clear that the difficulties 
had not been settled. The report of the Bituminous Coal Commission, 
which failed to be unanimous, became effective as of 1st April 1920. 
It awarded a 24 cents increase to tonnage workers, 5J cents for 
trappers and boys and a ~l per day increase to day-men. A tribunal 
of operators and miners was recommended as was a policy of coal 
storage to keep demand higher in summer. The wage increases were 
backdated to JIst October 1919. The result did not entirely 
placate the U .M.W. but, as in the railroads, it confirmed the 
justice of the miners' demands. Anthracite miners however were 
furious at the award and demanded their own wages be submitted to a 
Commission. This report in August 1920 caused fury in Pennsylvania. 
It gave the workers a rise of 1JJ' less than the bituminous workers 
and even this was not a firm recommendation. The Commission felt 
it could not "commit itself to an award (which gave) •• 
encouragement to the • • vicious spiral in prices" • .54 
A strike appeared to be imminent and indeed anthracite 
workers began to go on 'holiday' as it was termed. This was in 
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addition to the strikes which had broken out in Illinois and 
Indiana in the Central Competitive Field over the destruction of 
differentials in the Bituminous Commissids aHard.. Not surprisingly, 
the President felt compelled to \,rite to William B. 1;"i1son that 
ItI feel I need your advice very much and there is no one else's'I 
am willing to take.,,55 This confirmed that ''Tilson had returned to 
his Secretary's advice rather than Tumulty or the Attorney General. 
The end of the crisis allowed the President to treat the 'labor 
problem' separately again without the pressures of 1919 to colour 
his attitude. 
The Secretary of Ia.bor immediately sent the conciliation 
service to try to bring about a settlement. Their conclusion ~'Tas 
that agreement on differentials could be reached in conference. 
The President agreed that the Indiana and Illinois strikers. return 
to work. The conference met on the 13th of August in Cleveland vTi th 
the situation in the Central Field normal once more. Agreement l{aS 
finally reached and the bituminous situation appeared finally to 
be settled by the end of the month. 
The anthracite situation remained tmsettled however. The 
U.H.H. had. reluctantly accepted the award of the commission. 
However, "voluntary uprisings,,56 Hhich the union had failed to quell 
now forced them to the conference table. On 9th September the 
secretary sent the President a memo laying out his view of the 
situation. He agreed that normally, as the anthracite workers 
claimed, an agreement in the bituminous sector also applied to 
the anthracite sector. This did not apply in reverse hmTever so 
that the November 1918 anthracite award did not apply to the 
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bituminous sector. This led to the unrest and the commission award. 
Anthracite workers moreover worked an average of 75 days more than 
their bituminous cOtmterparts per annum. The bituminous rates, 
though higher, did not in fact lead to a larger wage. Moreover 
the Secretary added, the anthracite leaders had asked the 
President to set aside the award on 30th August, before it was even 
made. Wilson refused to do this on 1st September "until the real 
sentiment of the anthracite workers can find expression and they are 
ready to abide by the obligations they have entered into". 57 It 
was now his Secretary's opinion that this was the correct attitude 
to adopt. "Any initiative • • that you would even consider 
calling the joint scale committee together .•• would be playing 
into the hands of those who defied you and lead to still further 
unsettled conditions".58 The Secretary was sceptical of the U.M.W. 
argument about rank and file insurgency and believed that the 
leadership, both in failing to control • holidays' and in calling 
for the award to be set aside, demonstrated not only a sympathy for 
the insurgents but an active desire to support them. Fairness was 
one thing but in this case the Secretary felt further concessions 
would be weakness in the face of threats from workers whose case he 
did not believe was as justified as the bituminous claim had been. 
In any case there was no opportunity for differentiation between 
insurgents or regular unionists, as both the Secretary and the 
President felt that the award had to stand. It was impossible for 
it to be changed merely to help the regular union leaders. Noreover 
it was doubtful whether any changes would have that effect. As the 
Secretary saw it, any changes would only encourage further 
insurgency. In the reply the Secretary drafted for the President, 
he advised the anthracite workers to abide by its obligations and 
upheld the President's statement to Enoch Williams, one of the 
leaders of the Pennsylvania Mine Workers, on 1st september and 
hoped that they would return to work. This they did by 
20th September. A row then erupted about non-tmion workers drafted 
in to replace strikers but this was settled by the operators 
agreeing to reinstate the strikers. calm returned to the coalfields 
of Western Pennsylvania in October when a conference at Scranton 
confirmed the new wage levels. It finally appeared that the 
Wilson administration had been able by a judicious mixture of 
strength and concession to achieve at least a truce in industrial 
relations. A truce was all that could be expected. The 
administration had effectivei;y failed to provide any way fOnfard. 
The anthracite and railroad disruptions forcibly demonstrated that 
both sides were determined to pursue their own interests. In 
these industries, at least, compromise did not appear to be an 
immediate prospect. 
The coal industry provided further evidence of continuing 
conflict. In Western Kentucky an outlaw strike had resulted in 
violence which had spilled over into the Virginias. In Alabama. 
the operators had refused to agree to the award of the commission 
which led to a strike which lasted from the autumn of 1920 well into 
the following year. The Governor had intervened to order all 
out-of-state U.M.W. members out of Alabama. In such a situation 
the Secretary felt a further conference would be useless and on 
6th Februa.ry the President admitted that ItI see no sufficient 
rea.son for action on my part" • .59 The President was unable to ta.ke 
the step of enforcing his policy where compromise had collapsed. 
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However, this was no longer the Woodrow Wilson who had 
launched his New Freedom so powerfully in 1913 and. had. taken 
America into a war for democracy. Even before Wilson's own 
collapse and. with this the collapse of Democratic cohesion, the 
strain of the war had had a telling effect on his administration. 
Cabinet members were resigning throughout 1919 and 1920, with 
Thomas Gregory leaving early in 1919 followed by Carter Glass,the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretaries of the Interior, 
Agriculture and. War. The issue of the League served to throw 
the Democratic party into turmoil. Wilson had been the rudder of 
the party since his inauguration but in the face of the 
resignations, the divisive issue of the League and the Treaty, 
and the end of Wilson's power with his illness in 1919, 
disintegration and confusion affected both the administration and 
the party. Wilson had been at the centre of the administrat ion's 
policy for six years. His illness left a vacuum. 
This was serious enough but, in addition, despite Wilson's 
early re-commitment to post-war reform, the disentanglement from 
war-time commitments was the process which dominated administration 
thinking in 1919. A return to peace-time conditions was the 
precondition for further reform. Thus no reform programme had 
been implemented in 1919 which might carry the administration 
forward of its own momentum. He had accepted the codes of the 
N.W.L.B. but showed no enthusiasm for their implementation in 
peace-time. Wilson's labour policy was based largely on his own 
philosophy and on the 1915 report of the Commission on Industrial 
:telations. It had concluded that: 
The only hop~ far the aolut1on of tho tre~enc1ows 
frob1c=o createo1 b-, 1n:1W5trla.l relllt1or.el".1;>15 11ot\ 1n 
the effective Wle of our <!e::O':rat1c l..r..~t~tut1or .. , Ar.1 
&n trying to put. tho probleM of ,ov'emMnt. A.~1 ~(x l"t.y 1n A 
position whore thoy wUl no 1~9rHot.W'b thilt t'YbHc". 1)1 Th~ 
1:~t tMt. lnJUlIt teo 
Increasingly in 1919 the industrial disruption not only 
caused public discomfort but also frustrated the administration's 
priority of adjusting as smoothly as possible to peace-time 
conditions. Thus, the justice of the workers' demands became less 
important than the disruption caused by the actions they took. 
This led to v;ilson's condemnation of the wildcat railroad action 
and the coal strike. The Red Scare had given the period a tension 
which encou-~ed a stronger response, although the Attorney General's 
raids were never aimed at the unions. 
These divergences from Wilson's traditional outlook reflected 
his lack of political sympathy with trade unionism. The crisis 
of ~919 apart, however, the Secretary of Labor remained the main 
formulator of the administration's labour policy. The President 
returned to his advice and posture during 1920 but it was clear 
that the President's view of trade unionism had changed little 
during his term of office. The Bituminous and Anthracite 
Commissions and the Railroad Labor Board reflected the President's 
continuing inability to take a fresh political initiative on the 
question of trade union powers. Although the Second Industrial 
Conference had made significant initiatives on collective bargaining 
and strikes, these were still within the progressive tradition by 
avoiding any federal grant of power to minority groups. President 
Hilson could not politically endorse the principles which unionists 
and employers continued to seek and which continued. to fuel the 
'labor problem'. The outcome of the Wilson administration was a 
failure to provide an atmosphere or framework within which stable 
industrial relations could be achieved. The President, as a moral 
'friend' of unionism was unable to endorse its post-war demands, 
hor was his progressivism capable of absorbing the political 
implications of the movement. Samuel Gompers was willing to accept 
this position to some extent, but he too required some assurance 
of unionism's rights. Wilson viewed the 'labor problem' as some-
thing to be solved, not an issue requiring a fresh political 
perspective. From 1919, while sympathetic to the improvement of 
the general quality of life of working people, in terms of legal, 
economic and political power he wished to institutionalise the 
status quo. 
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The Congress to which President Wilson's speech was presented 
on 19th Y~y 1919 was far from being the eager instrument of execu-
tive policy it had been during the President's first term. The 
1918 mid-term elections had returned the Republican party to power 
in Congress. In the House of Representatives their majority was 
thirty-nine and in the Senate a slim margin of two. It remained to 
be seen to what extent the Republican party would be at loggerheads 
with the President over the labour problem. 
The Republicans in 1919 were bitter towards ilUson. Buoyed 
by the victory, in spite of Hilson's plea for the election of 
candidates faithful to his goals, they were determined to make 
Wilson pay for his partisanship. Republicans were further 
embittered by Wilson's decision to go to Paris personally and by 
the partisan team of advisers he chose to accompany him. Theodore 
Roosevelt's personal pique at being refused a command in Europe 
had also turned him into a bitter critic of the President. Here 
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was a critic '-lho, since his rejection of the Bull Moose nomination 
in 19l6,~Ad been able to reunite his party.l In the opinion of 
many Republicans, including Albert Beveridge, the League of Nations 
was "a real issue • • a winning issue,,2in 1920. It was clear 
that to defeat the League was also to defeat Wilson who Republicans 
assumed would again carry the Democratic banner in 1920. The 
Republican party, highly conscious of the next election, thus 
focused on the League as their weapon for victory and to obstruct 
the President. It is significant too that it should be the 
Senate Republicans who led this campaign. They wished to reassert 
the power of their positions over a President who had dominated the 
Senate for too long. Wilson's 1918 tactic had made it easy for 
Republicans to claim that their opposition to the President was 
motivated by a desire to defeat any attempt to use the war to 
partisan advantage. As Irvine Lenroot of ',.jisconsin wrote to 
Roosevelt on 13th Aprul 1918, "It seems • • we should do everything 
• • to create public sentiment that will make it clear that the war 
carmot and shall not be used for partisan advantage". 3 The 
Republicans' 1918 campaign theme would be continued in the fight 
over the League of Nations into the 1920 campaign. The Republican 
party in 1919 were thus in the happy position of being able to 
equate their partisanship with patriotism in attacking :nlson and 
'his' League. 
That political power was their primary concern in the League 
row was illustrated following the death on 6th January 1919 of 
Theodore Roosevelt. Almost immediately, speculation began about 
the likely nominee in 1920. The Philadelphia Public Ledger began 
a campaign for Senator Philander Knox of Permsylvania. The 
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following month the New York Times wrote of the likely contenders.4 
These included, Knmq General Leonard Wood, who was claiming the 
Roosevelt mantle; Governor F. Lowden of Illinois; Senator Miles 
Poindexter of WashingtonJ and Senators William E. Borah of Idaho, 
Hiram Johnson of California and Warren G. Harding of Ohio, all three 
of whom were either opposed to internationalism or Nilson, or both; 
and. finally ex-President William Howard Taft, a man who supported 
the League. As the New York Times pointed out, the key to the 
nomination and the party's success lay in the outcome of the League 
issue. Given Republicans' preoccupation with the 1920 election it 
was un1L~ely that they would be at all co-operative or interested in 
labour issues in the c~ming sessions of the Sixty-sixth Congress. 
Even on the issue of the League, with its obvious electoral 
possibilities, the Republican party was far from unanimous. 
Senators Borah and J~hnson were the most extreme of the Republican 
opponents of the League. They were fundamentally isolationists 
and would brook no compromise on the League. Senators George Norris 
of Nebraska, senior Republican and progressive, was also a member 
of the group to become known as the Irreconci1ables. A further 
group, the Reservationists, was led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of 
Massachussetts and Knox from Pennsylvania. These men did not object 
to internationalism but did object to any hint of obligation, which 
was of course basic to the League. S There were also several Pro-
League Republicans of major standing in the p1rty such as Senator Reed 
Smoot of utah and. ex-President Taft. Nonetheless, opponents of the 
League predominated in Congress. Despite these divisions, the League 
was an attractive issue in that it disguised the split in the 
party in Congress between progressives and conservatives. It gave 
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the Republicans a greater appearance of unanimity than did any other 
issue, a major consideration for a party with the presidential 
election already firmly fixed in its sights. 
Given this compelling list of advantages and the Republicans' 
preoccupation, it is hardly surprising that domestic issues 
received short shrift in 1919. The Eighteenth Amendment and 
Volstead Acts thus passed with distinctly less controversy than 
might have been expected "as if a sailing ship on a windless ocean 
were sweeping ahead. propelled by some invisible force". 6 The same 
was true of suffrage for women. Detailed criticism. of the Wjlson 
administration's handling of an increasingly difficult industrial 
situation was not forthcoming. Republicans merely condemned the 
government for returning to the "easy negligence of laissez-faire,,7 
in its failure to control inflation or the growing industrial unrest. 
It would have been unwise for Republicans to press this point too 
strongly since the right wing of the party was vociferous in 
advocating the run-down of the government's war-time agencies. Yet 
progressive Republicans, such as Norris and Senator R. La Follette 
of Wisconsin, supported continued federal oversight of the railroads, 
while Borah believed that a continuation of employment agencies were 
8 
"vitally necessary". Clearly if deep divisions were to be avoided, 
then the party had to remain muted on economic issues and questions 
involving the role of the federal government in society in which it 
was largely successful during 1919. Even the notorious Red Scare 
did not become a major issue in Congress. A committee was appointed 
to investigate Bolshevism in the country. The Red Scare remained 
very much a phenomenon associated with the media, public opinion, 
and the Attorney General. 
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This unwillingness to deal with domestic issues was shared by 
the Democrats in Congress. In previous years of the ~n1son adminis-
tration the White House had laid down the policy to be adhered to by 
the party in Congress. Thus the Democratic National Committee early 
in 1919 urged that this support of the administration not only 
continue but that it was "desirable to nurture a spirit in Congress 
which would lead to a more effective and outspoken support of 
administration pOlicies,~.9 Congressional Democrats were content to 
leave the initiative in policy matters to the Executive Branch. In 
their analysis the key factors in the Republican mid-term victory 
had been the German vote in states such as Nebraska, Missouri and 
Ohio and the influenza epidemic. The Committee also believed that 
the war caused. Democrats to suppress their partisanship. They saw 
1918 as an anamolous result for these reasons. With tighter 
organisation and stronger support for the President, victory in 1920 
was a distinct possibility. 
In early 1919 however the President was in Paris and contact 
between the White House and the party was minimal. The League of 
Nations dominated thinking in the ~hite House. The Democrats, 
committed to backing the administration, were being given no 
policy directives on domestic issues. IO This was the congressional 
situation when the President's speech on 20th 11a.y was presented to 
Congress. 
As has already been discussed, ~a1son committed his 
administration to the democratization of industry. Exactly what 
this meant in detail he did not specify, so that the speech, ~hile 
making clear ~Vilson' s continuation of his pre-war policies, gave 
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Congressional Democrats no guidance ~ith regard to legislative 
proposals they might support. Moreover, he made olear in the speeoh 
that he regarded matters with respect to oonditions, health and 
safety, largely as State concerns. Indeed, Wilson's expectation of 
a mutually agreed programme emanating from industry itself tended to 
disoourage any serious consideration of industrial relations by 
Congress. 
Congressional attitudes towards trade unions and towards the 
'labor problem' must be seen within this broader political situation. 
The partisan impera ti vee of the leadership of both parties tended 
to suppress any debate which might reveal deep splits in the ranks. 
The labour issue was frowned upon since it threatened to set 
progressives and oonservatives within both paxties against each 
other. Only when the crisis in industrial relations assumed major 
proportions in late 1919 did it reoeive the serious attention of 
Congress. 
Yet even in earlY' 1919, debates over the role of government in 
the post-war eoonomy revealed that the split between progressives 
and conservatives was too fundamental to be easily overcome. They 
revealed the nature of progressive thinking in Congress in the 
immediate post-war years and the attitude of Congress generally to 
this important indicator of political thinking. They also proved to 
be important in defining who were the 'friends and enemies' of the 
trade union movement in the remaining sessions of the Sixty-sixth 
Congress. 
109 
The meetings of the Education and Labor Committee of the 
Senate in the first half of the year were dominated by the problems 
of the aftermath of the war and, particularly, the extent to which 
the federal government should accept the responsibility for the 
welfare of its population in peace-time. Pursuant of Senate 
resolution S5397, the Committee held hearings on 29th January 
1919 on a bill presented by Republican Senator William Kenyon, of 
Iowa, to provide public works to increase opportunities for 
employment during the period of demobilisation and industrial 
readjustment. ll The bill raised exactly the question described 
above, albeit circumscribed by the proviso that it be for the period 
of readjustment. The issue was one of whether government action 
should be used to interfere directly with the performance of the 
economy and to aid the population. Kenyon was anxious to justify the 
bill in practical terms. IUs questioning of the Second Assistant 
Secretary of Labor, Louis F. Post and Secretary Wilson was confined 
to demonstrating the necessity of the proposal if hardship and 
upheaval were to be avoided. Post strongly supported the proposal. 
In the two months since the end of the war a U.S. Employment Service 
study had shown a rapid increase in labour surplus. In November, of 
lIS cities studied only 12 had shown a surplus, 29 reported continuing 
shortaps, while the remainder reported a roU8h balance. By 
18th January 1919, 18 reported shortages while 55 reported surpluses. 
Seattle, as an example, had suddenly found itself with 8,000 
unemployed workers and this excluded the strikers. Senator 
carrol S. Page reflected his own conservative political stance in 
expressing surprise that a strike could be effective when so many 
idle hands were available. Kenyon however believed that 
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Congressional action on the proposal, given these figures and the 
backing of Wilso~ and Post, was distinctly likely. 
The Chief of the Community Labor Board, confirming Post's 
figures, added that non-war industrial activity had increased by only 
half of one per cent in December. It was clear that the government 
would need to take up the slack until this situation improved. The 
Chairman of the Finance Committee of Chicago City Council also 
backed the bill. He claimed that his city bad already almost 
exhausted its _SO million budget, and that if public vorks vere 
to expand the finance had to come from Washington. Secretary Wilson 
finally added that there was also a need for government activity in 
public works abandoned during the war and, in addition to other 
consequences of the war, a need for railroad construction and 
restocking. 
Despite Kenyon's optimistic appraisal of the CongreSSional 
situation the bill did not get to the floor of the Senate before the 
end of the les8ion. In the following seSSion, and thil time with 
a Republican-controlled Senate and Committee, a similar fate befell 
12 
a bil~ to provide a permanent National Employment system. This 
proposal was heard by a Joint Committee of Education and Labor on 
19th June 1919. Once more the point at issue vas the continuation 
in peace-time of the war-time level of interference by the 
government in the economy. As Secretary Wilson put it to the 
Committee. ttl do not believe that any Government owes any man a 
living, but I do believe that it owes to every man the o~portunit:y 
to earn a living".l) The Secretary was calling explicity for a 
recognition of the government's increasing responsibility to ensure 
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the welfare of the population. Increasingly, equality of opportunity, 
the classic maxim of progressivism., was tending to be interpreted in 
interventionist terms. Again, however, it was the practical rather 
than the philosophical arguments which were employed in support of 
the bill. The market was not itself capable of balancing the supply 
and demand for labour. This J .B. Densmore, Director of U .S.E.S. 
claimed was obvious in time of war but was also true of the peace-
time economy. Three hundred thousand soldiers had already been 
placed. The cost of placement was a mere ¢140 per head, and in 
agriculture particularly where seasonal workers were vital, the 
U.S.E.S. was invaluable. With regard to strikes where employers 
asked for workers, the service would provide men although it 
apprised them first of the situation. The States themselves would 
provide most of the funds on a per capita basis so that the cost 
would be spread evenly. 
On 29th June, F. C. Croxton of the Ohio Employment Service 
added that only a national system could properly assimilate the 
employment levels throughout the nation. He also attacked the 
private employment bureaux. Senator Kenyon intervened to scotch 
the idea that the U.S.E.S. was being used as political machinery. 
He asserted that it was run purely as a public service. 
Thomas Blanton, a Democrat from Texas 9th District, then 
attacked the U.S.E.S. as a union protector, and an edifice for the 
spread of trade unionism. He cited a case of apparent victimisation 
of a government employee by the U.S.E.S. for her refusal ~o join the 
Federal Employees' Union. Blanton also accused the U.S.E.5. of 
political motivation in ending hiring by individual fims in 
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Philadelphia and Atlantic City. 'lb.e Chairman, with the backing of 
Kenyon and Representatives Ira Hersey, a Republican from Maine t 
John McCrate, a Republican from New York and Democrat John Casey 
of Pennsylvania, dismissed Blanton's accusations as outwith their 
jurisdiction and not pertinent to the bill. The bill received strong 
backing from the A.F. of L. Nonetheless it never became law 
despite the strong bipartisan support it received. The office was 
a Democratic creation and yet it had been Kenyon in the Senate and 
John I. Nolan, a Republican from California, who had put the bUl 
before Congress. 
'lb.e following month the Senate Committee was dealing with yet 
another bill involving the question of government's role in the 
post-war economy. The Minimum Wage Bill was IX) t a war-time policy 
now being assessed for its suitability. It was instead a long-
standing issue and a bill had twice passed the House in the previous 
Congress by thumping margins.l4 The Senate had failed to act on the 
bill as yet although it had been first introduced in 1913. The bill 
waS for government employees only but progressives believed that once 
levels were settled, it would act as a barometer for the rest of 
the economy bY' enacting the principle of a living waee. 
Conservatives in this instance, however, had practicality on their 
side. Democrat Hoke Smith of Georgia questioned the right of 
menial workers to earn more than skilled people. Lutber Steward 
for the National Federation of Federal Employees replied that a 
minimum wage would require a reclassification of wage scales 
throughout the government system. The 'Vast coat of the bill was 
too much for conservatives to contemplate. Republican Josiah O. 
Wolcott of Delaware then challenged the whole basis of a living 
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wage. He challenged the assumption that the living wage should 
be calculated solely on the earnings of the father. Might not sons 
or his wife be working? In which case they might earn more than 
the so-called minimum. The hearings continued into October w1 th it 
becoming increasingly apparent that conservatives on the committee 
could accept neither the principle nor the cost. They were 
rejecting the idea that the government could legislate on such a 
thing as a minimum wage or indeed that a minimum wase was legi tima te. 
As in Woloott's objection, the idea that the poor might actually 
earn more than a minimum wase appeared reprehensible to conservatives. 
No action was taken on this bill in the session. 
Although not directly concerning industrial relations or trade 
unions, these bills raised the issue of the government's responsi-
bility for the welfare of the less privileged. Attitudes on this, 
the central point o! divergence between conservative and progressive 
political philosophies, were related to attitudes towards trade 
~ioniB1D and the labour problem. What the hearings on these bills 
revealed was that they split Congressmen into philosophical camps 
rather than party allegiancies. Conservatives sought an end to the 
government's war-time commitments and a return to an unfettered market 
economy based on their belief that what bene!ited business would also 
ultimately benefit the rest o! the population. Progressives were 
less sanguine. They !eared business wealth would corrupt the demo-
cratic system. For progressives the question was now whether the 
pre-war re!orms had actually created their idea o! a just and equal 
society. It was clear that there were many among them who still 
!elt that reform was necessary and that government initiative was 
required. Thus Democrat Smith was more akin to Senator Wolcott, 
114 
Kenyon closer to John Casey, a Pennsylvania Democrat on this issue. 
This resulted in a reluctance of Democrats and Republicans to air 
bills which were so palpably divisive. 
By October the League was a far more politically attractive 
issue to exploit as, for Republicans, was the "cold calculating 
machiavellian tyrantn15in the White House. Without party guidance, 
the subject of federal int~ntion in the economy was thus left to 
the individual conscience. It had yet to become clear whether a 
progressive position on the role of the governmen~ derived largely 
from the Bull Moose platform of 1912, would be reflected in any 
new initiatives to reform industrial relations. Up to this time 
Congress had also been reluctant to deal with the question of labour's 
rights in industrial relations - the same divergence between 
progressive and conservative being likely to occur. 
However, the strike in the steel industry was too large a 
dispute for Congress to shelve. In October it undertook an 
investigation into the steel strike. The investigation was in two 
parts; the first in Washington, the second in the centre of the 
strike region in Pennsylvania. Despite the immense amount of 
testimony that the Committee listened to, no suggestions were 
forthcoming. 16 Both sides in the dispute stuck firmly to their guns. 
The Committee itself became increasingly divided as the two different 
arguments became understood. Senator Borah for instance was a 
Western progressive whose interest in labour issues had previously 
been slight. He accepted unions as organisations seeking equality, 
but he wrote to the editor of the Southern Labor Journal that "I 
never have advocated the right of a labouring man when he quits 
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work to prevent another labourer from going to work ... 17 By 
loth November 1919, after the steel investigation, Borah's position 
had shifted to reflect the conundrum which the labour question posed 
for progressives. As he wrote to Idaho State Senator T. Stanford, 
18 he was in "entire sympathy" with Judge Gary's refusal to countenance 
a closed shop, or to have the dispute arbitrated. When Gary 
"imperiously rejectedn19 the o union representatives' call for 
collective bargaining however Borah felt he was unjustified, stating 
his belief in the risht of trade unions to organise. Borah was thus 
on the horns of a dilemma. He did not sympathise with union power 
politically, but in terms of justice believed that unions had a right 
to recognition. If unions had no alternative but to strike in order 
to win recognition, Borah could sympathise with their moral position 
but he could not accept the sweeping power legitimacy might bestow. 
Neither could he, nor progressives generally, contemplate 
legislation which would force employers to recognise trade unions. 
There was a gap between moral and political su~port which progres-
sives were unable to bridge. 
Clearly, compromise was the course most favoured by Borah, a 
oourse which Wilsonian progressives in the Democratic party were 
trying to follow at the Industrial Conference. The problem of 
industrial relations in 1919 forced progressives to question the 
thrust of Wilsonian reform and raised the question ~whether trade 
union power was a necessary component of a just, sgalitarian 80ciety. 
It signalled a"drift from Wilsonian progressivism to the Bull Moose 
platform of a balanoe of power groups by a more affirmative state. 
Balance remained the keynote of progressivism, but the basis was now 
under review as a result of the 1919 crisis. This situation in 
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progressive thinking was a contributing factor to the inability of 
Congress to legislate on, or even devise, a coherent policy with 
regard to labour. Sympathy for unionism was not sufficient to 
overcome doubt about the advisability of a grant of power to unions. 
Progressives sought reforms for the benefit of all the people and not 
to put power in the hands of any predominant group. The variegated 
nature of the progressive movement also prevented any new initiative 
on unionism in 1919. 
The Democratic party had supported the Wilson reform programme. 
Robbed of the leadership of their President and without power in 
Congress after 1918, it Iemained to be seen whether the party could 
maintain its cohesion, and whether its pro~ssivism could develop 
beyond the parameters defined by Wilson. In the Republican party, 
progressivism encompassed Senators La Follette and Norris, men who 
had taken part in the 1908 Insurgency against Speaker Joseph Cannon 
and who wholeheartedly supported the affirmative role envisaged for 
the government in the Bull Moose platform. Other progressives had 
followed Theodore Roosevelt back into the Republican party and a 
milder progressivism. However incapable of any new initiatives on 
the power of unions at this time, all remained firm defenders of 
trade unionism as it stood and its demands for better treatment from 
employers. In the remainder of the session they were called upon to 
be such as the labour problem came to the floor of Congress. 
If progressives were in an ambivalent position with regard to 
trade union power, this was not the mood of conservative members of 
Congress in 1919. Although quiescent for much of the year, the 
spate of strikes by autumn, the Boston Police strike, the threat of 
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a rail stoppage, the steel strike and finally the threatened coal 
strike provoked their hostility regardless of intra-party damage. 
Their desire to protest against union disruption was encouraged by 
the action of the administration in bringing out a restraining order 
against the U.M.W. under the war-time Lever Act. They hoped that this 
signalled the end of union sympathy in the administration. The uproar 
which this action aroused was due to trade union claims that the unions 
had been given assurances by the Attorney General Thomas Gregory that the 
Act would not be used against them. For the Democratic party this was a 
major issue of policy. The deep division between the progressive and 
oonservative thinking over the proper policy towards trade unions was 
therefore first aired in 1919 inside the Democratio party. 
Speaking on behalf of conservative Democratic opinion, Senator 
Charles Thomas of Colorado strongly backed the administration's 
deoision. Whatever assurances unions may have received with regard to 
the Lever Act "the coal strike carried that policy beyond the bounds 
20 
of endurance". Indeed, Sena tor Thomas went on, the s trike be ing 
tithe lawful carrying out of no legitimate purposelt2~d even gone 
beyond the scope ot Seotion 20 of the Clayton Act. This strike was 
one which had to be prevented by whatever means the administration 
could find. The Senator believed that strikers may "disregard 
contraots, oompel others to strike, prevent others from taking his 
plaoe and oontinuing operations •• may destroy property and terrorize 
22 
communities" and that lithe word itselt implies force, violence lurks 
within it. AggreSSion is its synonym.,,23 He went further to 
link unions to the Red Scare by olaiming that 6,408 strikes during 
the war dem~nstrated their disloyalty. It was time to stop 
conciliating such a movement. 
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The Senator went on to develop this theme the following day. 
He read the Senate a letter from Leslie Shaw, the Democratic 
Governor of Colorado, which expressed the opinion shared by the 
24 Senator that trade unions sought "absolute control of America". 
The progressive attempt to ensure equality had gone too far in 
giving unions the privileges it enjoyed. It was now abusing these 
privileges to destroy the American system and its traditions of 
equality and individual freedom, in an attempt to dominate the 
nation with its own 'collectivist' organisation. The only means 
by which this situation could be reversed was by ending this 
conciliation of 'collectivist' trade unions and reasserting 
individualism. 
No man must be forbidden to associate himself with 
others engaged in the same enterprise, nor required 
to do so • • • Each must have the right to quit 
temporarily or permanently, and his employer must have 
the reciprocal right to suspend. or discharge.25 
In other words, unions should be limited to the size of the 
business in which they worked and should not have the right to 
picket or prevent strikers from simply being replaced. In this 
policy the Senator was advocating something strikingly similar to 
the proposals made by the business group at the Industrial 
Conference. As a means' of publicising its policy the Conference 
could be considered a success. 
This bitterly anti-union position was framed in terms of 
individual liberty; the American way as opposed to an alien 
collectivist theory - "Shall an organized minority dictate to an 
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unorganized majority?,,26 This epitomised the nature of conservative 
thinking. For them individual liberty was the very fount of the 
American system. It was this which actually ensured equality and 
justice. The disruption of 1919 was an example of the consequences 
of progressive meddling with this tradition. People were already 
equal. By giving trade unions privileges, equality and liberty 
were destroyed with the economic vitality of the nation. It 
was this political philosophy which predicated conservative 
opposition to unionism per see Its ar~~ents exactly coincided 
with business arguments about the evils of unions. The system was 
a natural one and the people fared according to their ability, 
regardless of the futility of individuals in an economy dominated 
by giant corporations. 
Yet the progressive movement had grown up precisely around 
this widely-perceived danger posed by large corporations' power. 
They believed that individual liberty was no longer an automatic 
assurance of equality and justice in such an industrial system. 
Individual liberty had to be considered in the context of the 
latter two maxims. Trade unions were necessary as a balancing 
power in industry to ensure these tenets of democracy and to 
improve the conditions of working people. This position was . 
reflected by Democratic representative Robert Thomas from 
Kentucky's third district in the House, in defending the U.M.N. 
and condemning the administration's action. The premise of his 
argument was an acceptance of the right of men to organise and 
voice their grievances. Thomas denied that the U.M.W. had any 
intention of destroying the nation and pointed to the 7100 million 
Liberty Bonds bought by the union and 60,000 members of the union 
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who had served during the war. Thomas was determined to 
concentrate on the facts of the case which he was sure would 
prove the justice of the mineworkers' unrest. He attacked 
conservative claims that the miners earned adequate wages and 
claimed that "every statement I have seen about the matter is 
mere assertion and guesswork".27 Citing the figures of the 
Department of Labor for his own state of Kentucky they showed 
an average yearly coal output of 804 tons per man. At a rate 
of 78/77.5 cents per ton a mineworker's wage amounted to 
~623. 89 per annum. still more distressing was that their 
tonnage was limited by the inadequate supply of coal cars. 
Mineworkers' wages were not only meagre but were so due to 
factors including seasonality of demand over which they them-
selves had no power. In such straits the justice of the 
miners' position was undeniable. Thomas believed their aims 
were legitimate and deserving of more sympathetic treatment than. 
that meted out by the administration. 
As if to confirm Robert Thomas's attack on conservative 
figures, Thomas Blanton then produced facts on average wages in 
West Virginia, gleaned from mine operators. The figures of a 
Department which "sought to defend the lawbreaking, anarchistic 
28 leaders of the cruel coal strike" could not be trusted. His 
figures gave monthly wages in West Virginia in the main unorganised 
fields as ~25J to ~547 per month - almost as much as Kentucky 
miners earned in a year. It should be said that Blanton was the 
most consistent and virulent opponent of unionism in Congress 
though his very extremism served to undermine the credibility of 
his arguments in the eyes of his colleagues. 
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In spite of Blanton's extremism it was clear that conserva-
tives, in linking individual liberty to anti-unionism, had 
developed a powerful political argument. The conservative view 
was that by enfctCing union membership as a condition of 
employment (the closed shop) the individual was denied the right 
to choose. Individual liberty was also violated where strikers 
prevented replacements from taking on the work. The strike weapon, 
by threatening the nation with discomfort and disruption, undermined 
the political system by winning demands in extra-parliamentary 
fashion. Individual liberty, freedom of choice and the proper 
working of democracy were under threat from trade unions, and 
thereby justice and equality. Conservatives, by using the language 
of progressivism enshrined by the WUson administration, were able 
to forge an influential argument against unions. As the Republican-
controlled Sixty-sixth Congress continued it became obvious that the 
undoing of Wilson policies in labour matters was.tr~atened not by 
Republicans but by bipartisan attacks by conservatives. 
The increasing crisis in industrial relations was being 
pa.:raJ.leled by the rising temperatures in Congress. Early in 1919 
this issue rarely reached the floor of either House. As has been 
demonstrated, other questions held more political attraction. The 
continuing dialectic between progressives and conservatives was 
confined to the committees. Here, however, it was clear that 
progressives were not being restrained by the Wilsonian style. 
They were demonstrating a swing towards the Bull :100se acceptance 
of the extended state; a more direct assumption of responsibility 
for the welfare of the population by the government under the 
influence of the war-time experience. Although progressives 
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preferred to prove the desirability and need for such measures, 
they were underpinned by a continuing concern for progressive 
beliefs in equality and justice. There was a growing mood implicit 
in these proposals that these goals would not be achieved by the 
to/ilson mode. Individual liberty could no longer assure these 
aims, even given a regulatory framework. Direct intervention ~ 
the government was required. Up untU this time it was not clear 
to what extent this changing progressive perception of the proper 
definition of equality and justice affected their attitude towards 
the question of trade union rights. As the row over the invocation 
of the Lever Act revealed, however, the mood of congressional 
progressivism was at odds with the White House view. It appeared 
that there was an acceptance of even this action by the U.M.W. in 
the belief that equality in industry could only be achieved if 
trade unionism was allowed full use of strike action in order to 
bring business to the conference table. They believed equality 
had been achieved in industrial relations but it would require 
some years perhaps for the business community to appreciate the 
fact. The power of unions must be allowed to make employers 
appreciate the new situation. The attitude among some progressives 
was that unrest should not be suppressed since it was justified by 
business intransigence and the justice of the economic demands of 
the unions. These congressional progressives were in close 
sympathy with the unions but were not proposing to institute 
further reform. Acceptance of union power by business was the only 
way to reach settled industrial relations. 
This attitude had been admirably demonstrated by Kentucky's 
Thomas in his condemnation of the use of the Lever Act in addition 
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to his outrage at the government's flouting of its commitments. 
Another promiment Democratic spokesman on unionism was Alabama's 
Representative Genrge Huddleston. In December Huddleston gave a 
classic example of the progressive position on the trade union issue. 
He attempted to separate any political implications from the dispute. 
Yet the acceptance of unionism was itself based upon political 
views of the society. Holding that trade union unrest had 
primarily economic origins, the conservative attack "tends only to 
convert it from industrial unrest to political unrest".29 
Asserting that industrial equality could no longer be provided by 
individual liberty, the organisation of trade unions was necessary 
to ensure this. The strike weapon was the only truly effective 
method whereby unions could have any true equality since it gave 
them bargaining power. It was their one assurance of "a square 
deal for the wage earner". 30 If the nation were to espouse a 
faith in equality then it must accept these union rights. The 
alternatives were enslavement or a socialist government which would 
rule on all issues. The unions themselves did not wish either 
alternative, neither did progressives. Therefore the progressive 
task was to ensure equality by allowing unions their rights. 
If this were done then economic unrest would diminish and 
political unrest would not exist. For in granting them equality 
the government would have performed a task which the nation as 
well as the unions belieVed was proper. As Huddleston put it 
'~e may always trust the citizen to love and defend the 
government which deserves to be loved and defended".3l 
The defence of unions was now identified as a basic test of 
progressives' commitment to their belief in equality in a free 
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society in which the government had the role of ensuring the 
effectiveness of the legal basis of that equality. Progressives 
must accept industrial disruption as a. price to be paid in the first 
instance while both sides of industry came to &Ccapt the new basis 
of equality. This was in harmony with the progressive concem over 
the increasing political and economic power of business. Regula.tion 
they had agreed, was required. Unionism, however, ~itted their 
belief in the minillum of government where their goals could be 
achieved by other means. Compulsion was not part of the progressive 
thinking on industrial relations. Justice required that trade 
unions be allowed to use strikes. This was the basic argument 
behind & firmer progressive support of the trade union movement in 
Congress. Their continued defence of unionism in 1919 rested on 
their belief that unions had still achieved neither equality nor 
justice. This rested primarUy on economic issues of wages, 
ccmditions 8Jld hours, and a support of unions in the pursuit of 
these·&ima through strike action. They continued to deny that 
industrial unrest had any political overtones in spite of the fact 
that both parties were split deeply over the issue. It remained to 
be seen whether progressives still held enough power to defend 
these beliefs in Congress in the face of the conservative attack. 
It was clear that on the labour issue, party lines were irrelevant. 
Up to this time the session bad. yet to vote on any labour 
issues. Progressives had been quick to defend the Department of 
l&bor from attack from ThoJDILS Blanton but had been unable to 
prevent the tms8&t1ng of Wisconsin's socialist Representative. 
Victor Berger. The key test of Congressional opinion over the 
'labor problem' came in the debate on the labour provisions in the 
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bill returning the rail.rcs.d.e to private ownership. In the Senate, 
Albert Cummins, Republican, Iowa, had presented his bill for the 
prlvatisation of the railroads. He quickly made clear that his 
belief that the railroads should be returned to private ownership 
had. no ideological basis. He believed that private ownership w,a.s 
more economically viable than public ownership. This was in itself 
a dangerous assertion. George Norris immediately attacked Cummins, 
arguing that his belief was unfounded since government ownership 
had never been given a fair trial. Before Cummins could draw such 
conclusions it was necessary to extend government ownership to 
evaluate the performance in pea.c_time conditions. This position 
was being pushed by ex-Director General McAdoo and was strongly 
supported by the railroad brotherhoods. However, another Section 
of the bill was causing greater hostility from the unions. This 
was a provision that the industrial relations on the railroads be 
subject to compulsory arbitration. Senator La. Follette in attack-
ing the provision gave a clear exposition of the progressive 
posture and reinforced Hu:idleston's opinion. 
The very purpose of this provision is to prevent strikes, 
and. the very benefit which the employee derives from the 
strike is t.hat it gives him collective strength in 
grappling with the great corporations to bring them to 
a serious consideration of the demands labor makes. J2 
Progressi vas had identified the strike, as the Industrial 
Conference had, as a necessary component of genuine collective bLrg-
aining. yet Progressives were not a.verse to conciliation ma.chinery. 
As the President was aiming for such machinery in the belief that, 
once round a. table, reason and common interest could emerge, so 
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many progressives in Congress shared his perception. However, many 
could not countenance the denial of the right to strike however 
much they might desire conciliation and compromise. Senator Borah 
found the provision "unsound in law and unwiee in policy")) 
Senator Cummins' bill had included a measure proposing that 
the railroad workers have two seats on the board of directors of 
the railroads. The Cummins' bill was a curious mixture, denying 
unions power on the one hand, allowing them a voice in the overall 
affairs of industry on the other. A voice in industry had always 
been labour's wish. It was the root of President Wilson's hopes 
for democratization. They sought a voice in matters pertinent to 
labour rather than overall policy. If unions had power they could 
then influence overall policy by the nature of their own aims. 
Cummins' quite radical proposal was in fact struck from the bill on 
a motion by Senator Henry Myers, Democrat, Montana. In doing so 
he argued that business must be allowed to run its own affairs. 
Myers and Cummins agreed, however, that the railroads were too vital 
to the welfare of the nation to allow industrial disputes to bring 
them to a halt and thereby strangle the national economy. The 
railroads, Myers argued, were the arteries of the body of America. 
Wi th regard to the railroads, the Q.uestion was "whether the 
Government or organized labor is more powerful,,)4 This was the 
argument which allowed the provision to remain in the Senate bill. 
It had powerful influence by dint of the fact that President 
Wilson had invoked the Lever Act against the U.M.W. Furthermore, 
it also upheld the principle of equal! ty among power groups in 
society. The railroad strike was a weapon too powerful to be 
condoned. 
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In fact 'public welfare' was a double-edged principle. It 
could be used, as cor~ervatives wished, to suppress the activities 
of a group liable to inconvenience the rest of the nation. Conversely, 
it could be used by progressives to support claims for nationalization, 
as· had been done in the case of the railroads. The difference was in 
whether the right of workers were Been as part of public welfare. 
More important for the success of this provision was the fact that 
this principle split the progressive movement with regard to labour. 
This had occurred in the case of the Kansas Court of Industrial 
Relations. 35 Some, such as Albert Beveridge, had welcomed the idea. 
Other progressives, such as La Follette and Huddleston, opposed the 
move as a suppression of liberty, an argument endorsed by conservative 
politicians since business was equally under its rule. For progressives 
supportive of this idea, order and the public welfare were the priorities. 
For other progressives, concern for the rights of the unions and the 
independent power and self-worth of the working people took 
precedence. If progressives in the Senate appeared to be shifting 
to an acceptance of the arbitration provision in the Cummins' bill, 
in the House the mood was swinging in the opposite direction. An 
amendment from Congressman S. Anderson, Republican from 
Minnesota proposed a board of mediation be set up in addition to a 
labour board in order to defuse minor disputes and supercede 
compulsory arbitration. By early 1920, the Senate was beginning to 
agree with La Follette's judgment that compulsory arbitration would 
merely "accentuate and redouble the demand for Government owner-
. 6 
ship".3 The diminution of tension in 1919 with the ending of the 
. 
coal crisis had also reduced tension in Congress. A move was made 
by Lodge to insert a 6O-day cooling-off period as a compromise 
measure but it became clear that a joint conference would not agree 
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to either proposal. In conference both these proposals and the 
provision of compulsory arbitration were struck out leaving only the 
original structure of the board. 
The importance of the battle over the labour provisions of 
the Transportation Act was that in the real test of progressive 
strength it had been able to frustrate the aims of conservatives 
to curb union power. The railroad brotherhoods were far from happy 
wi th the plan of submitting disputes to a board of public 
representatives. The decisions were not binding however and the 
machinery offered no threat to and might even encourage the 
expansion of union organisation in the industry. The record vote 
on the conference report on the Esch-Cummins Bill un!ortunatelj 
affords no indication o! the actual size of progressive strength on 
the labour provision. In the House, while progressives such as 
. 
Charles Linthicum in Illinois and Frederick Zihlman o! Maryland 
supported the report, Thomas and Alabama Democrat William B. 
Bankhead, Republican Edward Browne of Wisconsin and Huddleston 
opposed i~. The bill was a complex one. Progressive opposition 
was centred on issues such as return guarantees and indeed the 
issue of prlvatisation. What the vote pOints up is a split between 
radical progressives and moderate progressives on the bill as a 
whole. All that can be said on the outcome of the bill is that 
on labour issues the progressives together carried sufficient 
weight and unanimity to block any conservative attacks on the 
unions. While this was demonstrated, it also became apparent in 
the record vote that progressivism sheltered varying degrees of support 
for unionism which would make ~~imity on any further initiatives on 
labour issues unlikely.J7 
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In fact by 1920 initiative was firmly in the hands of the 
conservatives who were tmwilling to abandon their campaign against 
tmionism at this point. They now attempted to end. all industrial 
action by attacking picketing or any attempt to prevent strike-
breaking as abridgements of individual choice, both of the 
. employer and the strikebreakers. Senator Thomas had followed this 
argument earlier in the session and . it was also at the centre of 
the principles which the business group had presented to the 
Industrial Conference. Miles Poindexter of Washington proposed. an 
anti-strike bill which came to the floor of the Senate soon after 
the anti-strlke provision of the Cummins bill had been defeated. 
He was one of the leading anti-tmion spokesmen in the Republican 
party. His bill was based on the idea that a strike, as a protest 
against conditions of employment, was simply a quitting of 
employment and did not "affect in any way the right of any 
individual to quit his emp10yment ... 38 The bill made illegal any 
organised effort to dam8gedellberately the trade or property of the 
firm involved in the dispute. In other words, the bill sanctioned 
strikebreaking, in fact refusing to recognise that strikes even 
existed. This flew directly in the face of the statement by the 
Industrial Conference that a strike was not simply a. leaving of 
employment. Even Senator Lodge, now in favour of the idea of a 
cooling-off period, was forced to admit the inadvisabUity of the 
sophistry which claimed to allow strikes while actually making them 
illegal. It appeared from this that Consress was becoming less 
hostUe towaJ:ds unions. 
This trend. was confirmed by the de1:ate on an amendment by 
Senator Myers to the Stmdry Appropriations bill which attempted 
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to ban any federal employees joining unions affiliated with the 
American Federation of Labor. His supporting argument was that it 
was inconceivable that employees of the national service could be 
loyal in that service if they also were members of organisations 
whose aims were likely to clash with those of the state. Reflecting 
the growing Congressional distaste of the conservative anti-union 
position, Senator Irvine Lenroot, Republican, Wisconsin asked 
'~en has the American Federation ot Labor become an outlaw? There 
ought to be a stop to the baiting of organized labor.,,39 Lenroot 
was tar from being an independent of the La Follette and Norris 
stripe. He was a faithful Republican betore he joined the 1908 
Insurgency and remained loyal thereafter. This opinion thus 
reflected reasonably well the view of mild progressives in Congress 
that trade unions were far from Bubversive or that they posed any 
threat in their actions to the state. The result of the vote on the 
amendment was that while 35 voted apinst, only three supported the . 
proposal. They were Myers himself, Senator F.E. Warren, Republican, 
Wyoming and Senator Thomas of Colorado. The conservative position 
was becoming increasingly exposed as an extreme One which progressives, 
both Republicans and Democrats, could not accept. The anti-union 
position was held by a small minority, however vociferous and 
vituperative. 
This tendency in the Senate was being para11e11ed by events 
in the House.' Consideration of the appropriations for the 
Department of Labor gave Blanton the opportunity once more to attack 
the Division of Conciliation as an agent of union expansion. To 
offset that tendency he urged that Itthis particular branch of the 
Department of Labor ought to recognize what is known in the 
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United. states as the principle of the open shop."4O This, together 
with an attempt to increase the appropriations for the Department 
of Justice to ca.rry out its campaign against radicals, caused 
John J. casey, a fellow Democrat from Pennsylvania, to wam 
Blanton to "stop playing politics with this all important labor 
41 issue. " In fact it was clear that backing of tmionism was a 
political" position. Despite such attacks the House voted. increased. 
aJ)l)ropriations of ¢SO,OOO for the Division. Simeon Fess, Republican, 
Ohio, also proposed. a ¢25,000 increase in the appropriation for the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The reasoning behind the proposals was 
that the Department of Labor was the key government instrument in 
seeking peace in industry and as such should not be crippled. The 
progressives in the House, after successfully beating off the 
conservative attacks, appeared to be ta.Idng a tentative initiative 
aver the 'labor problem'. 
When the bill reached. the Senate it was James Phelan, a 
Democrat from California who introduced the motion for an extra 
appropriation which James Nolan, Republican, California, had done in 
the House. In proposing the amendment he argued that, "It does not 
seem right at this moment, when the di:fficulties ahead of us are 
many and not insignificant to cripple in any manner a bureau which 
42 had demonstrated its success. n Atlee Pomerene, his Democratic 
colleague from Ohio, supported these sentiments. The main threat 
to the success of this provision, however, was not anti-union 
attitudes but a growing dema.nd. in COIIgreSs and the administration 
for an economy drive. This served to defeat the amendment so that 
only 1100,000 was appropriated, which was the amount the 
Appropriations Committee of the House had originally proposed. This 
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illustrated that the labour problem never existed in a vacuum. 
Besides political attitudes, other contemporary issues inevitably 
influenced the outcome on votes pertaining to labour. As the session 
drew to a close the threat to lmionism from a conservative backlash 
proved largely an empty one. The Poindexters, Blantons and Thomas's 
were flmdamentally out of step with Congressional opinion, which 
had treated the labour crisis of 1919 with relative equanimity. 
Progressives proved resolute in the defence of trade unions' right 
to exist and the justice of their claims for improvements in wages 
and conditions. It was clear that this was becoming regarded as an 
established norm. What did cause some wavering among Congressmen 
had been the issue of preventing lmdue disruption and inconvenience 
arising from industrial disputes. Here signs of a split in 
progressivism were evident, depending on tM depth, of support for 
the trade union movement. In the final analysis Congress supported 
the status quo in industrial relati ons. 
The real difficulty, however, was that there was no notion 
among progressives of extending these rights. Essentially the 
Wilsonian reforms on labour had reflected progressive opinion. 
Indeed unionism wished no more now than to be allowed to opel:8.te 
under the existing reforms. In this they had the backing of 
progressives committed to trade unions. other progressives shifted 
their concern from union rights to an attempt to institute a system 
of machinery through which industrial disputes would be minimised 
and the possibilities of conciliation and compromise increased. 
Advanced progressive thinking had already shifted focus towards 
a broader social policy and questioned their perception of 
equality, reflected in the Nolan Minimum Wage Bill, voted for 
IJJ 
reconsideration in March 1920, and the proposal for a national 
employment system. It remained to be seen whether this· 
development in progressive thinking would also influence attitudes 
on unionism and how widespread this development might become 
Dong progreSsi vee. 
The state of moderate progressive opinion in Congress as the 
session ended was reflected accurately by a joint statement made by 
Senators Robert Owen of Okla.homa. and David Walsh of Massachussetts, 
both of whom were Democrats. If it were to establish and ensure 
equality in industry the administration must "suhBtitute Govemment 
for private distribution of the necessary commodities of our 
people. ,,43 This was a renewed call for government control of the 
railroads and increasing government control on prices and profits. 
With regard to the 'labor problem' Owen and Walsh backed the policy 
of their President. 
Fair wages, respectful treatment, reasonable hours, 
safety, sanitory oonditions, collective bargaining and 
the right to be represented by counsel of i~s own 
choice should not be denied.44 
A strong confirmation of progressive support for union claims, they 
believed this to be the basis of an equa.l, just, industrial system. 
Owen and Walsh also called for "some intelligent co-operation for 
the protection of the people against highly organized special 
interests. ,,4.5 
Despite progressive support for unionism, a fear of inordinate 
power still haunted the moderates' thinking and continued to rule 
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their attitude to l.Dlions. Progressives supported unions because they 
were one component of a system of equality, not the vanguard of a 
movement to win the reward due to the producers of the nation's 
wealth. Moderate progressive attitudes to l.Dlions were predicated 
stUl on moral imperatives of equality and justice, which they 
believed had largely been achieved. They might defend union rights 
but they did not perceive any avenue for further legislative action. 
Settled industrial relations was now a matter of custom and habit. 
Moderate progressives however did not advocate the complete freedom 
of unionism. They wished to foster agreement as soon as possible to 
prevent disruption and disorder. This was the principle implicit 
in the RaUroad labor Boaxd and the Industrial Conferences. More 
radical progressives were less concerned about disruption. The 
exercise of power, in their opinion, was necessary in order to bring 
business to accept tmionism's legality. There was thus a difference 
between the two attitudes, albeit significant only in crises. 
Besides this ambivalence apparent in 1919 and the different 
priorities held, other factors of a more practical nature stood 
between progressivism and a development of thinking on trade 
tmionism. As has been noted, there were progressives in both the 
major parties. This was a major obstacle to progressive coherence 
at any time. In 1920, election year, it was even more so. The 
focus of both pa.rties in 1920 was on the election and the League of 
Nations, as has already been discussed. Thus, while the labour 
issue was increasingly threatening to split both pa.rties, the 
issue of the League had a tendency to unite the pa.rties once more. 
With the end;of Congress and the debates on labour there, and with 
no major industrial disputes at the time, the election campa.ign 
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began in earnest, attention swinging back to the League issue and 
away from industrial relations. This brought progressives such as 
:Sorah and Norris into the Republican mainstream and had a similar 
effect on the Democratic party. To be sure, this situation did not 
end progressive support for unions but it did serve to deflect 
debate from the subject in the election year. 
Indeed. for Republicans, sensing unhappiness in the nation, any 
debate on particular issues might actually hinder rather than help 
their chances of victory. Phila.nder Knox' s keynote speech at the 
Republican Convention set the tone for the campaign to follow. 
Their main target should be "the egoist of the White House" who had. 
"demanded uncontrolled. power" in 1918. He had also attempted. to 
force the League and Treaty on the nation. The effect of his 
obsession wit~ foreign policy had. been that, "The practical 
administration of domestic affairs is allowed to drift by neglect 
while the practical administration of foreign affairs is hampered 
by vague idealism ... 46 The Republicans would follow a "wisely 
progressive" path in future, one which looked to the welfare of all 
the people. This was an approach which all the prospective nominees, 
Lowden, Wood, Harding, hoped to satisfy. Only Poindexter had based. 
his campaign for the nomination on an anti-labour position. In 
Pierre, South Dakota he said that the two main issues of the 
election were ''National Independence and • • • Industrial 
Independence. The one is menaced by Internationalism and the other 
by the closed shop. ,,47 As the Red Scare ebbed so too did Poindexter's 
chances, as did those of Attorney General Palmer in the Democratic 
party. 
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senator Hi:ram Johnson of California hoped to carry the party 
for progressivism and isolationism, a hope which never looked likely 
to succeed. In 1920, Republicanism was not seeking a positive 
identity. Even the League was an issue which the Republicans could 
not agree on. The party in Congress might be able to do so but to 
the party outside Congress, with men such as Taft and Herbert Hoover 
and C.E. Hughes, could not. The Chicago Convention gave Wood a 
significant lead over Lowden in the early ballots while J ohnsan 
got the progressive votes. Wood satisfied the ex-Roosevelt 
progressives who had abandoned the Bull Moose. Lodge, however, was 
not pleased by the continuing slow accumulation of delegates for 
Wood, and even less enamoured of the increasing strength of 
Illinois' Lowden to whom many Johnson votes were by then drifting. 
Lodge overruled the floor and adjoumed the Convention. Johnson 
refused the Vice Presidency under either Lowden's or Wood's 
leadership and thus threatened the Convention with a stalemate. The 
senate leadership was unable to reach any conclusion as to a 
favourite. Reconvening next day, there was a gradual growth in 
Hal:ding's strength and with the assertion by Smoot that Harding was 
his choice, the bandwagon for him got under way. In fact it was 
Connecticut which got the l:andwagon going by voting for Harding 
against the instructions of Senator Frank B, Bra.ndegee. 
Harding was from Ohio; he had supported Lodge on the Foreign 
Relations Committee and had said nothing significant on labour issues. 
As a Senator in a time when the Senate was attempting to regain power, 
he was available by dint of the direct election of Senators which 
demonstrated his ability to win votes. The nomination of Harding on 
the tenth l:allot ensured that the party was not committed to any particular 
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policy, since Harding had established his position by personality. 
He was, moreover, little lOlown to the nation at large, but his 
personality could not have been more of a contrast with that of 
President WUson which was an important consideration. "Harding 
had demonstrated the more attractive qualities of a compromise 
candidate. ,,48 
Meanwhile, the ~ident had cut himself off entirely from 
the pure politics of winning his party's nomination. By never 
stating his intentions he threw the party into confusion. No 
momentum could develop for the campaign in the nominating battle 
because Democrats were forced by the situation to hold themselves 
in check. Ex-Secretary of the Treasu:ry, Carter Glass, was 
nomina.ted by his own Virginia delegation but no real enthusia.sm was 
inspired by this, least of all in Glass himself. The most notable 
aspect of the Virginia situation was its complete support of the 
WUson administration. At this time WUli.a.m McAdoo, Wilson's heir 
a.ppa.rent in the public's eye, and with the expected backing of the 
railroad brothemoods, was denying any intention of running, though 
he made clear that he would not refuse if the offi.ce were offered 
to him. To a greater extent than in the Republican party, the Demo-
crats had an additional problem in the prohibition issue. Major 
Democratic power centres. notably New York and its Governor 
Al Smith. were regarded as unequivoca.l 'wets'. W. J. Bryan and 
McAdoo were both staunch 'drys'. It was Burleson' s opinion that 
only a. personal liberty plank would defuse this situation. The 
Postmaster General, a.n important centre of patronage in the party, 
also strongly recommended that the party remain loyal to Wilson's 
policies and record. 
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By the time they reached San Francisco the Democrats were a 
subdued party, with its leader aloof and the tide against them. 
The League was not an issue at the Convention. In the keynote speech 
Homer S. Cummings restated the fundamental commitment of Democrats 
to the principles which their President held. On the floor, however, 
as Burleson explained in a long letter to David Roper, Secretary of 
the Navy, the prohibition issue was ma.Idng a difference on votes. 
McAdoo's managers had succeeded in alienating key delegations from 
New York and tfew Jersey by insisting on a known 'dry' putting in 
McAdoo's name· Despite attempts by McAdoo and Burleson to 
minimise this problem, it cost McAdoo the nomination. New York 
finally went to Governor Cox of Ohio who was at least prepared to 
compromise on prohibition. Cox also had strong progressive 
. 
credentials and a very efficient machine, a combination which 
finally triumphed. 
Senator Key PJtman of Nevada, in charge of the Western 
Department of the Democratic National Campaign Committee, believed 
that the winning issue in the campaign would be to portray Harding 
as a reactionary against Cox's liberalism. Harding voted for the 
anti-strike Cummins' bill, against public ownership of the 
raUroads and against publicity of profiteering :figures. "In every 
important test between capital and labor, he voted for the'former 
and against labor ... 49 Cox on the other hand. was calling for 
"industrial readjustment" .50 Pittman went further to stress that 
the League was mexely a Republican subterfuge to gain power for 
business interests. The AS. of L. and unions bad taken no part in 
the Conventions but Samuel Gompers personally endorsed Cox as did 
T.J. Connelly of the Ohio State Federation of Labor. 
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In fact neither party had anything new to offer on industrial 
relations. Harding, ina:tly case, was continually successful in 
defusing any threat of issues emerging from the campaign. He first 
agreed with Borah on the League and then with Taft, he was careful 
to seek advice on the campaign from aU quarters of the Republican 
party. On 6th September he declared. himself to be in favour of 
unionism. The campaign continued in this pattern wi t.b Cox 
desperately trying to create issues and Harding managing to obfuscate 
them. Damaging to Cox too was the lack of White House support.. for 
Woodrow Wilson was the constant shadow over the entire campaign. 
WhUe Cox sought national issues, it was local problems which were 
deciding voters - prosaic problems such as taxes and prices. Here 
both parties endorsed economy in government and a budget system, 
the only differences being their views on the tariff issue. By 
6th October the New York Herald was predicting a Republican land-
slide. Ethnic alienation over the minefield of foreign affairs, 
taxes and prices and an exhaustion from moral crusades were all 
factors. The upheavaJ. of 1919 was also an important factor in 
turning the popula.tion to the party of sta.bUl ty. the Republican 
party. In the west and Mid west there was unhappiness over the 
Federal Reserve's new tight money po1iey, one which Senator Owen 
had a.lrea.dy warned. Congress about in Ma.y 1920 when the Boa.rd. began 
to put up its interest rates to member ba.nks. "If this policy is 
pursued of broadly deflating the credits of this country, there can 
only be one result, that of depression and ruin to many. ,,51 Farmers 
were already feeling the effects and were likely to vote according 
to their discomf crt.. 
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For these reasons Harding won by the huge margin he did in 
1920. The DemoCl:'&tic organisation in the South was feeling 
resentful that patronage had not been more forthcoming and cracks 
began to appear. Above all Wilson had been the issue behind the 
campaign, if not personally then in his style of politics. 
Despite a campaign which had avoided any issues of crucial 
significance, the split between progressives and conservatives had 
never entirely submerged. A wide variety of politicians were 
increasingly concerned about the growing depth of the split between 
the progressives and conservatives, despite their ability to 
minimise the split during the election. W. H. Taft had. written to 
Charles Kelsey, President of the Guara.ntee and • Trust Co. of New York, 
"I still wish both the old parties could be burled and that we could 
line up on the basis of conservatism and radicalism."S2 As the 
previous session of Congress had demonstra.ted, the issues which were 
arising, and increasingly the labour issue was a major factor in the 
trend, were causing not a Democra.tic/Republie&n debate but a 
progressive/conservative one. This debate was becoming more and more 
difficult to reconcile, ,though fortunately the League in 1920 had 
temporarily achieved this, as had the Haxding leadership and Cox's 
commitment to Wilsonian reform. The situation as Louis Post 
described to W. J. B:rya.n, however, was one which he believed likely 
to run outwith the control of the old parties. 
The whole thing is in such a muddle ••• things seem 
to be muddling themselves up to such an extent that 
there may be a spontaneous breakaway from the old 
parties • • • I do not recall • • a time which has 
so resembled that of the middle fif1 tea • .53 
Post was reckoning without the League. 
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Although this patched up the split, as the call1];l&ign went on 
progressives, while not abandoning their parties, were muted in the 
national campaign and were in the process of in fact attempting to 
form a more coherent Congressional presence on the basis of their 
own Senate and Congressional campaigns. It was Wisoonsin's 
Senator Ia Follette who took on the leadership of this process. Of 
all the progressives, Ia Follette was the most bitter antagonist of 
the Republican 'Old Guard' of which he regarded Harding a product. 
Borah, while remaining completely independent of this group, did 
not involve himself in political attacks against them. La Follette 
was deeply involved in an attempt to defeat Irvine Lenroot, the 
Republican candidate in the Senate race in that State which began 
an important momentum in 1920. He had used his own Wisconsin 
machine to run the independent Governor Thompson against Lenroot. 
This campaign reflected to some extent the frustration radical 
progressives felt towards moderates. More important was the deep 
personal distaste Ia Follette felt for Lenroot. La Follette 
1:e1ieved the campaign would be confined mainly to the issue of the 
League and he invited Borah, Democratic Senator James Reed from 
Missouri and several others to speak. The importance of this cam-
paign was that it focused non-Congressional progressives such as 
George Record, Gifford Pinchot and Frederick Howe on La Follette as 
the man most likely to break with his party and run independently 
as a progressive. Most insistent on this was John Hopkins, 
Chairman of the Committee of 48, who urged La Follette during the 
summer to declare himself as an independent for President. In his 
Wisconsin campaign moreover he had won the support of the railroad. 
brotherhoods and attracted attention from the U.S. Labor Parties. 
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Despite Hopkin's pleading, even offering La Follette the 
opportunity to write his own oampaign planks, the Senator never took 
seriously the idea of jumping into the Presidential election so late 
in the raoe. He was aware of the laok of progressive unity and of 
their voioe not being heard on issues of oonoern to them in the 
1920 eleotion. He was also aware that the first priority was to 
increase progressive strength in Congress. La Follette realised 
that his r'UIlning independently would be of little oonsequence until 
there was a major congressional progressive presence, willing to 
support his independent position. On 14th August therefore 
La Follette sent a circular letter to progressive Senators proposing 
the idea of an Independent Congressional Campaign Committee. His call 
for an independent campaign was based on his opinion that neither the 
Republican nor Democratio party would under their present leader-
ship and support be able to follow a truly progressive path. In 
the campaign, important domestio issues were being ignored. There 
was apathy towards politics and mistrust of politioians in the 
country. Both parties would suooumb to "sinister interests of 
speoial priv1ledge (WhO) •• are preparing to oomplete their 
oonquest of the oountry's resources and to free themselves from 
every vestige of governmental control • • regardless of which 
party 1s sucoessful".54 To oombat this development, progressives 
must identify this fundamental enemy which cuts across party lines 
and begin to fight for their own candidates, regardless of party. 
The task of the oommittee would not only take on this political 
battle but to do so must put before the nation the eoonomic 
alternatives to be chosen., Although at the time these economio 
alternatives were unclear, La Follette was 'biting the bullet' and 
stating that there was a deep politioal difference between 
progressives and conservatives, one based on attitudes to the 
economy. It was one which included the attitude towards trade 
unionism. 
The most prominent targets of La Follette were Borah, Norris, 
J. I. France, Republican Senator for Maryland and, among the Demo-
crats, Senators David Walsh, Massachussetts, James Reed of Missouri, 
Robert Owen ot Oklahoma, George R. Chamberlain ot Oregon, the leader 
of the Democratic pro-Leaguers in the Senate, Thomas Gore from 
Oklahoma, A. O. Stanley from Kentucky and representatives 
Thetus Sims ot Tennessee and Huddleston ot Alabama. During September 
the replies began to filter back. To Southern Democrats there could 
be no thought of splitting their party. Huddleston preferred to 
continue to fight within the party to establish "class action by 
the masses for taking over the party machineI"Y',~,5 If concern over 
the loss of any machinery they already had determined most replies 
to La Follette's proposal, then the idea of an organising committee 
was almost equally unanimously approved of. Some Senators who had 
been able, as La Follette had been, to establish a strong personal 
loyalty among the State electorate were ~~e least enthusiastic. 
This was true for instance of both Borah and Norris. The response 
of virtually all the Ssnators and Representatives canvassed by 
election day 1920 was positive, and boded well for the continuing 
progressive commitment in the new Congress. 
The effect of the Harding Presidential landslide inevitably 
had a dramatic effect on the Congressional power balanoe. The 
Republicans increased their majorities by 19 and 12) in the Senate 
and the House respectively. The effect on progressives however 
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did not depend on the victory of a particular party. In Idaho the 
defeated Democrat Nugent was replaced by Republican Frank Gooding, 
a firm progressive. In Kentucky, J. Beckham was beaten by Republi-
can Richard P. Ernst, neither a progressive nor a reactionary. 
Charles Henderson was defeated by Republican Tasker L. Oddie in 
Nevada and in Oklahoma Thomas Gore, a key progreesive, was deieated 
only to be replaced by another progressive, John W. Harreld, 
Republican. Chamberlain in Oregon was defeated by Republican, 
R. Stanfield - in this campaign in the isolationist West the leader 
of the Democratic fight for the League was too ex:posed. In South 
Dakota, Edwin Johnson was defeated by a progressive Republican, 
Peter Norbeck. In Utah the League was once more the iactor which 
defeated Democrat King in his iight with Republican D. P. Cole ton. 
In the Senate the election had made practically no impact on 
progressive strength. 
It should be stressed further that La Follette's list was by 
no means all inclusive. He did not invite California's Senators 
Johnaon or Phelan nor had he written to Iowa' a Kenyon or the 
Kansas Republicans Charles Curtis and Arthur Capper, nor Democrats 
Key Pittman, Andrieus Jones in New Mexico, nor Kenneth McKellar of 
Tennessee. Indeed La Follette had been attempting to defeat 
Irvine Lenroot, an ex-insurgent and still a progressive. 
The administration might prove to be different but in Congrees 
the battle over domestic issues on a bipartisan basis appeared 
likely to continue. It is olear however that this organising 
drive by La Follette had iailed to develop progressive policy. 
At the end of the war, aa before it, progressivism's main impulse 
had been a distaste of business power. It had been Wilson and his 
administration who had first combined this mood and their own 
thinking with recognition of trade unionism. For Congressional 
progressives, labour had generally been regarded casually. They 
accepted Wilson's view but rarely considered labour problems as such. 
The crisis in 1919 caused by labour disputee was now forcing a great 
many to come to terms with the implications of trade unionism for 
their movement. This process went on simultaneously with the grow-
ing debate engendered by the war over the role of government in the 
peace-time economy. These debates increasingly demonstrated the 
split between progressives and conservatives within both parties. 
This, and other issues, mads clear that this was in fact a split 
involving deep political beliefs. 
Progressivism had always been a hybrid of principles; justice, 
equality, individual liberty and the protection of the public. As 
the movement developed, particularly in the two years following the 
war, progressives wers being forced to re-examine the meaning of 
their fundamental beliefs. As a result, individual liberty was 
becoming secondary to the consideration of justice and equality. 
Tbey were increasingly being forced by labour disputes to reconsider 
even their definitions of justice and equality, particularly in 
economic rather than moral or legal terms. They could not commit 
themselves to a fundamental redistribution of wealth, by a radical 
reform of the taxation system or by providing unemployment benefits. 
They did continue to sympathise with unionism's demand for a 
continually improving standard of living. They continued to demon-
strate a deep antagonism and suspicion of the business community 
as exploiters of labour and political power brokers. These trends 
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tended to push progressives however tentatively to clear support of 
the labour movement. Though further political initiative on 
industrial relations remained unlikely, this direction was given 
added impetus by an increasing willingness to regard natural 
resources as being or the people and as such not fit solely for 
private profit. Radical progressives, close to La Follette were 
beginning to form a broader economic critique. It should be 
emphasised that this trend was practically imperceptible and no 
concrete proposals had been propounded. It is a new harder tone 
in progressive thought, a willingness to deal with economic and 
industrial problems, which is the main indicator of the trend. But 
progressives were still very much individuals; the Independent 
Congressional C~paign Committee had yet to be organised. 
The progressives, it must be pointed out, by no means 
constituted a majority in Congress. The key to legislation was the 
floating vote. Senators and Congressmen with little practical 
inclination to the right or the left, lacking detailed knowledge of 
the Bill under discussion, held the real balance in a Congress where 
, . 
neither committed progressivesnor conservatives could command a 
majority. It was these floaters' reluctance to accept compulsory 
arbitration which had finally defeated this section in·the Trans-
portation Act; their concern for the National Debt which ruled out 
a minimum wage Bill. Also, for all the development in their 
movement, when it actually came to proposing industrial relations' 
legislation, the progressives had few suggestions. They believed 
employers ought to bargain with employees whether ~~ionised or not 
even though the steel strike had demonstrated graphically that 
employers would not do this. La Follette's opinion on labour and 
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the democratisation of industry was, as his secretary put it, 
"He believed that this principle should be gradually applied to 
industry and that its detaU should be worked out in the hands of its 
friends as the situation deVeloped" • .56 It was an opinion that his 
progressive friends could endorse. still atomised and only 
tentatively re-assessing their political stance by late 1920, they 
had. not developed a credo on labour relations which could bring 
them to launch a political campaign to pass legislation on 
industrial relations in favour of the unions. 
The developing of a broader economic thinking and the formation 
of a more tmited group in Congress demonstrated that among this 
radical group there existed a determination to press on with further 
basic reforms; a development likely to be to the benefit of trade 
tmions. The unions themselves of course were far from clear in 
their position on broader economic issues. 1919 and 1920 were 
years of confusion and conflict which had radicalised unions, made 
them feel the inadequacy of the Clayton Act. In 1920, after 
statmchly defending unions, progressives initiated a new impetus 
led by La. Follette. It remained to be seen how the events of the 
following years would affect radicaJ. progressives' t trade unionists' 
and conservatives' opiniOns towards each other. 
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CHAPl'ER 4 
THE HARDING ADMINISTRATION 
In the opinion of the editor of the Machinists' Monthly 
Journal, "The election of Harding as President is to be the signal 
for a general. assault upon the A.F. of L. by the courts, police 
• • and. press throughout the country • • ."1 Since the end of the 
war the trade union movement was feeling increasingly besieged. 
HanUng's victory appeared to justify this sense of embattlement 
and. the belief in their own isolated position, despite his campaign 
equivocations. 
This mood had begun to replace the earlier hopes of new 
recognition and power during 1919. The dismantling of the N.W.L.B., 
the unchecked localised suppression of the steel strike, and the 
invoca.tion of the Lever Act by the Wllson administration demonstrated 
that unionism had still not achieved industrial legitimacy and 
government support. A sense of disillusion was confirmed in the 
opinion of unionists by the fallure of either the First or the 
Second IndustriAl Conference to endorse trade unions fully as the 
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legitimate organisation of representation for the working population. 
As we have seen, this had been the basis of union hopes for the post-
war period. 2 They had expected either a continuation of the N.W.L~B. 
or at least a clear confirmation by the Wilson administration of the 
principles the Board had upheld. This they believed would have 
ensured the rapid spread of unionism and. the establishment of its 
industrial power. In the event the Wilson administration appeared to 
retu:rn to a 'hands off' policy. It appeared to be determined merely 
to institutionalise the pre-war status quo, without any guarantees of 
the rights accepted during the war. Many unionists were ultimately 
disappointed by the post- war policies of Wilson's administration. 
They were also disturbed by an impression that Congress had 
"given encouragement and. support to autocratic and reactionary 
policies. Its dominating thought has been the repression of labor. ,,3 
It appeared to many trade unionists that their movement was isolated 
from contemporary political attitudes. The election of Harding seemed 
to confirm this gloomy opinion, and. led. to the prophesy of the editor 
of the Machinists' Monthly Journal. 
Samuel Gompers however was anxious to scotch such opinions. 
He stated that ''The charge that there are no friends of la.bor in the 
Democratic and Republican parties is ridiculouso,,4 The anti-strike 
provision of the Cummins Bill, the Poindexter Bill. the Myers 
amendment to the Sundry Appropriations Bill had all been defeated. 
The people who were proposing the anti-union legislation did not 
reflect Congressional opinioa. As for Congressional a.nti-unionists 
such as Thomas Blanton, here was "a subject for the psychopathic 
ward. ,,5 
1.53 
Sympathy for labour continued to exist in considerable 
degree in Congress. Nonetheless Gompers was forced to concede that 
in failing to uphold unions as the legitimate representatives of the 
workers, the preliminary report of the Industrial Conference had made 
"a fatal omission. ,,6 As 1919 demonstrated, the Clayton Act 'W'ould 
only be tenable if 1:acked by regulation of business's responses to 
• 
unionism. By dint of his experience on the N. W .L.B., and his 
sUllport of Wilson, Samuel Gompers in 1919 had looked to the 
government for the codification of union rights. His disappointment 
was evident in the abandonment of this idea. However, Gompers held 
to the traditional 'friends and enemies' policy to defuse agitation 
for an independent political movement. 
The political situation in late 1920 was thus highly complex. 
In December 1919, reflecting Gompers' view, the A.F. oiL. had 
stated the basis of its policy for the 1920 election in Labor's 
Bill of Rights, agreed. on in a joint meeting of the Executive 
Council and the leaders of the member unions. The meeting strongly 
1:acked the rights to strike, to organise, to 1:argain collectively 
through representatives of workers' choosing. It upheld the right 
of public service employees to organise. The frustration of these 
rights was being achieved. by the injunction. This was "a. 
revolutionary measure which substitutes government of judicial 
discretion for government by law". 7 This signalled. a return to 
the minimal legal protection of union activity. Labor's Bill of 
Rights went on to call for the election of judges every six years 
and for their power to declare Acts of Congress unconstituticnal to 
be ended. Wages should not be fixed on a cost of living 1:asis 
but must be allowed to rise in order that workers might achieve 
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constantly improving standards of living. Unions and. 
collective bargaining provided the primary step to make industry an 
efficient and fair servant of the community. Co-operation was 
vital to improve industrial perfomance, in both industrial 
relations and the production process •. Unions therefore welcomed 
co-operation between "the scientists of industry and the representa.-
8 tives of organized workers." This grew out of consultation between 
Gompers and the American Engineering Society. The engineers' sincere 
desire for efficiency easily overcame earlier fears of worker 
exploitation. Such consultation demonstrated unionism's value to 
industrial performa.nce. Finally the meeting endorsed the Peace 
Treaty and the League and emphasised its own loyalty to the nation. 
As the document made clear, the A.F. of L. remained 
determined that their rights be recognised by business. As has been 
noted however, progressives were ph1Dsophically incapable of 
legislating further to protect these rights although they continued 
to believe these rights to be proper. Congress would not a.bridge 
these rights but neither would it go furtherJ such was the balance 
of opinion in the two houses. Yet this was necessary if the injunction 
were to end. The progressive solution was to erect a machinery of 
conciliation, an attempt which dominated the approach of the 
Wilson administration. It was a basic assumption that if the two 
sides met regularly round the table, the likelihood of strikes 
would be diminished. It would in fact implicitly recognise unions 
since they were the only organised voice of entire industries and 
importantly, the Industrial Conference had proposed region-based 
negotiations. Explicit recognition of unions could only mean the 
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denunciation of the plan by business and was therefore self-
defeating. Yet this was the key to union acceptance since it was 
their belief that once recognised, their power would be such that 
employers would have no alternative but to bargain. The problem 
was firstly in establishing this power. Machinery was of no use 
unless it provided specific codes to support the growth of this 
power. Progressives could not give unions specific endorsements. 
The situation as the election campaign began was one of 
stalemate. While the balance of strength in Congress enacted no 
destructive legisation, it enacted no favourable legislaticn. The 
collapse of its conciliation policy saw the Wilson administration 
return to an ad hoc policy with regard to the coal union. The 
inception of the Railroad Labor Board had the effect in 1920 of 
temporarily taking the railroads out of the political arena. 
The stalemate continued during the election when partisan 
necessity forced both parties to issue only vague planks on labour 
to bind. the parties together. This stalemate however was more 
damaging for unionism than otherwise might have been the case due 
to the increasingly aggressive attitude of the business community. 
Judge Gary's attitude in the steel strike had been implicitly 
endorsed by the employers' group at the Industrial Conference in 
1919. They regarded bargaining as a function only of the 
individual plant of factory; individual liberty applied equally to 
joining or not joining a union, the right to work as the right to 
strike. The issue of freedom of choice was a major problem for 
progressives in deciding the propriety of backing unionism 
absolutely. Concern for individualis~ had been one of the 
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key founts of the reform impulse. The trade unions forced 
progressives to re-assess the basis of their movement. In 1920, 
business highlighted the issue by beginning a campaign to pUblicise 
this line, timing it to coincide with the election race. 
On 18th June 1920, the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce issued 
a paper entitled labor Relations in Cleveland. The nine principles 
in this document were of the ambivalent nature to which all sides 
could subscribe and yet never agree as to interpretation. On 
wages the document recognised factors other than simple supply and 
demand such as the cost of living and saving needs. However, also 
to be considered were punctuality, productivity, individual skill 
and continuity of employment. There was to be no discrimination in 
either closed or open shops. The document also appeared to endorse 
collective bargaining although it was to be among the immediate 
workforce tmless otherwise agreed. This in no way abrogated the 
right of individual bargaining. Importantly too, it endorsed the 
right of the public to tminterrupted service. The document was 
widely circulated and warmly received by the business community. 
Its importance as a public relations exercise cannot be under-
estima.ted. It gave the impression of a responsible, concerned 
business community aware of its responsibilities towards the 
customer and prepared to be reasonable with its employees. In 
fact the document upheld the status quo and as such clearly pushed 
on to unions responsibility for disruption. Crucially it left 
business free to choose whether or not to bargain, which was the 
root of the problem. 
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still more threatenir~ to the union movement was the launch by 
the National Association of Manufacturers of 'The American Plan' in 
May 1920. Its primary purpose was to uphold the principles outlined 
at the Industrial Conference. The N.A.M. held that bargaining should 
be at plant level and that the individual was the basic component of 
the nation and the Constitution. It strongly upheld the right of 
the courts, as protectors of the individual's rights, to pass on 
Acts of Congress. It attacked. the Federal Trade Commission as 
"inquisitorial beyond its authority".9 It called for control of 
strikes. Combination could be allowed only when it did not 
injure the public interest. It attacked the denial of funds for 
injunctive proceedings. The injunction, business believed, was 
simply a process which established an equality in industrial 
relations. The N.A.M. claimed it did not oppose trade unions as 
such, only when they interfered with the personal liberty of 
employer or employee. This was, in effect, a manifesto for a 
virile business community, free of any further government inter-
ference in industria.l. relations. 
There can be little doubt that it was the strong campaign by 
the N.A.H •• 1hich was the real cause of the trade union's sense of 
isolation and embattlement by late 1920. The ca.mpaign ~ras a highly 
successful one by November 1920, as the N.A.M. reported in its 
first Open Sho" Bulletin. During these eight :nonths no less than 
1,665 Chambers of Commerce including the Cleveland Chamber had 
subscribed to the ideals of the American Plan. The key to the plan 
;.as the awarding of contracts. 'iIherever possible businesses 
subscribing to the policy attempted to place contracts or orders 
with businesses which liere open shop, 1e using non-union employees. 
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The building trade was a major target for this treatment and this 
explains why the Carpenter was so bitter in 1920. It should be 
pointed. out moreover that the N .A.M. was itself a combination of 
employers' associations which were also carrying out this policy 
in addition to providing strike-breakers and implementing a 
10 blacklist. Finally the N.A.M. actively encouraged Citizens' 
Alliances to be formed. which would carry out the same tactics under 
a guise apparently divorced. from the business campaign. BuSiness 
in its propoganda also attempted. to imply that the trade unions were 
in themselves alien to the traditions of the United states. 
Facing such an unprecedented. and united campaign, including 
the moves by the railroad executives already mentioned, some unions 
were no longer prepared. to accept progressive equivocation. They 
now believed. that their interests could only be served. by a 
government which would not allow businessmen the choice of whether 
or not they would deal with unions. They felt they needed. a 
government devoted. to the interests of the working class. For 
these unionists 'the labor problem' required a political solution, 
one which progressives appeared unwilling to provide. Stalemate in 
1919 and 1920 in the face of the business campaign had now become 
disastrous. They felt that they needed outright political backing 
and began to form labour parties. This mood was particularly marked. 
in Chicago where the Federation of Labor, under John Fitzpatrick was 
instrumental in forming the Chicago Labor Pa.rty. In Detroit, a 
similar move was afoot. In Fisconsin, as we have seen, the 
railroad brotherhoods were deeply involved in the Senate race. 
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Samuel Gompers was greatly upset by this mood. His views were 
expressed on 19th February 1920 in a letter to William Mitch of the 
Indiana State Labor Party. "This is no time for expe=imenting with 
11 political parties." He continued to maintain tha. t unionism should 
continue to back progressives who had stayed loyal to unionism in 
the crisis of 1919. Indeed it was now vital to build on that 
fOtmdation. He held firm in his belief that unions had no part to 
play in politics, that it was a movement of and for itself. Neither 
would a party wholly wedded to the union movement satisfy Gompers. 
He denied that the trade union movement had any implications for 
the economic system as a whole. All that the unions required was 
an end to injtmction. Then the unions could achieve their ends by 
themselves. As he wrote to J. J. McSwain, "The workday should be 
shortened through the economic power of the workers. It does not 
seek to gain a shorter workday by law. ,,12 Political ideology 
meant nothing he claimed, yet it was a palpable fact that only 
progressives were prepa.red to act for the movement. Gompers was, 
of course, deeply committed to Wilson so that in fact he himself was 
politically involved. 
Gompers still carried the majority of the A. F. of L. behind 
him but with the U.M.W. calling for nationalisation and state and 
city federations forming independent parties, the next few years 
would be of telling significance for trade unions. The key to the 
problem was whether progressives could develop a critique whereby 
further reforms in favour of trade unions could be assimilated. 
This was important not only for the future growth of unions, but also 
for the political perception of unions and indeed the position of 
Gompers himself, in addition to the future of the progressive 
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movement. The 'labor problem' had already developed beyond the 
solution proposed by Wilson. 
After the election of Warren G. Harding the issue was the 
same but the tone had changed. The union position in 1919 had been 
fused with optimism. During 1920 the campaign of business and its 
determination to push unionism back had changed the dispute to a 
defensive one. With Harding in power that defence became still 
more important. The reforms labour sought were no longer for 
expansion but for survival. This chapter studies the policy and 
attitudes of the Harding administration and how they affected the 
nature of the dispute between business and labour. The rapidly 
changing economic situation represents an important factor in this 
development. 
The trade unions, believing Harding to have been the choice 
of the Old Guard, looked forward to his administration with 
trepidation. Indeed, Farren G. Ha.rd.ing was always a conservative. 
He was not, however, a radical conservative wont to attacking trade 
unionism; his was a flexible conservatism which upheld the 
contemporary status quo. He would do unions no favours and had. no 
reform prognL~e to offer,but neither had. he any intention of a 
vigorous pursuit of legal reforms detrimental to trade unionism. 
It is also untrue that Harding was politically naive or that his 
mind was incapable of grasping the modern system; his was the 
mind of a career politician, loyal to the party, supportive of the 
powerful, uncontroversial. As a standpat Republican he had no 
unique political programme. His main concerns were the traditional 
Republican planks; tariff, taxes, economy in government and 
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laissez-faire in the economy. The later disaster which befell the 
Harding administration was due to his lack of discrimination in 
appointees. He was a conservative and believed in the conservative 
policies of his party. He was a follower,not a leader. ~;ith regard 
to trade unions he had no political opinions as such, though no 
doubt his personal distaste for them had its roots in his political 
leanings I his was a personal, not an ideological view. This was 
revealed in a letter the President-elect wrote to a close Ohio 
confidante in February 1921; "I do not think I should be excessively 
annoyed by any process of picketing though I confess I do not like 
it • • • They are prejudicing their case more than helping'by that 
13 . 
sort of procedure." What Ha.l.'ding meant was that his own opinion 
was prejud.iced by picketing. For Harding, a booming economy was 
the prime obligation of & Republican President. Any disruption of 
this process would not find favour with the new President. Thus, 
in his broad political outlook, Harding could tolerate unionism 
where it did not injure and disrupt the business system. As regards 
trade unionism,Harding had no particular antagonism or indeed 
particular concern; his priorities were the traditional Republican 
ones. 
Yet even in these, Harding was to cause his Senate friends 
some considerable doubts. Aware of his own limitations, perhaps, 
Harding had pledged to draft 'the best minds' into his cabinet. 
The 'Old Guard' in the Senate confidently believed this to be an 
election promise and unlikely to influence Harding's ultimate 
choices. His early appointmenta reassured Senate Republicans. 
Rewarding his campaign manager, he appointed Harry M. Daugherty as 
Attorney General. His loyal Ohio supporters were drafted into 
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minor posts. Major contributors to the Republican war chest were 
also remembered - ex-senator John W. Weeks became Secretary of War 
and Edwin Denby was appointed Secretary of the Navy. 
These were less important than two key posts still to be 
decided - the Secretaries of State and Treasury. The former 
would be a key indicator of Harding's position on foreign policy 
generally and on the League issue particularly. His choice of 
Charles E. Hughes was greeted by isolationists as the defection of 
Harding from their cause. Hughes' standing in the nation and the 
party overcame these grumblings and the appointment was confirmed 
by the Senate. Much more widespread consternation was caused by 
Harding's decision to awoint Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce. 
Despite his support of the Republican cause in 1920, Republicans 
believed him to be still too close to the Democratic party after 
his relief work and participation in the Industrial Conference. 
Hoover had also built up in a series of speeches in 1920 a strong 
identity as a progressive. Additionally, he had been one of the 
foremost spokesmen in support of the League of Nations idea. Hoover's 
appointment was finally confirmed after Harding agreed to accept the 
conservative Republican's wish to see Andrew Mellon appointed as 
the secretary of the Treasury. The concession was easy since the 
President had no objections to Mellon or his economic view. Yet 
the Mellon appointment apart, Harding had been able to choose 
largely whom he pleased to serve in his cabinet, a striking example 
of the lack of leverage which various groups in the party had on 
Harding. His appointment of James J. Davis to the Department of 
Labor was also largely Harding's personal decision. He had first 
come to Harding's attention through their both being ~embers of 
the Order of the Mooseheart, a charity organisation which Davis 
had almost singlehandedly kept alive. - More'importantly, 
he was an ex-iron puddler and still held a tmion card. Such 
abilities and advantages convinced Ha:rding that Davis was ideal for 
the post. Ha:rding did take cognizance of the need to reassure the 
broader party faithful and did so by appointing Will Hayes as 
Postmaster General, Charles G. Dawes, a supporter of Frank Lowden, 
as Director of the Budge~and Henry Wallac~editor of a mid-western 
farm journal, as Secretary of Agriculture. With the exception of 
Hoover, the labour movement remained largely tmimpressed by the 
Harding cabinet and continued to view the future with concem. 
The President's inaugural address served only to confirm the 
tmions' view. The speech signalled Harding's determination to 
shake off as much of the war-time commitments of the Government as 
possible. He called for "the omission of tmnecessary interference 
of government with business • • • a resumption of our normal onward 
way • • ... 14 This meant a return to "the inexorable laws of 
nature",150r at least the law of supply and demand, of economy in 
govemment, tax cuts and tariff reform. The theme of his speech he 
encapsulated in concluding that "Our most dangerous tendency is to 
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expect too much of the govemment." The Harding administration 
was determined to interfere as little as possible in any aspect of 
the American economic system. Industrial relations would have to 
be settled as the employers and employees saw fit. 
Ha:rding's economic outlook was echoed by his c?nstitutional 
interpretation of the role of the President. He believed that the 
President ~"as bound strongly by the election platform of the party 
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and should work in co-operation with Congress in seeking to enact 
its planks. Harding was well aware of the congressional mood as a 
result of the Wilson presidency and doubtless felt it unwise to 
claim any predominance for himself in the drawing up of a 
legislative programme. He was happy to tow the party line and 
leave the legislative agenda to the Congress. On both these 
issues the Harding administration's basic strategy was founded. 
Initiatives on domestic policies, other than tax and tariff, were not 
envisaged and particularly not in industrial relations. Harding 
had given little thought and had no specific views in what was a 
minefield of detail and intra-party disputes. Striking fear into 
trade unionists, the Harding attitude in fact disappointed the 
N.A.M. who sought much more positive support. They condemned such 
. 17 
a hands-off policy as "pussyfooting". 
This did no t mean that Harding did nothing at all once in 
office. It did mean that the Presidency would not be the forceful 
polioy ini tia tor it had been under Wilson. Thus, while Harding was 
in close touoh with Senator Nicholas Longworth of New York over the 
programming of the legislative agenda, he had littls himself to 
suggest as to how it should be implemented. The President did 
intervene in the tariff debate but only to advise Representative 
Joseph W. Fordney of Michigan that he opposed the idea of a duty on 
Mexican oil imports. The spread of Amerioan investment abroad was 
too important an objective to be discouraged in order to appease 
domestio oil producers.18 In faot discussion on speoific tariff 
proposals was being held up by a bitter debate over the American 
valuation plan and an anti-dumping bill. These divisions were 
aggravated by the introduction of the Mellon Tax Plan. The result was 
a virtual end to any direction of legislation. The Congressional 
situati~n may have deflected attention from the administration but 
increasingly, criticism was beginning to mount about the inability of 
the administration to take initiatives or indeed to appear to have any 
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ini tia tives to pursue. The result of Harding's policy on 
industrial relations was stagnation. Nothing would be done by the 
administration on this issue or indeed on any issue as Congress 
became increasingly rancorous. 
In this stagnant and yet bitterly divisive atmosphere, with 
public opinion increasingly critical, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
released figures giving the unemployment level as approximately 
5 million. These dramatic figures forced the Harding administration 
to grapple with the increasing problem of unemployment as revealed by 
its own agency but indeed it was neither the Preeident nor his 
Secretary of Labor but the Secretary of Commerce who first pointed to 
the need for the administration to act. 
Herbert Roover was the sole recognised progressive in the 
Barding administration. In accepting the Commerce position he had 
made it clear to the President that he could do so only with an 
assurance that he would be given a broad portfolio to be involved 
in every aspect ot the nation's commercial life. Harding had 
willingly agreed to this since he had little wish to involve 
himself in the economy at all. Thus it was that Hoover wrote to the 
President on 20th August 1921, that although he believed tr.e 
20 Labor Bureau's statistics were "absoluteJ;r inoorreot. he did 
fear a worsening situation in.the winter and for this reason he 
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felt it was for government to explore any possible way which 
might help. His idea was that "local action must be stimulated" if 
21 
"any real service in the unemployment problem" was to be 
accomplished. To achieve this Hoover proposed a Presidential 
Commission which could influence public opinion and the "employing 
forces". 22 The fact that the federal government was demonstrating 
concern would galvanize States into taking action in public works, 
particularly road buildL~g. 
Since Hoover's proposal in no way implied federal action 
beyond the encouragement of individual community ani State activity, 
the President had no objection to the idea. In addition Harding 
"would be glad to have you suggest to me some of the men •• whom 
you think would be helpful in making a success of such a 
conference". 2) The final list included Samuel Gompers, J. De Frees, 
Chairman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ex-President of Yale 
University Hadley and D. C. Jaecklin of the Utah Copper Company. 
In fact as the conference proposals were to make clear their 
catholic suggestions covered the entire range of possibilities. 
The conference was from start to finish Hoover's plan. Its 
proposals reflected strongly Hoover's own ideas. The first of these 
reports was issued on 30th September 1921. As Roover had earlier 
said, the conference confimed that "the problem of :::eeting this 
emergency is primarily a community problem".24 It recommended the 
settL~g-up of emergency committees in each locality to register 
those seeking work and provide charity relief. It urged businesses 
to manufacture for stock. Pointing to the $700 million municipal 
bonds floated since August to support public works it urged further 
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state and mlmicipa1 spending. It called on the federal government 
to expedite public works for which appropriations had already been 
made and for further appropriations for road construction. The 
President was delighted by these proposals. He wrote to Hoover 
that "If nothing more comes of it than the recommendations contained 
in these resolutions, the meeting will not have been in vain ... 25 
Harding might well be enthusiastic; it made no demands on the 
Executive other than administrative ones. The burden of costs 
would fall squarely on the states and municipalities. It highlighted 
the need for self-help and. community concern and focused on Congress 
in the call for further appropriations. 
On 12th October Hoover sent Harding a further list of the 
conference's proposals of broader scope. These proposals once more 
focused attention on Congress rather than the Executive. It ca.l1ed 
for the speedy passage of tax and tariff reforms, reduced railroad. 
:rates and settled. exchange rates. Finally. the conference called 
for an elimination of waste in production. 
There can be little doubt that the latter proposals were 
intended largely to pressurise Congress on the issues of taxation 
and tariff. both of which business pointed to as causes of. and 
necessary precursors of recovery from the recession. More 
importantly, however. the conference revealed that the economic 
concern of Herbert Hoover was with working people as a whole. The 
Secretary had a broad. organic view of the nation. He believed 
deeply in the greatest possible measure of individual liberty. He 
recognised however that in the twentieth century this required 
modification4 This he believed must arise from the strengthening 
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of the community conscience and a recognition of the need for 
individuals to accept responsibility for the welfare of the rest of 
the community. This voluntarist view was reinforced by Hoover in 
emphasising the importance of State and municipal action where the 
problem of unemployment was beyond the abilities of localised co-
operation to solve. Responsibility flowed from the individual 
upwards - the federal government being a last resort; the traditional 
progressive view of the individual in a competitive system offset 
by a caring responsible society. The President was quite willing to 
accept Hoover's policy. It signified no commitment from the 
federal government nor further regulation. In most respects it 
supported the traditional standpat Republican view of the economy. 
As with the majority of progressives, Hoover did not view his 
goals in tems of political power but simply in terms of improving 
the quality of life in America. Unlike Wilson, Hoover's primary 
concern was for the improvement of the economic quality of life 
This would be determined by the nation's capacity to produce. 
Hoover believed it was the duty of the government to foster the 
conditions for an increase in America's productive capacity. 
Information, structural improvement and research were the means by 
which this could be achieved. Hoover was an administrative 
progressive, seeking the overall improvement of American life through 
technical retorm. Etficiency in all things was the aim ot the 
Secretary ot Commerce. If achieved, the economy would be capable 
of satisfying the needs of capital, labour and the consumer. It 
was Herbert Hoover who controlled the economic policy of the 
Harding administration and in its main thrust was a policy to which 
Harding could not object. 
Hoover's attitude to trade unionism was a part of his broader 
economic philosophy. As we have seen, Hoover shared the opinion of 
the Wilson administration that industrial relations required 
machinery for order. Unions were simply a reality. Because they 
were the only organised voice of the working people, Hoover was 
prepared to accept trade unions as an integral part of that machinery. 
Additionally, Hoover also accepted that unions could aid his campaign 
to eliminate waste in industry. While Hoover accepted unionism he 
had no intention of championing any further reforms. The '~abor problem' 
had developed from being a part of Wilson's moral progressivism to 
being a part of Hoover's administrative progressivism. It remained 
only a factor. Hoover was not prepared to deal with the question 
of the power of unionism per see Ul timately, Hoover did not fill the 
vacuum which existed in the policy of the Harding administration 
towards the question of trade union power. His priority was 
economic well-being and efficienoy. Unions, where they existed, 
were accepted as organisations which could contribute to that effort. 
Despite this lack of commitment to the fostering of trade 
unionism itself, unionists warmed to Hoover's approach because it 
offered them a chance to prove their importance to the production 
process. With lay-offs occurring regularly and falling prices 
undermining union wage claimS, this was becoming an inoreasingly 
important ugument in the trade unions' struggle for legi timaey. 
Hoover was doubly important as the one major administration figure 
wi th some sympathy for the trade union position. On 30th November 
1920, Samuel Gompers had congratulated Hoover on his election as 
President of the Federated American Engineering Society and agreed 
with Hoover that unions oould co-operate over waste. It was 
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particularly important for unions to demonstrate their validity 
in the face of the N • .l.M. 's Open Shop Campaign. Gompers therefore 
believed that "It is necessary that employers, the engineers •• 
and the workmen join in working out the basis of the principles of 
26 
constructive production." 
In declaring this position Gompers believed one of the 
principles underlying co-operation must be union legitimacy. This 
'f.'as a major about-turn on Gompers' part. In January of'1920 he had 
written that "Organized labor does not seek or want a share in the 
management of industry".27 Now he accepted that his movement must now 
be willing to accept some responsibility at least for industrial 
production. This direction was emphasised by the deepening receesion 
and the need to counter the R.A.M.'s policy. Co-operation bad been 
launched by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
and the International Ladies' Garment Workers. It increaSingly 
appeared to offer security for unionism in a hostile atmosphere. This 
shift in trade union attitude did not reflect any major change in their 
aims. They still believed the Harding administration was hostile 
and this peroeption indeed encouraged their willingness to co-operate 
with business. The 1921 recession deprived them of the argument that 
a rooketing cost of living justified their wage claims. They now saw 
that wage claims needed to be tied to production. Moreover, it also 
ended the growth of union membership. For all these reasons, if 
unions were to win their demands they needed a new approach and one 
based in industry. As we have seen, the railroad brotherhoods had 
lessened their attacks with the erection of the Railroad Labor 
Board, although their political aotivity continued as their 
participation in Wisconsin demonstrated. Co-operation was a tactic not a 
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shift in the basic goals of unionism. The I.A.M., for instance 
continued to be involved in a great number of small disputes while 
it also investigated opportunities for co-operation. 
The combination of recession, the N .A.M. campaign and the 
non-interventionist attitude of the Harding administration led to 
a shift in the trade union outlook. In 1919 and 1920 the unions 
sought the acceptance of their legitimacy by business for 
expansionary purposes. In 1921 the movement was in a defensive 
struggle to preserve the unions which already existed from the 
attempts of employers to emasculate them. In this struggle unions 
had been badly weakened by the recession. The goals of each side 
remained the same as at the First Industrial Conference but the 
economic situation changed the power balance in industrial relations. 
In this situation the leadership of the union movement sought 
a tactic which could be employed to strengthen their hand at such 
times. The attitude of the President was determinedly non-commital. 
The economic policy controlled by Herbert Hoover became the one 
glimmer of hope for trade unions. They seized upon his call for 
the elimination of'waste as a new means of establishing their 
legitimacy. In this cause unionists were prepared to a.ccept 
responsibility for production performance. This was important not 
only for union legitimacy but also for the maintenance of wage levels 
a.ga.L"lst calls by employers for cuts in wages in this time of 
deflation. In the situation of 1921 trade unionists were shifting 
to an acceptance of integration into the economic system, a 
significant modification of the 1919 position of legitimacy on their 
own terms. The combination of the industrial situation and the 
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nature of the Harding administration caused a move by tmions towards 
compromise in tactics, th~ugh it must be emphasised their goals 
remained the same. The tactic itself however called for unions to 
integrate themselves into the economic system as it existed. This 
new stance was now being considered by the A.F. of L. but no policy 
had yet been annotmced. It remained a question of the judgment of 
individual tmions. It was also tmclear as to "rrhether they would 
initiate any policy on these lines - the Unemployment Conference 
made clear that Hoover had little inclination towards central 
activity. 
While tmionists were adapting their attitude to the Hoover 
economic policy the control of labour policy, as such, was left 
entirely in the hands of James J. Davis, Secretary of Labor, by 
Harding. Davis's policy became clear in a series of speeches he 
gave during 1921. Particularly important was his speech in 
Philadelphia in Jtme 1921. He stated that, '"rhis time of adversity 
28 has taught us the lesson of working together." He felt that 
co-operation must be legally enforceable by ma.king "all parties 
to labor disputes •• get together before disruptions take place.,,29 
The Secretary of labor's first concern was with economic disruption 
rather than with laying down the principles which would guide his 
department's approach to labour. Davis was extremely sensitive to 
business opinion. He went as far in November 1921 to explain to the 
Academy of Political Science that the conciliation division was not 
in any sense Ita government interference with private enterprise". 30 
The reaction of the business community to the department's 
tmemployment statistics in the summer was scathing. Although 
Davis responded that the N.M.T.A., one of the loudest critics of 
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the figures, represented the most "hardboiled,,3l of anti-unionists. 
be had new figures issued for the Unemployment Conference. These 
reduced the total unemployed by 1.5 million, ignoring the coal and 
railroad. cOIll1ll1m.ities entirely. Davis, it was clear, would do 
nothing which wculd antagonise the business commtU'li ty. 
Davis took little part in the Hoover Unemployment Conference 
and indeed appeared to resent Hoover's interference in labour 
affairs. He complained to Harding that Hoover' s plan to set up an 
Unemployment Bureau in the Commerce Department merely duplicated 
the work of the U.S. Employment Service. His participation in the 
Shipping Board row over preference of Americans in merchant ships 
was ineffective. Similarly, although a conciliator was sent to 
Alabama, little could be achieved in settling the dispute between 
coal miners and employers over wage cuts. Davis did commit himself 
to the saving wage, but had. no opinion on the legislation of a 
minimum wage. The conciliation division continued to solve most of 
the disputes which occurred in local areas and here Davis now 
proposed the appointment of experts in each industry who could be 
consulted in reaching agreements and in their implementation. 
Davis sought order and compromise in industry. He had sympathy for 
the justice of union claims but no patience with industrial 
disruption. He similarly berated industry for its aggressive 
attitude towards labour. Hence his advocacy of a legally 
enforceable cooling-off period and legally enforceable contracts. 
He had no sympathy for either side in any industrial disruption. 
In all his speeches Davis kept fi:rm1y in line with the non-
interventionist attitude of his President. The one exception was 
Davis' s determination to cut immigration to a minimum and to set 
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up elaborate machinery to ensure immigrants became naturalised as 
quickly as possible. 
The administration had withdrawn entirely from the industrial 
relations debate. In doing so it had ended the framework around 
which that debate continued under Wilson. It was a framework which 
had been decided primarily by the attitude of the President. In 
1921 neither Harding nor Davis was prepared to declare opinions 
which might be used aa guidelines in handling industrial disputes. 
The result was a continuation of the guerrilla mentality which 
Wilson had hoped to dispel. It was up to both sides to win what it 
could be direct action. The year 1921 had been largely trouble-free 
yet to ignore a situation which had never been properly assuaged was 
a dan8erous exercise. Not only did President Harding allow bitterness 
to fester but he bad no guidelines for the handling of disputes. 
The momentum of the N.A.M.'s 'American Plan' was continued in 
the vacuum created by Harding's position and the recession. Early 
in 1921 employers began to call for wage cuts. A questionnaire 
devised by the Chamber of Commerce and circulated in Pittsburgh 
found 66% supported wage cuts. It was their belie! that "normalcy 
could not be expected until all wages had taken a cut".32 As prices 
fell, business called for wages to fall equally, the argument 
being that the war had inflated both and both must now fall if 
the nation was to revert to a peace-time basis. The response of 
the A.F. of L. at its 1921 'Denver/Colorado Convention in June was 
to blame inefficient business and unscrupulous profiteering for the 
reoession. It also resolved that wages should not be tied to the 
cost of living but should be decided on a more 'scientific basis'. 
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They were determined to continue to increase their living standards, 
regardless of moves in the cost of living. This position directly 
contradicted that of business and demonstrated the tactical aim of 
co-operation. "The practice of fixing wages solely on the basis of 
the cost of living is a violation of the whole philosophy of 
progress ,,33 • • • The unions were not prepared to accept cuts. A.s 
Samuel Gompers wrote to President Harding on 21th A.ugust, this idea 
meant that "There is a constant tendency to standardize classes, 
each class baving a presumptive right to a given quantity of various 
commodi ties. ,,34 Indeed this call for wage cuts was beginning to 
engender unres t in the unions, particular lyon the railroads and in 
the coal industry. While unionists were tur.ning to compromise, the 
pressure from smployers was simu1 taneously stiffening union resolve. 
As has been mentioned previously railroad executives had 
begun to inject the !ssuss of wage cuts, work praotices and the 
soope of agreements into claims before the Railroad Labor Board which 
decided that working rules should be changed. It introduced piece 
work, allowed non-unionists to be represented by men or their own 
choioe other than union negotiators. This latter was seen by 
unions as a threat to their power in the industry. Still more 
angering to the brotherhoods was the !'act that several railroads 
particularly Atterbury's Pennsylvania Railroad had begun wage cuts 
and a process of widespread lay-of~while contracting out work. 
The 1921 recession had weakened unions and forced them to reoonsider 
their tactics and avoid strike action. As the business attack 
continued, however, the unions were being forced to defend their 
position in the faoe of government inaction. The oonsequenoe was 
the bitter strikes in the ooal and rail industries where unions 
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were at their most powerful. Ostensibly over wage bargaining, 
these disputes centred on the question of power and whether the 
economic priorities of business or labour would triumph. 
In Indianapolis in September, the President of the United 
Mine Workers had issued to the unions' biennial convention a 
commitment to "no compromise lt)' The agreements in the coal 
industry were set to run out on 31st March 1921. \fuile operators 
sought cuts, this meesage from Lewis seemed to presage trouble •. 
The Carpenters' union had early in 1921 declared its intention that 
"no reduction in wages under present conditions is admissable ... 36 
As in 1919, the unions and the business community once more appeared 
to be approaching unanimity in determined opposition to each other, 
with neither prepared to compromise on wages. The unions claimed 
the right to a constantly increasing standard, regardless of 1t1e 
cost of living - in effsot a redistribution of wealth. While wages 
were the ostensible cause, the root of the disruption once more was 
economic beliers. Once more a political stance was required for any 
proposed solution. This was the worsening situation which the 
Harding administration, with nothing which could be recognised as a 
policy, had to deal with in 1922. 
The crisis broue;ht on by the strikes in the coal industry and 
the Shopmen's strike on the railroads dominated the Harding 
administration's labour policy in 1922. No other issue ~truded. 
The administration had made a premature attempt to bring the 
operators and the U.M.W. to the oonference table in Ootober 1921. 
Since the U.M.W. did not decide on its wage demands until 
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February 1922, this was an unreasonable request. Essentially the 
difference between the operators and the miners was that the former 
wished a major wage reduction and district or State-wide agreements 
whilst the union refused to accept cuts and wished to continue with 
the national agreement. The determination with which both sides 
held their positions gave Harding little cause for hope. Hoover 
was convinced from an early date of the ineVitability of a strike. 37 
Hoover indeed had the Geological Survey draw up a report on coal 
stocks and output in the event of a strike. He appeared to be 
willing to wait out the strike. 
Their report anticipated that the U.M.W. would be able to 
close down only 65% of the nation's mines and that 5 million tons per 
week could be expected from non-union mines. This still left a 
weekly shortfall of 2 million tons but there was a stockpile of 
65 million tons, enough the survey concluded, to survive an 11-week 
strike by bituminous miners without seriOl s discomfort even though 
some regional differences would arise. The anthracite region, 
however, much more concentrated and more strongly organised, was 
likely to suffer near complete c1osedown. A stoppage of longer 
than s1% weeks would mean exhaustion of stocks and severe 
difficulties.3~ Anthracite production, however, went largely to 
domestic consumers and with summer near the discomfort was unlikely 
to be serious. The administration therefore had three months to 
solve the bituminous situation which would begin to hurt industrial 
output, as that was where most bituminous coal was consumed, 
particularly by the railroads. The administration made another 
attempt in late February to bring the two sides to the table but 
the operators turned the offer down since negotiations would be 
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national, at once satisfying the union position. The rigidity of the 
two sides caused Harding to wash his hands of the dispute. As he 
wrote to Davis, ItI doubt if there is anything which the 
Administration may do to prevent a suspension • • in the union 
field."J9 
The coal strike began on 1st April 1922 with the administration 
apparently unhappy but lIDwilling to intervene. physically in the 
dispute. James Davis, however, expressed his "keen disappointment 
at the failure of certain operators to fulfill the terms of their 
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obligation to meet in conference." In his opinion it i.Jas clear 
that the operators had acted wilfully in allowing the strike when 
the U.M.W. was prepared to negotiate. No further action was taken 
by the administration in the first two montl13 of the strike. Yet 
given the policy of the administration and the lack of interest in 
industrial relations during 1921, it was difficult to see what could 
be done. Only a guarantee of lIDion legitimacy might end business 
intransigence. 
Reports from the Geological Service during April and May made 
it clear that the strike had won far more support than they had 
anticipated. Bituminous production during April never reached 
4 million tons; this was not achieved until mid-May. Anthracite 
production throughout this time remained practically nil. The 
crisis appeared to be coming on much more quickly than had been 
projected. The Herrin Massacre in Illinois caused a loss of a 
great deal of sympathy for the U.M.W. This much publicised 
atrocity was the result of the miners' determination to prevent 
strikebreaking in a small community. Perhaps the most shocking 
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aspect for Americans was the realisation that these isolated and 
feudal towns where such bitterness festered still existed. Harding 
never considered using this as an excuse for the suppression of the 
strike at the time. In July, when he hoped both sides would be 
exhausted, he called the operators and unions to the White House to 
discuss his proposal for a commission to investigate the dispute, 
its findings to be binding. As Harding put it, the U.M.W. rejection 
based on its demands for a guaranteed national agreement centred on 
the Central Competitive Field, caused him to have a "loss of 
sympathy with the position of Mr. Lewis who has assumed that the 
nation must do his will or be made to suffer. ,,41 
By July, Harding was beginning to feel keenly the pressure 
on him to settle the industrial disruption. This had been made worse 
by a strike by railroad shopmen on 1st July over a further decision 
by the Railroad Board to reduce their wages. He was personally 
piqued by Lewis's refusal of government arbitration of the dispute 
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and had no further intention of offering his services as mediator. 
He now believed that the men must return to work, for which he 
appealed on 17th July after the breakdown of talks. 
The freedom of action on the part of wor~~en • • does 
not measure in importance with that of the public 
welfare and national security, I therefore invite you 
to return to your mine properties and resume operations4J 
Although Harding now strongly disapproved of the strike and wished 
it to end, he was extremely reluctant to suppress it. He hoped it 
would end of its own accord. Unlike Wilson, curiously, he allowed 
the right to strike to stand in this dispute. To suppress the 
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strike would only satisfy operators and Harding still sought 
"the middle path to a permanent settlement,,44 and in this he 
remained firm. In fact, in early .August it became clear that both 
operators and strikers were beginning to feel a strike was costing 
too much and a rapprochement began to take place. Indeed, by the 
time of Harding's tough speech of 18th August 1922, the two sides 
were in Philadelphia and close to agreement. 
As can be seen, Sarding's view of the strike had been 
hardening during the summer to a point in August where his anger 
could no longer be contained. There can be no doubt that he wished 
to pressure the U.M.W. into agreement through his speech. Suppres-
sion of the strike could not be far off. The refusal of the miners 
to retuxn to work pendil'lg the commission angered him to the point 
where he claimed that ''Except for the coal as comes from the 
districts worked by non-organized miners, the country is at the 
mercy of the United Mine Workers.,~5 The real reason for the 
refusal of the U.M.W. was the binding nature of arbitration and the 
issue of seniority. The agreement was reached independently but 
essentially on the lines Harding had suggested, though it was not 
binding. Settlement, favouring the U.M.W., in the retensicn of the 
old wage scale, wa. achieved in late August to run until 1st April 1923. 
Harding, however, still had to resolve the crisis in the rail-
roads. He had also tried to mediate in this strike by calling for 
a resumption of work while the issue of seniority be put before 
the Railroad Eoard. Inevitably, the shopmen's union rejected the 
proposal. Firstly, Harding's suggestion put the issue of wage 
cuts, the reason for the strike, out of the dispute. !~oreover, 
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in their view the Board was now clearly antagonistic to unionist aims 
and if they resumed work without seniority guarantees then they would 
simply lose them. Thus, they rejected the administration's proposal. 
This, in addition to the coal strike, added to Harding's anger and 
frustration. Most important in influencing Harding's later activities 
however was the opinion he held about the nature of the Railroad 
labor Board which he made clear in his 18th August speech. Frankly, 
he believed that the Board's decisions were in effect quasi-judicial 
and that as such their decisions deserved to be upheld. He believed 
that the shopmen in striking had broken a trust implicit in the 
machinery of the Board. He now called for legislation to make the 
Board's decision legally enforceable. The union position was that 
an appeal to the Board, 't7hich Harding held to be the proper course, 
was pointless since the Board was biased against the uni.ons. 
Harding was moving to a position, at least with regard to 
agreements reached through government machinery, where collective 
bargaining agreements should be regarded as legally binding. In 
effect this called for the banning of strikes. It was his opinion 
that, although recognition of unions was not in dispute, "'tle must 
check abuses or excesses which conflict with public interest • • • 
Public welfare for Harding came to mean the banning of economic 
disruption. Wilson had been constrained from this view by his 
acceptance that public welfare also meant the improvement of the 
standards of living of workers. 
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As the crisis mounted, the President became increasingly 
aware of the power which trade unions in key industries such as 
coal and the railroads could exercise through the use of the strike 
weapon. This appeared dangerous to Harding. It was not simply a 
damaging economic power but threatened the fabric of the nation. 
He moved significantly in 1922 from a position of remarkable 
equanimity in April, prepared for the time being to tolerate the 
disruption while sympathising with neither side, to strong 
opposition in August. The power of the unions, the real crisis they 
caused and their refusal to negotiate forced him to attack tmionism 
bitterly as a dangerous minority. "Generations of democracy are 
surrendered to mobocracy and the freedom of a htmdred millions is 
surrendered to the small minority which would have no law.,,47 The 
latter piece is a reference to the Herrin Massacre. The public 
interest must be upheld at all costs. In this instance the 
administration had no hesitation in accepting responsibility for 
the welfare of the nation. Harding went on to attack unions for 
suppressing the rights of individuals to work. As he wrote to the 
Attorney General on 1st September 1922, sanctioning an injunction 
against the shopmena "The underlying principle involved in this 
situation and this action is the survival and supremacy of the 
48 Government of the United states." 
The government had al.so laid down an ul. timatum tantamount to 
breaking the strike in calling for Horkmen to return to work "~ith 
the protection of federal troops. It was when this tactic had 
failed that the decision to seekan injunction was decided upon. 
Ultimately, Harding could accept unions only in 30 far as they did not 
disrupt the economy. He appreciated that destruction of ~~ionism 
was undesirable. Indeed, Harding wrote to Atlee Pomerene, 
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Democratic Senator from Ohio, that he feared that ''Peace and 
restored transportation would be a very long way off if we undertook 
to bring it about from the viewpoint of those who speak alone for 
the operators.,,49 Yet circumscribing unionists' right to strike 
meant robbing them of their pO"fer, requiring that they depend on 
employers' magnanimity. Harding's position, however ambivalent, 
was not favourable to trade unionism. His Attorney General, 
Harry Daugherty, had no qualms about such a consequence, declaring 
the purpose of the injunction to be to uphold the open shop, as 
well as the government. The injunction caused a storm in Congress 
and strong protests from Hoover and H~hes. Harding was attempting 
a'middle path'once more. 
In fact this storm left Harding unaffected. The attacks 
centred almost entirely on Daugherty and the injunction row soon 
lapsed. As in 1919, the ending of the strike far outweighed 
concern over the method of its achievement. It did however 
demonstrate that there were limits to Harding's acceptance of trade 
unionism. In the event of a crisis he believed it necessary to 
abridge union rights, although normally he had little time for 
unionism one way or the other. They were part of a free market in 
Harding's view and as such he had no objection to them. kllo~ing 
unions to cause a crisis could be sanctioned only by a political 
ideology which accepted the thesis that the distribution of wealth 
"'as of a priority which justified the economic damage caused to the 
business community. It required a belief in the right of the 
working class to ,deld power in the form of trade unionism. It 
was a position ';hich Wilson had been unable to sanction - neither 
could President Harding. In a crisis the commitment of the 
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Executive, conservatives and progressives alike, was to resolve it 
as soon as possible. 
The atmosphere surrotmding the labour problem in 1922 remained 
identical ~dth that of 1919. The purpose of each group remained 
the acceptance of their power by the other. Each issue disputed by 
the two groups ... ras imbued by the broader hopes which each cherished. 
Thus, while wages was ostensibly the key issue in 1921 and 1922, 
in fact the core of the disagreement was the 'divergent views of 
the two groups as to ,·;hat wages actually were and what should influence 
their levels. \<'hatever the issue, the real difference between unions 
and employers remained their economic perception. 
The most significant development of 1921 was the acceptance by 
trade tmionists of the need for some degree of responsibility for 
industrial performance on their part. Although the goals remained 
the same, this tactic meant integration and a modification of their 
inflexible position where only full acceptance of their aims would 
be adequate. It signified a shift towards accommodating the 
political thinking of Herbert Hoover and administrative progressivism. 
Although the inflexibility of employers forced tmians to resort to 
industrial action, this was a trend which would re-emerge when the 
unions were able to construct a coherent policy. It was, however, 
but one of the unions' methods to achieve its ends. In a period of 
recession, the need to maintain wage levels forced unions to 
abandon the simplistic cost of living scale and seek other means. 
What this might mean for the future relationship of trade unionism 
and the political system remained Ul'l..."""9so1ved. The continuing 
intransigence of the business community meant that in 1922 
politicians were faced once more by the question of how to 
minimise industrial disruption without forcing business to accept 
unionism. 
President Harding was disinclined to deal with the problems 
of industrial relations. His Secretary of Labor sought to maintain 
the status quo but was never able to give this the force of a 
coherent outlook; he simply abhorred the extremism of both sides. 
He failed moreover to establish the authority of his office. 
Herbert Hoover represented the one glimmer of hope for unionism 
within the Harding administration. Yet unionism was but a factor 
in the Secretary of Commerce's broader economic policy and it was 
far from clear whether Hoover would initiate any plans which would 
give his ideas solidity. In 1922 the crisis resulted in Harding's 
resorting to his basic instincts. Unionism, though not to be 
destroyed, must certainly be controlled. Given the lack of any 
momentum in labour policy this attitude became representative of 
the administration's policy. In these years unionists had to look 
to Congress for backing. 
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CONGRESS 1921-22 
Preaident HardiDB bad made olear trom the outset that hia 
policy tOVlU'da labour would be atriotly nOD-intsrnntiODiat. Be bad 
avoided labour iaaUBa at all timea dur1n& 1921. Be belie~d deeply 
in the ma:J:im he bad e%pounded in hia 4th March Inaugaral Addreaal 
"Bo atatute enaoted by maD can repeal the inexorable law ot nature. 
Oar moet da.Dproua tendenO)" ia to expeot too much or goV'8rnment."l 
This chapter atudie. any di~rpnce or acr .... at betweea 
Bard1n&'a outlook and Congresaioaal opinion duriDB the years to 1922. 
Particular emphui. i. placed on the nature and da~lopaent or 
proc:z:ea.i~ thJ.:nlduc on the labour proble. at this time. .u though 
La 'ollette's idea ot a more tormal ~aree.i~ identity in 
C01J.&r8sa had been obaoured by the presauras ot eleotioneering, the 
reapODBe bad been pnerall,. poei tiV'8. The tortunea or thia idea 
and ita impaot upOD the natura ot progreaaivism ia or major ooncern 
in thi. chapter. The da~lopmeat ot a aore coherent proareaai~ 
pro~ waa likel,. to be ot considerable importance to the natura 
of the relationship between unionists and their Congressional 
'friends'. Whether this would be the key to bridging the political 
gap between trade unionism's ultimate aims and the limits of 
progressive attitudes on industrial relations remained to be seen. 
The following sessions of Congress and its response to the 
unemployment issue and the 1922 crisis would be a strong indicator 
of these trends. This chapter also examines the question of how 
damaging such tendencies might have been electorally in 1922 and 
to what extent a progressive/conservative dialogue was superceding 
the traditional party loyalties. 
The 'lame-duck' seesion of the sixty-sixth Congress provided 
ample evidence that progressives had not been cowed by the Harding 
victory in 1920 and were as determined. as ever to protect the trade 
union movement. WhUe the President-elect began to assemble his 
Cabinet in Florida, 08car Bland, Republican from Indiana, re-opened 
the issue of the Lever Act's use in a debate on repeal of war-time 
legislation in the House. He flatly stated that the Act had 
shattered labour's trust in government due to its misuse against 
them a year earlier. Bland went on to argue that ite use had been 
deeply unjust not only for the violation of trust but also because 
"the miners struck in 1919 because they had a grievance that ought 
to have been listened. to by someone."2 Wells Goodykoontz, Republican 
from Weet V1.rgin1a., endorsed. Bland's opinion that the miners had a 
just grievance. So too did Alabama's Huddleston, signifying the 
continuing bipartisan progressive support for the fair treatment of 
labour by the government. Similarly, oonservative opposition to 
unionism maintained. its bipartisan character. Poindexter's anti-
etrike bUl returned to the floor of the Senate in December 1920. 
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A motion to reconaider effectively killed it ott in that a.ssion. 
In the House, lllanton alao continued hu harangue of the A.l. ot L •• 
By this time he vas demanding that there be no reoosnition ot 
strikesa "\1Ie have got to establish 'The .American Open Shop' ".3 
Yet despite this, in the sirtr-suth Congress initiative 
on labour matters vas taken up by progressives. They were nov 
pushing bills up tor consideration which forced Congress to oontinua 
to conaider labour iasuss. In his resolution (S.Res.440) 
cali!ornia's Republican Senator Hiram Johnson called torI 
A thoroucb and complete investip tion ot the oondi tiona 
e%1Jlting in the coal tields ot Lopn, McDowell, Mercer 
and Minso Counties, West Virginia, tor the purpose ot 
aacertaining the underlying cause. ot unrest. 4 
The Senator called particularly for the inveetiption ot the 
praotice ot coal operators employing armed gwu'ds and whether ltate 
troops were necessary. Since this investip tion would require 
tundiDg it vas reterred to the Coal! tt.. to Awl! t and qantrol 
b:pell8el and not the Bduoation and Labor Coaaitte.. The mOlt 
important aspeot ot the resolut1on was 1 te pointed reference to 
bwlinell practice in industr1al d1sputes. Johnson reoosn1aed that 
the peatest eincle oontr1butory faotor in prolonpd bitter strikes 
and the tailure ot unions to orpn1se vas the reoourse to strike-
breakers and their 'riolent protection by priftte gwu'da. Deprived 
ot this taotio the,. would a180 be deprived of any expectation ot 
being able to end strikes th .. elves. The end ot the hope that 
Itrikel could be broken would make employers much less willing to 
allow strikel to occur. Some progl!'8ssives now appeared willing to 
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grasp the nettle of the details of industrial power. Seeking, as we 
have seen, to uphold tmion rights without further legislation or 
coercive laws against employers, progressives hoped to achieve this 
through such issues as these. What was significant was that 
progressives were moving from a position where tmions ought to have 
their rights upheld to an attempt to find means of achieving this 
end. 
Such bills and resolutions as these, however, remained depend-
ent upon individual initiatives. There was nothing recognisable as 
8. progressive labour policy as yet. The homogenising force in 
progressivism had always been the movement's objective of ridding 
America of co:ruption and establishing an egalitarian SOCiety. 
Progressives had never been able to agree on the means by which this 
could be achieved. The defection of Theodore Roosevelt from the 
Bull Moose Party, the impact of the government's war-time activities 
on post-war politics and the end of ~! ilsonian leadership served to 
atomise further the progressive movement. It fell to the conscience 
of each progressive to decide which of the movement's moral 
imperatives should gain predominance. Their conclusions with regard 
to the priorities of their movement were of considerable importance 
t.o trade 1.mionism. As we have already seen, a continuing support 
for equality and justice had not been established. Progressives 
generally still could defend the rights of tmions but many, in 
accepting the post-Wilson status quo, sought order and were 
prepared to minimise the economic powers of tmionism. Yet even 
among advanced. progressives prepared to accept \mion power, means 
of achieving 8. broader acoeptance of unions remained \mclear. 
The Johnson resolution was a first tentative step in this 
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direction, though it was once more an individual initiative. It was 
the concem of La Follette, the most prominent of these advanced. 
progressives, that they should form a more homogeneous group based 
on coherent policies. How successful this effort proved to be and 
the extent of support it gained in Congress would. be of major 
significance for the trade union movement in its continuing struggle 
to have its legitimacy accepted. by the business community. 
La Follette's attempts to launch a progressive group in 
August 1920 had met with a lukewarm response. In the wake of 
Harding's victory the need for progressive coherence appeared to 
La. Follette to be more important thlLn ever. In December 1920 he 
launched. the People's Legislative Service. It was formed. largely 
by La Follette's Wisconsin backers, prominent among whom were 
Warren Stone of the Brotherhood of Firemen and Engineers and 
William Johnston who beca.me Secreta.ry/Treasurer of the P.L.S. and 
Basil Manly, an ex-chairma.n of the N. W •L.B. who became a staunch 
ally of 1& Follette. The Senator hiuelf was chairman, George 
H1.I1dleston. one of the first to join the P.L.S. was its vice-
chairman. Concem to define policy and to win wider support 
prevented the P.L.S. from _king great impact on Congress and the 
treatment of labour issues. Nonetheless, the Johnson resolution 
represented a continuing concem among some progressives over the 
details of industrial relations which seemed to bode ill for the 
policy which Harding committed hiuelf to in his Inaugural Address. 
Indeed, a ma.jor question mark hung over the nature of 
relations between Congress and the new administration. Despite the 
fact that Republicans now had handsome majo:ities in both houses, 
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this barely affected the fine balance between progressives and 
conservatives in Congress. The situation was taUor-made for the 
Democratic party to embarrass the administration in supporting the 
progressives. Moreover, one of the key campaign issues had been 
the power of the Presidency under Wilson. Now free from \IIUeon's 
domination, Congress would. not wU1ing1y succumb again. still more 
troubling to Harding was the factionalism in the party other than 
that caused by the progressives. Internationalists were at logger-
heads with nationalists over the key question of foreign relations. 
Tactically, too, Ha:rding could not call on the unquestioning 
support of senator Lodge, while the influence of senators 
Boies Penrose of Pennsylvania and Reed Smoot of Utah was on the wane. 
'nle administration's spokesmen, Senators such a.s Harry New and 
James Watson, both of Indiana, did not have clout. All these 
factors pointed to a fractious sixty-seventh Congress and difficulty 
for the new President in gaining its 'tacking. 
On the debate on the Johnson resolution, Harding's non-
interventionist position received strong support from the anti-union 
conservatives at least. Democmt Senato% Henry Myers from Montana 
agreed with the President that. 
Of late it has become a practice every time a strike 
of any consequence occurs in the United States for the 
striking miners particularly to fly to the Government 
and ask the Government to take their side.S 
It was Myers opinion that the government ought not to allow itself 
to be used as a weapon in industrial disputes, particulArly where 
these involved private contra.cts. Myers also maintained that this 
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particular unrest was a matter for the authorities of West Virginia, 
not the central government. This latter line of argument brought 
support from Senator Dial, Democrat, South Carolina, who was also 
concerned for the debilitating effect on States' power of the 
increasing recourse to the federal government. West Virginia's 
senior Senator, Republican Howard Sutherland, echoed this opposition 
to the resolution by stating tlat the unrest in his State could be 
controlled by the West Virginian authorities. Despite this apparent 
unity between standpat Republicans and States' rights Southern 
Democrats, they could not command a majority, so that the Johnson 
resolution passed the Senate. The vote not only made clear that 
conservatism had no control over legislation in the Senate or the 
House but that Harding's non-interventionism did not have the backing 
of a Republican majority. 
This is not to say that the progressives had an overall 
majority. The key to the fate of labour issues, ironically, was 
held by the majority of Senators and Representatives who eschewed 
ideology. These men had little studied the ~ros and cons' of the 
arguments surrOlmding the labour problem. They took each case on 
its merits. They could not initiate legislation- their knowledge 
wa.e not adequate.- but it was their votes which decided whether any 
proposal achieved a ma.jority. An investigation could be backed by 
these men. It involved no legislative commitment while it did 
demonstrate Congressional concern. They lmderstood that conservative 
opposition was not on & par with Harding's non-interventionist policy but 
was rather a deliberate attempt to crush unionism. They sympathised 
with neither side but appreciated that something must be done. 
Thus. the Republican Senator from New York, William Calder, had 
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propo8ed a bill giving the ?ederal Trade Commi •• ion much increased 
powers oftr the inve.tigation and publication of price. and proti ta 
in the coal industry. Renecting a growing reoognition of the 
SOftrnment" duty to aotively proteot the publio intere.t, Calder 
.tated that "in the interests of the public, the Government must have 
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.ome oversisbt of this basic neces8ity". The bill went to La Follette's 
Committee ot Manutaoturers wbere three week. of bearingB were beld, 
at which the di8pute quickly centrsd on the que.tion of SO'ftrnment 
intervention, but the bill failed to come to the tloor before the 
.ea.ion ended. 
'!'he continuing preSN •• ift campai6ll, it va.s olear, vas .uc-
ceeding in .hi!ting the centre of oonceneua .li&htly. The floating 
YOatere vere nov prepared at lea.t to oonsider sovernment aotion. 
That these neating voters approached questions on a pi.c.meal non-
ideological basia, howftr, va. demonstrated during the .ummer in the 
debate oftr an ... ndment in the Bona. to the La Yollett.'. Seaman' • 
.lot. Priori tie. ehi!ted vi tb the term. of the propoeal under 
ooneideration. '1'he ... ndment trom Republican Prank Soott ot Michigan 
•••• ntially called for the .crapping of the .let'. pro~.iona vitb 
re8l\rd. to .bipplDc on the Great Lake.. It ,0U&ht the return ot a 
two-vatoh .,...t •• , the reduotion by l~ ot able 8 .... n required, and 
an increas. in hours trom 56 to 84 per week. Uabama'. William 
BaDkbead, Democrat, characteri.ed thia ... ndment a. but a prelude to 
"a whole.ale attack upon all th. pro~.ions ot the La Poll.tt.'. 
Seaman's !ot".7 The majority ot the Bouse did not share Bankh.ad'. 
concern. '!he ... ndment vas pu •• d atter a further usndment trom 
Calitornia'. Republican John I. Bolan re.toring the ei&ht-hour day. 
The argument tor ths Soott amendment rested .olely on a concern about 
the viabllity of Great x..ke.' eh1pp1n&'. The naaller ve •• ela pl,.!ng 
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on the Lakes simply could not afford or require the legal minimum of 
able seamen, while the three-shift system crippled the shorl-haul 
business there. In this case principle gave way to the p:ractica.l 
conside:ration of the survival of shipping on the Great Lakes. This 
~in swayed the floating voters and caused the amendment to pass. 
Congressional confirmation of trade union legitimacy depended upon 
the opinions of mild progressives and the floating vote. The success 
of the Johnson resolution appeared to demonstrate that the campaign 
of more radical progressives over the labour issue was shifting the 
centre of consensus. But, since even these progressives remained 
di~tmited and unclear as to how to proceed with the 'labor problem', 
this shift was due mainly to the repulsion many felt towards the 
conservative attitude. William Borah caught this mood when he argued 
on the noor of the Senate on 7th July 1921 that I 
The safeguards of our liberty a.re not so much in danger 
from those who openly criticise them as from those who, 
professing to believe in them are willing to ignore 
them when they are found inconvenient to their purposes.8 
Congressional opinion on the labour question was in considerable 
disarray in the new Congress. Backing for labour among mild 
progressives and. the noating vote wa.s due largely to deprecation 
of the attitude and activities of business and conservatives. It 
remained to be seen whether a new coherent initiative by more 
advanced progressives still aiming to act on behalf of tmions, 
could clarify this situation. Vital to any development of opinion 
on the 'labor problem' was whether the issues arising during the 
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Congress would continue to involve debates based on the progressive/ 
conservative dialogue. 
When La. Follette wrote to a Wisconsin constituent early in the 
new Congress that "this is one of the busiest sessions of Congress 
in my experience"9, it was due largely to the protracted debates over 
tax and. tariff reform. These two issues had been the major planks 
of the 1920 Republican platform and as such were the top priorities 
of the Harding administration. As basic Republican policy it was 
hoped that these two issues could be employed as the foundation of 
a united party in Congress. These were regarded as means to end 
the fractiousness and ineffectiveness of the Congress, and revive 
traditional party loyalties. The tariff debate certainly succeeded 
in deflecting Congress from the progressive/conservative clash. In 
doing so, however, it did not line up the party but rather caused it 
to degenerate into an incoherent free-for-all. After eight years of 
low tariffs this was a.lmost inevitable, given the vast number of 
articles whose rates had to be decided and. the clash of particularist 
interests invo1 vad. Some coherence did appear early in the tariff 
debate over the basis from which schedules would be decided. In 
this row it quickly became clear that the dispute centred on tariff 
levels rather than the prl.ncip1e of increased tariff itself. On 
this issue, at least, the Republicans were able to muster a 
DlLjorlty. To that extent the Republican leadership succeeded. 
From that point, however, the debate became largely a process of 
barter. 
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Tax reform proved equally contentious. Unlike the tariff 
free-for-all, these proposals broke traditional loyalties and the 
progressive/conservative dialogue re-emerged. La Follette sought 
inheritance taxes while Ogden Mills, a Republican Representative from 
New York, championed the proposal for a tax on spending rather than 
the idea. of a sales tax, to bring in revenue lost on the reform of 
income tax and scrapping of excess profits taxes. These latter 
proposals MUls supported in the belief that the key to prosperity 
was the fluidity of capital. Taxes, he maintained, "drive capital 
out of enterprise, stops the wheels of industry" .10 This was the 
argument broadly backing the Mellon income tax cuts. Progressives, 
however, were dubious of this argument. La. Follette was pushing for 
an inheritance tax in order to prevent "the accumulation of immense 
forttm8S in the h&nds of the few"lland so to equalize wea.lth to 
some extent. Their concern was not particularly industrial 
enterprises but rather personal fo~unes. This goa.l was shared by 
both Democratic a.nd Republican progressi vas and advanced on the 
Democratic side by Oklahoma's Robert Owen. The debates on tax a.nd 
tariff proposals ground on through the summer a.nd into the winter of 
1921. 
Conservatives, even in traditional areas. were simply unable 
to push their aims through this confused Congress. If Harding was 
adopting a 'hands off' attitude then the task of pulling the 
Republican ranks together fell to the Senate 'Old Guard'. Their 
power had diminished dramatically, however, with seniority now 
passing to several progressives, notably La. Follette, Borah and 
Norris. Lodge and Pennsylvania's Penrose were unable to bring 
Republicans together in sufficient numbers to defeat a Democrat 
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a.lliance with progressives. Indeed as we have seen, the key was 
again inconspicuous Senators, neither committed progressives nor 
conservatives, who could not endorse legislation which represented 
the fullest expression of these groups. 
The tariff debate was largely an interruption of the dispute 
based on the progressive/conservative split at the expense of 
traditional party loyalties. In 1921 neither the Harding 
administration nor Congress was able to hurt the labour movement 
directly. In CongresS I&rticularly the ba.la.nce indeed was such as 
to make any anti-union legislation highly unlikely. In fa.ct the 
initiative in the debate had by 1921 passed from conservatives to 
progreseivee. It was far from certain, however, whether advanced 
progreseives could win the backing of mild progreeeives and floating 
voters to push through legielat ion favourable to unions, these 
progreseives remaine:i disunited and. unclear as to policies to 
pursue. It remained to be eeen whether this etalemate would be 
broken if the progreesive/coneervative dialectic was to continue 
to dominate Congreeeional debates. 
As the receesiOll became a. public concern in mid-l921, the 
conservatives in fact gained new etrength from the position 
adopted by employere. The receseion of 1921 ensured that the 
dialectic would continue. Wages had gone up in the inflationary 
war years. To maintain profit margins, wages must now fall ae 
prioes fell and demand contracted. Theee efforts to lower wagee 
led progreseives to attack the profit margins which industries had 
achieved during the war and immediately afterwa.rde. Prof it 15 were 
more than adequate, they argued, to offeet short-term losses. 
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Moreover, they argued that it was not wages but a credit squeeze 
which caused the slump. Progressives also used the slump to argue 
for the improvement in efficiency. Thus. even where economic and 
industrial conditions provided conservatives with the initiative. 
the strong progressive response tended to counter balance it. 
Conservatives in effect wished to pass a.t least part of the cost of 
the slump in revenues onto their employees, either in redundancies 
or wage cuts. The 'Wage Reservoir' in classical economic thinking 
was too large, relative to the amount of money in the economy. 
This in turn meant business had less money to invest and to cover 
costs, thus wages must fall. Progressives disagreed with this static 
model of the economy's performance. Firstly, the profits of the war 
were such as to cover short-term losses. That to ease the slump, 
demand must continue at a level of maximum effectiveness. They 
further believed business could. by improved efficiency, cut 
production costs and thereby boost sales levels. CruCially, however, 
the traditional progressive suspicion of business meant that they 
were unable to accept that employers should be able to pass on to 
the poor the effects of a slump on their profit levels. Progressives 
remained unconvinced by the conservative argument as their own 
thinking became centred on the economic system. rather than the 
corruption of the system by individual businessmen. 
WhUe the progressives continued. to be sympathetic to the 
labour viewpoint, they oould do little of practical value to help 
unions. The eoonomio slump was far more damaging to labour 
than any actions of the Congress or the administration. The 
S, 735; 000 out of work had given employers the freedom to impose 
cuts in wages and redundancies in the battle to reduce costs in 
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industry. However much Congress argued over this issue, the action 
required in the final a.na.lysis was the enactment of a minimum wage 
or the augmentation of the power of unions. As we have seen the 
Nolan Minimum Wage bill could not be passed even when limited to the 
public service. In any ease, trade unions were at best ambivalent 
towards such a proposal. They feared that a statutory wage floor 
would in practice become a wage ceiling. Union leaders also feared 
that government intervention would destroy any need for workers to 
rely on tmions to protect their interests. In 1921 their position 
was that the worker deserved and should expect a constantly 
improving sta.nda.rd. of living. The major threat to this was a 
recession in which employers could cut wages with impunity and 
recalcitrant workers would simply be dispatched to a congested job 
uarket. As far as tmicnists were concerned the recession and its 
effect on the workforce emphasised the question of the powers of 
trade unions to protect the interests of their membership. Their 
main concern waa the reservoir of jobless which undermined their 
ability to act and thus maintain wage levels. Their first priority 
was to oppose the employers' campaign of wage cuts thereby 
IIILintaining effective demand and thus reducing the unemployment total. 
The unemployment oris is • due largely to the example of WUson 
and Roosevelt and time-consuming procedure of Congress, was 
primarUy the President's responsibility. This fact and the willing-
ness of the Secreta.ry of Commerce to identify and accept this 
principle had resulted in the Unemployment Conference being called. 
Congress, gi van no lead from unions, was pushed into the background 
in terms of its ability to affect the economic recession. 
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Senator La Follette for one was sceptical of the benefits of 
the Conference and of the intentions of the administration. As he 
wrote in october 19211 "The best minds of the country are in 
Washington to solve the problem, but as far as I can see their chief 
task has been to minimize the figures issued by the Department of 
Labor on the number of unemployed~ .12 Although this was a widespread 
view of what could be expected of the Conference, the Conference 
itself demonstrated some acceptance of government responsibility for 
employment. However. in its calls for tax and tariff stabUity it 
again focused on Congress where criticism had. been increasingly 
aimed in 1921. On the unemployment issue itself, however, by 
concentrating as it did on voluntary work. and calling on industry to 
regulate its production and for the Commerce Department to provide 
better figures, it justified the skepticism of La Follette and 
advanced progressives. Only the proposal that public works be made 
to respond. to the economy more tellingly was of any direct relevance 
to Congress and this proposal was taken up in a resolution submitted 
by Senator Kenyon of Iowa on the relieving of periods of unemployment 
with a system of public works. WhUe the administration dealt with 
the immediate problem, the issue was also of major concern in the 
long term to Congress. Progressives once more demonstrated their 
initiative and willingness to embrace government proposals. 
The hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and 
Labor made clear that conservative opinion was flatly opposed to 
Kenyon's bUl and the government intervention for which it called. 
Senator Coleman Du Pont, Republican of Delaware, believed that "it 
would be 10% good and 10% l:ad and the rest would not cut any ice". lJ 
This was not an opinion shared by many of those who gave statements 
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to the Committee. Dr. Wesley Mitchell, Director of the National 
Bureau of Economic Research, organised in 1920 and funded by the 
Ca.rnegie Fotmdation, strongly supported the bill. He believed that 
the proposal would smooth the business cycle in the belief that booms 
caused slumps and the severity of the two were closely rela.ted. He 
also believed. that knowledge of the figures were in themselves an 
important step towards a stable industr1.a.l. system. The idea was 
close to Hoover's own economic thinking. It was accepted. that booms 
led. to over-expansion which would lead. inevitably to contraction. 
Even the lmowled.ge of over-expansion would dampen the boom and 
minimise slumps. 
o. T. Mallery, the Chairman of the Industrial Relations Committee 
of Department of Labor a.nd Industry, Pennsylvania, added. that it was 
actually cheaper to build in recession when materials were more 
plentiful. Moreover the bill only proposed. the postponement of 2~ 
of government building per annum so that building in normal times 
would not undulY' be contracted. Yat even this small percentage 
would absorb an estimated JQ% of unemployed. labour in a recession. 
The proposa.l did not increase the government's expenditure, indeed. 
given the reduoed. costs in slumps and inflated prices in booms, it 
m16ht &Ct~y save money. At no extra expense this proposal oould 
have a. significant impact on the well-being of the population. 
M:r L. Wa.lla.ce of the American Engineering Society believed that 
"this bill is fundamental in its theory and it has in prospeot very 
materla.l and beneficial reeul ts It. 14 Not least of these benefits 
was the hope that such a system would encourage private industry to 
minimise seasonality, a problem which was at the root of industrial 
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disruption in the coal industry particularly. The hope among 
engineers was that this planning would act as an example in all areas 
of the industrial system. The American Fedemtion of Labor gave the 
proposal "its absolute endorsement" .1..5 
The pllJ:'pose of the bill was not to attack business. Although 
the recession was disastrous for \mions, neither was it particularly 
enjoyed by business. This was not, in the strictest sense, a union/ 
employer issue. Yet the key to the bill was its intention of 
modifying the performance of the economy. In this it did highlight 
the growing ideological implications of the union/employer dispute. 
The bill fundamentally conformed to the union viewpoint of a 
mechanistic economy as opposed to business belief in a natural 
economy. Thus, while business ea.w the benefit of a more stable 
economy and could accept the proposal on that b&sis, as the 
General Mazlager of the Associated General Contractors of America 
said, his industry might object to the bill for the interference 
of the govemment it implied. This bill pointed up the basic 
political divergence between unions and employers, a divergence which 
also chamcter1sed the natUl."8 of the progressive/conservative split 
in Congress. This was not a radical proposal, it had. been put 
:f'orwa.xd by Senator Kenyon, by no mea.ns. assooiated with advanced 
progressives and, in fact, a senior Republican and chairm&n of the 
CODUllittee on Education and La.bor. This propoeal repreeented the new 
mUd progreesi vism, very close to the Hoover view but which now 
accepted the need for govemment action in this area, whUe being 
stUl uneasy about unfettered union power. Even this was too much for 
coneervatives to accept. 
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Senator Thomas Sterling, Republican from South Dakota, for one 
could not accept such a principle of intervention. "That time has 
not come when we simply appropriate money for the support of the 
people" .16 He clung tenaciously to the idea of a free economy. To 
Kenyon, however, the bill did not mean extra appropriations it meant 
positively improving the conditions of the people of the country by 
doing nothing more than re-a.rra.nging the schedule of public works. 
He did not regard this as any real interference by govemment, and 
even if regarded as such, to be so palpably wise as to be justified. 
Notwithstanding the objections of conservative Senators on the 
committee, Kenyon was confident that the bUl would be voted 
favourably. Important to the bUlls prospect was also the support 
from Secretary Hoover, though Hat'ding himself did not venture an 
opinion. Despite Ken!'Oll's optimism the bill faUed to get to the 
noor of the Senate during the session. 
In his address to Congress of 5th December 1921, the President 
had barely mentioned. unemployment. His only reference to labour 
relations was a. call for "a charter of elemental rights" .17 This 
indicated Harding's wish to see industrial relations come under 
quasi-legal supervision. It was not an opinion which many 
progressives could back and was deeply unpopular with trade unionists. 
yet the question of the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes 
remained a. major problem for progressives to solve. The reoession 
of 1921, the Railroad Labor Board and the Coal Commission had 
temporarily freed Congress from involvement in the issue. Yet it 
was clear that the question of unionism was inextricably bound to 
many questions about the economy and the government role with which 
Congress was concerned. 
The report of the Committee of Education and Labor on the 
West Virginia situation submitted on 27th January 1922, forced 
Congress to return to the consideration of the issue specifically. 
The first fact the report demonstrated was that despite the attempt 
~ Senator La Follette in his People's Legislative Service to create 
a coherent progressive philosophy and bridge the gap between 
progressivism and the unions, it was an issue on which progressives 
were hopelessly unable to come to any agreement. As Kenyon, the 
Chairman of the Committee admitted, in submitting the report, "It is 
18 impossible for the committee to agree on any report." There were 
therefore only the opinions of the Committee to report. Borah did 
nat submit an opinion although his views were plain. As he wrote to 
George Perkins in February 1922. 
I urged several years ago that the only solution of 
these matters was for the government to take over those 
commodities which are of the nature, and by nature, 
monopolies, and I do not see any other solution.19 
Such a position of government intervention had never previously been 
acoepted by oonservatives and was nat in this case, as the opinions 
of La.wrence C. Phipps, Republican of Colorado, Sterling of South 
Dakota and Republican F .E. Warren of Wyoming showed. Their views 
were that the mineworkers had been perfectly satisfied with conditions, 
that union organisers had come from other states and that they had 
used violence and intimidation. They strongly urged that unions be 
incorporated and held liable in oontracts, as were industries a.nd 
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businesses. They believed only mutuality before the law could make 
contracts binding and bring stability to industrial relations. 
Senator Kenyon's response was to propose a code of industrial 
relations. This reflected the strong tradition of mild progressives 
to seek orderly justice in industrial relations which had. grown in 
popularity since the Industrial Conference in 1919. Indeed Kenyon 
referred specifically to the Second Conference in putting forward. 
his proposals. He agreed with its recommendations that either the 
Bureau of Mediation and Conciliation within the Department of Labor 
must be expanded or that the coal industry must have a board similar 
to that organised in the railroad industry under the 1920 Transporta-
tion Act. He was critical of the Conference and that Act and indeed 
the Kansas Court of Industrial Relations for failing to provide a 
code which would allow both sides to find out where they stood. 20 
It was Kenyon's opinion that the key to peaceful industrial relations 
was that both \.mions and business be gi van firm guidelines. Both 
sides must recognise the practical limits of their claim. He 
believed that "the whole story of this contest is • • of a spirit 
of suspicion, hate and. retaliation on both sides tl'l1.t does not 
augur well for industrial peace in that portion of the state". 21 
Once both sides understood definite limits to their claims they would 
end their constant struggle for supremacy. This echoed strongly the 
view of President Wilson. Now, however, progressives believed that 
a code must be put in place, since understanding was unlikely to 
emerge voluntarily. Also reflecting the development of progressive 
thinking was the code proposed by Senator Kenyon. In his opinion, 
the code must recognise the rights of tmions to organise peaceably 
and bargain collectively through representatives of the workers' 
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own choosing. It must also recognise the right to strike, and the 
right to attempt to dissuade others from breaking the strike, though 
not by violent means - picketing rights in effect. The unions had 
no right to force individuals to join \mions or to force them to 
break contracts made with employers in doing so. 
This code, which Kenyon attempted to put on the legislative 
agenda, appeared to give trade unionists the legal endorsement they 
had so long sought and which, as Kenyon himself had noted, the 
Industrial Conferences had failed to ensure. However, real 
difficulties were also inherent in the code. Primary a.mong these 
was the ruling that unions could not force individuals already under 
contract to join the union. This in fact left open the question of 
the Yellow Dog Contract, a popular method of union obstruction among 
employers. The code also lacked any meaningful prohibition of strike 
breaking and the use of armed guards, °al though Kenyon had in his 
report condemned these practices. In attempting to be fair, Kenyon 
was leaving businessmen with the weapons which could undermine 
unionism. Whether this coincided with Harding's position was never 
made clear. 
Kenyon's proposed industrial code failed as had his proposal 
on unemployment. The beginning of 1922 showed Congress to be still 
confused. The two groups at the extremes of Congressional opinion 
remained true to their positions since the war. Anti-union 
conservatives were doing all they could to end the ability of unions 
to strike or picket and to deny any government aid. This derived 
from their belief in a free market economy. a belief which also led 
to their opposition to any suggestion of federal economic intervention. 
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As we have seen this group "'as bipartisan in composition. Similarly, 
advanced progressives close to 1& Follette remained committed to 
allowing trade lmions to exercise their power, even if crises 
resulted, to force employers to recognise their legitimacy. These 
men had made but little contribution in 1921. They were unable as 
yet to speak as one voice. The resolution of Senator Johnson of 
Califomia., however, reflected. their concem for the detail of 
industrial disputes. 
Between these two groups the real power in labour issues lay 
with the floating, pragmatiC vote and mild progressives. The float-
ing vote was not swayed by principle. As has been demonstrated, 
this vote passed the Johnson resolution and then abridged the 
provisions of the Ia Follette Seamen's Act. Pra.cticality, and the 
mood of the public would govern their decisions. Nonetheless the 
left,..,am trend towa.:rds clearer support of lmion rights and. the 
acceptance of federa.l responsibility in the economy, as represented 
in the resolutions of senator Kenyon, marked a. shift in the centre of 
Congressional consensus. COnsensus here means simply the point at 
which most could agree. The Kenyon proposals marked a new trend 
among moderate progressives,in 1921. They were now prepared to 
codify the rights of unions which Wilson and the Industrial 
Conferences had avoided. It should be pointed out that progressives, 
however, remained splintered and individualistic. These were trends, 
not coherent policy developments. Even these trends, while not voted 
down, were not being accepted by the floating vote. The issue of 
tariff reform had faUed to submerge the ideological split, or end 
the consequent stalemate. It appeared that only a major upheaval 
would be likely to bring such a confused. situation to an end. 
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It was at this time that the coal miners' announcement was 
made to strike on 1st April 1922. Oscar Bland. characterised the 
strike as one likely to become "one of the greatest industrial struggles 
in the history of our cotmtry". 22 When the impending strike was first 
known of Congress displayed its sympathy for trade unionism in a 
widespread. belief that the coal operators were "pemitting the 
1st of April. the expiration of the contract to come, knowing that 
a great nationwide strike will prevail". 23 Support for trade 
unionism was at its strongest when progressives' traditional antipathy 
towards the business community and its power was aroused. 
Progressives believed clearly that the operators were deliberately 
fomenting a strike in order to blacken and destroy the United Mine 
W orkel'S in order to re-establish their control over the mining 
communities. Where they felt a business conspiracy existed, as in 
the looming coal strike. their support went more firmly in the 
first instance to the tmiCllS. In the House, Edward E. Browne. 
Republican. Wisconsin went further still to de~ the legitimacy of 
the ostensible purpose of the operators in refusing to negotiate, 
that high wage levels were being maintained throuCl inflated prices. 
In the Senate too, the progressives sympathisErlwith the U.M.W. 
The coal strike encapsulated. the key questions which confronted 
progressives in the sixty-seventh Congress. The basic question of 
employers not respecting the rights of unions to represent a.nd 
1:argain for the workforce became enmeshed in the broader question 
of wage levels and whether the economy should be made to benefit the 
population more directly. On the first issue, progressives 
were quite clear and tmanimoUB in their opinion which Borah stateda 
"Either a strike •• or the miners go back to work for wages 
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absolutely dictated. by the mine owners themselves". The strike 
also raised once more the role of the government in industrial 
relations. In the House, progressive support for the U.M.W. was a 
l:asis for an attack on the Harding administration. This attack was 
adOJ?ted predictably by Democratic progressives. Huddleston accused. 
the executive branch of sympathising with the operators in its 
"hyprotical pretense • • of an effort to bring these contending 
forces together". 25 In its failure, the administration became 
identified with those who, while "always lustUy decrying class 
consciousness. the affUiated OJ?en shoppers show an intense class 
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consciousness". Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover defended the 
administration's failure to bring the two sides to the negotiating 
table in terms of the limits of executive power. ''The govenunental 
agencies hAve no legal authority to terminate or intervene in the 
strike" .27 This was a reminder of the f1.mdamental non-interventionist 
thinking shared by the members of the Harding administration. As 
advanced progressive OJ?inion had developed, however, this position 
was regarded as baing as hostile to trade unions as active support 
for the business community's motives, a position which also put 
pressure on mild progressives to take a more positive stance. 
Huidleston's attack reflected the leftward trend of the P.L.S. under 
La Follette and showed the progressives' suspicion of business as a 
class, although there was a continued reluotanoe to express this 
feeling. Furthermore, suspicion of the administration's motives was 
a bipartisan progressive phenomenon. This was oonfirmed by a reso-
lution by Representative Edward Dennison, Republican, Illinois 
which sought to deny wages to any govenunent officer in the state 
and Justice Departments bringing inj1.mctive proceedings against 
the striking miners. 
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The growing crisis occasioned by the strike was forcing 
several progressives to consider the radical step of government 
ownership of the coal industry. This mood did not come from such 
socialist ideas as expressed by Meyer London of New York. His 
opinions were too much the expression of an 'outside' economic 
critique to be embmced. by progressives. It was his opinion that 
"the time when legislating consisted in laying down moral principles 
28 is gone". In his view it was time for government to take over 
running of the economy from the shambolic private enterprise system 
and. to bring justice and equality based on the economy, not morality, 
to the majority of the popula.tion. WhUe senator David Walsh 
(Democrat) of Massachussetts agreed that "private enterprise in the 
coal industry is on trial",29this position grew from its tradition 
of concern for the general welfare. The motivation behind the idea 
of government ownership was the progressives' belief that the public 
had a right to expect continuity in the essential industries. 
Clearly, though the U .M.W. also campaigned for government ownership, 
the question of strike action in a government-owned coal industry. 
committed to serving the public, remained open. Progressives 
sought order in the industry and an end to periodic disr.lption. 
Given the progressive attitude to unionism. however, unions' status 
would certainly be assured, while the rationalisation of the 
industry also would be to the benefit of the workforce. The 
progressives had taken the initiative on the broader issues of the 
coal industry, and also backed the U.M.W. position in calling the 
strlka. 
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The Herrin Massacre in Illinois in June 1922 quickly threw the 
initiative back to the conservatives in Congress. To anti-unionists 
these killings demonstrated the lawlessness of unionists and proved 
they were undeserving of justice. It also demonstrated trade 
unionism's violent suppression of the individual's right to work. 
senator Myers pointed to this principle, long a conservative 
favourite in their attacks on unionism, as the conservative approach 
to peaceable industrial relations. 
If the people who i-'anted to work • • were permitted to 
work • • and if the government would protect them in 
exercising that right, I believe the strike itself 
would work itself out to a wholesome, healthful and 
natural settlement. JO 
As in the Poindexter bill, the conservative argument remained that a 
strike was a mere quitting of work and that as such workers should 
simply be replaced, with government backing if need be. This in 
their opinion was the best way to ensure peace and prosperity in 
industry, effectively a call for the breaking of the strike and the 
union. 
Therefore, there existed a deep poli tical divide betl-reen 
conservatives and progressives, a divide which was being opened up 
by the problem of labour relations and the issues it raised. 
Conservatives believed strongly in the emasculation of trade uniOns, 
in the pre-eminence of the 'natural' working of the economy, the 
right of management to make decisions on wages, productivity, and 
lay-offs, lmfettered. They saw no role far the government in the 
economy, except where action was necessary to recover this basis. 
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Progressives, derived from their early sus:picion of concentration of 
wealth and the :power such wealth commanded, were increasingly 
convinced of the need to reform the 'natural' workings of the 
economy. In their o:pinion equality and justice had still to be 
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achieved. Once eml:arked on this trend, :progressives were forced 
to deal with the :priorities involved. By 1922, the coal crisis and 
the apparent root of the :problems in the structure of the industry 
forced several :progressives to consider government ownership. They 
were far from unanimous. Many :progressives baulked at such 
intervention and concentrated on the labour relations :problem, they 
embraced Kenyon's idea of a code on which to base a nationwide 
concUiation service as suggested in the report of President Wilson's 
Industrial Conference. All were now reconciled to increasing 
federal intervention in the economic system. This was an issue which 
many in Congress were unable to acce:pt, as they were unable to accept 
the full implications of the conservative position. They were 
:pre:pared, however, to accept that trade unions were legitimate 
organisations with legitimate concerns. The Congressional situation 
in mid-l922 remained in stalemate, swaying from conservative to 
progressive initiative ~ the industrial situation changed but with 
neither able to achieve even temporary dominance. 
What the crisis had achieved was the increasing agreement of 
progressives in the need for action, however unclear they were on 
what that should be. Three courses of action were now open to 
them. One choice was 'based on the view that the nature of industrial 
power amounted to the ability of unions to enforce a strike. The 
Johnson resolution on the West Virginia situation had indicated the 
key to industrial power in .raising the issue of the use of armed 
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guards by operators seeking to break the strike. On 29th July 1922 
Senator Lee S. Overman, Democrat from North carolina, had read into 
the Congressional Record a statement by the Governor of that State 
of his policy towards strikes and picketing, a view which was 
heartily endorsed by OVerman. 
striking labourers have a right, to such an extent as 
they can do so orderly • • to present their argument 
to a person about to take their pl.a.ce and if such 
person agrees • • it follows that a person breaks no 
valid laws who undertakes to persuade another • • • 
I will hereafter • • permit reasonable-sized committees 
•• to present their cause to anybody they present it 
to. 31 
This principle of laNiul, peaceful picketing was one which 
progressives could agree to with ease. This gave strikers their 
rights whUe also giving the individual his freedom of choice, and 
progressives believed. that such rights the unions already had, 
whether explicitly or not. What the Herrin Massacre, and indeed the 
West Virginia rioting, had proved was that the use of company guards 
and strikebreakers brought in en-masse by compa.nies denied unions 
the opportunity to let the strikebreakers Jalow the situation. The 
first choice was legislation to end business weapons such as armed 
guards, importation of strikebreakers, the use of the Yellow Dog 
contracts. The second, as in the Kenyon resolution, was to set up a 
board or a code of conduct for all industries. The third choice was 
. government ownership. Progressives were split largely between the 
government ownership or Kenyon al terna.tive. These two also satisfied the 
progressi va desire for order and to be seen to be acting in the 
national interest, rather than against any group, as the first choice 
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entailed. By 1922, hOl-:ever, it l'as clear that progressives were 
looking to several areas in the search for a solution. 
None of these were, as yet, choices which the floating vote or 
indeed standpat politicians in both parties could endorse. During 
the summer the effects of the crisis in galvanising progressives 
began to ;.'eaken. Increasingly concern for the welfare of the 
consumer began to dominate Congressional attention, reflecting once 
again the broad rather than specific concern which progressives 
de~onstrated towards the 'labor problem'. This concern was 
heightened by the beginning of a strike by railroad shopmen over 
Railroad labor Board decision No. 1074 to cut wages, for the second 
time in six months, by between 4 cents and 1,5 cents per hour. The 
emergency changed in nature from the problem of coal production to 
one of coal distribution. In consequence, Congress abandoned its 
traditional disputes to quickly promulgate legislation for a new 
investigation of the coal industry, although this time with specific 
instructions to assess the possibility of implementing government 
control of the industry - an investigation which'was now also 
winning the grudging backing of traditionally standpat Republicans 
such as senator 'r:alter E. Edge of New Jersey who stated thatl 
"I am ready to modify •• opposition to Government intervention in 
private business •• and to advocate legitimate scrutiny." 32 
senator Kenyon was less hesitant, "I for one • • shall favor taking 
over the mines. II)) The crisis had. served to shift consensus 
lIILI8inally, although whether legislation could actually pass remained. 
to be seen. The U.H.W. and the operators of the central competitive 
field had now begun to seek a conference and were able to reach 
agreement at Cleveland in late August 1922. The key issue of 
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national or district agreements was postponed as alarm grew at the 
rate by which non-union production had increased during the strike. 
Despite the improvement in non-union production and the return 
to work of the union fields. the strike on the railroads continued 
to threaten a coal shortage and present the Congress and administra.-
tion with a desperate situation. So much so that Harding in his 
\ 
18th August speech had to ask for legislation to set up a Federal 
Fuel Distributor to give priority to coal shipments. The legislation 
for this and a U.S. Coal Commission were law by 22nd September 1922. 
Even this legislation progressives regarded as largely ineffective 
and Senators with such divergent views as Borah, Edge and Lenroot 
of Wisconsin became increasingly convinced that the Congress would 
have to grant power to the President to take over the mines and 
railroads to cope with the crisis. The rights of the public must 
take precedent over both union and business prerogatives. Many 
more in both H01~es were no longer concerned with the question of 
rights, all they wished to see was an end to the industrial crisis. 
which '\o:as by then in its sixth month. 
The President had called for a return to work on 1st September 
1922, a retuxn to be protected by federal troops and state militia. 
This, in conjunction with his opinion that the strike being against 
a decision of the Railroad l&bor Board was in itself illegal, set a 
tone of anger and impatience centred on the shopmen's union. This 
line was echoed in the House of Representatives by Republican 
Andrew Volstead of Minnesota. who held frankly that "the strike and 
lockout must be outlawed,,?4 The government must act to stop the 
strike. But the strikers must be reinstated for in mentioning 
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'lockout' he reflected the Congressional opinion that both operators 
and strikers were equally to blame. Alabama's Huddleston also 
believed in action: "The administration has abandoned its efforts 
to end the rail strike and Congress sits supine ... 35 He did not want 
the type of action ultimately taken by the administration. 
Government control was increasingly being accepted by 
progressives. By September 1922, however, the crisis had caused 
Congressional concern to be focused almost wholly upon ending the 
strike. The Daugherty injunction of 1st September 1922 demonstrated 
that this attitude was shared by the President. Given the mood of 
the time, the injunction was received by Congress, as the New York 
World editoria1ised bitterly, as being "too sweeping •• but the 
strike ought to be ended ••• Therefore remain silent while the 
Constitution which we are sworn to uphold is disregarded ... )6 Relief, 
rather than protest, swept through Congress and the nation. 
What protests there were, were made by Democrats. Republicans 
remained remarkably muted. Senator Tom watson of Georgia made a 
bitter attack on Daugherty, condemning the injunction and his 
explanation of it as n~t1y biased in favour of the railroad 
owners. This, he argued, overlooked the violations of Board 
decisions by the railroad executives. If the Board was a legal body. 
as Harding claimed, then it was as illegal as any strike and had 
destroyed union confidence in the Board. This in turn made Harding's 
argument that the union should have appealed to it a. fatuous 
. proposal. Watson a.lso queried the convenience of Judge Wilkerson, 
who had issued the injunction, having been appointed only a few weeks 
earlier. In the House a motion to impeach the Attorney General was 
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made and referred to the Judiciary Committee. The main protests 
"'-ere being made against Daugherty while Harding himself escaped most 
criticism. 
Democratic Senator Joseph T. Robinson's (Arkansas) objections 
to the injunction were confined largely to its nat~ not the broader 
thinking of the administration. Robinson thus made several key 
points about the nature of the injunction and held that it was itself 
illegal. Firstly. the injunction was patently sought by the 
government on behalf of the railroad owners and as such violated 
Section 20 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. Furthermore, he held that 
in such sweeping repression of any activity pertaining to the strike, 
it also violated the constitutional rights of free speech. press and 
assembly. Finally, Robinson argued that the fundamenta.l assumption 
of the injunction was that the strike was per se an illegal 
conspiracy against interstate commerce, again not a legal basis for 
injunctive action. From these points Robinson expanded the issue 
to condemn the administration. The injunction had been used not 
for its proper purpose of protecting property but to end the strike, 
which power "the law of the United States does not, expressly or 
im:p1ied1~ give the Attorney General or the courts.";? 
Senator James Hatson of Indiana. defending the administration 
with which he had been closely identified, claimed that the 
government had a great responsibility in fact to defend interstate 
commerce against conspiracies. so that the injunction was not against 
the strike as such. Furthermore, he argued that Section 20 of the 
Clayton Act had not been violated since it had been the government 
'-hich had brought the action. He also believed that the injunction 
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had been justified in order to protect the public in the emergency. 
Watson added that it was no longer properly a case for Congressional 
perusal, being sub judice. 
The crisis had both continued to prod progressivism to more 
radical proposals and. atti.ttrles to tmionism while reinforcing the 
need for the crisis to be brought to an end, by whatever means. 
The relief felt by Congress and its inability to find any solution 
to the labour problem were factors contributing to the desultory 
treatment accorded the injunction. Nonetheless, the injunctive 
action had ended the credibility of the Harding administration in 
the eyes of much of Congress and certainly in the eyes of trade 
tmionists. This was likely to become evident in the 1922 mid-term 
election. This would also be some indication of the mood of the 
public in 1922. The preparations for the election, in fact, also 
contributed to lack of Congressional outrage. Senators seeking 
re-election in 1922 had begun to turn their thoughts to the matter 
as early as October and November 1921,as in the cases of La Follette 
and Borah. They turned in 1922 to State issues as they tried to 
demonstrate their commitment to their constituencies. Comments on 
national issues were thus muted. The Harding administration 
recognised the looal nature of these elections, and so determined 
not to interfere in the campaign. It also wished to avoid :naking 
1922 a test of the administration. As Taft, now Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court and very close to Harding, particularly on the 
gol:' course, .wrote to William Karger. "The administration did not 
think it part of its business to help candidates in the primaries 
•• even in Ohio. ,,)8 Senator Lodge, running for re-election in 
Massachussetts, found the lack of White House backing disturbing. 
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Despite actual non-interference, Harding had, in vetoing the Bonus 
Bill, thrown the campaign into confusion. Lodge had. voted for the 
bonus and so he badly needed some confirmtion from the administration 
of its continued confidence in him. Throughout october 1922 he 
wrote a series of letters to Harding asking for a letter of 
endorsement. He also complained of the failure of Secretary of 
Labor Davis to make any speeches in Massachussetts. Moreover, the 
crisis of 1922 was being felt particularly in New England as winter 
neared. Lodge felt em1:att1ed and in need. of help. 
Standpat Republicans were also running into problems in the 
Mid West as Senator Harry New discovered in his primary defeat by 
Albert Beveridge in Indiana. In addition to the bonus, the Mid West 
was in a depression which was forcing them to seek central 
government aid, as had been the case in the 1880's and 1890's. The 
Republican nomination of Beveridge, however, demonstrated the 
agricultural motivation behind the Mid Westexn sentiment since 
Beveridge was a strong backer of the Kansas Court of Industrial 
Relations, much hated by the A.F. of L. 
The 1922 elections, despite the non-intervention of the 
Harding administration, except in Frank Brandegee' s race in 
Connecticut, raised. ideological questions. To be sure this varied 
from state to state and candidate to candidate, and yet the 
government' s role in the economy did recur during the campaign as 
did attitudes towards trade unionism. 
The extent to which the cris is in 1922 affected voting is 
impossible to qUAntify accurately. As we have seen, the labour 
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problem had become enormously confused by this time. 'Friends' for 
unionists meant men who would support their views. As progressives 
found, however, these wishes were often contradictory and not often 
compatible with their own views, as in the opposition to Kenyon's 
code of conduct. Nationalization too remained an issue on which 
unions were far from unanimous. Progressives moreover were 
themselves divided and ambivalent on the labour issue so that it was 
too complex by 1922 to have any quantifiable effect. Progressives 
were clearly 'friends' but on new proposals the relationship 
remained ambivalent due to unionists' continuing denial of their 
political implications. The crisis itself did polarise opinion on 
the actions of Congress and the administration, however, and did 
possibly' have an effect on voting. However, the likelihood is that 
it merely confirmed trends already set in motion by the agricultural 
crisis a.nd local issues. In the latter the unions could make 
themselves felt, a.s in Wisconsin's La Follette machine. In rural 
area.s where railroad. towns and mining communities had more impact, 
then progressivism was much more likely to be friendly to unims. 
With regard. to senate races, this concentration of unicnists had 
less power but they could provide an organisation of sorts. In 1922, 
the mood of the nation, one of frustration with Congress and the 
administration alike, determined the outcome a.t the polls, an ama.lgam 
of issues rather than anyone in particular with the exception of 
the Mid West and Great Lake states. 
The election of 1922 provided the Democratic party with a much 
needed boost after the post 1920 gloom, but the results provided 
progressives with still more encouragement. Indeed. the Democrats 
suffered the defeat of two of their Senators with Atlee Pomerene 
losing to Simeon D. Fess, a Harding-backed candidate in Ohio and 
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Marcus Smith, defeated by Ralph Cameron in Arizona. These defeats 
were offset by Samuel Ralston' s victory over Beveridge in Indiana, 
a reflection of lmim strength in that State. Beveridge believed 
his defeat to have been due to Ku Klux Klan strength there; the Klan 
had apparently infiltrated Indiana unionism. William Bruce defeated 
Joseph France in Maryland; Woodridge Ferris triumphed over 
Truman Newberry, a man ta.inted by scandaJ., Edward Edwards was 
successful against Joseph Felinghuysen, a recognised White House 
favourite in New Jersey; Royal S. Copeland defeated William Calder 
in New York; C.C. Dill, with full tmion backing, defeated the hated 
Miles Poindexter; and. the victory in West Virginia was M. Neely's 
over Howard Sutherland. The Republican majority in the Senate was 
cut from 20 to six. The Democrats made similar strides in the 
House. The gains made by Republicans in the South. notably in 
Tennessee and Missouri were overtumed, while in New York. New 
Jersey and Indiana. Democrats made gains while they picked up seats 
. throughout the country. In the House a whopping 16.5 Republican 
majority was reduced to a mere 10. 
The gains made by progressives in 1922 were likely to make 
these majorities still more difficult for Republicans to transform 
into legislative control. Particularly stunning had been the 
sweeping victory in Minnesota over Republican Frank Kellogg, still 
another Republican sta.lwa.rd, and Knute Nelson by the Farm-Labor 
cand1da.tes Henrlk Shipsted a.nd Magnus Johnson. The progressives 
had suffered a set-back in the defeat of France in Maryland but this 
was offset by the victories of progressive Democrats Dill and Neely. 
Even where Senatorial positions had rema.ined within the same party, 
progressivism had made further inroads. This was the case in Iowa, 
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for instance, where Kenyon's seat (he, having become increasingly 
troublesome as chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, had. 
been appointed to the Customs Court) had been taken over by 
Smith Brookhart. In Montana, the outspoken anti-tmionist Henry Myers 
was ousted to be replaced by Burton K. Wheeler, later to run as 
La. Follette's vice-presidential candidate and in Pennsylvania 
Penrose had been replaced by George W. Pepper. A further progressive 
gain had been the election of Lynn Frazier to Porter McCumber's 
North Dakota Senate seat. Success in the House was less apparent, . 
indeed in New York, Meyer London was defeated although in Wisconsin 
Victor Berger did win. 39 
This new infusion of progressive strength into a more evenly 
ba.lanced Congress prompted La. Follette to attempt once more to tmit~ 
progressives. His P.L.S. made no impact so far. Indeed, the 
initiatives on labour issues came from progressives who were out of 
sympathy with La. Follette's rad~calism. Yet this leftward drift 
encouraged La Follette in thinking that a broad progressive movement 
could be created. On 18th November 1922 the senator issued a 
statement declaring that. ''The time has now come for the organization 
of a well-defined group co-operating in support of accepted. progressive 
40 principles and policies." These policies he outlined as aid to the 
farm commtmity, opposition to the administration's determination to 
pass a ship subsidy bill and. an acceleration of the merger of 
railroads. He believed that "public sentiment will earnestly 
support a sincere effort to mobilize the progressive forces in 
41 Congress". 
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It was clear that progressivism needed some coherence. In 
1922 it was little more than a collective phrase applied to several 
individuals. As we have seen the principles on which progressivism 
was based were moral and as a result each progressive gave different 
weight to different principles. In economic problems moral 
principles decided their actions. As London had noted, and the 
disarray in progressive ranks apparently demonstrated, moral 
principle could no longer be the basis of legislation. As La 
Follette's statement revealed, progressives' unity since 1919 derived 
from legislation they were able to oppose rather than any they might 
propose. This applied equally to the labour problem, as the events 
of the post-war years had. so far demonstrated. Perhaps the 
development in progressive thought in the Sixty-5eventh Congress 
could now be made into concrete policies and give the movement a basic 
credo, particularly with regard to labour, the economy and the role 
of the government. 
While progressives rejoiced and were girding their loins for 
the new Congress, the view from the White House seemed mOI:e dismal. 
The President, who had had. to wait over a year for tariff reform 
and had the tax proposals of his Treasury Secretary practically 
overturned, was also under pressure from the verJ heartla.nd of 
Republicanism to act on the agricultural depression. He had 
witnessed a rebellious Congress bringing government to a practical 
standstill and was frankly dismayed at the progressive gains. The 
gains themselves did not worry him most, he would "have been more 
satisfied • • if it always expressed itself for or against a 
political party so that we might have party sponsorship and • • 
42 party ability to do things". It was the continuing stalemate in 
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Congress which dismayed him. He frankly wished that La Follette 
et al would split away, expecting of course that conservatives would 
unite under the Republican banner. For President Harding the 1922 
election presaged yet another difficult and argumentative Congress 
to come. 
By 1922 the ideological split between progressives and 
conservatives had become clearer. The unemployment problem in 
1921 caused progressives to accept the need for positive federal 
intervention to protect the well-being of the less fortunate in 
America. This shift represented. a significant move, albeit 
limited in detail, away from the traditional progressive 'national 
interest' stance. Equality and justice it appeared could no 
longer be ensured by legal reform; the government must act in favour 
of particular groups. 
This trend continued with Kenyon's proposed code growing from 
the West Virginia investigations. Unions' right to bargain and 
organise was unequivocally guaranteed, again a significant 
development from the position of Wilson and closer to advanced 
p~ssives such as La Follette. The agricultural crisis also 
encouraged the leftward trend toward the protection of the less 
fortunate and away from simply regulating business and allowing the 
'small man' economic freedom. 
Yet despite this progressive development with its unequivocal 
endorsement of trade union rights, there was no legislative success 
in these years. The floating vote remained in control. Moreover, 
while the unions welcomed progressive proposals on unemployment, they 
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still sought a voluntary system and discouraged Kenyon's code. 
Ambivalence between unionists and progressives remained unresolved. 
229 
NOTES 
1. Congressional Record Vol.60~·Part 5. p.4535, 66th Congress. 
third sess1on. 







Ibid. p.301. Congressional distaste for Blanton was such that 
a move was made to expel him during the 67th Congress. Although 
it failed it served to demonstrate that Blanton was isolated in 
his opinions. 
Ibid. part J, p.269J. 
Ibid. p.2798. 
Ibid. part 5. p.4322. 
Ibid. part J, p.2640. 
Ibid. part 4, p.)433. 
9. La Follette family papers, Box 113. letters sent, La Follette 
to George Comings May 7th, 1921. 
10. Ogden L. Mills papers, Box 121, statement by MUls of July 20th, 
1921. 
11. La Follette family papers, Box 11.5, letters sent, La Follette 
to Charles Anieken, district court, Fargo, N.D. October 4th, 1921. 
12. Ibid. Box 116, letters sent. La Follette to a Wisconsin 
constituent october 13th, 1921. 
13. Senate Commission on Education and Labor, Hearings on S .2749, 
to prepare for periods of Wlemployment, p.10. 
14. Ibid. p.31. 
15. Ibid. p.22. 
16. Ibid. p.)? 
17. Congressional Record Vol.62, part I, p.J9, 67th Congress, second 
session. 
18. Ibid. part 2, p.1797. 
19. Borah papers. Box 109, Borah to George W. Perkins February 14th, 
1922. 
20. For details of the Kansas Act see notes to Chapter 3, No.35, 
p.150. As Kenyon pointed out the conference had completely 
avoided the issue of trade union legitimacy as a method of 
worker representation. 
230 
21. senate Committee on Education and Labor, S.Rep. No 457 to 
accompany S.Res.SO January 27th, 1922, p.S. 













Ibid. part 6, 1'.5205. 
Ibid. part 7, 1'.6415. 
Ibid. part 9, p.8528. 
Ibid. part 7, 1'.6417. 
Ibid. part 9, 1'.8375. 
Ibid. p.9297. 
Ibid. part 10, p.10733. 
32. Borah papers, Box 109, Borah to Hoover May 19th, 1922. Borah 
was quoting Edge from his statement in the Calder Committee 
Hearings • 
. 33. Ibid. Quoting Kenyon. 
34. CongressiOnal Record, vo1.62, part 12, p.12017 , 67th Congress, 
second session. 
35. Ibid. p.11806. 
)6. Ibid. p.12197. 
11. Ibid. p.12206. 
38. Taft papers, serles 3, Taft to Karger April 1st, 1922. 
39. Congressional Directory, Vo1s.1-7. See these for all voting 
totals. 
40. La Follette family papers, Box 118, , letters sent, November 18th, 
1922. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Ha:r:ding papers, P .O.F., c.f .806, Ha:r:ding to Jonathan Bourne 
November 9th, 1922. 
231 
BUSINESS AND LAl30tlR OPmION TO 1923 
In preceding chapters the political respellSe to the 'labor 
problem' had baen predicated upon the definition which had arisen 
trom the 'irtlt Ind'WItrial Conference in 1919. Aa waa made apparent 
in Chapter 'our, however, the A.F. of L. seemed to be bag1ml1ng a 
reasseasment ot ita tactic. in 1921. In addition, the preceding-
chapter demonstnted that progre •• i,... tended to IDO..,. towards a 
clearer acceptance of unionism'. claima. Thil tendeno7 was molt 
marked by the sroup o£ advanced progre •• ives who had agreed to 
partioipate in La Follette's People's Legislative Service. 
This Cbapter return. to look at the impact which the 
recession and the aggre •• ive busine •• campaign had upon the 
nature of industrial relatione and trade unioni.ts' outlook from 
1921 to 192). '1\1i. in turn lead. to an analysi. of the 
development or otherwise ot trade unioni.t.' attitude. to the 
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political dimension of their movement. Subsequent chapters will 
deal ~ith the political response to any trends which emerged in 
industrial relations during these years. 
On 5th September 1921, James J. DaTil, Harding's Secretary of 
Labor expressed the administration's desire to see a lessening of 
industrial hostility when in a Detroit speech he saidl "No true 
American businessman entertains a serious thought of smashing the 
1 
working man's organization." Davis called on business to restrain 
itself in a period of recession and not to escalate industrial 
disruption by using the situation to crush unionism. 
This appeal reflected the neutral position of the administration 
and Davis' willingness to pressurise at least verbally the business 
community as well as the unions. Yet such an appeal showed an 
imperfect understanding of the atmosphere in 1921. Regardless of 
whether business sought to destroy unionism or simply reduce wages 
it would almost inevitably force the unions to respond to the 
challenge. As already described, deflation for business meant cost-
cutting and wages were a main target. It was not a simple question 
of wage cuts, however, but involved the opposing views of the two 
groupings as to how the economy worked. Business policy would almost 
inevitably clash with unionism's aims in the economic situation in 
1921. In such a situation Davis would be powerless as a result of 
his lack of policy. 
In fact, despite the appeal for restraint by the Secretary 
of Labor, the N.A.X. regarded the recession as a golden opportunity 
to intensify their campaign for the open shop. Given the ample 
2JJ 
supply of labour, the Open Shop Department encouraged local business 
to employ non-unionists where possible and to use non-union firms in 
contracts. This effort reached its zenith '··ith the organisation of 
the San Francisco Business Exchange which was a clearing house for 
non-union labour and contractors. San Francisco businesses would 
submit their contracts to the Exchange, which \':ould be won by 
tenders also submitted to the Exchange by employers agreeing with 
the principles embodied by it. The aim was to attempt to control 
the nOT,·~ of business deals and to squeeze out firms employing 
unionists. Local participants in the open shop campaign. adamantly 
denied that they intended to crush trade unions, theirs was Ita 
spontaneous protest against the autocratic tendencies of organized 
labor. ,,2 Their ostensible aim was merely to allow individuals to 
exercise their own choice although it is debatable whether this 
could ever be satisfactorily achieved without trade unionism being 
rendered powerless. This was certainly the view held by trade 
unionists of the purpose of the open shop movement. 
In 1921, however, the business community did not require 
prompting from the N.A.M. to begin to centre its attention on a 
campaign to reduce wages. They were still deeply committed to the 
laws of supply and demand as revealed by their continuing belief that 
wages were merely a function of the costs of production. "To 
stimulate buying at home and to secure markets abroad, efforts are 
being made to reduce the cost of production by lowering Hages • • • ,,) 
The business view was that to stimula.te demand, products had to be 
made more cheaply. This in turn required wage cuts and increased 
profitability to stimulate business demand a.nd to maintain productive 
capacity. The N .A.:1. campaign, although enjoying increasing 
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popularity in 1921, did not represent the central pre-occupation of 
American businessmen. This was purely economic. Yet even this ran 
exactly counter to labour aims in the recession. Thus, while perhaps 
not subscribing to the radical position of the N.A.M., employers who 
merely sought wage cuts became participants in the broader clash 
between unions and employers. While the Iron Age editorialised about 
retrenchment being "necessary in everything, ,,4 the Carpenter stated 
bluntly that "no reduction in wages under present conditions is 
admissible. ,,5 
While business concentrated on cheap supply to attract contract-
ing demand and to release capital for expansion, the A.F. of L.'s 
view was of a demand-led recovery. As Samuel Gompers saw it: 
"Every reduction of wages is a reduction in the consuming power of 
the wage earners and a direct blow at the prosperity and well-being 
6 
of the country." More importantly, wages were in any case woefully 
inadequate to provide a proper standard of living so that any 
reduction ""ould mean penury. Unionism was coromi tted to a constantly 
improving standard of living for its membership and so fundamentally 
opposed to any attempts at frustrating this goal. Once more the 
opposing philosophies of the two groups seemed to presage a new 
test of strength, even without the N.A.M. campaign. 
The American workforce was being cowed to a large extent 
sL~ly by the reality of at least Jt million unemployed in the 
summer of 1921. This resulted in there being little opposition to 
cuts of 5 to lQ% in wages, although these cuts were largely made in 
tmskilled non-union sectors. Nonetheless even the Carpenters' 
union had accepted cuts of 5 cents per hour. Some industries did 
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demonstrate a close connection between the reduction or wagee and an 
attempt to emasculate tmde unionism. '!his vas the case, for 
instance, in the coal fields of Alabama. Here, wage cuts of 10'}6 
were simply announced, to take effect in only three days' time in 
late 1920, in breach of the 1917 Washington Agreement. The Alabama 
U.M.W. went on a strike which dragged on through the year. When 
union tunds ran out and strikebreaking began to haft an efrect 
production slowly returned to normal. 
The Unemployment Conference in September made little 
difference to the industrial atmosphere by the autumn of 1921. It 
neftr came to any significant conclusion on vage leftls, although Hooftr, 
&8 had Davis, appealed to business to continue as normal in order to 
sorten the impact of the recession. If anything, the Conference 
defiected attention rrom the deteriorating industrial situation by 
concentmting on voluntary efforts, on government action and tax and 
tariff refom. The latter also reflected a major business concem. 
Business leaders resarded tax cuts as a vital element in economic 
recovery, almost on a par with vage reductions. The unions too. 
warmly supported the proposals on public spending and were amonpt 
the foremost backers of the ienyon bill derived trom these ideaa. 
Unemployment inS12r8J108. though, never became a popular issus wi thin 
the unions although broached at several conftutione. Their 
preoccupation vas with an expanding job market to lessen businees 
impunity in laying off men and 80 keeping wage levels steady. The 
main concsrn remained with the 1JIIDediate economic situation in 1921, 
not a questioning of the fundamental social structure. 
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It was a disastrous year for trade unionism. At the same 
time as the A.F. of L. celebrated record membership levels of 1920, 
the recession was already beginning to whittle the figure away. This 
weak job market led to an insecurity which allowed business to reduce 
wages with relative impunity. The union position was also undermined 
by the first cuts taking place among unskilled, non-unionised 
workers. This widened differentials and isolated the unions' wage 
rates. The Unemployment Conference, despite its endorsement of the 
use of public works to buoy the economy, did not help the immediate 
situation. By the end of the year the trade union movement felt 
increasingly under Siege from aggressive employers who, whether 
seeking the destruction of unionism or wage cuts, were equally 
threatening to the future of the trade union movement. Trade 
unionists throughout America realised their isolated position was 
itself now under threat. Increasingly, business complained that 
union rates must also fall, especially in key sectors of the 
eoonomy such as the coal, railroad and building industries. 
Business now sought to have its demands met in the bastions.of union 
power. 
Two major decisions by the Railroad Labor Board had begun to 
break down union work rules in that industry. So threatened did 
the shopmen feel by this, coming as it did at a time when several 
anti-union railroads, notably Pennsylvania, had begun contracting 
work outside their shops, that they were on the brink of strike 
action. This was postponed in October 1921, but it made clear that 
the pressure was now wholly on the heart of the American trade 
union movement. The full implications of the wage reduction 
campaign were now clear. This was not merely a question of dollars 
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and cents but far more a question of whose economic view would 
dominate. The editorial of the Iron Age for 5th January 1922 
elucidated the business attitude at the beginning of the new year; 
" • • wages on the railroads, in the building trade, and in coal 
mining. These are the three conspicuous obstacles to resumption of 
industrial and commercial activity. ,,7 1921 had seen wage reduotions 
and the intensifying of the anti-union oampaign leave unionism 
largely unaffeoted. Their losses had been due to the reoession. 
In 1922 the wage and anti-union campaigns were reaching their 
olimax in an attempt to triumph against major union strongholds. 
Coinoidentally, key industries in the American eoonomy, the ones in 
whiCh costs and produotion levels were of vital importanoe to the 
rest of the industrial complex, were also the ones with the 
strongest union organisations. If' the eoonomy was to recover 
quickly, railroad rates, ooal prices and building oosts had to come 
down. This required wage outs. In effect the strength of the 
unions in these industries had to be broken. A major clash loomed 
whether over unions' power or over wage cuts. By late 1921 these 
differenoes were largely irrelevant, it was a dispute over the 
nature of the eoonomy. 
The first to feel the full blast 01' the oombined strength of 
the demands for wage cuts and the anti-unionist mood wem not in 
fact the railroad unions. AlthoU@h wage reductions were before the 
Board, these had not yet been deoided upon. In the meantime, the 
railroad workforoe was prepared to live with the revised work 
rules. It wae in the Chioago building trades that the struggle 
began. 
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Early in 1921 several contractors had handed building workers 
an ultimatum of accepting wages of ~l per hour, or not reporting 
for work. This in effect constituted a lock-out, resulting in a 
complete shut-down in Chicago building. On 7th June 1921, the 
trade unions and contractors agreed to the appointment of 
Judge J.M. Landis as an arbitrator. One week later the Judge ruled 
that the wages dispute could not be settled without a change in 
work rules and practices, although these were not part of Landis's 
remit. Pressure from press and public forced both sides to remain 
silent, thereby allowing Landis to proceed. His decision on 
7th September, effectively setting a maximum wage of between 
95 cents and ¢l per hour caused an immediate walk-out. Several 
contractors, equally unhappy with the award, agt"eed to continue with 
old scales and practices at least until contracts under construction 
were completed. A 'Citizens Committee' was then organised which 
urpd a return to work only on the Landis scale. It threatened 
contractors not abiding by this, with the lOBS of contracts, and 
of credit from Chicago banks. The Illinois Manufacturers 
Association, the Employers' Association of Illinois and the 
I 
Chicago Association of Commerce backed this threat by announcing 
that contracts would be given only to those tinns which adhered 
to the Landis award. The 'Citizens Committee' went further to 
announce to the unions that if they did not work under Landis 
terms, they would be replaced by out-of-town, non-union labour. 
This 'Committee's' policies were strongly akin to those employed by 
the N.A.M. 's San Francisco Business Exchange. Confusion reigned in 
Chicago. Many unionists struck, othe:!:'S re-negotiated their wages 
with individual contractors while others returned to work at the 
Landis scales. 
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Still more confusing was Landis's further decision to 
recommend that carpenters, sheet metal workers and painters should 
similarly accept wages of around 95 cents to ~l per hour. This was 
despite the fact that these trades were not part of the original 
dispute, nor parties to the award. The result wae that the 
'Citizens Committee' joyfully expanded its campaign to include the 
carpenters. The other trades were small and specialised, the 
carpenters' union had 18,000 members in Chicago alone. The 
Committee had decided that the opportunity to defeat the unions and 
make Chicago an 'open shop' town had arri vad. 
The carpenters' union immediately moved to seek an injunction 
against the Committee. This was refused the union, although the 
oourt agreed that the Committee was an illegal oonspiracy in 
restraint of trade. Faced by the full panoply of business 
organisations in Illinois and Chicago and denied any legal recourse, 
the union was grimly defiant. liThe Carpenters' Union will not be 
destroyed. •• The union of carpenters of Chioago defy the 
Criminal Citizens' Committee to do its worst. 1t8 
In April 1922, the oarpenters' action in Chicago was over-
shadowed by the beginning of a nationwide stoppage in the coal 
fields on the 1st of the month. Miners' president, John Lewis, 
in the April issue of the Carpenter in fact denied that this was a 
strike at all, since "the operators want a suspension, the workers 
do not. ,,9 The miners had been willing to negotiate with the 
operators in February but they refused, claiming that no good could 
oome of it since the O.M. W. would simply seek a raise. This Lewis 
denied; all they sought was a continuation of the exist~~g soale. 
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The points at issue were the operators' desire to cut wages, to 
sorap the oheck-off, vital machinery for the union organisation, 
and to end the nationwide agreement. These were demands which the 
. 
U.M.W. oould never submit to. The operators, in,fact, did not wish 
to re-negotiate and make their position olear, for fear of publio 
revulsion. Thus, they simply allowed the stoppage to occur, both 
to crush the union and weaken the union's publio position. The 
bus iness community , united behind the coal opera tors, denied 
ulterior motives in their position. They argued that all that was 
. being sought was wage cuts to bring profitability back to a 
struggling industry. This sanguine support of the coal o'Perators 
was based largely on the belief that in a time of large ooal 
s tockpU •• , and a large non-union supply of workers, no serious 
damage would be done because the U.M.W. could not keep a strike 
viable for a long enough time to dangerously deplete stooks or 
harm industry. Following a year of returning business initiative 
in industrial relations, their attitude towards the ooal strike was 
one of confidence, indeed treating the strike with something 
approaching levity. 
As the effectiveness of the mineworkere' aotion became 
apparent by its complete closure of unionised fielcb and significant 
impact on non-union production, this optimistic mood evaporated. 
As this situation continued, attacks on the U.M.W. became more 
strident. Calls for an end to all strike action in the coal 
industry proliferated during the summer. :By 5th October 1922 the 
Iron Ag editorial was taking a much harder line against trade 
unionism as a whole, reflecting the broader nature of this and other 
disputes: 
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It is high time that strong efforts be made to combat 
our various organized minorities. There are many 
substantial nuclei around which working forces can be 
marshalled to meet the organized minorities. There are 
for instance the Chamber ot Commerce of the U S, the 
National Association of Manufacturers, the American 
Railway Association, .American Bankers' Association 
and the Engineering Socisties.10 
It was calling for nothing less than a full-scale N.~.M.-style 
effort by the business cOlDlll'lmi ty to O'V8rcome the power of trade 
unionism. The suocess of the U.M.W. in continuing an efrective 
strike for five months had turther radicalised some business 
opinion. 
The coal dispute itself had never been a olear issue for the 
public upon which business oould capitalise and the U.M.W. even had 
some strong political support. By ~U8WIt, moreover, while this 
opinion was hardening, the coal operators were feeling the strain 
and began ne80tiating with the U.M.W.. Attacking unionism was one 
thing, but in a hishly-unionised industry carrying on the struggle 
had proved too costly. The president of the U.M.W. could justify 
claims that the mineral action had "checked the downward trend of 
wages for labor in general".ll Moreover, in getting the old wage 
scale and work rules reconstituted it had destroyed arbitration as 
a settlement procedure. 'l'hese claims and the outoome of the 
dispute were irkaome to business in the fruatration or its aims. 
Aggravating as it did the efrects or a coal strike already 
asslDDing serious proportions, the reaction of the business 
cODll1UDity to the railroad shopmen's strike was predictably damning. 
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Crucially, their opinion condemning the strike coincided with that 
ot the President. On the shopmen's strike, they were aftorded a 
clear issue upon which to attack: trade unionism. Prom the outset 
they were loud in their support ot the railroad operators' resolution 
not to rehire strikers on a seniority basis. They hoped trankly 
that the union would be crippled· in the aftermath of the strike. 
The c1m1Ulative etfect ot these strikes was to radica1ise business 
and labour opinion once more. The polarisation of the 1919 
Industrial Conference had returned to industrial relations in 1922; 
in this instance, however, not as a result ot both sides' ambitions, 
but as a result or the employers' aggressive campaign. The 
1920-21 hiatus had resulted trom the receseion and the initiative 
ot engineers in calling tor co-operation. While unions responded 
ravourab1y, the etrect on the conduct ot industrial relations in 
the meantime wae ephemeral. 
The railroad brotherhoods' ire was raised not only a6&inst 
the railroad operators but also at the Railroad Labor Board • 
.As tar as the Railway Employees Department of the A.F. ot L. 
vere concerned, they tsl t they were "marching down a blind alley 
vi th no hope ot reliet in sight". 12 The Board had sorapped ths 
national agreements, abruptly ending haarinp on the various 
clausss to do so, had ended oftrt1.me for Sundays and nov 
proposed a cut in va.. ot 7 cents per hour, coming on top ot a 
cut ot 8 cents per hour a year previously. The railroad operators 
meanwhile were blithely ignoring decisions ot the :Board. The 
Pennsylvania railroad even broU8ht injunctive action a6&1nst the 
Board to prevent the publication ot findings on that railroad. To 
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the railroad workers the 7 cents t cut meant that they were the only 
ones likely to surfer from adverse decisions of the Board. The 
Railway Employees' first effort was to seek a guarantee from the 
Railroad Labo~ Board that it would in future be able to have its 
decisions acceded to by the railroad operators. On 7th June 1922 
the Board replied that since it had no police powers, it could give 
no such guarantee. The railway employees saw no other alternative 
but to take strike action against the proposed wage cuts, a decision 
which the shop crafts supported virtually unanimously. They 
regarded the Board as a tool of the opera tors. 
The President's view was that the strike was illegal. He 
fel t that the railway employees ought to have appealed to the Board 
and from the outset his attitude to the action was apparent. The 
result of this attitude and the defiant positions taken by the 
operators and strikers led to the iasuance of an injunction against 
the strikers on 1st September 1922 by Attorney General Daugherty. 
If the U.M.W.'s action seemed to demonstrate the continuing 
strength of unionism, and appeared as a victory for the movement 
against the employers' campaign of cuts, the end of the shopmen t s 
strike was a crushing blow. To all intents and purposes it enforced 
the Board's second wap cut and badly damaged the sbop crafts' 
organisation as new men were recruited to fill the places of those 
who defied the injunction. It also badly undermined union 
confidence in the face of a hostile administration. 
The industrial disruption of 1922 marked the apotheosis of the 
business campaign against the trade union movement and the attempt 
to confirm its powsr in the indust::ial system. 'lb.e str1.1ces made 
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clear, however, that even at a time when business opinion was most 
radicalised the success of its efforts depended largely on govern-
ment intervention to uphold its position. This occurred in the 
railroad shopmen' s strike and its consequence was to deal a 
shattering blow to that organisation. In the coal strike, however, 
it was clear that stalemate would be the only result of such a 
business attituds in a tightly organised industry. Business efforts 
could not dislodge unionism without government backing. Moreover, 
the coal strike also revealed that general business opinion was 
diverging from that of industries actually involved in disputes. 
The huge cost discouraged active efforts to implement their views. 
The result of the havoc of 1922 was therefore far from discouraging 
for trade unions in well-organised industries. Moreover, while the 
shopmen's strike demonstrated the fragility ot unionism when 
business and government were arrayed against it, the ooal strike 
had also revealed that government baoking tor business was far 
from automatic, and was not predioated on support tor business 
perceptions. 
In tems ot the _ative strength of the" antagonists, there 
was no doubt that, as the Maohinists' Journal editorialisedl 
It'lb.e industrial depression • • has been our greatest handicap. ,,13 
Although Samuel Gompers attempted to make light ot the membership 
losses in 1921, a deoline ot almost one million could not be 
explained away simply by the cessation of war work. Samuel Gompers 
also added that these figures were deceiving in that unions waived 
membership fees on unemployed members, so that these, while still 
mionista, were not being oounted. This was in faot irrelevant. 
No matter how loyal unemployed unionists may be, they had no power 
because they had no work. Moreover, the jobless pressured 
unionists and non-unionists alike to accept wage reductions. It 
vas when these reductions became a campaisn theme that the unions 
in industries under the greatest pressures, as were the coal and 
railroads, decided to msiat. It waa clear that the traditional 
unions could defend themselves and stop the campaisn by the 
employers. The result ot the 1922 industrial conflict vas 
stalemate. 
Tbe problem tor unioniste from 1922 was not defensive but how 
to continue to advance the mowment. While maintaining strength, 
the mions were Dot able to increase membership. The recession also 
torced the unions to look closely at their policiea with a view to 
maldng them better able not onl,.. to detend their members' intereats 
but . to continue to pursue these during economic recession. Policies 
tor that purpose did not become apparent until 1923, atter the 1922 
disputes had ended. lIowftr, plans tor co-operation between unions 
and employers, bad already arieen trom w.rioua stimuli. The 
International Ladies' Garment Workers co-operation plan in New York 
stemmed primarily tram the shared wish ot unionists and employers 
alike to end the dUtioul ties of this chaotio industry. 'l'ha 
acwement was reached atter a bitter strike to oppose wap 
reduotions. In etfeot the union accepted a l~ cut in return tor 
a commitment to g1 'ftt priority to union workers. The war had also 
civan an impetus to hopes tor co-operation. .... the preamble to a 
1919 co-operation agreement between the I.B.E.W. and the National 
bsociation ot Electrical Contraotors and Dealers, there vere 
, 
among unionists those who wiabed that their lone-held beliet that 
their interests lay with a prosperous economic system be made more 
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obvious. Thus the agreement made its p%'iority not only a 
consideration ot the public, but states its beliet thats "Close. 
contact and a mutuallT sympathetic interest between employee and 
employer will develop a better working system, which "Ul tend 
constantly to stimulate production ••• "14 Increasing production 
and illlpro'ring economic pertormance vas the basis of claims of 
'mutual interest'. 
Samuel Gompera vas also torcefullT supporting the 1I0ve to 
co-operation during 1921 in the paps ot the .American F,derationist. 
It had printed in full Herbert Rooftr's speech to the Federated 
.American Bngineera' SooietT on 19th November 1920. Samuel Gompers 
believed that co-operation vas a major part ot the tradition ot 
the A.F. ot L.. 'VoluntarT helptulness' vas applicable not merely 
to trade unions but alao to their relations with emploTBrs. OnlT 
where employers sousht no reconciliation with or recognition ot 
trade unioni .. would unions ot necessity ti8ht tor their aims. The 
employers in such oas.s had d.stroyed an,. possibUi t,. or oo-operation. 
'l'aylorism had bean s.an b7 Goarpera as an attempt to destroy 
• all that unions rapresented. The new .ng1neen, howe"",r, did not 
tIIIe ths lansua .. ot the stopwatch; additionally they cri tici.ed 
manapment for vaste, particularly that caused by seasonality ot 
employment. The engineers seemed to otter unionism reoognition as 
a meaningt"ul part ot the industrial Syetell, which, as unionists had 
alva,.. held, could pro'9'1de a decent living for employers and 
employees alike. 'l'hey appeared to confh'm unionism's claims that 
batter working condi tiona, shorter hours. batter va .. s, could improve 
productivity and etticienC7, thereby maintaining profitability. 
The engineering approach oftered trade unionism the hope of a 
voluntarist industrial relations Bystem where workers t rights were 
respected by employers who recognised the contribution made by 
workers to the production process. It provided exactly the compro-
.ise between political agitation and economic improvement ¥bich many 
unionists sousht. Thus Goaapers f'elt that "the co-operation now 
being developed between the workers and the scientists of' the 
engineering proteesion is one of the hi8hJ,y si8nif'icant develop-
ments ot the daytt.15 Gompers saw in the engineering movement an 
opportunity f'or the integration of' unionism into the industrial 
sya t.m , thereby winning the movement de facto legitimacy without 
any legielati'ft or political guarantees. 'Ibis integration had been 
given added urpncy by the recession. U unionism was accepted as 
an integral part of' the industrial system, then e~ion and 
improved condi iiona would tollow. 'Ibis opinion also led io the 
seiting up ot a coll'llittee at the Denver oon'ftntion of the A.J'. of' L. 
in 1921 io invesiilate a new vases policy. Ii sougbi a polioy 
vh10h would pursue an e'ftr-increaa1nB standard ot living, while 
attempting to usooiate the movaani with an increasingly 
mechanised indWltrial system and proteoiing workers trom the 
1921 had been a ,..ar ot contusing si8%lAls. A..F. of' L. 
meabership reached its peak in late 1920, bui by the time the 
conveniion could celebrate the teai, the recession was already 
cuitlnc deeply into these saina. !be recelsion also led the 
A..J'. ot L. leadership to give priority to stability and job 
'eouriiy, conaideratioDS which ooinoided with the rise of' the 
eDliDeer1nB movement and hopes tor the integration of unionism. 
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'lb.ese two factors caused labour leaders to look seriously- at defining 
a new wages' policy which would quicken this integration while stUl 
maintaining wase levels in a recessionary' period. Compers also 
gleaned hope from the recommendations of the Unemployment Conference 
for it at least demonstrated that "unemployment is a problem that 
can be solved"~6 'lhis coincided with the unionists' meeban1stic 
view of the ecoDOIII7 as opposed to the business view of a 'natural' 
econolll7. That the Conference called for action at all was a major 
fillip for unionism, even thoU8h the action was limited in the main 
to communities, States and municipalities. 
Despite these sigzus ot apparent hope tor Gompera that his 
grad1lal.ist, voluntar1at,non-poli tical attitude might triumph, &n7 
real promise ot reconciliation depended on the attl tude of the 
'bt18iness community-. II thoU8h Sunlal Compers belisved unions would 
not atfect the econODl7 sisn1ticantly-, this was a moot point for ID8l11 
employers. In 1921 the recession had strengthened their determina-
tion to waken trade unionism and cut wages in order to improve 
their own financial prospects. The,. were as hoatile towards trade 
unionism as at aD.7 time previously, a fact of which rank and tile 
workers were acutelY' aware. Co-operation wae not heir1&' taken 
seriouslY' bY' these men. u we have seen the business community did 
not regard co-operation as a pressing priority-. The reeul t was that 
the unions under most pressure were forced by business aggression to 
defend themselves in .1922. HostUity- and conflict submersed anY' 
move towards co-operation and conciliation. There was a t.eling 
that "such trusts need to be broken up tor the beneti t ot the wage 
17 
earners in pneral". Azrr mention ot co-operation tended to centre 
on wom councils, rather than trade union agreements. 18 The Open 
Shop Department ot the N .A.M. continued its bitter a ttacka on trade 
unionism which they held threatened the United States with "subjection 
to arbitrary class rule".19 Company unions were the only 
co-operation which they vere willing to contemplate. The r8sul t 
was that 1922 became a year ot bitter conflict, completely submerging 
thoughts ot conciliation, as unions tought tor their continued 
e:dstence. 
Despite the new trends towards co-operation, abandoned during 
the 1922 strite, the aim remained legitimacy. Co-operation was 
merely another meana to the same end; a response to the dUticul t 
t!Jaes in which unionists tound themael..,.s and retlecti..,. ot IDIJ17 
unionists denial ot &n7 econOllio or political implications ot their 
JIO..,.ment. 'l!he recession vu putting new strains on industrial 
relations and on the tn.de unions' policies. WhUe the ettects ot 
the recession caused thes. shitts in mions t industrial policies, 
it also had a signiticant etteot on their political posture. Once 
1I0re it _de trade unionists aware that, particularly in recessiona, 
untU there exiated a Cong2:'8881onal majority Iympathetic to trade 
tm1ona' viewpoint, the7 would be under continual threat trom business 
tactioa. "'lbe 'tal. ot political succass will be the measure ot 
assistance it -7 render the industrial lIo..,.ment in its strugsles ... 20 
The _jor impetus towards a deeper political commitment, howe..,.r, 
did not come troll this general labour consciousness which was well 
wi thin the traditional 'friends and enemies' policy. It came 
rather trom particular trade unions, which the recession and the 
employere t campaiga W8l8 putt1nc under intense pressure and who 
theretore tel t that business must be torced to aocept their movement or 
whose major concerns were political in nature. Thus it vu that 
250 
the railroad unions, unhaPPY' with the Railroad Labor :Board, emer~d 
as the major impetus behind the launching of the Conferenoe for 
Progressive Political Aotion in February 1922. The7 were oonvinced 
that it wae time for unionism to forge more permanent and organised 
links vi th the COD8%'8SS ional progress i ves. This opinion had been 
stimulated by the e%perienoe of participating in the Wisconsin 
campaign of 1920. The 'friends and enemies' polio7 vas simp17 
inadequate for their pressing needa, nor did it give strong enough 
expression to their feelings of antagonism toll8.rda employers and 
disillusion with the ineffeotiveness of the two old parties. 
Samuel Compers vas deep17 anxious about the organisation of 
trade union political maohinery-. He attempted to have the tirst 
meeting ot the C.P.P.A. in Chicago on 20th Febrwu7' postponed 
because the lI:xecutive Council ot the A.F. of L. was scheduled to 
meet at that time. William Johnstone, President ot the I.A.M. and 
the Chairman of the C.P.P.A. tlat17 retused this request. .u thoup 
the organisation of a third party was to await events, the time for 
organisa tion ot a trade mion political llO'ftment was overdue. In 
addition to Johnstone, the railroad presence was represented by' 
Warren S. Stone, the Locomotive Ima'1neera chiet, and J. Manion, 
President ot the BaUwa7 Telecraphers' Brothemood. Sidne7 lUllman 
ot the textile workers, Morris Hillquit from the Socialist put7, 
Buil Manl7, a close confidante ot La lollette, and Frederiok C. 
Rowe were also prominent among the delegates to the Conference. 
Goarpers was alarmed b7 the tone of the resolutions from 
Chicago. The C.P.P.A. called for a joining of forcss with 
socialists, the Non.-Partisan Leacue, the rumer-Labour partT and 
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the Committee ot 48. It alao made olear ita determination to take 
an aotive part in the political prooess, particularly the primariea, 
and lDOet alarming ot all to Gompers, it reaol ved that: 
When aotion within the old parties is tutile, organize 
independently. It ill otten better to lose aa independents 
with a aquare out iSSue, than to loae aa you haft lost in 
. 21 
the put by wasting ballots on men who cannot be trusted. 
'!'be ~solution made olear that thia IlOvement represented to a large 
degree the olaaa-oonsoiousness vi thin the labour movement in .America. 
Attacking bankers and speoulators and large employers,. the,. stated 
that "They have deolared war on the produoing 01asaea".22 AlthoUBh 
the 1mpetua 0&IIe trom uniona vith par1:ioula:riat mtereata, the 
C.P.P.A. revealed the deep t.eling amon& theae uniona that only a 
thoroQ8bl,. lett-viDg moveaent oould tull,. protect, UIlderatand and 
propound trade union ailll8. It was an explioit admuaion that aome 
uniona no 10Z'lpr tel t represented by the traditional two-party 
sfltem. Despite the aerious implications this bad tor the nature 
ot trac¥t unioniam as be aav it, Gompers in the ''Pring or 1922 had 
little to aay about the C.P.P.A. He preferred rather to emphasise 
the unity ot the movement in the hostUe, oontemporary industrial 
ol.iMtB. In a major artiole in ths American le<\!ption1at of 
February 1922, be pledged .&..7. ot L. backing for the railroad union 
and the U.K.W. positions in the atronpst terms. He atated bluntl,. 
tba t the Board had failed, that the unions vere onoe more bargaining 
direotl,. with operators and would have full .A..F. ot L. support if 
industrial aotion was required. As tor the situation in the mining 
industry, Gompers atated frankly that "The !merioan labor movement 






yield to injustice". 23 On the issue of the defence of unionism, 
the movement was united. Despite the new political split and moves 
towards co-operation, in the bitter industtial atmosphere of 1922 
the movement had closed ranks. 
Indeed this was vital for Gompers. Johu Lewis had attempted 
to win the Presidency from Sa.muel Gompers at the 1921 Convention 
l&%'aely as a reeult ot Compere' ambivalence in 1919. The President 
did not wish to commit the same mistake in 1922. The A..F. ot L. 
B:xecutive was thus anxious to pro.,. itselt to be in step with rank 
and til. opinion. Gompers moreowr waa anxious to repaJ.:r the damap 
done to his rela tionahip with Lewis in the row 8urrounding the 
Kansas Industrial Court and the action ot Disttiot 13 ot the V.M.V •• 
Gompers bad been a bitter and outspoken opponent ot this Court 8ince 
its inception in 1919 and bad supported the detiant posture of 
District 13. '!'his, however, con!lict8d with the determ1mtion or the 
Intematioaal becuti.,. :Board to .tamp out inauraency. They 
there tore condemned the Disttiot's aotioaa and soqht to ezpel its 
President. Gompers tound himself in the awkward po8ition ot 
8upporting what Lewis and the I.R.B. re,ard8d as inaurpncy. Hia 
torthr1&bt support or the U .M. V. came as a welcome opportun! ty to 
repair this damaae. 'l'he rounding ot the C.P.P.A. saw added 
impetus to the ag:ressive attitude adopted by the A..J'. ot L. in 
1922, and the droppiDg ot the co-operati"f8 mood which bad been 
theJ.:r tirst response to the recession. In the tollowiDg year, 
ra41cali .. apin became the keynote ot the unions' attitude. This 
reneoted itselt in the .t'ol1ndillg ot the C.P.P.A. and this also 
stimulated the A.7. ot L. '. close support ot industt1al aotion in 1922. 
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'l'he C.P.P • .1. provided a stimulus to the increasing activitY' 
of the .1.1'. of L. in politics. The important thing for Gompera to 
otteet the threat ot the C.P.P • .1. vas to demonstrate the vigour ot 
the .1.1'. ot L.. 'Dlis he bad done in his unequivocal support of the 
11.M.W. and railroad brotherhoods. He also bad in the issue ot the 
Supreme Court, and the injunction, a hrther opportunity to 
demonstrate the determination ot the .1.F. of L. to e%pound the 
wiehes of the rank and tUe and do 10 in a political milieu., 
HostUity towards the courts had long been a tradition of 
American trade unionin. Thie had intensified after the Clayton 
Act appeared to be nullified by the continuing use ot the 
injunction aaa1nat industrial action by trade unions. Other than 
complaints aDd awer, howewr, there waa little move to mount a 
oampaisn to retorm the court or to make thie a _jor political issue. 
The appointment of William Hovard Taft as Chief Justice had, as 
Gompere admitted to Karger, "tickled me to death".24 Gompera, having 
worked with the ex-President on the I.W.L.B., hoped that "a new and 
progresSiva,,2S Taft misht emersa &1 Chiet Justice. Despite no 
co-ordinated ourpaisn apinet the ~urt, trade unioniets had been 
bitterly angered by the White Court's decision in the Duplex case in 
1920, mak.irlg Ulsp.l. the aecondary' boycott and denTing any defence under 
the Clayton Act due to the lack ot 'proximitY". Justices Oli'ftr W. 
- 26 Holmes, John ll. Clarka and Louis D. Brandeis diesented. 'lbe Supreme 
caart had alwa,.. been a conaerw.tive bodY', a thorn in trade union flesh. 
Thie _de Gompsra ..,.lcOIIIe a man whOIl he believed had pined some 
experience of labour and ita thinking. 
Gompera' hopes for a more sympa thetio Supre.. Court ware 
daBhed by deoisiona handed dO'Wl1 in the first term of the new Taft 
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Court. !he first decision made against trade union interests 
involved the emotional issue of child labour. It was Taft moreover 
who delivered the opinion of the Court. The Wilson administration 
had used its powers of taxation to effectively punish the employ-
ment of minors. Taft simply held this to be unconstitutional, a 
breach of the government's use of its taxation powers. It was an 
opinion vhich only- Clarke felt constrained to dissent from. The 
A.F. of L. said little about the opinion as its grounds were 
apparently justified. In 1921 it continued to be the injunction 
which domina ted union attacks on the courts. The opinion of the 
Court in the case of Truax -v- Corrien, again by Taft, caused 
considerably- more anger in June 1922. The decision made picketing 
practically- illegal. A dispute over wages and conditions led to a 
strike and the picketing of a restaurant in :Bisbee, Arizona. Taft 
upheld the injunction, arguing that the picketing was of a nature 
which violated the restaurateurs' property right by making "abusive 
and libellous charges".27 Justice Pitney and Clarke dissented 
over the Supreme Court's overruling of a law in Arizona which had 
exempted such actions from legal constraint. :Brandeis in his own 
dissent also made this pOint. Within the broad legislative terms 
it was perfectly wi thin the Arisona Court." powers to decide on the 
terms of its powers of equity and that this had not violatsd the 
14th Amendment which ensured due process and under which Truax had 
sued for a remedy. Brandeis went further to condemn the Court's 
action as a police action, since no remedy was legally required. 
The dissent of Holmes was the most political of the three. "There 
is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the 14th Amendment 
beyond the abeolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making 
of social experiments that an important part of the community 
desires ... 28 
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Within a month of this decision, on the 5th of June 1922 
Chief Justice Taft handed down the opinion of the Court in the case 
of The United Mineworkers -v- The Coronado Coal Company. At issue 
was the coal company's claim for damages from the United Mineworkers. 
Taft found that the International was too remote to be held liable 
so that the U.M.W. in effect won their case. However, in coming to 
this decision the Chief Justice said that it was with "great regret 
that the court finds itself unable to affirm the decision of the lower 
court's holding the United M.1neworkers liab18". 29 This obiter 
dictum caused a furore in 1922 at the A.F. of L. Convention which was 
held only five days after the handing down of the decision. As 
Samuel Gompers pointed out, the Court in this case "rendered a 
decision which goes beyond any previous decision of that tribunal in 
its antagonism and opposition to labour ••• ,,)0 It was clear that 
the Court would be only too glad to make unions themselves liable 
to damages. Not surprisingly the Convention warned of "a growing 
spirit of resentment that is being engendered by the class attitude 
of our judges .. )l 
The cumulative effect of these decisions from the first 
sitting of the Tart Court wae to make the powers of the Supreme 
Court the major issue which the A.F. of L. raised in the 1922 
mid-term election, along with the question of the future of the 
Railroad Labor Board. The Court issue lent the A.F. of L.'s non-
partisan campaisn a vigour and radicalism it badly needed if the 
effect of the C.P.P.A. on the broader trade union movement was to 
be contained. Early in 1922, Gompere had previewed the campaign 
committee'a likely priorities by listing unemployment, taxation, 
agrlcul ture, the anti-union campaign and injunctions as the main 
issues, positions on which union endorsements ot candidates would be 
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decided. By September the Supreme Court and. Open Shop campaign had. 
given the A.F. of L. a uniting purpose. These were given added 
significance by a speech by Senator La Follette to the A.F. of L:s 
Cincinnati Convention attacking the Court's veto power of the wishes 
of the people. The Daugherty injunction of September 1922 only 
served to focus labour hostility on the courts and also on Congressional 
politics. These events galvanised the A.F. of L. into a radical position 
close to that of the C.P.P.A., though the A.F. of L. was not yet 
prepared to echo political posture at the time of the 1922 mid-term 
elections. Combined, the result was a marked leftward swing in 
unionists' outlook. 
It remained to be seen whether this attitude would become 
entrenched or diluted. The Chief Justice was little concerned by 
the uproar over his decisions, as was reflected in a letter to 
President Harding in August 1922. "I suppose you have noticed the 
yawping of Gompers and La Follette over the Child Labor and Coronado 
cases, but I have not heard much of anything ..... 32 Taft was secure 
in his interpretation of the role of the Supreme Court I 
Whenever the legislative department steps beyond the 
legislative sphere and attempts to assume itself any 
of that portion of sovereign power which by the 
constitution is reserved to the states or to the people 
it violates the fundamental law. In order that the 
constitution be preserved inviolate it was entrusted to 
the dutiful care of the judiciary. 33 
Protest did not affect this view at all. The Chief Justice's main 
concern was with the balance of the Court. Far from being a wholly 
conservative body it was in Taft's view dangerously divided. In the 
cases of labour indeed only Taft's vote produced. the majority. He 
loathed the sight of the Court undermining itself by significant 
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dissent from its own opinions. This weakened its authority. 
!randeis, Clarke and Holmes formed a core of dissent in the Court. 
Taft's reaction to the row over his decisions was a determination 
to bring on to the bench men of his own opinions who could lend 
greater weight to the court's rulings in such cases. His problem 
lay in the dissent, not in the decisions. Thus when Justice Pitney 
announced his decision to retire, Taft advised the President that 
tiThe best way to deal with them is to hit them between the eyes by 
the appointment of staunch friends of the Constitution, who will do 
nothing to sap the pUlars of our Government. n34 Taft thus 
continued to stand by his decisions and sought to strengthen his 
opinion in a court which he saw as too liberal. 
The years of 1921 and 1922 had been replete with a bewildering 
change of emphasis on priorities. The A.7. of L. began the decade 
with the largest membership in its history, with increasing 
government recognition, implicit even in the Transportation Act of 
1920. The recession however forced labour into a rapid policy 
. 
chan!'!. In 1920 the unions had been aggressively seeking recog-
nition and wage rises in a full labour market. Three million 
unemployed early in 1921 immediately shifted concern to a defence 
of sains in the face ot a bUSiness effort to slash wage bills. This 
with the rise of the engineers encouraged unions and the A.F. of L. 
to give serious consideration to means of integration in the indus-
trial system which would protect their position in just such 
difficult times and undermine the business attitude. As the 
recession continusd and the N.A.M.-inspired campaign sained wider 
credence, these essentially long-term ideas were pushed into the 
shadows as unions in key industries fought to maintain the status quo. 
The railroad. a.nd coal strikes resulted. 
By the end of 1922 bitterness and hostility were being 
directed not only against business but also against the administra-
tion, and the Supreme Court. This mood was strengthened by the 
Daugherty injunction and a series of decisions unfavourable to 
labour. Both industrially and politically trade unionism as a 
whole was once more radica1ised as the 1922 mid-term elections 
approached. The C.P.P.A. signalled a mood among many trade unionists 
that a new class-consciousness was near to gaining concrete 
political expression. The agricultural crisis by 1922 had become so 
serious that it echoed the political issues which the 'labor problem' 
had highlighted so that the 1922 election had undertones of an 
ideological struggle between right and left as American society came 
near to splitting into class-based political allegiances in the 
industrial and agricu:Ltura1 crises. The result of the election would 
be vital to the political stance of the A.F. of L. and would 
influence the A.F. of L. as to whether it would follow the lead of 
the C.P.P.A. 
Samuel Gompers chose to interpret the result of the election 
as a vindication of unionism's claims and the non-partisan policy 
of the A.F. of L. although this was of course on a progressive 
versus conservative basis. Thus while in Indiana Democrat Samuel 
Ralston defeated Beveridge, in neighbOuring Iowa, Republican 
Smith Brookhart was the victor, both standing as progressives. He 
believed the result to be Ita condemnation of the whole program of 
hostility to the organization of workers • • a sweeping condemnation 
of • • the Railroad Labor Board. It was a condemnation of the 
injunction in labour disputes. ,,3.5 The movement could look forward. 
to 1923 with renewed hope and confidence in the struggle against 
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repressi ve employers and a reactionary judicial system in the 
knowledge that their argument was winning public support, as the 
results had demonstrated. 
Although Gompers made no mention of it, the C.P.P.A. also 
rejoiced at the November result in their Conference the following 
month in Washington D.C.. They had been active in the support of 
La. Follette, Edwin Ladd and Lynn Frazier, Brookhart, C. C. Dill, 
Robert Howell, Henrik Shipstead and Magnus Johnson, John Kendrick, 
Royal Copeland, Henry Ashurst, Kenneth McKellar and. Burton K. 
Wheeler. It is impoesibl~, however, to define even the labour vote 
in 1922 and equally impossible to distinguish between the ~elative 
effects of the C.P.P.A. and the A.F.of L. campaigns. In fact 
both organisations backed the same candidates. It is certain however 
that without the l."Ul:&1 discontent in that year, the power of labour 
elect orally would have been exposed as minimal. However, the fact 
that the C.P.P.A. provided these progressives with an organisation 
which, given their independence, was likely to be more efficient 
and united than their own party's ma.chinery. did make a. significant 
contribution to the progressives' success. As did Gompers, the 
C.P.P.A. looked forward to 1923 and the further development of 
their movement. 
In the event, the 1922 elections were the high water mark of 
trade union radicaliSM and of the ideological split in United 
states politics. Even in 1922 there had been signs that industrial 
relations were unlikely to continue in the same vein for very long. 
In the same issue of the American Federationist in which 
Samuel Gompers had rejoiced at the mid-term election results and 
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exhorted unionists to continue their efforts in 1923, the President 
of the A.F. of L. noted an article by the Bank of Commerce in its 
Commerce Monthly. That article noted. that "the spread between 
producers' and consumers' prices is unreasmable for many classes 
of goods". J6 In other words, Gompers observed, the banking 
community was finally admitting that prices were well above the 
reasonable cost plus basis of pricing. He hoped that prices would 
now be reduced and that business would end. its extortion of the 
public. 
A still more significant indicator for 192J, however, besides 
this voice of criticism from the centre of the business community, 
was the collapse of the Citizens' Alliance campaign against the 
earpenters in Chicago. It had been broken quite simply by the 
business resurgence in the city building trade in 1922. The need. 
to build meant taking on unionists on their own terms and accepting 
that the power of the unions in Chicago would not easily be 
destroyed. This was abetted by the revelations that the Citizens' 
Alliance was run by several prominent Chicagoan businessmen, a 
fact which quickly aroused public ire and wrecked the credibility 
of the campaign. With the business resurgence and in the wake of the 
U.M.Il. strike, non-union miners received a 4~ increase. In the 
steel industry too, the workforce received 20% wage rises. 
Economic recoverycaused business attention to s~itch from 
the campaign for wage cuts and against trade unionism, to their 
main purpose of making profits. The determined union resistance to 
the campaign, moreover, discouxaged business from active 
continuation of the campaign when ?rosperity once more arrived. 
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This is not to say that antagonism towards unionism had abated to 
any great degree. The decision of the Massachussetts Supreme Court 
in the Moore Drop Forge case,for instance, caused widespread joy 
in the business community. The decision legitimised the 
'Yellow Dog' contract, a document which employers had new recruits 
sign promising not to join trade unions. While their hostility 
to unions remained constant, however, businessmen were no longer 
willing to make this a prominent feature of industrial relations. 
They did not wish to force industriaJ. action on unions. 
The most prominent example of the changing business mood was 
the issue of the 12-hour day in the steel industry. Prompted by 
Hoover, Harding had called the leaders of the industry to Washington 
and proposed that they abolish the two-shift system. J7 This 
suggestion was unacceptable to the steel industry. A compromise 
was reached whereby these men agreed to form a committee to examine 
the question. After an entire year of study, this committee 
finally reported that it could not recommend the institution of an 
B-hour day in the American steel industry. It based this finding 
on a belief that there was insufficient labour to fill the new 
jobs, that the cost would be prohibitive, ani that the men in the 
industry appeared unenthusiastic about the idea. The steel 
industry thus appeared. as united as ever in the summer of 1923, 
anti-union, and rejecting ideas proposed by engineers and backed 
by the Secretary of Commerce. 
In the steel industry there was no threat of reprisals by the 
unions against this intransigence. Yet in July 1923 James Campbell, 
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a member of the committee and President of the Youngstown Steel and 
Tube Company announced that his mill departments would be 
implementing an 8-hour day at once. He warned that this might add 
~3 to a ton of steel but he believed that the 8-hour day would come 
rapidly to the steel industry. In August the carnegie Steel 
COlll1'8.ny announced an immediate and complete shift to the 8-hour day, 
adding that "the cost my not be so large as at first estimated". J8 
As the Iron Age editorlalised, there were problems in the changes, 
but there was now a mood not only in steel but throughout the 
business community that it was time to act rather than dwell on the 
difficulties involved. 
Similarly the boom in building had. largely turned contractors 
from the attempts to destroy the unions in that industry. In the 
railroads, peace set in in 1923 as average freight loadings for the 
third week in August rose to record levels. In the coal industry 
too, to a large extent as a result of the stock rundown caused by the 
coal and rail strike, record production figures were being achieved. 
Railroad re-stocking had given the steel industry the demand it 
needed to look forward, and as steel production rose so railroad 
business improved. By late August the steel industry was even 
admitting that, in addition to their cost estimates being wrong, 
"there appears to be an ample supply of workmen available for the 
three-shift plan". 39 This marked a significant concession by this 
industry in particular, for it had consistently argued for the 
existence of a labour shortage in order to oppose the restriction 
of immigration. 
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A combination of prospsrity and a realisation of the strength 
of trade unionism in its key areas served to end the campaign by the 
business community. Dollars and cents once more became their main 
preoccupation, not the open shop. As decisions in the steel industry 
had demonstrated, moreover, the return of prosperity fundamentally 
undermined the business coherence.which the recession and the N.A.M. 
had been able to forge for a short time. The N.A.M. continued its 
campai~'but it no longer commanded the adherence it had achieved 
in a time of over-supply of labour and dwindling contracts. 
This change in business mood was a prerequisite to any change 
in the atmosphere in industrial relations. As has been adequately 
demonstrated, the recession had put enormous pressure on unionism, 
pressure which the movement as a whole felt compelled to resist. 
Conflict dominated union policies throUBhout 1922 as a result,and 
had pushed political activity to the forefront of union tactics. 
The apparent thaw in business attitudes led to an easing of the 
pressure unions had to face and allowed them to turn to the policies 
which had been in gestation since 1921. At the Portland Convention 
from 1st to 12th October 192), co-operation began to emerge as a 
realistic policy. This surrounded the recommendations of the 
committee set up to study a 'scientific' basis for wag9 negotiations. 
The committee fOlmd that an American standard of living must be the 
bedrock of the wage ladder. Significantly, however, the committee 
felt that recognition of the contribution by unions to productivity 
levels must also be taken into consideration in wage negotiations. 
Unionism was beginning to accept that 11 had a responsibility for 
the performance of the plant or industry, a prL~ciple first broached 
by the engL~eers' movement. 
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The most striking example of this idea came in the setting up 
of a co-operative scheme between the I.A.M. and the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad. Unions long held that their movement was an aid to 
industrial performance. By 1923 it recognised that this required 
a positive commitment by unions to do so. It was this thinking 
Which had prompted the convention committee to propose its 
recommendations Which in addition, given mechanical improvements, 
provided a fail-safe way of securing steadily rising wage levels in 
return. The I.A.M.'s call for co-operation was a conscious attempt 
to prove the union's position. The union's President, William 
Johnstone, had first floated the idea in an article attacking 
piece-work in 1921. To end this system the unions must get a 
basic wage schedule in return for productivity commitments. "It 
strikes me that the thing to do is to get some railroad president 
who is not bitten by the Atterbury bug • • to go into this matter 
in a sincere wholehearted way. ,,40 This idea was quickly applauded 
by Oscar :Beyer, an engineer with offices in the Machi."lists' 
Building in Washington II: Who encourased Johnstone to follow up 
what he had recommended. Johnstone did bring the idea to the 
attention of Davis Warfield, President of the Seaboard Railway, but 
the response was lukewarm. It was not until :Beyer met Mr M. Potter, 
a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that any 
possibility of the idea reaching fruition appeared. Potter was 
enthusiastic about the idea and "very intimate,,41 with 
Daniel Willard. It was Potter who was successful in having 
Johnstone, Jewell and~yer meet Willard in spring 1922. 
The railroad strike brought these consultations to an end 
though not before these were advanced enough to withstand the 
bitter atmosphere of the strike. Talks resumed in October 1922 
and in spring the plan was launched in the Glenwood shops of the 
B & 0 Railroads. This encouraging news for the unions took on 
added importance in late 1923 when Beyer issued his first report 
on the success of the venture. The railroad proved an exception in 
having launched "a rehabilitation campaign,,42 for striking shopmen. 
These men were largely forgotten by other lines. Beyer made a 
point of comparing its figures with those of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad whose antagonism to unionists was legendary. Comparing~he 
B & O's July 1923 performance with that of July 1922, freight train 
miles increased 89.9%. Gross ton miles increased l2~, reflecting 
an increase in business of 90%. Despi te this huge increase in 
business stUl more encouraging was the fact that the percentase 
of locomotives unserviceable had been reduced from 50 to 14.1~. 
Locomotive miles per day increased from 34 to 69.5 miles. The 
comparative figures for the Pennsylvania were 45 to 61 miles. In 
passenger service, locomotive miles per day increased from 107 to 
140.2 miles in July 1923. The Pennsylvania figures were 110.2 to 
119.5 miles. !eyer thus concluded oonfidently: 
It is expected that the accomplishments of the future 
even more than thoee of the past will demonstrate the wisdom 
and soundness from the viewpoint of organized labor as well 
as management of the polia,y of co-operation, as now 
enforced on the Baltimore and Ohio. 43 
This was an enormous fillip for trade unionism and its integration 
policy. The A.F. of L. also gained a boost from an unexpected 
source in 1923. The Supreme Court ruled that the Kansas Court of 
, 
Industrial Relations was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Taft 
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made the ruling on the basis that, simply because business provided. 
a service to the community, it was unreasonable to charge businesses 
with an obligation to continue service under all circumstances. The 
mions regarded. this ruling as ambiguous. It demonstrated that their 
claim for justice could be upheld by law. It also showed. that Taft, 
whil~ accepting this principle for business, would not apply it to 
the unionS •. 
These important events in 1923, in addition to an improving 
job situation and. a slight improvement in wages, gave rise to a 
peaceful interluie in industriAl relations. Nonetheless, this 
changing situation did not result in trade unionism becoming any 
less b~tter about business inequities or the Supreme Court. At 
Portla.nd they continued to call for a constitutional amendment to 
prohibit child labour, far Congress to be able to re-enact laws 
decla.red. uncorustitutiona.l by the Supreme Court J for unions to 
simply ignore the 'Yellow Dog' contracts and for unionists to 
continue to pressure the politicians through legislative committees. 
and the abolition of the Railroad labor Board. 
The LA.M. best typi:fied the gamut of trade union attit1.1des in 
1923. WhUe the co-operative idea wa.s launched at Glenwood and 
spread to other B & 0 shops, A.T. McNamara. could write enthusiasti-
cally that • "Amalgamation is just aratmd the corner. Industrialism 
44 is in the air." Throughout the year, moreover, the Machinists' 
Journal published articles with the intent of informing its 
readership on political issues sponsored by the C.P.P.A. Among 
the contributors were Donald Richberg, a leading progressive lawyer, 
BasU Manly, J .A. Hopkins of the Committee of 48 and Senator 
La Follette. Their subject matter included the pay of the railroad 
presidents - L.F. Loree of the Delaware and Hudson received some 
¢70,OOO per annum from his various directorships - Invisible 
Government, the Constition, Railroad Valuation and Government by 
Monopoly. The I.A.M. was employing all fields that lay open to it -
economic, co-operation and political - to achieve its ends. Moves 
towards co-operation in 1923 by no means diminished the sentiments 
expressed. by Frank Duffy in the Carpenter I 
Much has been said •• about the 'identity of interests'of 
Capital and Labor. If the interests of these two forces 
are 'identical' •• why should the workers be denied 
the right to place their price of labor, and the 
capitalists be priviledged to dictate upon what terms and 
conditions he shall invest his money? , • • if the 
interests of Capital and Labor are identical , • why do they 
not share equally in the profits •• ? Are these evidences of 
'identity of interests'? ••• we do not see it.45 
Hostility and co-operation co-existed in the A.F. of L, in 
192), indeed co-existed even within individual unions, In the 
years 1921 and 1922 the movement had been breifly re-united by a 
crisis which made defence the priority. In 1923 freed from such 
pressures, individual unions began once more to air their own views. 
The consequence of the quiet industrial situation was that the split 
between radicals and the A.F. of L. leadership over politics became 
more distinct. As wa.s reflected in the Machinists' !1onthly, there 
was now an increasing involvement in the C.P.P.A. among certain 
unions. The political momentum carried on in 1923, despite the lack 
of industrial disputes, It was no longer limited to those industries 
radicalised by strikes or direct involvement with legislative issues 
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ar the Supreme Court. It must have been disturbing for Gompers to 
see several key state Federations of Labor submit resolutions to the 
Portland Convention calling for a.n independent labour party. Such a 
proposal from the Chicago Federation was not surprising but 
Minnesota, Pennsylvania. and Illinois Fede:ra.tions all submitted 
similar proposals. These proposals were supported also by the 
A.A.I.S.T.W. They were resoundingly defeated by 25,066 votes to 
1,895 with 1,628 not voting. Nonetheless, despite this defeat, the 
trend. was worrying for Gompe:rs since, although it was clear that an 
independent party would not be endorsed, a much stronger political 
movement might well have commanded more support. Gompers 
responded by publishing a remarkable amomlt of editorials during an 
off-year, emphasising the need for effort while simultaneously 
limiting political concern to immediate issues. He poured scom on 
any dependence on legislative and state action. 
The American trade union movement • • is opposed to 
having the state do anything for adult wage earners 
which they are capable of doing for themselves. Those 
who place their faith in the legislative method •• 
believe that the state should be used to do everything 
it can ••• 46 
The threat from communism was also beginning to gain more 
space in the American Federationist though generally this consisted 
of attacks on Russia. or on Foster's Trade Union Educational League. 
Gompers also found time to attack Amalgama.tiou Schemes. The A.F. of L. 
leadership ,,'as returning to its traditional posture by late 192J, 
which upheld the existing structure of the movement, its 
t:ra.ditional political posture and. economic integration. 
The fact that times were good, or at least becoming better, 
aided the A.F. of L. in containing its radicalism. Business 
optimism had permeated the rest of the society and problems were 
being minimised, except almost inevitably in the coal mining industry 
where industrial action once more loomed as anthracite miners sought 
wage rises. Yet here too conflict was avoided by the new progressive 
Governor of Pennsylvania, Gifford Pinchot, who gave the miners a l~ 
rise. Even in the coal industry it appeared that peaceful relations 
might have an opportunity to develop. Of increasing concern for the 
A.F. of L. Executive was the continuing decline in membership and 
growing complaints of apathy in paying dues which again distorted 
membership figures. John Frey lambasted "raincoat unionism,,47 in 
December 1923. attacking the tendency to apathy when times were good, 
and to which the A.F. of L •• through its integration proposals. 
looked for a remedy. 
By late 1923 the A.F. of L., as Samuel Gompers made clear, was 
shaking off the radical posture of 1922. In this he was aided by the 
improving economic situation and an 'apparent tendency amor~ business 
leaders to view their workers in a more considerate manner. These 
factors served to stimulate the hope that with the help of the 
engineers, trade unionism could be integrated within the economic 
system. The consequence for the political stance of the A.F. of L. 
was that it once more resorted to limiting itself to particularist 
issues and its 'friends and enemies' policy. The A.F. of L. 
remained loyal to the narrow view of trade unionism as a purely 
economic organisation, denying that its claims to legitimacy had 
any broader economic or political implications. The emergence of the 
C.P.P.A., however, demonstrated that some among the unions did recognise 
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the relationship between their aims and political attitudes in 
Congress. They had both responded to and stimulated the shift in 
Congress in attempting to form definite links with the advanced 
progressives. 
This political fissure in the trade union movement was largely 
a question of tactics, and did not concern the basic aim of 
establishing trade unionism as a legitimate industrial power. As 
we have seen, Frank Duffy, editor of the Carpenter, was as convinced 
of the existence of the class structure in American society as 
McNamara of the I.A.M.. The difference between the C.P.P.A. and a 
great many within the A.F. of L. was that the latter refused to 
accept the need for a permanent organisation outwith the A.F. of L. 
or political methods to achieve legitimacy. In terms of candidates 
both were supporting the same people. The only difference was that 
the C.P.P.A. explicitly accepted that, whatever their views of the 
nature of trade unionism, the hostility of business and the 
ineffectiveness of many politicians, the movement would only achieve 
its aims by political means. They would not simply be able to 
become integrated into the economic system. 
The conservative leadership of the A.F. of L. was attempting 
to avoid such a posture in its new hopes for cooperation and by an 
increasing tendency to tar all union radicals with the communist 
brush. They held aloof from a firmer coromi tment to the groHing 
progressive trend towards their industrial view. ~espite the 
apparent fragmentation of the labour movement as election year 
approached, the purpose of all unionists remained the same. This 
was the definite acceptance by the political system of the legitimacy 
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of their power in the American industrial system. The ~uestion in 
1924 would be the political expression which this aim would take, 
and what effect it would have on the nature of the American 
political system. 
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FROM HARDmG TO COOLIDGE 1923-1924 
This chapter attdies the effect at the 1922 election results 
OIl th1nIdng in Congrees durlDg 1923 and ea.r1y 1924. 'the purpose is 
apin to follow the develop_ent in prosressivea' attittdes to tmde 
unionism in the iDduatrl&l context of t.boae 1e&r1!1 aet out in 
Chapter six &Di to g\8ge the impact of these attitudes on the 
nature at Congree8 ud. its outlook on the 'labor proble.'. The 
chapter also stlXiiea the DAtura of the adainistration's approach to 
both 1.Ddustr1al :r:el&ticma and. the Congreesioaal situation in these 
yeara. 
President Haxd1Dg bad. been upset by the progre8aive gaine in 
the 1922 aid-tem e1ecticma. The prosressive upsurge was deplored 
tor further weakening traditioaal ~y coherenoe and the in:t1uence 
at the administration on Congress. Gone were auch frleMs at the 
adain1.stration &8 SenatorS Ha.r:r:y New; Frank Kellogg a.m 
. -
J oseph Frel~en. The Pretsldent had. beoome estl'Uged fro. Lodp, 
while also h& viDg lost the key Pennsylvania. voices of 
PhUa.nder Knox and. Boies Penrose. 'l'he administration felt keenly 
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the la.ck of senior Republica.n Senatom who could wield influence on 
the JlI'rly as it faced the new seeaion at the Sixty-Seventh Congress. 
President Harding Jdght not have been too upset by this 
prospect. In the previous two years CODgreSs had borne the brunt of 
public criticisa for the la.ck or coherent policy. It was a situation 
which was tmlikely to continue for INCh longer. In 1924, it would 
be the Presidency not Congress which would inherit the legislative 
reca.t'd. IDleed, the DeaOCl:&ts bad contlDually atteapted to tie 
the CcmgreasionaJ. situation to Presidential ineptitude in a.t'der 
to gain the axiJaua partisan advantage. Inevitably they regarded 
the results of the 1922 election aa confirmation at the success of 
their caapaign apinat a Do-Iothing Congreas and adll~nistration, 
a Coagrees in fact whose Bost beeficial legislation they claiaed 
had been achieved by co-operation between Dellocmts &Jd 
progressive Republicans. '1'hrou8bout 1921 &Jd 1922 they echoed a 
reark Jade by Borah that "It is im:poasible to get anywhere in 
- -
Ccmgress and. it is 1apOllsible to get 8. neptive or a.ff1Dative 
declaration froll the Whit. House".l Their caapaign was based on 
there being a leaderless Senate and House a.nd an incap.ble 
Ixecutive. The result, Deaocmts asserted, was "the worst Congress 
. 2 
in twenty y-.ra". 
For these r .... ona the Preeident W&8 canacious at the 
political necessity of acting to defuse these criticisms froll a.n 
enlarged progressive presence a.nd a re-1nvigorated Democratic party. 
He also realised that if action by the Executive was not forthcoming 
then Congress would be still Bore sh&Jllbolic. In fact, Ha.zod1.ng bad been 
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urged. since mid-192l to take more control of the chaos ,in Congress. 
James Emery, President of the N.A.M., for instance, had written to 
Malcolm Jennings in September 1921 that lithe leaderless condition 
of the party in the House and Senate on practical questions • • will 
make it necessary for the President to :3.ssert party direction. II) 
This Harding had only once attempted, so determined. was he to beat 
off the prospect of having to veto a Bonus bill that he had taken the 
decision to address the Senate on the issue. The result had been 
the defeat of the measure. This was offset to some extent by bitter 
Democratic complaints abolTt the intervention. For Senator Borah the 
President's action cast doubt upon the Senate's sovereignty. The 
Bonus had been sure of a majority until the President intervened 
directly. The power of patronage had forced. the Senate to 
"surrender our judgement to his direction".4 This bitter reaction 
convinced Harding that his earlier view that the Senate must simply 
agree with the Executive without overt Presidential pressure was the 
correct one. Thus, despite continuing chaos in Congress a.nd advice 
from close friends, Harding had refused. to exercise his power. 
Harding was encouraged in this posture at the time by a persistence 
among critics to disparage Congress rather than the Presidency. 
The industrial chaos brought on by the coal and rail strikes, 
however, pushed responsibility upon the Executive. As has been noted, 
Harding, due in no small way to personal pique, ruled out any 
Presidential initiative after his July proposals had been rejected 
by the U.M.W. Unable and 1.Ulwilling to become involved. directly, the 
President called for,and got in short time, a U.S. Coal Commission 
and a Federal Fuel Distributor to ameliorate the shortages the rail 
strike was continuing to cause. These steps were forced on Harding, 
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and. such a course wa.s far frOli his personal preference. Harding 
wa.shed. his ha.nds of the coal industry after the Federal Fuel 
Distributor was inst&lled &Ild a Commission wa.s set up to investigate 
the illdustry's problems. Answering a plea. from the Mayor of Boston 
to act on the coal crisis the President wrote that "I do not see how 
the government could effectively do more". 5 Wben th~ coal. strike 
. 
aDded HardiDg wa.s in full accord with the wishes of Secreta.ry Hoover 
who believed that "The Adm" nistmtion should keep its hands 
6 ., 
out ••• ". except to encou:rage accept&nce of mediation in April 
when & new agreement was due to be fixed, and. to discourage hopes 
at wage reductions uong coal operators, for which Hoover believed 
there wa.s no ba.ais. RaIding &greed that "a definite peace"7 lastiDg 
at least two years was requil:'ed. He wa.s anxious that the coal 
1nduat%'7' s probl_ should not again plague his a,d.inist:z:e.tion • 
. 
He hoped, as WUson dM. that if stabUity could be achieved, the 
two sides would strive to exteDi it. Harding's &etion over the 
coal. strike had been in response to a crisis, and was in no way 
part of a new initiative by the adI!1n'stmtion. In fact Hal:d1ng's 
action continued to be neutral in this industry, recognising the 
contribution which coal operators' oalls for wage cuts had D8de to 
the disruption. 
yet the crisis continued due to the tie-up in the :z:e.Uroada 
&8 the result of the shopmen's strike. Med1a.tion and fairness 
-
ew.pomted in the face of continuing cmos. Harding as a result 
endorsed his Attorney General.' s wish that the Government enjoin 
the unions involved in the strike. In fact Harding found his juati-
. . 
fication for this &etion in his belief that the Board was a quasi-
ju1icial institution. Among his cabinet, however. while Da.v1s 
re_ined sUent. Hughes proteeted strongly am Hoover W&8 fmnkly 
" ,-
8 
"flabbergasted" by the injunction. The President penisted with 
., . 
his attitude to the Boa.'t'd. In his message to Congress on 8th December 
. . . 
1922. he called clearly for making the decisions of the Bo&1."d binding. 
This he justified by stating that I 
We have &8swaed so great a responsibUity in necessary 
regulation that we unconsciously have &8SUlled the 
responsibility for maintained service I therefore the 
lawful power of enforcement of decisions is necessary 
to sustain the _jority of government and. administer to 
the public welfare.9 
Ultimately, this attituie revealed Harding's conservative 
. 
interpretation of 'public welfare'. which was in effect the right to 
coneuae. ' The purpose behiM such a proposal was sill.pJ.y to avoid. the 
recurrence of the chaos of 1922 and. to avoid embroiling the 
administration in such ind:ustr1a1. disputes. In so doing, however, 
Harding was prep&red. to overrule \.Dl1on demams for free collective 
1:a.rga.ining which could not take precedence over the discomf ort it 
IIight cause. Following on the heels of the mil strike and combined 
with the 1922 election results am the Democratic revival, Harding 
was now reconcUed to taking on the mantle of leadership of the 
Cong:r:easiOD&l RepubliC&Zl8 and advocated such propoeaJ.s. The 
Railroad labor Board _topic was an area. in which Harding had a 
personal opinion aM definite policy. In addition, this was an 
area. in which the govemm.ent was a.lread.y involved. The 'labor problem' 
in general, however. was not an area. where Harding was anxious to 
launch his C&JIIi&1gn or where he had further proposals to make. 
The issue was far too di visi ve within the Republican pLrty to ba.se an 
attempt to renew the party's direction upon. Harding was also 
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conservative in his at.t.itude to the role of government. This basic 
viewpoint restrained him from applying his attitude on the Railroad 
Board to industrlaJ. relations generally. Here he continued his 
neutrality. The crlsis of 1922 had forced Harding to act, so that 
. . 
now Harding was resolved to assume a more forceful role. He now 
required an issue on which to base his effort. 
Haming's ca.mpa.ign to give the Republican party a lead 
required the backing of mild. progressives. In this aim the 
'labor problem' would be of no use and indeed cOlmte:z:-productive. 
In his December speech he lalmChed this effort by promising to 
follow "a sanely prog:t:'eSSive,.l°path. More significant than this" 
vague rhetoric was H&1::ding's shifting away from 'normalcy' when he 
asserted that "There will never again be precisely the old arder, 
.. 11 
indeed I know no-one who thinks it to be desirable". This 
statement in fact cl.arl.fied what had. always been Harding's opinion. 
'llormalcy' meant status quo, not an attempt to tmdo reforms which 
had gone before, as mre .. conservatives wished am as progressives 
feared. Haming then decided to use the Ship Subsidy Bill to unite 
his pLrty and assert his lead81'5hip. The President had indicated to 
Reed Smoot his determination that this be lIBde a test of Republican 
12 loyalty. He was quite p:epa.red. to see the pressing appropriations' 
. -
schedule held up and to call an emergency session to-get the bill 
through. This was the issue around which Harding decided that the 
"re-eons~tion to the n&tion as a whole"lJwould begin. 
The railroad legislation was certainly part of the Hard1nc 
. . 
initiative. He did not object to unioniall, but could not tolerate 
too great an inconvenience as a result of their activities. Harding. 
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in my case, had alwa.ys believed that the Board's decisions were 
tantamount to being legally biDiiDg and. was equally unhappy that the 
Pemusylvania Ra.Uroa.d bad blithely ignored the rulings of the Board. 
Therefore, he wished to brillg legal force to the Board and. suppress 
. . 
the freedom of both sides. The President, in fact, did well to 
concentrate on the Ship Subsidy rather than to make his propos&l.s on 
the Railroad Labor Board the major priority of the new session. 
. . 
Any initiative by the President needed the vote of centrists in 
Congress to succeed. Harding wa.s nat sure of gaining the support of 
centrists in his view of the RailroBd BO&:I'd. . Indeed neither was 
Ha.rding likely to gain railroad or conservative support on such a 
proposaJ.. As the Kansas experiment had shown, control of unionisJll 
was welcomed but attempts to control their own freedom were bitterly 
opposed by business. His railroad proposal never gained serious attention. 
The vital need to hold the centre of his party in Congress had 
been recosnised by H&l:diDg in his 8th December speech and had. been 
uade increasingly urgent with the a.pparently independent policies now 
to be pursued by the progressives within La. Follette's expanding 
People's Legislative Service. On 1st December 1922 the Cowttee 
on Coll1llittees of the P .L.S. had. organised collDllittees to handle 
various policy a.re&8 in Congress. 14 The willingness of so many 
progressives to form such an organised cabal reflected their new 
confidence. The timing of the La Follett. call, coming on 
lath November 1922 &fter the election, had a.llayed fears that the 
move was tied to an independent ea.mp&ign. far11er rebuffs had 
indeed forced La. Follette to set such an idea. asid., at least untU 
--
such an organisation as the P .L.S. had been well founded. 
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These progressives were not priarily concemed with compromise. 
They wm quick to resp<Di to the Harding initiative by setting 
. . 
priorities af their own. For this :reason, while Harding gained 
froll his Ship Subsidy success, he seemed. unable to form ~he cohesive 
unit which would ensure Republican majorities consistently. The 
lack of Congressional power and. the s-U Republican majority meant 
victory On any issue could well be regarded as a success by the 
Adm' n1 stration. The Ship Subsidy bill had been carefully chosen to 
ake success for the administration as sure as possible. The 
emergence of the P.L.S. at one and the sa.me time challeDged the 
administration for the support of the centre, including lIlild 
progressives, a.nd also threa.tened the hopes of the administration's 
being able to control the legislative agenda. 
The agricultural crisis provided. a prime example of this 
threa.t. Acticn was problematic due to the administration having 
little in terms of positive policy which it could sponsor. Clearly, 
if the progressives were to transl&te the orga.nia&tion into policy, 
Hamirlg's Ship Subsidy inspired momentum might be quickly halted. and. 
a new agenda proposed. This was particularly true since the 
P.L.S. committees did not include such progressives as 
Fiorello La GU&l:d1a, & Republican, or Democrats J.C. Linthicum of 
Ma.ryland or COl:dell Hull of Termessee in the House and DU1, Thomas 
. . 
Walsh of Montana, Kenneth McKel.l.&r of Tennessee, David Walsh of 
Massachussetts, Burton Wheeler of Montana, Carter Glass, newly 
elected from Virginia. ar Key Pittman of Nevada, all of whom might 
be expected. to support P.L.S. initiatives. 
This threat quickly became a reality in the fourth session of 
the Sixty Seventh Congress. Harding's Ship Subsidy success apart, 
the progressives took over the momentum by placing the agricultural 
problem squarely before Congress. It was due to their abUity to 
uake agricultural. reform a major Congressional. issue at this time 
that earned the progressives the term the Farm Bloc. Since a great 
deal of the progressives were from ru:r:aJ. areas it was not surprising 
that the agricultm:aJ. recession should be their first priority once 
the,. became organised. It was an issue on which they were all 
agreed and was by 1923 the primary concem of these men. Nonetheless 
the P .L.S. organisation did not have as its only concem the state 
of agriculture, it was simply that these factors made that iSBue the 
first 'priority. Farm Bloc is thus something of a misnomer, unfair 
to the breadth of the significance of the P.L.S. 
Irvine Lenroot had offered a ru:r:aJ. credits bill which proposed. 
to exteDd a ~48 million line of credit to 'tanks to lend at the rate 
of only~. llu:IIlou:red to have received. administration baoking the 
progresai vas attacked the bill as silllpl,. &gravating the problem of 
rural illdebtedness. The response from the P.L.S. was to sponsor 
a bill by senator Norris, which called far the launching of a 
corporation to buUd, buy, lease and. ope:rate elevators and 
warehouses. It would buy up surpluses to sell abroad at reduced 
rates, while ensuring f&r'1ll8r15 a fair rate of return on their produce. 
In fact in & session crowded by the Ship Subsidy, itself a long and 
often bitter debate, and appropr1&tions, neither of these proposals 
was allo11Bd the time for lengthy consideratiCll. 
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Despite the fact that the Republican majority was l.a.rgely 
ineffective and that the progressives were increasingly 1nf1uent1aJ., 
Harding emerged with his reputation much improved. in public opinion. 
His success in the Ship Subsidy and the retum of tranquility in 
industry were pa.r&;ly the cause. Much more important, however, was 
the adm3n3stration's foray in foreign relations. In successfully 
negotiating a debt repayment with Britain and in his new call for 
American participation in the World Court, Harding won renewed 
personal popularity whUe Congress continued to be at loggerheads 
&lid while rural America suffered. The Arms Limitation 'l'reaty in 
1922 bad also greatly boosted the reputation of the President. 
This was a step which could satisfy all sides of the party and 
public at that time. 
As a result of the priorities of the two contending forces in 
1923, labour issues were forced to the ba.ck of Congressional minds 
and the caJ.endar. Issues ather than labour were more conducive to 
the aims of both the P.L.S. and administration. It must be 
emphasised, however, that the lack of attention paid to l.a.bour in no 
way affected the significance of the continuing progressive/ 
conservative dialogue. If anything, it served to demonstrate the 
underlying ideological nature of the debate. This was no longer 
disputes on particular issues but a continuing divide on broader 
perceptions of the extent of the govemment's responsibility for the 
welfare of the popula.tiOl'l. After the crisis of 1922 and the 
unemployment of 1921, the administration returned to its traditional 
position on the 'labor problem'. The theme struck by the Secretary 
of labor Davis was that, with the economy ilIproving, 1t would be 
wrong to continue the industrial con.:f'lict. Now was the time to 
28.5 
co-operate. On 1st January 1923 Davis argued in a speech delivered 
in New York that "The American people are tired of strikes. Public 
opinion will not tolerate any suspension of work in any of these basic 
industries. ,,15 Wages moreover were beginning to trend upwards in 
steel, non-union coal and building , and even the American Woollen 
Company had awarded a 121% increase to its workforce. While Davis 
spoke of optimism and co-operation, he was anxious that government-
run enterprises should not wreck the basis for his argument. He 
therefore strongly protested to the President over proposed wage cuts 
by the Shipping Board in May 1923. He warmly welcomed such moves as 
the B de 0 co-operation plan and. the ending of the 12-hour day in the 
steel industry and decisions such as the Supreme Court ruling in 
the Pennsylvania railroad case. The administration welcomed this 
ruling by Taft against the railroads I application for a Writ of 
Certiori, since it appeared to demonstrate the evenhandedness of the 
16 legal system "depending upon which side is in the right". a point ' 
emphasised by the Kansas decision. 
All this Davis could point to as demonstrating that labour was 
not being victimised by the administration or legal system and 
that the best interests of unionism lay in co-operation, not conflict 
with the business community. This would also mean, of course, less 
difficulty for the administration in maintaining its non-interventionist 
position. The issue of the Railroad Labor Board reform was quietly 
forgotten in this atmosphere of optimism, encouraged by a lack of 
serious industrial disputes. As described in Chapter six, the trade 
union movement had begun to move independently to such co-operation -
a process launched in 1923 - and their response to the administration 
was to ignore it. Angered by the activities of 1922, it simply did 
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not respond to what the administration said. 
While the administration, in pursuance of its laissez-faire 
policy, sought to calm the waters of industrial relations, Congress. 
and the P.L.S. did not in fact ignore entirely issues which were 
closely related to labour. This was despite the pressures on time 
caused by the clash of progressives'and administration's purposes 
and. the need to pass the appropriations bills. The North Eastern 
states continued to suffer from coal shortages which caused 
Senator David \I'alsh of Massachussetts to call for a better grading of 
anthracite due to the poor quality coal now being used. to satisfy 
demand but ¥hich many felt was yet another example of exploitation 
by the coal operators. A further bone of contention in the New 
England states arising from the coal shortage was the continued 
export of coal during the shortage. Again this aroused ire and 
attacks on the coal operators. Traditional progressive suspicion of 
business continued, a factor likely to be of some importance if 
milder progressives were to back the P.L.S. or to seek more radical 
reforms. Indeed, this particular issue was broadened to include most 
progressives following the first report of the U.S. Coal Commission 
on 15th JanuaJ.!'Y 1923. The report flatly refused to make any 
recommendations on the future of the coal industry since these would 
inevitably involve "not only theories of government but also the 
economic life of the Republic" .17 William Borah in particular "rae 
frustrated by what amounted simply to a reiteration of the problems 
of the industry. There was no attempt to solve over-development, 
the question of prices and profit, or crucially, the issue of 
government ownership. As a member of the P.L.S. Committee on 
Natural Resources, Borah was determined to take up the matter once 
more when time allowed. By 1923 the progressive suspicion had. 
developed from attacks on the men involved to a questioning of free 
enterprise in industries charged with the public interest. 
Also in gestation was the issue of ~hat to do with the 
Railroad Labor Board. In this La Follette was closely involved with 
the Railroad brotherhoods and the Railway Employees' Department of 
the A.F. of L. and had. been since November 1922. While this issue 
was being worked on in Spring 1923. the issue of government works in 
. time of depression was a.r.:a.in introduced. Originally proposed by 
senator Kenyon, it was now taken up by Senator Frelinghuysen of 
New Jersey and in the House by Frederick Zihlma.n, a Maryland 
Republican and progressive. Given the pressure of time, this bill 
failed to get a hearing. The most striking point Has tr..a.t 
Frelinghuysen had sponsored the bill, a measure of the extent to 
which progressives had shifted the centre of debate in Congress. 
The situation in the summer of 1923 was of a President 
enjoying a continuing high level of popularity, who was largely 
unable to control a contentious Congress where the agenda was being, 
if not decided then increasingly frustrated by a vocal minority. 
The President had succeeded in having his Ship Subsidy Bill passed, 
tariff reform enacted and had. also switched his line on foreign 
policy, now championing American entry into the 'florId Court and 
abandoning his ambivalent isolationism; "It is an unseemly thing 
far this nation to say to the world we are unwilling to have to do 
18 
with anything whicR is not our specific creation." This position, 
fo11<»'ing the success of the disarmament conference in 1922, 
appeared. to restore to America a diplomatic leadership ,·-e1comed by a 
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great deal of Americans. Isolationist opinion remained but this. 
concentrated in areas where progressive strength was already firmly 
established, little affected Harding's popularity. Harding's 
championing of disarmament had also to a large extent negated this 
group. Equally important to the President was that it effectively 
spiked the Democratic guns on foreign policy. 
Also playing a. major role in Harding's popularity by the summer 
of 1923 was the strong recovery of the domestic economy, based. on a 
major boom in construction, railroad re-equipping and automobile 
manufacture, facilitated. by the growth in lending. Similarly, the 
increasing use of credit by consumers had fuelled a revival of 
demand. Harding had also strengthened his popularity among the 
population for his criticism of factionalism in Congress, although 
this tended only to aggravate the already strained relaticns between 
the Pres iden t and that body. 
While stil1 an issue for progressive interest and thought, 
the labour problem had not received. any serious consideration in 
1923, though the difficulties involved. had yet to be solved. The 
Harding administration continued its hands-off policy on labour. 
To this end Secretary Davis continuoo. to urge compromise and 
co-operation in industrial relations, a policy which the hiatus in 
the bitterness within industry served to encourage. Indeed the 
President had received a reminder of the continuing threat of 
Congressional progressivism's concern with labour's policies in the 
form of a proposal by James Frear of Uisconsin early in 1923. He 
called for the ending of the Supreme Court's ability to declare 
unconstitutional by votes of five to four acts passed by Congress. 
Increasingly progressives were becoming involved in the delate on 
Supreme Court power which had been a major issue for labour for some 
time. Even Albert Beveridge,defeated in 1922 in Indiana largely by 
the opposition of labour combined with democratic vote~ believed 
that "reaction has grabbed the Supreme Court" .19 This rm: was over 
the decision in the Adkins case that a minimum wa.ge law in the D.istrict 
of Columbia was tmconstitutional. Harding, buoyed by his popularity 
and. preparing for a Western tour, did not regaro. this as anything more 
20 than "the individual game of personal a.d.vancement •• " Increasingly 
Harding was becoming Presidential in outlook and action, perhaps the 
most important factor, with the improvement of the economy. So 
much had Harding become personally popular, that the increasing 
evidence of corruption within his administration failed to 
significantly affect his position. 
Upon his death, 1ial;'ding had. indeed reached a peak of popularity 
-,rhich looked secure enough ani so personally directed. that it seemed. 
sure to carry him to victory in 1924. The progressives, while 
bringing Congress to a practical standstill, were unable apparently 
to hurt the President. 1;hile this was the case, it was also clear 
that progressives continued to have a deep interest in labour issues 
and. that these had not yet been laid conclusively aside. Indeed, if 
anything, the continuing concern of progressives in a time of 
relative calm emphasised the broader implications of the movement 
for politics in the United. States. The issue during the sUcty-
Eighth Congress tmder the new Presidency of Calvin Coolidge, would 
be whether the progressives could translate their Congressional 
organisation and strength into a broader popularity and electoral 
success. 
Yet the relationship between the P.L.S. and the C.P.P.A. and 
the labour movement remained a puzzle. Although there had been little 
debate on the issue of labour, it was clear that it remained a major 
consideration for progressives. Increasingly, the members of the 
P.L.S. were prepared to advocate specific union aims advocated by 
the C.P.P.A. The Supreme C01lrt was becoming an issue of increasing 
significance for the development of closer links between progressives 
and labour. Moreover, talks continued between progressives and the 
mllroad brotherhoods over the Railroad Labor Board. Yet the 
A.F. of L. whUe involved in the Supreme Court issue remained 
suspicious of the independent progressives and of any political 
involvement beyond particular issues. Unease continued to 
characterise the relationship of the broader labour movement to these 
progressives and the C.P.P.A. The extent to which progressives as 
a whole could embrace the movement's objectives remained unclear. 
Milder progressives were stUl unwilling to grant unions the power 
which .. rould devolve from the satisfaction of their demands. They 
remained. fixed to the idea of a collective bargaining machinery, 
albeit shored up by a code such as Kenyon had suggested. While 
the radical progressives had succeeded in forcing milder progressives 
to approach the broader reform principles implicit in such proposals 
as government ownership, there was still no concrete disposition to 
act. All these issues depended upon the inclinations of the 
Sixty-Eighth Congress for clarification. 
The announcement by the new President the. t he intended to ask 
the Harding cabinet to rema.in seemed to confirm that the tra.di tional 
battle lines between progressives a.nd conservatives would continue. 
This decision wrecked any hopes Coolidge may have rarboured of 
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succeeding in uniting his :party for 1924. He attempted to bring 
progressives such &8 Bomb, Johnson and Capper into the oonfidenoe 
- -
of the White House but they remained intransigent. Progressive 
antagonism over the cabinet decision was a.ggra.vated by Coolidge's 
opposition to 8lly ruraJ. aid. 
While this rift continued, Coolidge demonstrated his talent 
for blurring the issues in the labour problem by his actions in the 
threatened anthracite strike in August 1923. On the 8th, Coolidge 
had agreed with Gifford Pinchot, the Governor of Pennsylvania, that 
DO suspensions should be allowed. during 1923. On the 15th of 
August Pinohot informed the President of his view that the Training 
Boa.rd involved in the dispute was a legitimate safety measure. 
The a.nthl:acite opemtors complained that this t:raining scheme was 
little more than a closed-shop armngement to oontrol ~e eul;ry of 
workers. On 17th August Coolidge thanked Pinchot for his suggestions 
and passed them to John Hays HaJlUllOnd, oha1l:man of the Coal Commission. 
Talks between the U.M.W. and the operators, meanwhile, had moved 
from New York to Atlantio City. In these it was clear that the 
bituminous miners were relucta.nt to engage in further industrial 
action and were seeking an accommodation over the row conceming. 
the national agreement. The anthl:acite workers' position waa more 
secure, however, aD! they displayed little inclination to compromise. 
Pinchot theret"ore decided. to pre-empt possible disruption and 
awarded the anthracite mers in his state a rise of 1"" and the 
oontinuation of the tm1n1Dg law. In a carefully worded telegram of 
oong:ratulations, Coolidge praised Pinohot's decision. "It was a very 
difficult situation in which I invited. 1~ help. "21 
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In the following days it was Coolidge who l.'eceived. the plaudits 
whUe P1nchot was attacked far having sold out to the mars. 
Pinchot thus bad the Coolidge telegra.m published in O1'der to try at 
least to gain the credit that only the Pl.'esident had BO far received. 
The astute Coolidge, however, on the saae day Pinchot had his 
telegr&. published, again wrote to Pinchot to offer the advice that 
"There is l.mlikely to be any result to the consumers unless there be 
~e action by the Permsyl vania. State Government in the mine prices". 22 
By a brUl1ant piece of anoeuvr1ng, Coolidge had succeeded. in 
inferring his control at the negotiaticme while not being satisfied 
, -
with P1nchot' s bandl.1ng of them. At ODe and the same time Coolidge 
inferred responsibUity while distancing himself' from its 
consequences. The President thus won.'.applause far saving the nation 
from still another strike while avoiding any other criticism for the 
details of the settlement. There could be no doubt. however, that 
the need. to avoid a strike led to the generous award in Pennsylvania. 
It is doubtful whether Coolidge would have taken the same course had 
the threat been a national one. The continuiDg negotiations between 
U.M.W. and the op81.'B.tors in bitWD1nows mining, however, made clear 
that neither of' these groups BOught another strife-tom winter. 
Increasingly, pressure from non-lmion production was forcing 
comprowe upon the two sides in the Central Coapeti ti ve Field. 
Coolidge's Secretary of IAbor Davis, moreover, continued to 
elllphasise the ilIlprovement in standArds of li v1ng to support his call 
for reconcUiation in industrial relations and could point to the 
B-hour day in the steel industry as a prime example. Immigration 
continued to be Davis' s ain pla.nk in his attempt to win union 
. 
approval. In 1924 his new proposal. was that the U .M.W. should 
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crea.te its own research 'bureau in order to bring order to any 
negotiations with ma.nagement. In his search for omer and 
tranquility in 1924, also repeated his suggestion that the DepLrtment 
of Labor ta.ke on experts to interpret agreements am establish their 
terms in order to end. the constant rancour caused by differences 
over the implementation of agreements. The overall impression 
created by Coolidge was of stability am continuity, a sense of 
proportion and a' sense that America really was quite all right a.nd 
that, if left well alone, would be' still better. America had. 
had enough of self-criticism, particularly since the anthracite 
and bituminous settlements presaged a period of quiet in industrial 
relations. In such a situation, Coolidge and his Cabinet would be 
the last to attempt any change, espeei&l.ly in industrial relations 
and union issues, unless action was forced upon them. 
This impression created by Coolidge contrasted sharply with 
the situation in Congress where a new campaign of self-criticism wa.s 
being launched. This took the form of a welter of invest16&tions 
into the activities of the Harding administration. oU leases at 
Teapot Domel the Vete:rans' BureaUf allegations of industrial 
espionage by Senator Wheeler ctr Montana. These investigations were 
exp!LZ2ded. in 1924 to include scrutiny of ca.uq:aign contribatdons which 
was an additional progressive concern. 
Senator ~v1d Walsh of Massachussetts also challenged the 
Republican claim to having a.chieved an economic recovery. The 
figures from a Bureau of Labor statistics Report he found "startling 
in view of Republican propogand& and. claims of prosperity, of no 
unemployment, of high wages, ani satisfactory living conditions". 23 
He claimed that, while the nel' tariff schedule had bloated profits 
(U.S. Steel had shown profits of ¢75.37 million in the third 
quarter of 1923, up from ~28.4 million 1."1 the same period in 1922), 
it had also increased the cost of living. In the year from 
September 1922 to 1923 there had been an inflation rate of 5.8.%.24 
Indeed, Secretary Davis wrote to President Coolidge on 19th March 
1924 that there was the beginnings of an unemployment problem as the 
"result of improvements in efficiency and mechanisation. These 
figures also showed that "This is rapidly becoming the situation 
throughout the country. "25 The stuiy in the North East states 
showed that while full-time working was now the norm, unlike 1922, 
there had. been significant reductions in payrolls, ranging from 
6 to 10J'. It appeared. that the Republican boom was fa.r from 
including the entire population. 
However much Democrats attempted to destroy the impression of 
well-being under Republicanism there were reasons why this effort 
fa.iled. Technological tmemployment, although clearly under way, 
was hitting few industries as yet. Some industries were already 
highly mechanised, such as the automobile industry, others were 
dominated by skilled workers as in the building trades. The impact 
was as yet limited but had. already been f'eJ.t 1D. for instance, the 
textile, boot and shoe industries. The unions, while beginning to 
feel the effects in the textile industry had not mounted any 
campaign on this issue. Their silence was a result of tying 
themselves to productivity as a means of increasing wages and to an 
acceptance of technological innovation with their support of the 
engineering movement. Unionism itself was also beginning to feel 
the effects of apathy among its employed membership. The other key 
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factor was that while the industrial population had, despite 
increased production, renained stable the service industries were 
booming. It was a middle-class boom, the very class whose conscience 
had been the key to the earlier progressive wave. Hard as Democrats 
and progressives worked to dispel their apathy, in 1924 they 
appeared to be failing. Their perce-ption was that "In many issues 
now coming up the people stand with the impression that the 
President is right and Congress wrong,,26 as Benjamin Felt put it. 
The effect of the investigation into corruption was not. to arouse 
suspicion and disgust but rather irritation that the happiness of 
prosperity was being blighted. Coolidge, a symbol of calm.. inaction 
and economy, reflected extraordinarily well the popular desire that 
politics did not intrude on this economic bliss. The unions in 
late 1923, as explained previously, had turned inwards and were also 
basking in prosperity. This combined with the disinterest among the 
middle-class to cause a silence in 1923, while the P.L.S. worked 
quietly on labour policies. 
The lack of industrial disruption also served to dispel any 
question of concern. Early in 1924 the U .M.W. and operators had 
finally agreed in Jacksonville, Florida, to continue their April 
1923 agreement. Lewis wrote to Coolidge that "The three-year 
agreement is a constructive development that will lead to the 
stability of the coal industry. ,,27 The stability would certainly 
benefit the nation and endear Lewis to the President. Whether it 
would be to the benefit of the U.M.W. ~as an issue which would 
cause increasing internal dissension within the union and internecine 
warfar~ which debilitated the union and distracted its attention from 
industrial relations, as well as political involvement,in the rest of 
the decade. 
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The apparent hiatus in the 'labor problem' made the 
investigation into corruption in the Harding administration vitally 
important to Democrat and progressives alike for the nearing 1924 
. 
election. Corruption had. always been a major component of the 
progressive reform impulse. It was therefore doubly important that 
progressives expose the corruption and thereby find solid ground for 
their reform demands. a vital consideration which could bolster 
their election chances in 1924. Corruption and the continuing 
battle for rural. aid formed the core of the progreseive intereste 
in election year. The President's response to the latter issue was 
to preach economy in governaent in order to boost investment and 
eavings. As regards corruption. Coolidge'e valuable capacity to 
hold aloof helped. as it had done in the anthracite row. win public 
support and deflect personal criticism. This position was greatly 
aided by Coolidge's becoming President only in 1923. thereby 
minimising chargee of complicity on his part. The fact tbl.t he had 
been & JIle_bar of the Harding Cabinet was submerged by his fastidious 
&Di honest character. The President was also aided considerably by 
his tuming away from bis earlier promise to keep on the Harding 
Cabinet. Daugherty was bitter about Coolidge's about-face on the 
question. accusing the President of capitulating to the deande of 
28 
"rioters a.u:l war profiteere". The action nonetheless neutmlised. 
. . 
the threat of the progressive O&Dlp&ign. 
The situation in 1924. one all too OODon sinoe 1919. was of 
a l.'8.noourous Congress lacking tmy olear _jeri ty or ooherence 
att:racting public approbation. The President mea.nwhUe re_ined 
personally popular despite being UMble to forge any polioy which oould 
unite a Congressional _jerity. making him practically ineffectual. 
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Such was the effect of the mounting progressive strength in 
Congress that it had. "done practically nothing with reference to any 
matter • • we have approved bills • • we must put through. I doubt 
if anything else is considered. ,,29 Indeed such was the progressive 
momentum that Congress was at a practical standstill. Yet, 
progressives Bet an agenda which they could not pass. 
Despite their concentration on corruption and rural issues in 
fact progressives were now in such an ascendant and coherent enough 
to also push labour issues, despite the lack of industrial disruption 
to force their consideration. The P.L.S. was by now anxious to 
display its continuing concern for union issues and wed the labour 
movement to its cause and forge, a broad left wing movement in 
Congress. In the House the Committee on the District of Columbia 
reported favourably on the Fitzgerald-Jones Workmen's Compensation 
Act. The unions had long complained bitterly about the treatment 
of injured and disabled workers by insurance companies in 
compensation claims. There was invariably a long wait, often requiring 
court action while the awards were generally paltry •. The Committee 
found that the maximum sum paid, rarely exceeded ¢4, 000 and this was 
no compensation whatsoever. The Committee argued that since machines 
were inspected it must also take responsibility for the well-being 
of the workforce. The bill, as SO many before it, never reached 
the floor. 30 
The Committee on the Judiciary in the House also reported 
fa.vourably on the proposed Child Labor amendment. It ~'as argued that 
the principle of minim~~ age and the responsibility of the Federal 
government to act had already been established in the ratification 
of the two previotE laws attempting to end child labour. This 
amendment was merely another constitutional means to the same end. 
In addition. since all but seven states of the Union already 
had child labour laws, the effect of the amendment would simply 
be to standardise those provisions. A minority report, however, 
strongly objected to this extension of federal power. It held that 
since 1913 there ha.d been a welter of constitutional amendments; 
that it was time to end this tampering with the fabric of the 
nation. It upheld the states' rights to regulate this problem. 
The battle between progressive intervention through centralised 
regulation and conservative laissez-faire allied to states' rights 
doctrine and also now employing the sanctity of the Constitution 
was yet again rejoined in this labour issue. In this case, 
however, the progressives' argument won the day. On 26th April 
the Child Labor Amendment passed the House, 297 voting for and 
only 69 against, with 64 not voting - a striking success. 
The development of progressivism to an acceptance of the use 
of federal power in the interests of equality, thouah incrEBSingly 
accepted, was still far from l:asic policy. William Borah, 
always a ma.veriek both within the Republican party and progressive 
movements, expressed strong doubts about the use of £ede%.'f!Ll. power 
in such cases. ''When you come to turning over to the national 
government not chUd.ren but boys and girls up to the age of 18, 
I don't think the Soviet Government has much over us. n3l The 
sterling-Townsend Bill had also caused such doubts and revealed 
the early libeDal traditions of progressivism. It was a suspiCion 
which progressives had not yet entirely overcome, had still not been 
lost from their thinking, in their search for equality. Nonetheless they 
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still could not accept the conservative cry as in this case of no 
change. In the vote on 2nd June 1924 Borah was tmable to sanction 
the extension of federal responsibility. While Wheeler, Owen and 
Underwood did not vote, the progressive argument was strong enough 
to carry the day and the Amendment passed, 61 votes in the 
affirmative, 23 votes against and two abstentions. 
While these bills showed a continuing progressive loyalty to 
the interests of the working population and in the Child Labor Bill 
a new ability to win approval for their policies, the key issue in 
the progressive-union relationship by the spring of 1924 was the 
Howell-Barkley Blll, one on which progressives could set aside their 
difficulties over centralised power. The bill was in fact a clear 
test of the loyalty of progressivism to the wishes of the tmions, 
and the railroad unions in particular. Certainly, the unions 
themselves regarded it in this way. The bU1 had been drafted 
entirely by the brotherhoods and the Railway Employees' Department 
of the A.F. of L. in 1923. The credibility of the Railroad Labor 
Board had completely collapsed. The BoaI'd had been swamped by 
disputes due to the failure of the Railway Executives and the 
brotherhoods to set up joint boards of arbitration to settle 
technical grievances. This had been the system under Federal 
operation during the war and had been generally recognised as a 
success. The RaUl.ray Board itself, tripartite as it was, was 
intended to deal almost exclusively with wage negotiations, the 
only issue in which the public could be deemed competent to 
participate. Thus, the intention of the 1920 Act had never been 
achieved while the ruling of the Board on technical issues, 
particularly work rules, had caused anger and ultimately a flouting 
JOO 
of the Board's decisions. This dissatisfaction led to the reform 
demand and the proposals for compulsory technical boards to 
supplement a Mediation & Conciliation Board which was to deal with 
wages and be made up only of members of the public. The two sides 
would guarantee to abide by the board's decisions which were to be 
filed with the U.S. District Court. As Democratic Representative 
Alben Barkley of Kentucky argued in a letter to the editor of the 
Louisville Courie~Journal, these proposals were derived largely 
from the provisions of the Newlands-Erdman Act and from the 
experience under federal control, during which time no industrial 
disputes su<?h as had. occu:rred tmder the Railroad Labor Board had. 
taken place. Only the compulsory nature of the technical adjustment 
boards and the payment of the members by the government was a new 
proposal. 32 
The real impact of the bill and the implications which aroused 
most opposition was the tacit acceptance that the unions were the 
only legitimate and representative voice of the workforce. Only 
significant organisations could possibly allow the proper working 
of the machinery. Local non-union groups would not be considered. 
Given the hatred expressJd by several railroads towards unionism, 
this ','as not an acceptable proposa.l a.t. all. The issue developed 
into ',-hether the \.mion could be the only representat.ive of the 
workforce. 
If the unions required any further confirmation of the need to 
change the nature of the negotiating machinery in t.he railroads, it 
was provided by the chairman of the Board, Benjamin Hooper. Late in 
1923 he launched a determined campaign against the proposed reform 
)01 
which immediately infuriated the unions and convinced them of the 
bias of the Board and its opposition to union power on the railroads. 
He argued that given the deluge of cases the Board had in fact coped 
remarkably well, that' its decisions had almost all been adhered to, 
and that the failure of the shopmen's strike "has strengthened the 
Transportation Act by demonstrating tl'at a railroad strike cannot 
succeed against public sentiment". 33 Since the railroad themselves 
\ol ere flouting board decisions with impunity,th1s once more smacked 
of persecution and bias to the brotherhoods. 
Hooper's protestations against the bill grew more vehement 
when it won time on the Senate floor. In April 1924 he again wrote 
to Coolidge denouncing the proposal as "an iniquitous measure 
drafted by certain labor organizations", J4"Those main purpose was to 
cement their own power. The public must remain paramount he claimed. 
On 31st May 1924 he wrote to Bascom Slemp, Coolidge's secretary, 
attacking the bill as '''a vicious, partisan, socia.listic measure". 35 
The response of the leaders of the brotherhoods was inevitable. In 
a telegram to Robertson, President of the Brotherhood of Firemen and 
Engineers, stone of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers sa.id 
frankly that ''The Labor Board through its present composition and 
through the freely expressed prejudices and antagonisms of its 
chairman • • • has disqualified itself from acting as an important 
tribunal".36 In the hope that this would justify his claim that 
the tmions were seeking reform for their own purposes. Hooper had 
this circulated to all Congressmen. What in fact it demonstrated 
was that rela.tions strained in a.ny case were now impossible to 
repair. Hooper had completely tmdermined the legitimacy of his 
Board. In fact this also undermined Coolidge's characteristic 
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attempt to defuse the situation in his December speech to Congress. In 
it he had called for a. cOOe of pmctice which might ultimately gain the 
force of law J a call which in fact the proposal went some way to 
satisfy. The point at issue, however, was the apparent extension of 
union power. 
The progressives were determined. to push this reform as ha.rd as 
possible. As an act of faith it was vital to progressives, in order 
that the brotherhood dominated C.P.P.A. remain in close harmony with the 
P.L.S. They were determined that this labour issue be forced on Congress 
in addition to the fact that many sincerely believed reform to be 
necessary. As Hooper's campaign increased this became more ~:ra.ti ve. 
The fact that the bill actually got time on the calendar 
reflected this progressive determination and the breakdown of 
Congressional discipline resulting from their independent and 
aggressive approach. Early in the first term of the session the 
House rules had been amended to allow a discharge motion on bills 
which the majority of the House felt were being unnecessarily held 
up by the relevant committee. A petition to discharge a bill 
required one hundred signatures which would allow the motion to be 
discussed and voted on. If a victory was achieved 'then 'the bill 
would be discharged from the committee. This procedure was now 
initiated with rega.rd to the Howell-Barkley Bill. This reflected 
. .. 
the Congressional mood of independence from the Executive and party 
hie:ra.rchy. Importantly, this progressi va initiative now also 
included labour issues as a vital part of the reform effort. The 
A.F. of L. support of the Howell-Barkley B1l1 made this the key to 
the progressive relationship with labour, indeed would be the bLsis 
JOJ 
of labour's attitude to Congress in the 1924 election. 
The debate on the bill began with the vote on the discharge 
motion. As Huddleston of Alabama put it. the vote on the motion 
itself was a test of Congressional opinion with regard to the labour 
movement. "The laboring people of this country have set their heart 
on this bill and are going to accept your action upon it as a test 
of your profession of friendship for them."']f The decision even to 
discuss the bill would be seen as a measure of Congressional 
willingness to respond to labour's concerns. 
BarkleY,argued as he had done in his letter previously cited, 
that the proposals were with one exception not r.~w and that despite 
union sponsorship. the proposals were not partisan at all since 
the 1.mions were "mindful of the general trend of public thought 
toward the railroad problem ••• ,,)8 Given the reasonable nature 
of the bill. Barkley argued that since the railroads were vital to 
the economy the discharge motion was a justified attempt to get the 
bill out from a recalcitrant Interstate Commerce Committee and on to 
the calendar. Everett Sanders, Republican from Indiana, denied all 
these justifications made by Barkley. The measure was a partisan 
one he argued, aimed at forcing the closed. shop on the railroads. 
He protested that carriers could not accept the proposed technical 
adjustment boards since these would deny any possible flexibility 
in local conditions. As in 1919, the opposition to the Bill centred 
on the issues of local negotiations and of the unions' suppressing 
individuality. Conservative opposition to trade unionism continued 
to rely on the same arguments and continued also to paint the spectre 
of union power as the basis of their opposition. On this basis 
Sanders went on to attack Democrats and progressives with political 
motivations, hoping either that Republicans would defeat the bill 
if passed or embarrass the President when he vetoed it. Republican 
Samuel Winslow of Massachussetts, Carl Mapes of Michigan and 
John Tincher of Kansas, all members of the committee involved, 
protested that such a motion would undermine Congressional authority 
and create a dangerous precedent. Democrat A. Shallenberger of 
Nebraska pointed out that any attempt to recommit the bill at this 
time would effectively kill it in the present session. The choice 
was clear, discharge or kill the bill. It became in such terms a 
stark ideological choice for Congressmen and had nothing to do with 
disrupting Congressional traditions. The Speaker of the House also 
observed that despite protests from committee members, the discharge 
motion, since it was in the rules, was a legitimate procedure. The 
bill had in fact been referred to committee in November 192), some 
six months previously. 
~e members of the committee, having had their first protests 
against the discharge motion brushed aside now raised objections to 
the provision in the bill for compulsory arbitration boards, 
primarily because they were to be structured on craft lines. This 
was a major complaint of the carriers too, since such a scheme 
forced negotiations upon them and also made it inevitable that the 
union "'ould represent the workforce. It gave the carriers no escape 
route although the Board's decisions were not to be binding. The 
Howell-Barkley Bill raised all the issues which had plagued union-
management relations and Congress, in the 1920's, in plumping for 
a board set up by the government, which virtually assured unions of 
control of its side in negotiations on a national scale; something 
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which railroads and the coal industry were then attempting to shake 
off. When the vote came on 5th May, therefore, the question of 
opposition or support for the bill rested clearly on the question of 
attitudes to the trade union movement and whether business should 
accept it as the legitimate voice of the workforce. The vote was 
194 in favour of, and 181 opposed to the discharge of the bill, with 
51 not voting. 
This apparent significant success for trade unions and progres-
sives, ho,··ever, was blunted by the failure to pass the bill in the 
session. In the t ... ,o days in May 1924 when the bill was actually 
discussed, conservatives carried out a successful fillibuster which 
included 24 roll calls. In an increasingly hostile atmosphere the 
bill was attacked as socialistic, class legislation while being 
defended by Wisconsin representatives notably and Democrat 
Frank McNulty of New Jersey. Nonetheless it was clear that Congress 
was near to giving unionism full endorsement. Time, and the 
conservative fillibuster had frustrated the bill this time. 
Despite this failure, unionists were heartened by what they 
identified as a growing favourable opinion in Congress. Yet, even 
the victory on the discharge motion was shrouded in doubts. 
Conservative Democrats might well be disposed to vote for the bill 
in order to emba.rra.ssthe Republican party and President. The recocl 
vote on the discharge motion witnessed many Democrats support the 
motion who might not have been considered radical progressives. 
The southern states of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas shov:ed 
striking solidarity in support of the motion. Yet, in Georgia, 
Florida and ~lissouri and New York, Democrats either opposed or 
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chose not to vote. Ultimately this was a vote of conscience, with 
no party control, so that the vote in fact did ren8Ct at least a 
willingness to see the bill discussed. Some Republicans under 
pressure as a result of the corruption investigations and criticism 
even from Republica.n newspapers of their failure to properly clear 
their names, might well have been inclined to vote for the measure. 
This did not happen, however. While New York and Ohio Republicans 
went with the motion,the majority opposed. the measure. The 
discharge motion by no means implied. support fC11: the actual passing 
of the bUll For Congressmen regaJ:ded. as marginal by unions, it could 
be an important vote winner in 1924. The entire Houee,. unlike the 
senate, would be up for re-election. yet such a large opposition 
vote does certainly seem to demonstrate that conserva.ti vas were 
voting their political views and nat taking political tactics into 
account. The fact that on all the a.djou:rmnent and considemtion 
motions the record votes remained consistent &lso tends to demonstrate 
that the vates were the legitimate expressions of political opinion. J9 
In comparison with the Child Labor vate too, the closeness of this 
vote shows an appreciation ot the issues at stake. 
yet if those who had particul&r opinions did vote upon them, 
then it becomes clear that success for the measure required the 
support or those pra.gmatic Congressmen. neither progressive nor 
conservative. who had not yet voted. This non-voting total was thus 
an import&nt example or the power of the centre in Congress. Their 
votes would decide the fate of the bUl, while neither progressives 
nor conservatives could collDllUld a majority. Expressions of viewpoint 
from the centre were very rare, Never experts on the subject nor 
wont to express their political ideology, they simply voted for the 
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issues they felt fairest and most just, in narrow terms of the 
status quo. A statement by Herbert Hoover that "the present set 
. 40 
up of labor adjustment has not given entire satisfact~on" would 
exactly sum up the position of the centre. They shared his concern 
with the continuing disruption on the railroads and were prepared 
to see the Railroad Labor Board reformed. Here, more than ever, the 
question of whether the discharge motion could be equated with 
support of the bill was vital. For at root it meant whether 
centrists had shifted to an acceptance of trade unions as representa-
tives of the workforce and a legitimate force to protect their 
interests. The vote on the discharge motion demonstrated that they 
remained far from convinced. of this, ,,:hile they did not oppose it. 
t 
Centrists would never initiate legislation. The key to their support 
la:y in the nature of the proposals. The Child Labor A:nend:nent was 
supported on moral grounds, while on the Howell-Barkley Bill they 
remained ambivalent. Their attitude was largely negative. As 
Senator James Couzens of Michigan saidl 
There is danger in control of Government by labor 
unions, just the same as there is in control of 
Government by capitalists. Hhat we must do is to ha.ve 
government control by all the people, not by groUps.41 
An admirable philosophy, perhaps, but one which gave no guidance 
when faced. by labour issues nor one which could in twentieth century 
industrial America be practically applied. 
Progressivism had made major strides, in fact, since this 
centrist sentiment was a plea for popular control Hhich had long 
been a key component of the progressives' reform movement. In the 
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post war years, progressivism, when confronted by the issues of 
power and the continued questiCl'ling o£ the proper basis for justice 
aD:1. eqtality :raised by the labour ~blem, had developed beyond 
the position now occupied by the centre. Pre-19l6 progressive 
tMnking had DOW become the bLsis of the status quo. Progressivism 
had developed at varying speeds. La Follette and the P.L.S. appeared 
to be moving to a view of an extended state to protect the population 
which included the call for a prograDe of natiClUiLlisation. Milder 
progressives could not accept such a role far the state. They . 
coutinued to seek a compromise between the maximum at equality and 
a continuing free enterprise economic system. Ad. vanced progressives 
accepted the need far tmde unionism to wield real power. MUder 
progressives, although since 1922 they accepted the need for t%Bde 
unions to exercise their rights, were still unhappy about the grant 
of power and continued to hope for an early compromise and for 
conciliation -.ch1ner;y to be erected. 
Despite the quiet of industrial relations in 1923 and early 
1924, the commitment of the P.L.S. to the labour IlOvement had. seized 
the momentum. Serious industrial disruption was no longer necessary 
for considemtion of labour issues. 
On the particular labour issues :r:a.ised in the Sixty Eighth 
CoDgress moreover, mUder progressives were in support at the reform 
proposals. yet the centre was still far from supportive of t%Bde 
unionism. The outcome of the 1924 election would do much to influence 
their opinions in the next Congress and the shape of reform 
politics in the following years. 
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CHAPl'ER 8 
THE 1924 ELECl'ION 
The 1924 election presented Samuel Gompers and the American 
Federation of Labor with an unedifying prospect. Their outlook on 
politics had ostensibly remained consistent since 1919. The 
'friends a.nd. enemies' policy continued to be the basic trade lmion 
method while the definitive establishment of the legitimacy of the 
movement remained lmionism's basic aim. In 1919 Gompers had been 
near to the a'be.ndonment of vollmtarlsm in his enthusiasm for the 
continuation of a system sim.1Jar to the N.W .L.B. in the poet-war 
,.ears. The collapse of the Industri&l Conferences and. the faUure 
of the WUson administration to codify the basic demands of tmionisil 
resulted in a return to volunta.rism. In the reoession of 1921 the 
oonsequenoe wa.s that tmionism embraoed the idea of industrial. 00-
operation a.nd. its emphasis on the self-reliance of the movement. 
The industri&l strife of 1922 did not result in a renewed call for 
a oodified reoognition of lmionism's demands. Instead the A.F. of L. 
lalmched a campaign against not only inj1.mctions but also aga,L'lSt the 
bias of the court system against any development or change. This 
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they did. in order to em. the key tactic used by employers to defeat 
strike &etion. Although a major union concem for many years, in 
the quiet atmosphere of 1923 this issue was pursued in the pages of 
the American Federationist with increasing vigour. This, a.nd. the 
Howell-Barkley bill gave the A.F. of L. the issues which would be 
. . 
the basis of its friends and. enemies, non-partisan campaign in 1924. 
The election appeared unedifying because neither the Republican 
nor the Delloem.tic party appeared likely to endorse these issues 
clearly. Equally distressing from the viawpoint of a movement 
anxious to preserve its non-partisan stance was the growing 
i:ndependence of the progressives wi» would fully embmce labour's 
deanda. While the A.F. of L. had. withd.l:awn to its traditional 
political outlook, many unionists saw the continuing irlabUit,. of 
the politie&1 s1St .. to :respond to union deDl&llds as the reason to 
increase political activit,. and embrace more l:8dical political 
solutions. The result had been the lAunch of the C.P.P.A. in 1922. 
The radical progressives most closely aligned with La Follette's 
P.L.S. and the C.P.P.A. represented a more l:8dical and politicall,. 
i:ndependent avenue to satisfy labour's needs in 1924. Although 
~,. complex the election of 1924 presented the A.F. of L. with 
the question of whether or not t.he t.rad.e union movement held 
ideological implications which made non-partisanship an 
impractical political outlook. 
The fact that up to 1924 the unions had b&cked progressives 
waa disguised by the vagueness of progressi visJll and by their 
being in both parties. The development of progressivisJll from 1920 
however had made it 1ncrsaing1y clear that the traditional identity 
J1J 
of the two major parties was being undermined by the ideological split 
between progressive a.nd conservative. Although this had. been made 
evident by the organisation of the P.L.S. many other progressives 
were putting ideas before part,. loyalty. Most ·po1iticiane still 
hoped that their parties could evolve without a formal split but 
1924 would be a major factor in any future developments. 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the machinations 
involved in the preparations for the 1924 race and. the campaign 
itself. The outcome would be of vital imporlance for the nature and 
development of progressive thought. The election would also reveal 
progressivism's continuing impact upon political thinking. Finally, 
the election was an indicator of who the friends and enemies of labour 
were in 1924, with all the implications this held for their traditional 
non-partisan policy. 
In the summer of 1924, the Republican party possessed two 
important assets for the November election. The first, despite 
Democratic ani even internal doubts, was the booming economy. The 
second. &eset W&8 the President. This was due in part to the practical 
consideration of the incwnbent's power of patronage. Still more 
important in terms of the need for widespread popul.a.r appeal. fundamental 
to electoral success was the character of calvin Coolidge. As the 
election campaign progressed, it became' clear that "calvin Coolidge 
the man, not calvin Coolidge the Republican"l was the main issue of 
the campa.ign. 
In the wake of four years of prosressive reform. led by a 
moralistic President, a world war, and four years of industrial 
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strife and recession, all the American people wished ,was the 
opportunity to enjoy to the full the contemporary prosperity. 
Prosperity appeared to dissolve any desire for change. In an 
ebullient, hopeful mood, the populace now wished only that nothing be 
done to interfere with tne boom. cal Yin Coolidge was eminently 
capable of fulfilling this task. It appeared that he was extremely 
reluctant to do more than keep the wheels of government turning. A 
taciturn man, the paucity of policy statements and speeches came as 
a welcome relief to the populace. Far from wishing to interfere it 
was clear that all Coolidge wished was that the prosperity continue. 
This rel.a.xed approach to the political affairs of the nation elicited 
a warm response. 
Many of the nation's problems he regarded as "God's problems 
not his"2. The one policy with which Coolidge could be readUy 
identified was that of goVernment economy. This too won widespread 
support in the business community. The argument ran that cash freed 
from the government went directly to investment and increas ing 
Alaer1ca.n industr1aJ. capacity and hence spreading wealth throughout 
, 
the population. yet in spite of the popularity of this policy, 
Coolidge was his own most important asset in the 1924 Presidential 
mee. His BUence and the fact. that he wa.a & new President gAve 
Coolidge an appearance of aloofness, both from the scandals within 
his own party and the confusion of Congress. 
Since Coolidge had only become President in 1923 he could not 
be held. accountable, in the public I1l1nd at least, for the chaos from 
1921 to 1922. This argument also applied to the issue of'the 
scandals within the Harding administration. Though Coolidge 
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appeared to take on some of the opprobrium in his decision to keep 
the Harding Cabinet, a suicide and resignations, particularly that 
of Daugherty, did much to sever the connection between Coolidge and 
corruption in public opinion. Coolidge's own piousness and 
frugallty served to further destroy the taints of corruption which 
might have affected the President's standing. 
The President's consequent sUence on the matter contrasted 
sharply with the Congressional investigations into corruption, once 
more winning the public sympathy. It also distanced the President 
from the Republican party machinery. Coolidge had already go n e 
far to achieving this in his lack of criticism of Republican 
insurgency. This distanced him from a party machine fighting 
desperately against that insurgency movement. A comparison between 
the pious, frugal, and taciturn President and a raucous, mud-slinging, 
confused Congress meant that, in the opinion of Secretary of Labor 
Davis "The more they stir it up the more the people will look to 
Coolidge and if they keep it up the election will be sure".; 
The predominance whioh Coolidge achieved through his personal 
popularity within the Republican party was more striking by dint of 
the dearth in the party of alt.ernat.ive president.ial nominees. There 
were doubts about Coolidge and he was far too conservative for the 
insurgent progressives. yet this popularity and his sUenoe meant 
mild Republican progressives had little with which to oppose 
Coolidge. Importantly, Republicans were loathe to tarnish their 
_in asset in a. real winning c&ndidate. A popular nominee was 
something which many progressi vas could swallow. particularly those 
who needed every help they could get in their re-election fights. 
;16 
It should be noted that the 1922 wave of Senatorial progressives 
were not involved in such races in 1924 and their influence 
consequently diminished • 
. In consequence of Coolidge's predominance within his party and 
apparent lack of any significant movement to put forwaxd another 
candidate to challenge the President, the Cleveland Convention of 
the Republican party was Ma cold-etorage affair".4 There was a deep 
. 
contradiction in the tone of these proceedings. In Congress the 
discharge motion on Howell-Barkley and on June 2nd 1924 the adoption 
of the Child Labor Amemment, pointed to a continuing split in the 
Republican ranks. Yet a split party appeared to be tmited behind 
Coolidge. This appeamnce was aided. by independent progressives, 
Norris, Borah, La. Follette, Brookhart at al, regarding the platform 
as an irrelevance. They simply denied that the document had any 
influence on their own political stance, and. took no part in its 
construction. The regular Republican progressives, meanwhile, 
acquiesced in the deeply conservative platform of 1924. The platform 
eulogised Hardirlg and re-affi:rm.ed its cODUllitment to economy in 
government, reduction of taxes and the Rep.lblican tariff policy. 
On foreign relations, independence was balanced. by an acceptance of 
the nation's duty to participate in the C&WS8 of peace. It 
vigorowsly opposed government ownership but made no commitments 
whatsoever to labour or agriculture. Mild progressives, while 
doubtless tmhappy with the tone of the platform, had no policy 
recommendations on these issues, embroUed as they still were in the 
conflict of priorities these isaues raised for their philosophy. 
Conservatism consequently became the dominant tone of the Republican 
platform largely throvgh progressive defa.ult and disgust. 
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While the Republican party appeared to pull itself together, 
however short-term and. unstable the tranquility might be, the 
proceedings in the Democratic party were also taking a highly 
unpredictable tum. The Democrats in 1921 were in disarray in the 
aftermath of the disastrous 1920 election. Various factors had been 
blamed, including a strikingly low turnout and. the character of 
James Cox's supporters. The recovery of their fortunes had been 
encou:ra.ged by the recession in 1921 and Harding's lack of leadership, 
combined with the breakdown of Republican discipline in Congress. 
The rapidity of this recovery was further spurred on by the results 
of the 1922 mid-elections, which appeared to confirm Democratic 
criticism of the Republican administration and. had given them real 
hope of victory in 1924, particularly if they could produce a major 
progressive as their standard-bearer to contrast with Coolidge. 
William Gibbs McAdoo continUed to be the main contender for Wilson's 
mantle, a trend gi van added strength by the former Pres ident ' s 
sharp dentmciation of any hope of Cox being re-nominated, this 
"would in 'tIr:f judgement be an act of deliberate suicide". 5 The 
Wilson years dominated Democratic party thinking. 
Wilson himself was well aware that his Presidency had been a 
major turning point for the party. It demonstrated. that conserva.-
tive southern Democrats, while still a major component, could not 
control the actions of the leadership and could accept even a 
progressive leader, if need be. In fact Wilson in 1922 was 
intending to resurrect both himself and. the Democratic party, despite 
Southerners, as the vehicle of progressive reform. The result of a 
series of consultations in late 1921 and early 1922 with Brandeis, 
Bainbridge Colby, his former Secretary of the Interior,. and 
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Thomas Chadbourne, now a New York lawyer but previously a Democ:ra.tic 
House leader, was the drawing up of 'The Document'. It was intended. 
by Wilson to be proposed prior to the primaries in 1922 as a 
.. 6 
manifesto for the future Democ:ra.tic party. Wilson stuck firmly to 
internationalism, calling once more for America to join the League 
of Nations and. lead. in the cause of justice throughout the world. 
The economic purpose of the Democ:ra.ts was to promote wealth "as a 
means of diffused. prosperity and happiness •• on the part of the 
great working masses of our people" in cont:ra.st to Republ~s who 
viewed wealth as "an instrument in the hands of individuals and 
corpo:ra.tions" .7 A Secretary of Transportation was called. for to 
take over from the I.C.C. and to control loans and security issues 
by :ra.U~s. The Secretary would perform the same tasks with 
regard to shipping. 
Revolution was identified as the major threat to democracy. 
"It is our purpose to defeat the irrational. programs of revolution 
. by sober and practical legislative reforu which wUl remove the 
8 
chief provocations to revolutions". This required co-ope:ra.tion, 
based. on an equality and dignity between workers and employers in 
industry and equal accessibility for all to the raw materials and 
means of motive power. In fact WUson's Document never gained the 
wide circulation the ex-President had hoped for. He was, in fact, 
dissuaded from publishing it. The Document itself was not 
controversial. Ultimately it was largely a reite:ra.tion of 
traditional Wilsonian progressivism except for the question of 
transport and national resources where Wilson showed his willingness 
to expand fed.e:ra.l power. It remained. a vague policy statement 
nonetheless. It was Wilson and the fear that he would use this 
as a springboard to re-nomination which caused the fa.Uure of this 
initiative. 
WUson had, even without the document becoming accepted party 
dogma, thrown leadership of the party to progressivism. After such 
an achievement Woodrow WUson died in Ja.nuary 1924. WUson's death 
and Cox's l.Dlpopularlty gave rise to the expectation that McAdoo would 
finally be able to take up the leadership of the party and "be 
unswervingly true to the principles of Wilsonian democracy".9 The 
l:asis of WUson's success in capturing the Democratic party for 
progreesivism had not only been his abUity to win the acquiescence 
of conservatives. He had also been able to minimise the antagonism 
between rural and url:an Democrats. In 1923, however, url:an progres-
sive Democrats were moving swiftly to the banner of the Governor of 
New York, A1fre:l E. Smith. Re-e1ected in 1922 to the Governorship 
by the biggest plurality in the history of that election, his success 
was such as to push him into the national limelight. Not only would 
he c01ll1ll&lld the support of other IIILjor democratic centres. Boston 
and New Jersey for example, but his progressivism was largely free 
of moral imperatives. Reform was a. matter of necessity and logic. 
"The state should not be prohibited by law from using ordinary 
10 human intelligence." A problem required a solution and if only 
the state could do so then the state must take responsibUity. In 
the Guberna.tori&l :race he pledged to curb the use of the injunction 
and. championed decent low-cost housing. He was anxious to 
improve the performance of the states' Workmen's Compensation Act, 
which he had ratified in his first term as Governor. He also 
strongly supported the municipal ownership of public utUities 
where any nnmicipality deemed. that to be in its best interests. 
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The difference between McAdoo's and Smith's progressivism 
was qualitative. McAdoo for instance had long been an advocate of 
government operations of the raUroa.ds. Neither were in fact 
desperate antagonists of business. They still sought order rather 
than a shift in power. Smith, however, had not inherited progressive 
concern for individuality. Need. justified. the use of state power 
and overruled concem for individual liberty. Smith could thus 
give stronger specific commitments than McAdoo - commitments more 
clearly for the benefit of the underprivileged than Wilsonian 
, 
progressivism was yet able to propound. The striking thing was that 
the leaders of the Democratic party were both committed progressives. 
The key issue which was to divide Smith from McAdoo had little 
to do with reform for the underprivileged. In his inaugumtion 
speech, after calling for minimum wages for women and minors. an 
anti-injunction bill and rent control. Smith read a resolution 
calling on Congress to modify Volstead to allow the sale of light 
wines and beer. This proposal, as with the majority of his other 
initiatives, became bogged down by the determined Republican 
opposition in All:any to all of Smith's proposals. What did cause 
. 
the PrOhibition issue to attach itself to Smith was a Republican 
measure repealing the New York state Prohibition Law. To veto it 
would eam the approbation of Tamrna.ny Hall, the Irish and the 
A.F. of L.. To go with repeal would raise the spectre of 
disregard for the national law and would certainly lose Smith the 
major upstate support he had received in 1922. It would additionally 
cause a furore within the Democratic party. 
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On 1st J\.Ule 1923 Sud th finally deoided to sign the Blll and 
repeal the State law. He argued that the law merely meant a 
duplication of work while the enforcement of the federal law would 
stUl oontinue. He also pointed out that this bUl had been passed 
on a bipartisan vote. Respecting this deoision's effeot on his 
political future, parlioularly within the Demooratio party, Smith 
stated "I have no political future that I am wUling to obtain 
.' 11 
by' the sacrifice of any principles or any oonviotions." This 
last statement really oocasioned an uproar in the party "1.'B.nks. In 
saying this the Governor tmdermined his legal justification by' 
making it appear that he supported the repeal in prinoiple. He 
now became firmly identified with all the vioes of liquor whioh many 
progressives sought to end. From being dubbed a 'wet' by the 
Anti-saloon League, this measure tied Sm! th irrevocably to 
anti-Prohibition in the mind of the broader publio. 
In 1922 the Demoorats believed they had a real ohanoe in 1924. 
The issues of tax and tariffs were then augmented 1n 1923 by the 
soanda.l in the Harding administration. In Congress this had 
remained the baais of Demooratio attacks on the Republican President 
and his party. If the Howell-Barkley vote had been used as a means 
of winning union eupport, it. a1eo present.ed. conservatives with the 
'opportunity to cull anti-tmion support in the country. - Yet even 
this strain the Democrats were prepared to overcome if it meant 
victory in 1924. 
At the 1924 Convention, however, the deeper temions within 
the Democratio party, .dormant during the WUson years, erupted in 
. 
the battle for the nomination. The two candidates represented the 
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two wings, cultm:aJ. rather than politica.l., of the Democratic party. 
William Gibbs McAdoo represented rural, protestant, dry Democrats 
whUe Smith represented the url:an, immigrant and catholic, wet 
Democrats. The bitterness indeed testified to Wilson's achievements. 
. . 
The ca.ndida.tes in 1924 highlighted what Wilson had smothered. The 
situation was vastly different from 1912 or 1916. All the issues 
which sepa.rated McAdoo from Smith had never become political issues. 
but they were deeply emotional ones and always liable to erupt to 
the surface. Such an eruption w&s practically inevitable when the 
two candidates were personally identified. with these issues. It 
W&8 also due in pa.rt to the url:an migra.tion which bad resulted in 
Amei.rca's urban population outstripping the rural population in 
the twenties. The rural population felt increasingly under siege, 
a mood &ggl:&w.ted by the agrlculturaJ. depression. Radio, the new 
highway construction, the flapper and the bootlegger seemed. to 
threaten their way of life with extinction in an avalanche of 
sophistication and corruption. The Xu nux Klan was only the 
most extreme expression of this widespread fear. They felt 
themaelves a.nd their America - that of the yeoman farmer so beloved 
of political rhetoric - being oV8rt'fhs1med by an alien culture. 
Al Smith became the incarnation of this. They could never accept 
his 1ead.ership. McAdoo aggravated their antagonism by his own 
commitment to Prohibition and reiteration of the p%8.ises of rural 
America. 
Adding to the seriousness of the claah wa.s the fact that the 
urban DellOC%8.tS were equally contemptuous of ru:I:IIJ. values. And the 
clash was aggravated by a lack of middle ground in the party. The 
Wilson coalition had depended in 1916 on renegade Mid Western 
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and. Eastern Republican progressives. Without this centre the two 
wings were exposed and unbridgeable. The New York Convention of the 
Democratic party was an tmm1tlgated disaster. It had been clear that 
there might well be antagonism but in fact there had been no re&l. row 
in the ranks up to that time. The Convention itself beca.me the 
crucible for a.ll these forces. The key was Bryan and his fund&-
. -
mentalist supporters. McAdoo felt he needed Bryan's men for victory, 
convinced that Smith would not release his own men to McAdoo. Thus, 
McAdoo had skirted carefully around the Kl.a.n issue. The Platform 
Committee had voted to put an anti-Klan resolution to the Convention. 
With four mUlion voters, in the rural South and West, outright 
condemnation could be suicidal. Bryan however went on to praise a 
plank endorsing the Ku nux IO.an. Uproar ensued and hatreds flared 
to the surface. After a fortnight and 103 l:allots, McAdoo and Smith 
agreed to step down in favour at John W. Davis. Still worse, 
Democratic disa.r.ray had been broadcast by radio to the nation for the 
first time. The Democratic campaign had died, or rather committed 
suicide, in New York. 
Despite the amount at progressives in the party the Democratic 
platform reflected the peculiar pressure which an election puts on 
a party to return to its traditicmaJ. planks. Thus, while it called 
for a co-operative marketing movement and the extension of credit 
for agriculture, the platform highlighted the problem of high tariffs 
as the greatest barrier to rural recovery while the issue of honest 
government also received prominent treatment. It also pledged to 
uphold the prohibition laws. Monopoly sained the party's 
condemnation. On the labour problem, however, while being in favour 
at collective bargaining, it would commit itself no further. 
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Significantly, and. renecting progressive strength within the 
Democratic party, the Convention clearly called. upon Congress to 
override unfavourable decisions of the Supreme Court on Acts of 
Congress. This platform was Democratic in character before being 
progressive. The labour plank was far from being an unequivocal 
endomement of trade unions. 
Given the policies and standard-bearers of the two major 
pa.rties the choice for labour seemed. to be between the lesser of 
two evils. They could not support Coolidge or Republicans nor 
. 
did they feel that the Democrats, with a relative unknown as its 
candidate, offered labour much hope of success. 
As in previous elections the two major parties had offered 
I 
nothing which might elicit an endorsement from labour, but in 1924 
labour also had the candidacy of Robert M. La Follette to consider. 
The effect of La Follette' s candidacy was to highlight the continued. 
indecision of the DemoC%'&tic platform by comparison. The C.P.P.A. 
had been working hard to organise since 1922 and could, at its 1924 
Convention in Cleveland on the 5th and 6th of July. boast an 
organisation in thirty states of the union. There had been 
difficulties. A split had developed between Manly of the P.L.S. and 
Hopkins at the Committee of 48, Manly having accused. the Committee 
of being less than open with the P.L.S.. Hopkins had. in fact been 
courting Borah during 1923 to run in the following year. He wanted 
Borah to run in an attempt to regain a position of influence in a 
situation where the C.P.P.A. a.nd. P.L.S., in support of La Follette, 
were becoming the increasingly dominant organisations of the left-
wing progressive movement. The efforts of the C.P.P.A. were such as 
325 
to gua.rantee a IIBjor effort in 1924. It was an effort, Manly believed, 
strong enough to war:ra.nt an independent campaign in 1924, with all 
the leftist movements uni t1ng. This included not only the Committee 
of 48, P.L.S. and C.P.P.A. but the Farmer-Labor ];8rties and the 
Socialists. The fact that all these groups could unite in Cleveland 
: behind La. Follette and Wheeler was largely a testimony to the extent 
of the C.P.P.A. 's gr<nmdwork. None of the other groups could hope 
to command such a nationwide organisation. For all of them the 
rea.1ity of a growing and apparently solid organisation of progressiv-
ism encow:aged them to combine. 
The second factor which encouraged unity was the possibility 
that this movement could tap both agrari.a.n and trade union 
discontent. This prospect of a national organisation and a strong 
voter 'tase fired all the progressi vas at Cleveland. La Follette, 
having witnessed the Republican Convention and doubtless heard the 
Democmtic farrago on radio, announced his availa.bUity. There 
could be no doubt from that moment that the organisation had a 
leader and that 1924 would see an independent campaign. 
Coolidge's conservatism at the Republican Convention and the 
disarray of the Democrats in New York presented the C.P.P.A. at 
Cleveland with the final incentive it needed for the running of an 
independent campaign. La Follette, so long considering the move, 
believed the time was ripe. Progressives who had been so long 
frustmted by the two old parties believed they could now nake 
clear the differences between themseives and Republicans and 
Democmts. They believed, moreover, that the groundswe11 of 
. . 
discontent which had become evident in 1922 could be exploited for 
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an independent candidate. The buoyant and expectant Convention 
therefore bluntly stated their case. 
Although the progressivism of La Follette was significantly 
different from that of Wilson, the key theme of the platform and 
1.'8.ison d' etre of the independent movement renained. strikingly 
similar. In the words of the cha1.rma.n, William Johnstone, this was 
a campaign for freedom. "The people of the United states must 
regain control of their government in order that they may move 
forward toward that economic freedom that was intended by the 
Declamtion of Independence. ,,12 The fight was for "the resto:ration 
of the confidence of the American people in the institutions under 
which they lived",lJin the words of Peter Witt of the Cleveland 
City Cotmcil. This curiously echoed the Wilsonian rhetoric about 
the recovery of American freedom of an earlier time. In the 
speech of socialist Morris Hillquit, however, there arose a note 
of the power struggle between classes of the population. The time 
had a.rrived he declared for "the toUers of this nation to free 
14 themselves from the bonds of capitalist oppression". There 
was a hint here of the shift in progressivism away from the 
political reforms of Wilson to a determination to give priority 
to the people who were weakest in the economy. to use the 
government not simply to protect their interests but actually to 
foster them at the expense of the rest of society. la Follette' s 
progressivism occupied a middle ground between the mild 
progressives and socialism. 
To the f·rogressives in Clevela.nd, the Harding scandals were 
simply the most sordid side of business control of politics. It 
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was their intention to ake reforms for the benefit of the people. 
The extent of this determination beca.me clear in the platform of the 
Independents. It called for unqualified enforcement of the freedom 
. . 
of speech, press and assemblage; public ownership of the natural 
resources incluiing water power, iron, coal, oil and timber; 
increased public works in times of depression; a surtax, excess 
profits tax, estate and inheritance taxes and a tax on stock 
dividend; a.nd repeal of high tariffs. It proposed public control of 
the Federal Reserve and Federal Farm Loan Boards to make credit 
equal to all and to promote co-opemtive banking; legal guarantees 
of the right to organise and ba.rgain collectivelYJ control of the 
meat packing industry and a government marketing corpomtion to 
relieve the agricultural depression. public ownership of raUroads 
am their democmtic control. the a.bolition of injunctions in 
labour disputes, the mtification of the chUd labor amendment 
and. the election of &ll Fedeml jl.¥iges. 
Wilsonian progressivism, a.nd that of Theodore Roosevelt's 
Bull Moose party reprded the federal government &s an arbitrator 
and administmtor. What reforms were necessary were undertaken only 
to ensure that this task would be performed fairly to all. In 
1924 the Progressives at C.P.P.A. had re-def'ined equality and the 
role of the government. They believed that equality could be achieved 
through & destruction of the economic grip of business, in addition 
to a purification of Congress itself, which meant the election of 
progressives. They regarded equality a.s a task which could only be 
achieved by the government I.'t&ndoning its arbitration role and 
actively controlling key segments of the economy. The governmant, 
not the individual, would be the guarantor of equality. Taxation 
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would no longer simply be a means of raising ftmds but would be so 
selectively, becoming a social policy and not simply fiscal. 
Though the purposes ultimately were traditional1y progressive, 
the interventionist nature of the means marked a major break with 
previous progressive tradition. It echoed closely-,. in fact, the 
welfare statism of the British Labour l8rly. It was an explicit 
acceptance of the theory that the state must take responsibility for 
and. actively protect the welfare and wel1-being of the poorest in the 
population at the expense of the richer and that true equality could 
only be achieved thereby. The effect of their platform was to 
explicitly accept the existence of a class structure in the United 
states and that equality was much more a function of economic status 
than progressivism had previously been able to accept. They could 
not accept socWism and the belief that the state become a proxy 
for the population. Individualism still remained a powerful factor 
in Mid Westem progressivism. Their social thought therefore 
compromised on control of: indUstries which were exploiting the 
co_on weaJ.th of the nation or were vital to its economic policy 
and power. Significantly, welfare proposals such as unemployment 
benefit and a free health service were not included. 
The independent movement of 1924 was an indigenous 
phenomenon arising from a growing acceptance that Wilsonian reforms 
had been inadequate. Regulation had given way to control. 
Additionally, the battles of trade unionism in 1919 and 1922 had 
reve&l.ed to many Progressives that their philoaaphy simply did not 
take cognizance of the real root of economic and power inequalities 
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in the nation. They realised that there existed a constituency 
which would be untouched by progressivism unless the government 
determined. to alter the economic bias in the society. Finally, 
business remained. rich and powerful, which fact confirmed. them in 
their view of WUson's fa.Uure. This revisionist progressivism had 
developed piecemeal since the war. The 1924 platform brought 
together all the planks which individual progressives had been 
putting forwa.:rd since that time. 
This development had been uneven, for progressivism had first 
. 
been a. moralistic reform movement dependent entirely on individual 
groups being able to agree. As we have seen, many progressives had 
not bridged the gap between 1916 and 1924. Beveridge had given 
mer a greater priority than further reform in endorsing the Kansas 
Court. Lenroot of Wisconsin reflected a broad trend in progressivism 
by remaining a moderate, unwilling to accept a new role for government 
while still motivated by his conscience. This too had been the tenor 
in the Democratic party although urlan progressives such as Smith 
seemed to augur a continuing leftward trend here. In the centre of 
political opinion were men such as James Couzens who represented a 
Jlode:z:ate posture, not tied to any philosophy 1Irut prepared to 
consider any proposal and accept whatever a majority of the 
population wished. He believed that America did not want 
nationa.lisation of the railroads. 
The P.L.S. therefore represented. the most radical of 
independent progressives wUling to accept the platform announced 
at the C.P.P.A. Convention. There remained many progressives who, 
whUe not prepared to accept its sweeping nature, stUl supported 
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trade tmionism. The stmin on progressives .who for so long had 
jealously guarded. their individuality was apparent. WUliam Borah 
remained. aloof from the La. Follette movement while George Norris 
concentrated. on particular issues rather than becoming an 
enthus1a.st of the movement in general. Despite this the P.L.S. 
formed a vanguard of congressional progressivism. 
Yet an Independent C&m];&1gn might not necessarily further 
the progressive course, the radicalism might be too extreme for 
. milder progressives. split the movement and if rejected in 1924, 
mise serious questions about the population's desire for reform. 
Additicma.lly while endorsing the platform and espousing its planks, 
few P.L.S. members were enthusiastic a.bout breaIdng from their 
respective pa.rt;ies to join La Follette. In order to avoid 
presenting his progressive colleagues with such a choice. La 
Follette gave strong assurances that there would be no attempt to 
draft an Independent slate for congressional or local elections. 
La Follette frankly did not wish to have his organisation become 
overloaded by such considemtions. He hoped rather that his 
campaign would demonstrate that a strong enough feeling existed 
in the nation that the two-party system was no longer relevant. 
He hoped to show that in fact the population was ready to vote 
in the progressive/conservative framework. so that laving the 
old parties would not result in loss of support for senators and 
Congressmen who wished to do so. or who would back La Follette's 
proposals as President. It was a compromise which suited all 
parties. Talk of an emergent third pt.rty was also discouraged; 
the line was that an.y such move would be considered only after 
November 1924. 
JJl 
As the P.L.S. was the vanguard of congressional progressivism, 
so the C.P.P.A. represented the most politically committed section of 
the trade union movement. In the summer of 1924 it was for the rest 
of the trade union movement to make the decision about its position 
on the new political situation. Samuel Gompers had long been 
identified as an ardent admirer of Woodrow Hilson and his loyalty to 
the Democratic party remained, if less obvious, in 1920. In 1924 
there were three candidates. This unique situation made necessary 
the unprecedented move for the A.F. of L. of making an official decla-
ration on the election, perhaps to the extent of endorsing one or 
other of the candidates. The fact that the C.P.P.A. was by and 
large a labour-dominated organisation put pressure on the A.F. of L. 
to hold ranks and endorse La Follette. Given that the Democratic 
and Republican parties had practically ignored labour, such a 
decision appeared more likely. In fact the Independent platform 
completely satisfied the demands made by the A.F. of L.'s 
Non-Political Campaign Committee. It had demanded a Child Labor 
Amendment: an end to injunctions; a guarantee of the right to 
bargain and organise; the repeal of Esch-Cummins: the ability of 
Congress to re-pass legislation declared unconstitutional; a."l 
inheritance tax and a graduated income tax. On all these planks 
the Cleveland Convention satisfied the aims of the A.F. of L and 
its constituent unions. 
In only two particulars did the Independent platfo~ not 
echo the A.F. of L. position. T~o first was the question of 
amending the Volstead Act to allow for light beer, a plank which 
both major parties straddled and the progressives did not breach. 
The second was i~~igration. These paled into insignificance beside 
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the overwhelming support of trade unionism tn the Independent 
platform. The main reason for the A.F. of L. withholding immediate 
endorsement was the fact that such a move was tmprecedented. As has 
been pointed out, however, the situation was such as to demand 
a clear exposition of the A.F. of L.'s position. Consequently 
the A.F. of L. declared that the best interests of labour lay in 
a vote for La. Follette a.nd Burton K. Wheeler, his Democratic 
running mate. In its circular to unions arguing for the 
recommendation, all the similarities were listed. The Independents 
were plainly friends at the labour movement, which Coolidge was not, 
and which the Demo~tic party in its continuing Wilsonian rhetoric 
had failed to make clear. For Gompers, formal endorsement of a 
candidate for President did not in a.ny way abridge the • friends and 
enemies' policy of the \mions. Support for La Follette was a result 
at what he had done and could be counted on doing for unionism. In 
the situation a formal endorsement was necessary to clarify a . 
confused election race. In fact, the A.F. of L. support for Wilson 
had been formal in all but open declaration - the endorsement of 
La Follette was a small step. The C.P.P.A. condemnation of the 
I 
two old parties had also deeply affected the trade tmion decision. 
To have endorsed either party would have deeply divided the labour 
movement, particular1y given the ambivalence of the Democratic 
platform and despite vigorous statements by Davis. 
Gompers was at pains, however, to make clear that the 
endorsement was of the two candidates and not of any nascent third 
party. It was as ever the endorsement of an individual, the core 
of the non-partisan policy, not a.ny political creed. Thus, he had 
to write to William English Walling running in Connecticut' s fourth 
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district for the Democrats against Schuyler Merritt. the Republican 
incumbent. that he should stay in the race and not give way to any 
Independent who might emerge. "The congressional campaign should be 
kept separate and apart from the campaign for the election of the 
executive of the United States. ,,15 Regardless of who was rtmning. 
labour would stay loyal to its friends. As Gompers wrote to James 
Duncan. a vice-president on the Executive Council. "Organized 
labor is not going down with any candidates. The American 
Federation of Labor will follow its non-partisan campaign this year 
as in years past. no matter which party may be in power. will 
continue to carry on its •• work ••• ,,16 The A,F. of L. was not 
about to bum its boats by backing only one party. In fact, 
La Follette had never asked it to make such a commitment. The 
fuss the AoF. of L. made only served to weaken the force of their 
endorsement, and the message it might otherwise have broadcast to 
the major parties. Ultimately, indeed, it also damaged the 
credibility of any hope of a distinct progressive organisation 
emerging from the Ia Follette campaign. 
There were issues, for which the Independents stood, about 
which the A.F. of L. was still dubious. principally their 
wUlingness to sncoumge central control. With the U .M.W. and the 
Railroad Brotherhoods supporting the nationalisation of their 
industries, the A.F. of L. could not but back their wishes. 
Nonetheless, their reservations about centralised power remained. 
They were as concerned as any business to minimise regulation, a 
basic ambivalence which further undermined the relationship with 
progressives. As was pointed out in the introduction to this 
chapter, since 1919 the A.F. of L. had returned to a. particularist 
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attitude to politics which attempted to eschew any ideological 
content. The A.F. of L. nonetheless could wholeheartedly endorse 
the main thrust of the La Follette campaign which he himself 
characterised. as "the encroachment of the powerful few Ullon the 
, 17 
rights of the ma.ny". Endorsement by the AS. of L. was a major 
boost to the La Follette campaign yet the act was significantly 
diminished. by Gompere' incessant need. to 'clarify' the decision. 
"We have acted. in strict acco1'dance with our long-established. 
policy of non-partisan political action. We have never endorsed 
a political party or organization and we stand by that refusal in 
18 the present instance." Gompers was unhappy about the endorsement. 
He felt pressured into the action and had reservations about the 
mdicalism of the La Follette platform. He therefore was anxious 
to minimise the implications of the announcement. It was with this 
ambivalent SUllPort from the A.F. of L. that the La Follette-Wheeler 
campaign was launched in July 1924. 
The Republican response was to focus attention not on the 
iasues which La Follette represented but on the possible 
consequences of a tied election as a result of his intervention. 
They argued. that this would result in the election being thrown to 
the House where Charles Bryan, the Democ:ra.tic Vice-Presidential 
cand.ida.te would be the likely compromise victor. In addition to 
these scare tactics, to raise partisan hackles and keep Republicans 
loyal, they accused La Follette of revolutionary intent, and his 
recoxd of opposition to the war was endlessly repeated, for 
example, ex-Governor Allen of Kansas charged that the La Follette-
Wheeler campaign was Ita partnership on the ideas of Lenine (sic),,:9 
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These Republican attempts at drawing attention away from the 
issues of the campaign were at the outset being frustrated by none 
other than Charles Dawes, Coolidge's rtmning mate. Given Coolidge's 
reluctance to speak, Dawes had. taken on the task of stumping the 
COl.Ultry. He was giving sharp speeches on Republican ideology, 
upholding, for instance, the right to use injunctions in labour 
disputes I "A labor injunction restrains men who want to assault 
and kill from carrying out their purposes."20 In an effort to deflect 
the likely consequence of Dawes' 1::arn storming, the Republicans 
enlisted. William Borah to speak. Unfortunately, Borah proceeded to 
denol.Ulce "this thing of apologizing for class legislation or closing 
your eyes to the demands of privilege because they happen in your 
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own party." He attacked the attempt to ~h the 011 scandals 
under the carpet a.nd. contrasted this with the incorruptible 
La Follette. An engagement tentatively set for Borah to speak in 
Des Moines was pranptly cancelled. Instead the Republicans turned. 
to the faithful and. famous. James Davis went on a hectic tour 
p:ra.ising Coolidge, whUe Charles Evans Hughes emph&sised the new 
Republican prosperity which La Follette was threatening to destroy. 
Essentially the Republicans left no stone unturned in an effort to 
defeat La Follette, although Hoover remained largely silent 
throughout the campaign. 
yet, their great fear wa.s that La Follette would sweep the 
board west of the Mississippi and this perception caused a 
significant shift in attitude amongst some key members of the 
party, which Nicholas Murray Butler had presaged in Ind.1a.na.polis 
in a major speech to the Republican State Editorial Association on 
8th February 1924. He- called for Republicans to end. their 
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lmthinking reaction to movements for reform. Their reaction had 
contributed greatly to the radicalism of La Follette, the 
popula.rity of new progressive ideas and the U}lset of 1922. In a 
statesmanlike speech Butler argued that. "The democratic system 
can not maintain itself indefinitely against these attacks by 
ignoring them or by refusing to deal frankly and courageously with 
the problems of modern industrial life ••• Political indifference 
brings no strength but rather weakness and danger to the democratic 
22 
system." Equally significant was an article in The Survey of 
15th August 1924 by Senator Pepper of Pennsylvania in which he 
stated that picketing, a major issue for the labour movementl 
may be conceived of as the protective action of a great 
social group who feel outraged at what seems to be to 
them a betrayal of their claims • •• In a community 
which so conceives of it, picketing is not a thing to 
be stopped. It is rather a thing to be domesticated. 23 
The Republicans were keen to deflate the La Follette claim by whatever 
mea.ns were available. There was an attempt made at the Chicago-
based investi8ations into campaign funding to implicate La. Follette's 
campaign in irregularities. The progressive threat, however, was 
regarded seriously eno1J8h by many Republicans for them to re-assess 
their previous attitu::les towards labour. Whatever else the 
La. Follette campaign might do, it made the political system consider 
seriously the nature of industrialisation for the nation. It also 
made labour votes more valuable prizes. 
While some Republicans moved significantly, if tentatively, 
towards a newly-sympathetic attitude to labour, the Democrats were 
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fighting hard for the workers' vote. This was in addition to the 
need to win attention, which was the party's greatest problem 
throughout the campaign. In his acceptance speech Davis had 
strongly endorsed the right of tmions to organise and bargain 
collectively and that. '~hey must not be impaired either by 
" 24-injlmction or by any other device." It was also emphasised that 
Davis had been instrumental in drawing up the Clayton Anti-Trust 
Act. Davis further argued that agreements between uanagement and 
labour should be voltmtary. "Anything other than this I believe to 
be impossible, undesirable, corrupting and tyrannical. n2S Yet, 
despite this clear statement by the Democratic party's leader of 
its commitment to labour wishes, concrete forms such support would 
take remained lacking while publicity of even this position 
remained a problem. There was, moreover, a strong labour mistrust 
of the major parties, a factor instrumental in the organisation of 
the C.P.P.A.. Despite Davis's statements, they no longer appeared 
credible to many trade unionists. 
There was much de1:ate wi thin the Democrats as to how best to 
conduct the campaign. In the West there was a strong belief that 
"only a political m1..xacle can turn those states to him (Davis), ,,26 
and that he should therefore concentr&te on the East. Yet the urban 
machines there had been deeply angered by the Convention and were 
feared to be less likely to work efficiently in 1924. In the South 
and Mid West, Davis was able to achieve widespread coverage, 
unfortunately, by his denunciation of the Ku Klux lO.an. The 
situation was made still more difficult by the belief that La. 
Follette would carve up the West with Coolidge. Moreover, 
La Follette was also working ham in the East to capture disaffected 
Republicans and Democrats. 
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While Democmts struggled far public attention, the labour 
vote and the unity of their party, the La Follette campaign also 
had najor problems to face. The shortage of funds made a Southem 
drive practically non-existent. La Follette's outspoken opposition 
to the Ku Klux Klan caused some difficulties in the West as did the 
participation of socialists in the independent camapign. Indeed in 
california, La Follette's name headed. the socialist ticket having 
faUed to satisfy Califomia' s electaral. law with an Independent' s 
ticket. This latter problem did. nat. apparently cost the campaign 
too much support. Indeed, John Nelson of Wisconsin believed. 
that I "These socialists have been the most energetic workers every-
where, but of course they are also a liabUity. I believe however 
that they are more of an asset than a liability in this campaign. ,,27 
Another significant difficulty faced by the La Follette ca.mp&ign 
was the duplication of effort between the C.P.P.A., the unions, 
and local Independent Progressive organisations. Perhaps the 
greatest difficulty was the fact that La. Follette's campaign did 
not have its own slate, so that confusion and complication stood. 
between the Senator and the voters. Indeed, many Republicans, 
lacking a local election fight, were lmlikely to desert a party 
in which their progressive views were represented. by local 
progressives. The key to La Follette's success would ultimately 
rest on the depth and extent which voters felt disUlusioned 
enough to break with old party ties. 
Aloof from the sound and flIr"J of the campaign charges and. 
counter-charges, stood. President Coolidge. If he had sought a 
situation which could emphasise his calm, he could not have found 
anything more suitable than the campaign of 1924, with its third 
339 
candidate a.dding to the cacophony. The newspapers also added to the 
clamour, predicting week in and week out 'lmtil the last in the 
campaign that La. Follette would run second to the President. 
There can be little doubt that the majority of Americans voted 
for Coolidge in November 1924, in addition to endorsing the booming 
prosperity of 1924 rega.rdless of the party in power. The result 
was a thump1:ng victory for the Republican party. Votes for Coolidge 
amounted to 15,725,016, for Davis 8,)86,624 and for La. Follette 
4,870,478, a plurality over both Independent and Democratic parties 
of Jt mUlion votes. As Samuel Compers put it a "The American 
people decided it wanted a conservative a.dministration. ,,28 This 
might not be strictly true; the conservative Coolidge benefited from 
his personality being unobtrusive at a time when "Politics, religion, 
education, the fine arts and other human activities had to compete 
for third at bestn29behind making money, sport and recreation. 
Change, the normal. theme of elections, was exactly what America did 
not wish in 1924. A scant ~ tumout attested to the lack of concern 
Americans felt in 1924. Inevitably, this hurt most directly the 
only party concerned with present issues. Their campaign was 
greeted apathetica.lly rather than enthusiastically by all but the 
most committed. 
WhUe the mood of the nation worked against Democ:rat and 
Independent candidates and for Coolidge, the third. party candidate 
also tended to take votes from Democrats :rather than Republicans. 
This was due in some degree to Western Republicanism already feeling 
that its progressivism was integral to the Republican party among 
Senators and Congressmen. There was a striking pa:rallel in 
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Arizona, Colorado, Indiana and. Nebraska between how far the 
Democratic' nominees ran behind. their Congressional tickets and 
the La Follette vote. Democ:ra.ts swung to La. Follette, Republicans 
stayed. loyal to their party. Also, however, the fa.ct that 
La Follette won significantly more from the Democ:ra.ts through-
out the country, but particularly in States such as Pennsylvania, 
with its large U .M.W. presence, in New Jersey and Ohio, and Illinois 
bears testament to the likelihood that the labour vote almost certainly 
switched from the Democ:ra.tic party to La. Follette. In Ohio, almost 
all La. Follette votes were from the Democrats and similarly in 
Michigan and Massachussetts. La. Follette did win votes in the 
West, but not in the numbers he might have been justified. in 
expecting. Republican progressives did not switch, in many cases 
because they believed that he had gone too far. Borah's individualism 
was more akin to their outlook. The rationalisation of coal did not 
concern them as much as the burgeoning central bureaucracy that 
this was likely to occasion. In the south, similarly, Davis's 
vote held up, although not so steadily as he might have liked, 
particularly in states such as Tennessee. In the one Southern 
state where La. Follette .won a significant proportion, Missouri, 
his biggest vote in any Southern State, it was enough to give 
the State to Coolidge. Thro~out the rest 0-£ the South, where 
white supremacy was a priority which forced progressivism to be 
absorbed, progressives stayed loyal to the Democratic party. The 
1924 election seemed to prove that Gompers had been correct in 
believing a third party movement would simply split the 
progressive vote, and that the power of the traditional parties 
would not be broken. In 1924 the vote was split three ways. 
Progressives had already achieved a modus vi vendi within the 
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two major parties, a position which they did not wish to forsake, 
particularly within the Republican party. The vote would also bear 
out the increasing radicalism of Democratic progressivism. JO It 
appeared in 1924 that most progressive voters were happy to accept 
the system as it stood. The most disUlusioned in 1924 were rural 
Democrats, and. here they tended to vote for Ia Follette. The 
Eastern situation was much less clear, but the losses of Democratic 
representatives, particularly in Pennsylvania, also points to 
Ia Follette gaining most from disUlusioned Democrats, many unionists 
among them. 
The election of 1924 was a mixed blessing for Gompers. Though 
it had been a disappointing result, this very disappointment could 
only reinforce the traditional non-partisan line of the A.F. of L. 
under threat from the La Follette campaign. In many ways the 
A.F. of L. endorsement was at all times presaged on an expected 
disappointment to puncture third party hopes particularly if the 
progressive presence could hold up in the Congressional elections. 
In 1924 the Presidential election, when a tide of contentment was 
generally apparent, was less crucial to labour than these results. 
Indeed, in the House although the Republ.ican majority was increased 
from 15 after 1922 to 59, these successes were spread fairly evenly. 
throughout the nation, generally single seat victories with the 
exception of Pennsylvania. where the Democrats lost all their seats. 
It was practically impossible to guess what effect these Republican 
gains would have on progressivism in the House. 
In the Senate the Republican majority was increased from 6 to 
16. Whether even this majority could defeat the progressive group 
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was far from certain. . An increase in Republicans did. not necessarily 
mean a parallel increase in conservative strength. What it did do 
was to lessen the ability of the Democrats to join progressives in 
frustrating conservative Republican legislation. Thus, the 
victory of Republican Rice W. Means over Alva B. Adams in Colorado, 
Republican Arthur R. Robinson over Samuel M. RsJ.ston in Indiana, 
George H. Williams over Democrat Selden Spencer in Missouri, did 
not significantly affect the progressive strength in the Senate, 
More serious, however, was the loss of progressive Democrats such 
as A. Owsley Stanley in Kentucky aM D.I. Walsh in Massachussetts to 
Republicans Frederic M. Sackett and William M. Butler respectively. 
Most disturbing for progressives, however, was the loss in their 
Western heartlands of two major figures in the P.L.S., of 
Magnus Johnson to Republican Thomas Sch&ll in Minnesota and 
mwin Ladd to Gerald P. Nye in North Dakata. In the latter case 
this was not in fact a further depletion of progressive strength. 
More serious was that another member of the P.L.S., Robert Owen, 
a Democrat, had been defeated in Oklahoma by Republican W.B. Pine. 
These defeats were setbacks to the progressive movement but in terms 
of the wave of support for Coolidge these losses were not as serious 
as might otherwise have been expected, particula.rly given the 
contemporary mood of' the population. With the exception of the 
losses of Ladd and Johnson the losses were Democrats. Progressives 
suffered mostly because of disillusion a.mong the Democrats. The 
progressive movement itself had survived the Coolidge deluge, if 
nothing else. This survival in the face of the La Follette result 
served to strengthen still further Gompers' position in the A.F. 
of L. and dampened all enthusiasm for independent politics. 
All that could be done now was to await the new session of 
Congress to see how well the progressives could hold up, and how 
much moderates would be prepared to endorse progressive positions 
as regaJ:ds the Howell-Barkley Bill. Although the parties' strengths 
had been affected, the moderates stUl held the key to the success 
of progressive legislation. If progressives and. Democrats could 
combine to convince moderates on an issue then, as William Allen 
White put it, thoush this was something of an overstatement a "The 
representatives and advocates of the underdog minority even in the 
big boom of the twenties held the l:ala.nce of power ... 31 Conservative 
Republicans still did not have the command which victory at the 
polls might have suggested. 
Labour leaders felt that 1924 proved that a non-partisan 
policy was more promising than putting all their eggs in one l:asket. 
As was to be expected, the election had l:arely allowed the important 
issues of Supreme Court reform or Howell-Barkley to emerge. 
La Follette had raised these issues in a serles of powerful election 
speeches, but they had fa.iled to attract serious debate or become 
centres of interest in the campaign. Labour had to take these 
issues up again in 1925 fearing that the crest of the progressi'le 
wave had already passed with the discharge of the Howell-Barkley 
Bill. The election results gave warning that this would be an 
uphill battle. Prosperity by now appeared to be taking a firm 
grip on the nation's political attitudes. 
The struggle for political consideration would now be 
undertaken by the trade union movement without full commitment. 
Ambivalent as labour had been to the political avenue in the past, 
the 1924 election had. served to puncture what expectations had 
existed. The result of the election returned the initiative on the 
future of trade unionism to Samuel Gompers and the conservative 
leadership of the A.F. of L.. Their a.ttentions were turning 
inwards. In the first instance they sought to defeat what they 
feared was Communist infiltration, and. the agitation of radicals 
for structural reforms of trade lmionism. This del:ate wa.s already 
beooming heated wi thin the United Mine Workers. Secondly, 
jurisdictional disputes mainly involving the Carpenters consumed 
muoh energy. Thirdly, the trade union movement had to fa.ce the 
problem of declining membership. The losses of 1921 and 1922 were 
seen largely in terms of the recession and the shaking out of workers 
recruited in wa.x-time. When prosperity arrived and membership did 
not recover, concem began to grow. By late 1924 la.bour's thinking 
and concerns were shifting quickly from politics, upon which it had 
been focused. to quite an uncharacteristic degree in the previous 
year, 'tack to industrial and internal questions. This tendency 
~s accelerated by the hopes held out by the co-operative idea, a.n 
idea which also had a tendency to encourage unionists to adopt a. 
more conciliatory outlook. 
Gompers had re-established his leadership and his pre-1919 
predominance. Over the issues of trade unionism and its involvement 
in po&ios and the response of its friends and enemies in the 
political system there fell a. deafening silence. 1924 marked a. 
peak both in terms of trade unionism's politica.l interest and the 
politioaJ. :response to trade union demands. Whether this could be 
maintained or developed. remained to be seen. The 1924 election 
result ensured that it would not be conducted with the intensity of 
the previous six years. Stalemate once more appeared to be the most 
likely outcome in both the industrial and political arenas ov.r the 
questions surrol.Ulding trade union legitimacy, as it had been the 
outcome of the majority of confrontations and disputes since 1919. 
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CONCLUSION 
Samuel Gompers died in December 1924. As the only president 
the American Federation of Labor had had, his death signified the 
end of an era in the history of the trade union movement. The 
structure of the A.F. of L. greatly contributed to the significance 
of the event. In the absence of any bureaucracy or effective 
cO\mtervaUing power the president had. a striking freedom to air 
his personal views on the nature and purposes of the movement. In 
turn this absence of alternative bases of power elevated the public 
prestige of the presidency as the only practical mouthpiece of the 
A.F. of L. organisation. The longevity of Gompers' tenure had 
highlighted the pre-eminence of the presidency. For these reasons 
the tenor of the AoF. of L. was bound up inextricably with the 
personality of the president • Despite William Green's declared 
intention to perpetuate Gompers' policies, his presidency would 
inevitably change the nature of the A.F. of L.· s leadership, even 
if only qualitatively. 
The election of 1924 marked the climax of a chain of 
developments in the immediate post-war years. This in itself makes 
that year deserving of acknowledgement as the definitive end of the 
period. Indeed the independent campaign of Robert M. La Follette 
and the A.F. of L.'s endorsement of his candidacy was an event wh~ch 
would itself modify political perceptions thereafter, redoubling 
the impression that this year was indeed a turning point. It is 
for these material reasons that the thesis cc:nc1uded. in 1924. 
The often-repeated. purpose of this thesis has been to modify 
the historical treatment of the nature of the American political 
system and trade unionism's contribution to its dynamic from 1919-
1924. The study of the success or failure of union demands serves 
only to reinforce the impression that these were barren years for 
labour. Therefore, the express purpose in this study has been to 
analyse the process of political development and similarly the 
processes within the trade tmion movement and industrial relations 
which influenced this development. In doing so it is hoped that 
certain trends emerge which rray lead to a renewed study of the 
period and to a better appreciation of the complexity of the 
American political process in these years. 
Trade unionists as a whole regarded 1919 as a year of 
opporttmity. The depth of the determination to have expectations 
satisfied, however, revealed a basic divergence of views within 
the movement. The president of the A.F. of L. had. undoubted prestige 
for the reasons outlined above, but far the same reasons he lacked. 
any effective control. His views and those of his Executive COlmci1 
did not rule the actions and opinions of constituent unions or their 
members. 
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In his demmciation of American socia.1ism, samuel Gompers had. 
always ma.intained that the trade union movement could exist and its 
membership prosper within the capitalist system. Theirs was a 
~urely economic organisation which, given industria.l power, could 
&dhieve its aims without recourse to the political system. Yet 
gua.ra.nteed use of industrial power required legal reform. Gompers 
accepted this, but continued to deny that any overt. ideological 
drlves"motivated these demands or that such drives were necessary 
to the granting of such reforms. The ratification of the Clayton 
Anti-Trust Act by the Wilson administration ostensibly confirmed 
the Gompers' model. The impact of the participation in the running 
of the war however fundamentally revised this conservative outlook. 
In the post-war years the idea of an industrial struggle against 
employers was replaced by a belief that unionism's future could 
best be ensured by a demonstration of the movement's responsibility 
and dependability which would gain public approval and administration 
support. Consequently, the rash of strikes which erupted early 
in 1919 gained no endorsement from the A.F. of L.. In the past 
Compers had scoffed at many unionists' hopes for a political 
solution; his model envisaged a virile, independent trade union 
movement. By 1919 conservative unionists had overturned their 
own model. Creatures of moderation and expediency, they now 
frowned on industrial action and reproved unionists for their 
rashness. 
The most glaring example of this divergence of viewpoints was 
in the debate surrounding the decision to call a strike in the steel 
industry. Jlhile Gompers might have access to President Wilson, the 
rank and file could see no concrete benefits. It was their view 
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that unionism must continue to fight against hostUe employers to 
win their goals. Power, not co-operation, would be the precursor 
of success. 
Ultimately these divergent opinions derived from differing 
attitudes towards the position of trade unionism in the economic 
and political systems. The conservative viewpoint was underpinned 
by the wish to gain acceptance with the belief that little disruption 
or change of these systems was required. They now viewed it 
primarlly as an issue of reason and individual acceptance, pointing 
to the reforms of Wilson as evidence that the process of acceptance 
was already under way. other unionists, however, believed that the 
entrenched position of employers would not be surrendered 
voluntarily. It was not the choice of employers, but the power of 
the trade unions which must achieve success. They were frankly 
unconcemed about the preservation of the capitalist system. If it 
were possible, so much the better; if not then it was irrelevant. 
In any case many were skeptical of the sympathy of the Wilson 
administration for their need for power. They could not see that 
acceptance was under way. It was these perceptions which led to the 
divergence in industrial tactics, as it would influence opinions on 
purely political issues. 
In 1919, however, this divergence of perceptions was submerged 
The violence inflicted upon the strikers and the degradation to which 
they were subjected forced conservatives to accept that moderation would 
not win the hearts of deeply hostile employers. Their moderation 
was swept aside by outrage, as they were forced to grasp the 
reality of industria.l relations. Furthemore the First Industria.l 
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Conference in october 1919 allowed radical and conservative to form 
a tmited front in proposing the fundamental change which they all 
supported. These changes were basic to the unions' effective 
functioning and were not an issue within the movement. It was 
their method of achievement and the different perceptions on which 
this depended. that divergence occurred. 
In the following years this divergence continued over 
industrial tactics. Appreciation of the radical unionists' position 
was sustained. by the olxlura.cy of employers, most notably in the 
N.A.M.·s open shop campaign which was launched in 1920. Such 
opinions as it expotmded could only serve to confirm the radical 
view that tmion legitimacy required action to denude the employers 
of economic pover. 
While this was the case, however, the conservative case for 
moderation and integration was also gaining in credibility. This 
was due firstly to the rise of the Engineering movement and the hope 
that the value of unions in the production process would be confirmed 
thereby. Once more this required the co-operation of employers and 
since this was not forthcoming those hopes remained unproven. It 
was the onset of recession in 1920-1921 which strengthened the 
conservative hand. Recession completely undermined the effectiveness 
of industrial action and concentrated unionists' minds on the 
defence of their movement and not how best to expand it. In turn 
this led to new thinking on how best to preserve wage levels. 
Radical, aggressive thinking was al:Bndoned. in this atmosphere. The 
strikes of 1922 did not cause further ructions in the union 
movement. Primarily defensive, they won the wholehearted backing 
of the A.F. of L •• 
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Radical thinking on industria.l tactics did not return to the 
trade \mions. Moderation dominated their outlook in 1923 and 1924, 
aided considerably by a growing atathy among the membership and the 
effects of returning prosperity and the consequent reduction in the 
willingness of employers to seek confrontation. More settled 
conditions were not conducive to further radicalism. 
In any event trade unionists were uniformly opporttmistic. 
Any means where legitimacy could be achieved was quickly accepted. 
Thus, \mions with radical traditions such as the International 
Association of Machinists and the International Ladies' Garments 
Workers' Union both sucoessfully latmched co-operation plans. The 
Brotherhood of carpenters conversely. had strongly attacked the 
idea. that America was a classless society and that employers and 
workers had an identity of interests. In industry the divergence 
of opinion was always vague. The true gauge was in the action 
taken and its extent. 
Most importantly, however, the lack of industrial. action and 
organising ca.mpa.igns from 1923 onwards was due to a new preoccupation 
with the political avenue as a means to gain satisfaction. Radical 
opinion was now concentrating in this area. and it wa.s here that the 
divergence between radical and conservative became most apparent. 
In this case the conservatives reverted to their traditional 
scorn of any dependence on po1itica.l aid. They accepted that politi-
cal help was desirable, but held that the friends unionisp1 already 
had were loyal enough. There was no need to be more rigorous 
about the commitment or political influence of these men. In line 
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with their attitude to industrial relations, radical tmionists 
were less enamoured with the support which politicians gave 
unionism. They felt only politicians with a much more concrete 
commitment to the power of trade unions warranted their support. 
They regarded many of the contemporary politicians as at least 
tmsotmd in this respect. In 1920 agitation for labour parties 
emerged. in various areas such as Indiana, Detroit and, most 
notably, Chicago. John Fitzpatrick was definite in his belief that 
tmionism could orily find satisfaction from politicians much more 
committed, not simply to their organisation, but also believing 
in the need for fundamental reforms of the economic system. 
Gompers denied that this was the case, arguing that progressives 
were already sympathetic to the tmion cause. 
Although Fitzpatrick's view was to the left of most unionists, 
his condemnation struck a chord with a good deal more who were 
disappointed. by the faUure of the Clayton Act and by Wilson's 
failure to latmch a N.W .L.B.-type board in peace time. Thus, while 
the resolutions calling for a.n independent labour party at 
successive A.F. of L. conventions from several state confederations, 
including Pennsylvania t were overwhelmingly defeated, in 1922 
several unions combined to form the Conference for Progressive 
Political Action. The railroad brotherhoods and the United Mine 
Workers had both decided in 1919 that only nationa1isation of their 
industries could satisfy their aims. Invariably this led to an 
increasing interest in the political arena. The railroad brother-
hoods, although quiescent at first, were soon complaining bitterly 
about the Railroad. Labor Board set up by the 1920 Transportation 
Act and were determined to have it scrapped. 
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As has already been noted, the recession had. frustrated 
tmionists a.bUity to act in the L"l<iustria1 milieu. This, combined 
with the heightened interest of the two largest tmion organisations 
and the convictions of men such as Fitzpatrick and a shared 
frustration with the reluctance of the A.F. of L. to champion their 
opinions, to provide the motivation for the fOtmdation of a new 
political pressure group. As the conservative outlook was mostly 
influenced by immediate factors f so the C.P.P.A. also grew to a 
large extent from immediate circumstan ces. From that time in 
February 1922 political issues dominated the thoughts of many 
tmionists, including conservatives. The movlng force of this 
concentration was tmdoubtedly provided by the C.P.P.A. both in 
terms of the commitment of unionists and the need for conservatives 
to respond. This became particularly important after the striking 
wave of progressive success in the mid-term elections of 1922. The 
conservatives in the A.F. of L. were sttmg into political action in 
order to deflect attention from the C.P.P.A. and minimise the 
threat it represented for the political posture of their organisation. 
The issues which Samuel Gompers chose to pursue to demonstrate 
the virility of the A.F. of L. were those of the powers of the 
Supreme Court and the continuing use of injunctions in indwstrla1 
disputes. By 1924, however, it was clear tha.t the C.P.P.A. had 
seized the initiative and that the future of the political aspect 
of tmde unionism would be botmd closely to the outcome of the 
1924 election. 
Ostensibly, this organisation was simply a pressure group 
seeking to forge a closer relationship between tmions and politicians. 
Participating tmionists, however, made clear that the C.P.P.A. had 
a much more serious implication. It effectively demonstrated that 
tmionists believed. that politicians needed to believe in the 
importance of acting positively to defend the working classes. It 
essentially symbolised a recognition of the need for trade tmionism 
to be seen in terms of an ideological framework. In responding 
to this initiative the conservative leadership, as in 1919, was 
forced to stiffen its position. In 1922 Gompers gave clear backing 
to the United Mine Workers and. Shopmen's strikes. Although they 
were qualitatively different actions than those in 1919. his 
tmequivocal posture was notable. More indicative of the effect 
of the C.P.P.A. were the renewed attacks' on the Supreme Court 
which Gompers launched and continued in the pages of the American 
Fed.erationist in 1923 and 1924, despite the quiet which had 
overtaken industrial relations. 
The final measure of the success of the C.P.P.A. was in 
forcing the A.F. of L. to endorse the campaign of Robert La. Follette 
in 1924. The anomaly of this action was that, in dOing so, Gompers 
J 
claimed that this in no way meant the abandonment of the traditional 
friends and enemies policy. La Follette was being endorsed as an 
individual. not because of the ideological implications of his 
campaign. 
Since 1922 the radical position of the C.P.P.A. set the tone 
in the political outlook of trade tmionists, so that conservatives 
were forced to compromise their position. Yet the latter cont~ued 
to deny that trade unionism required an ideological rationale for 
the political success of its aims. This was, in fact, the 
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flmdamenta.l implication at the foundation of the C.P.P.A. and 
La. Follette's 1924 campaign. The result in 1924 wa.s of crucial 
importance to the political posture of trade tmionism. Trade 
lmionism not only continued to have a. major influence on the 
political system during these years but increasingly forced 
politicians to seek more radical solutions to the problems the move-
ment highlighted. Whether this process would continue and develop 
and whether politics would continue to be accorded such attention 
from trade unionists were all at stake. 
The result of the 1924 elections was of vital importance 
for the tenor of American political debate, over and above its 
relationship to trade unionism as already described. During this 
period the divergence in the trade lmion movement was closely 
mirrored in the emergence of a split in American politics between 
conservative and progressive. Following the war it became apparent 
that the nature at President Wilson's progressivism prevented him 
from being a.ble to endorse the demands for trade union power. Such 
an acceptance required an ideological outlook which neither he nor 
his administration could accommodate. The labour problem was 
regarded by Wilsonian progressives as requiring the establishment 
of some means of a:rbi tra.tion. The first and second industria.l 
conferences were the result of this perception. In this 
thinking the government was neutral, there was no conception 
that the pre-war reforms should not have attained the equilibrium 
that these progressives sought. The further granting of 
extra-parliamentary power wa.s diametrically opposed to Wilson's 
purpose of minimising such power in order to liberate individual 
initiative. The inability of Wilson and his style of progressivism 
to bring about any reconciliation revealed the political nature of 
the dispute between the two sides. 
The effect of this failure by Wilson and the examples of 
success of government intervention during the war, however, caused 
a significant number of progressives in Congress to question the 
nature of their ideals and whether they could achieve the type of 
egalitarian, free society they sought. The disputes of 1919 and 
the palpable fact that the trade union movement was still unable to 
organise or picket freely played a significant part in progressives' 
disillusionment. No clear conclusions were immediately apparent 
in this process of re-assessment. The hearings of the Committee 
on Education and Labor did, however, reveal that several far from 
radical progressives were willing to countenance a continuation of 
a good deal of the government's w~time activities. The most 
striking example was the championing, by Senator Kenyon, of the 
continuation at war-time levels of the U.S. Employment Service. 
The question which progressives had to answer in this case was 
whether an egalitarian society could spring merely from individual 
liberty or whether the federal government had a responsibility to 
intervene and support the less priviliged. i-lany progressives now 
concluded that the latter course of action was necessary. The 
extent of such a responsibility remained unclear. The power of 
business had also been a significant force in the development of 
progressivism. Again, after the intervention during the ;{~, the 
efficacy of Wilson's regulatory approach .. as questioned. Instead 
of acting as an ~~pire, ~ny now felt that only economic intervention 
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could redress the imbalance of power in American society. 
Conservatives, conversely, denied all such thinking and called for 
the scrapping of as much of the government's war-time commitments 
as possible. 
In this context, the trade union disputes with employers had 
a significant bearing. Given the reassessment which many progressives 
were making, the position of trade unions appeared to bear out the 
need. for stronger government support. Similarly, the treatment of 
workers by employers and the latter's denial that wages were anything 
other than a cost of production, convinced many progressives that 
only positive action to curtaU the power of employers and the strict 
adherence to the freedoms unions had ostensibly gained under the 
Clayton Act could bring any equality to society. The labour problem 
thereby did much to illustra.te for progressives that further federal 
action was required. 
This process of development in progressivism was 1:ased in 
part on the Bull Moose platform of 1912, which had called for 
more affirmative government action. The extent to which such 
proposals were adhered to at that time is open to question. In 
1919 there was little doubt that La. Follette for one sought this 
type of government and placed a new emphasis on economic factors. 
The process of this development was slow and incoherent and 
occurred piecemeal as individual issues arose and individual 
progressives expressed their views. There was no indication of a 
thematic or ideological framework for their opinions. La Follette 
formed the People's Legislative Service "to remedy this. 
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The reaction of progressives to this initiative revealed the 
fundamental difficulty which confronted any effort to weld these 
individuals into an ideologically coherent movement. Southern 
progressive Democrats continued to argue that to split the pa.....""'ty 
would simply damage the progressives' base. They sought to change 
from within. Independent Western progressives argued that they were 
happy with their independence. Despite this reluctance to enter 
any formal coalition, the tone of Congressional debates continually 
emphasised the development of an ideological split in American 
politics. Discussions centred consistently on attitudes to the role 
of the government and the extent of its responsibility for the less 
fortunate among the population. This applied not only to debates 
caused by industrial disputes but also emerged in other debates; 
~x reform, for instance,and in 1921 the proposals of Kenyon for 
the deliberate manipulation of federal expenditure to respond to 
economic conditions. Importantly for the momentum of progressive 
reform was the growing disquiet among farmers due to their growing 
indebtedness. Together these confirmed progressives in their calls 
for much greater federal activity. La Follette's belief that a 
fundamental shift in the nature of partisanship 'tras under Hay was 
echoed by many conservatives ~·'ho were frustrated by the confusion in 
Congress. The Republican party was unable, despite its majority, 
to ef:ective1y control the legislative agenda or ensure the passage 
of their bills. They saw progressives i,ithin their party cross to 
the side of the Democratic opposition. 
In 1922, the crisis brought on by the coal and rail stri:{es 
served to ra.dicalise still further progressive opinions on the 
necessity of federal intervention to establish order on an 
361 
increasingly chaotic economic system. The mid-term election in 
that year gave a further boost to progressive hopes that their 
:radical solutions were finding a response from the population. As 
a result, La. Follette's P .L.S. began to take shape and win support. 
CruciaJ.ly, the formation of the C.P.P.A. appeared to these radical 
progressives as an endorsement of their position by the trade l.Ulion 
constituency. Despite the quiet in industrial relations, radical 
progressivism continued its momentum in 1923 and 1924 through the 
questions of the agricultu:ral crisis, the powers of the Supreme 
Court, the corruption in the Harding administration and their 
championing of the Child Labor Amendment and the Howell-Barkley 
Bill. In all these issues the divide between those who believed. 
in an interventionist state and those who did not dominated the 
discusssions and revealed the ideological basis of politics in 
the early 1920's. In this development, despite the denials of 
trade unionists, support for unions was predicated upon the belief 
in a broader role for the government and that further economic 
reforms were necessary to establish equality in society. 
The effect of this development upon politics in the 1920's 
was that Congress largely ground to a halt. The few successes 
which the Harding and Coolidge administrations a.chieved were in 
issues which broke down the split between progressives and 
conservatives, as in the Tariff del:ate. It should be pointed 
out, moreover, that neither Harding nor Coolidge pursued or 
attempted to formulate any policies with regard to industrial 
relations. Stalemate best characterised the political ba.1ta.nce 
of power in the 1920's. 
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It is argued here that this outcome'was due to the fact that 
many Democrats also supported the progressive position. They 
were not opposing conservative Republicans on a traditional' partisan 
tasis. James Cox in 1920 and John W. Davis in 1924 were progressive 
standard-bearers for the Democratic party. The leading candidates 
in 1924 for the Democratic nomination William G. McAdoo and Al Smith 
were also both unashamed. progressives. The only difference between 
radical progressives and Democrats was in the extent of the radicalism 
and the broader implications they perceived in the progressive 
movement. Democrats were wary of this kind of ideological argument. 
Similarly the kind of wholesale nationalisation radicals proposed. 
could not be endorsed. by Democmts. Yet individually, tax reforms, 
the nationalisation of coal and rail.roa.ds t and the municipal 
ownership of water power had &ll.found support from Democrats. 
George Huddleston of Ala.tama, as an example, was a key member of the 
P.L.S. but remained a loyal member of his party. More importantly, 
despite the tone of radical progressivism, the actual proposals 
in agricultural and tax reforms, the ChUd Labor Amendment and the 
Howell-Barkley Bill were essentially modemte in nature and 
therefore able to gain progressive Democmtic support. As the votes 
on the discharge of the Howell-Barkley Bill demonstmted, the 
Democmts were also split by ideological loyalties. 
The bJ.lance of power in Congress was not held by the P.L.S •• 
They were on the left of the political spectrum, as extreme 
conservatives were a minority on the right. As issues arose, less 
extreme but nonetheless committed progressives and conservatives 
gravitated. towards these two sides. As the Howell-Barkley Blll 
demonstrated., the balance of power was held by mod era tea. 
By the time of the election race in 1924 La Follette had 
developed his progressive outlook to a point where he believed that 
only an independent campaign could be considered. To do otherwise 
would be to compromise his beliefs. The result of the election in 
1924 would be of major importance for the momentum of neo-progressivism 
and not simply for La Follette's radical campaign. 
The election race never reflected the seriousness of its 
implications for the future of the American political system. The 
conservatives in both Republican and Democratic parties were muted 
in their ca.mpaigning. La Follette was generaJ..ly denounced as a 
danger to the nation, but none of the topics he represented were 
debated in detaU. John Davis had difficulty in getting attention 
at all. At the end of the :race, Coolidge was a. long way ahead. of 
both of his rivals. Although five mUlion votes was easily the 
best performance of any independent campaign, the magnitude of 
the Coolidge victory obscured any appreciation of this achievement. 
As Gompers saw it, the population had endorsed conservatism. 
This was not entirely the case. The bulk of La. Follette's 
support came from disillusio~ed Democrats, but mny of those who 
had voted for Davis had voted for a nan who helped draw up the 
labour sections of the Cla.yton Act and who had throughout the 
campaign been voluble in his support of labour. La. Follette's 
fa.ilure was in not weaning the millions of mid-western progressive 
voters away from the Republican party. They remained satisfied 
with the position of independent progressives such as Borah and 
Norris representing their opinions within the Republica~ party. 
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Samuel Gompers was certainly of this opinion. He believed the 
result upheld what he had argued all along, that independent action 
was not only futile but damaging to the chances of success offered 
by the friends and enemies policy. He believed the result vindicated 
the conservative position. The abandonment of the C.P.P.A. in . 
February 192.5 demonstrated that this was a perception shared by many 
. in the trade tmion movement. The result appeared to discredit the 
radicalism in both politics and the trade unions. 
The impact of the election upon the attitudes of trade unionists 
and politicians in the following years is not the immediate concern 
of this thesis. What is important is that in the very nature of 
the post mortem on the result it is evident that there had been 
heightened expectations as to the outcome. These expectations arose 
from the reality of a more radical trade tmion outlook coinciding 
with and stimulating a continuing development of progressive 
politics which remained a significant force in American political 
debate in the years 1919 to 1924. 
Implicit within the purpose of the thesis lie two assumptions 
which constitute the central a.na.lytical themes. The first is the 
belief that there continued to be important political developments 
during these years. The second assumption is that the labour 
movement and its aims were an integral and participating force in 
this development. It is hoped. that the thesis has demonstrated 
the legitimacy of these assumptions and that this will lead to a 
renewed study of the nature of the relationship of trade unionism 
to the political system in America. 
This is an aspect of the history of this period which has not 
racei ved sufficient study in the past. As discussed in the 
introduction, there are sevel.'8.1 reasons for this~' most iIlll'ortant of 
which is the perception of the years 1919 to 1924 as a period of 
conservative resurgence and dominance. It is hoped that the thesis 
goes some way to modify this perception. Even it it were the case, 
th~ is no reason why political developments should not still have 
occurred. The thesis goes fu..~her to demonstrate that progressivism 
was changing to an acceptance of the need for the government to act 
affirmatively on behalf of the people and that this was far from 
being a minority opinion in Congress. The result of the 1924 
election however crushed the possibility of any conscious political 
realignment in America. The efforts of both unionists in the 
C.P.P.A. and the Progressives of the P.L.S. while having provided" 
the dynamic of political discussion up to 1924 had failed to 
realign the politi.ea.l system. If labour was to receive more 
effective political backing it would derive from social change in 
America. The broader union movement had always been ambIvalent 
about the political posture it favoured. After 1924, the 
possibility of further political: initiatives from unionists 
appeared unlikely. 
The primary issue raised by the agitation of trade unionists 
was not in respect of their claims for the rights to strike, bargain 
collectively or represent the workforce. These were constituent 
parts of the broader political question of where power lay in 
American society. Many progressives, faced by this issue, concluded 
that power was a function of the economic position one held. This 
meant that the idea of individual liberty ensuring an ega.litarian 
society could no longer remain credible. Increasingly, progressives 
accepted that the economy was the vital arbiter of power and that the 
government must therefore intervene and the trade mlions must be 
allowed. to exercise their rights if a truly equal society were 
to be established. This outlook had the effect of :ra.dica1ising the 
political spectrum in America. The result was not conservative 
dominance, or even that progressives held a balance of power. 
Progressives and conservatives were in fact in rough equilibrium. 
The l::ala.nce of power lay with moderates in both the Democratic and 
Republican parties. The overall effect was of stalemate. 
Neither Harding nor Coolidge was able to affect this situation. 
The trade union movement reflected this split in politics. 
There too a radical minority was providing a momentum to which the 
leadership of the movement was forced. to respald. The period from 
1919 to 1924 was a period of gradual but significant change in the 
nature of American politics, a change fuelled by the demands of 
trade unionists. 
The friends and enemies policy of the trade union movement 
was increasingly brought into question during these years. It 
served to confuse the message trade unionists wished to communicate 
to politicians. Radical unionists held that only an ideological 
commi tment to the working class could constitute true friendship. 
Conservative unionists, including Samuel Gompers, denied this. 
All who were prepared to vote for particular trade union proposals 
were regarded as friends. This non-partisan policy was l:ased. on 
traditional party lines still being of relevance. Yet the fact 
was that progressives generally could support mlion issues. It 
became a question of the depth of support and on this radicals were 
dissatisfied. The friends and enemies policy tended to confuse 
the political impact of trade unionism. It was not the Number of 
friends labour had. but the na.ture of that friendship which exercised 
radical trade unionists. This outlook and La Follette's :radical 
response started the momentum leftwaros. In effect La. Follette 
-
went too far in his proposals thereby alienating the majority of 
progressives. This ultimately punctured the progress which had been 
made during these years. Importantly, however, the conservative 
unionists minimised the need for progressives to adopt La 
Follette's radicalism by continuing with their traditional friends 
and enemies policy. This provided milder progressives with a 
constituency and thus deprived them of any motivation to endorse 
La Follette' s position. The friends and enemies policy thus not 
only diluted the impact of the trade tmionists t demands but also 
confused the political debate during the period. Nonetheless it 
can be concluded that the political discussions of the period 
resulted in a leftward trend in progressive thinking which tended 
to confirm the friendship of progressives for unionism. It was in 
this context that the trade unions took their place in the political 
spectrum. Far from being excluded, the conservative unionists 
were well represented in numbers if, by the very nature of their 
moderation, politicians were unable to meet their demands fully. 
Furthermore, radical unionists found a respanse from the P.L.S. 
~hose campaigning was gradually influencing milder progressives. 
The stalemate in politics was mirrored by stalemate in 
industry. The unions could not extend their organisation and 
employers could not diminish the presence of unions by direct 
action. The recession of 1920 to 1921 badly affected union 
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membership. The boom in new industries such as chemicals and 
automobiles resulted in a relative decline of the percentage of 
unionists in manufacturing industries. Finally, the shift of 
textile manufacturing from the North East to the South and in 
-
coal from unionised to non-unionised fields ~uced union 
membership without any victory over unionism per see These moves 
were motivated largely by economic factors. Nonetheless, the 
consequence of these economic considerations was the apathy and 
lack of organising activity which overcame trade unionism from 
1923. 
Economic factors weakened. the trade \.Ulion movement in this 
period, not any conservative campaign against it. Indeed the 
trends pointed to a growing progressive concept of federal action 
which included. the acceptance of trade \.Ulion power. The trade 
union movement had friends in the political system. The change in 
the American political system, however, meant that the questions 
of greatest importance during the period was how effective these 
friends were and how they were chosen. These questions had never 




President's First Industrial Conference 
Representatives of the Public 
Fuller E. Ca.lloway, La.gra.nge, Ga. 
Thomas L. Chadbourne, 14 Wall street, New York City 
Henry S. Dennison, Framingham, Mass 
H.B. Endicott, Dedham, Mass. 
George R. James, H .R. Moore Dry Goods Co., South Third and Monroe 
streets, Memphis, Tenn. 
Thomas D. Jones, Marquette Building, Chicago, Ill. 
A.A. Landon, American Radiator Co., Buffalo, N.Y. 
E.T. Meredith, editor Successful Farming, Des Moines, Iowa 
Gavin McNab, Merchants' NationaJ. Bank BuUding, San Francisco, Calif. 
L.D. Sweet, Carbondale, Colo. 
Louis Titus, :J+4 Market Street, San Francisco, Calif. 
Charles Edward Russell, 5 East Twenty-seventh Street, New York City 
John Sp:1.rgo, Old Bennington, Vt. 
Bert M. Jewell, A.F. of L. Building, Washington D.C. 
Paul L. Feiss, Cleveland, Ohio 
Representatives of Women 
Ida M. Tarbell, Pen and Brush Club, Gramercy Park, New York City 
Lillian D. Wal.d 
Representatives of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
Harry A. Hheeler, Unicn Trust Co., 801 Otis Building, Chicago, Ill. 
Ernest T. Trigg, Federation of Construction Industries, Philadelphia, Pat 
Herbert F. Perkins, International Harvester Co., Chicago, Ill. 
John J. Raskob, Du Pont Powder Co., Wilmington, Del. 
Homer L. Ferguson, Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., Newport 
. News, Va. 
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Representati ves of Farmers' Organisations 
J.N. Tittemore, American Society of Equity, Omro, Wis. 
T.C. Atkeson, National Grange, 303 Seventh Street, Washington D.C. 
e.s. Barrett, Farmers ' Co-operative Union, Union City, Ga.. 
Representatives of Investment Bankers' Association of America 
Edgar L. Marston, Blair & Co., 24 Broad Street, New York City 
Howard W. Fenton, Harris Trust & Savings Bank, Chica.go, Ill. 
Representatives of Organised Labour 
Samuel Gompers, A.F. of L. Building, Washington D.C. 
Frank Morrison, A.F. of L. Building, Washington D.C. 
Daniel J. Tobin, 222 East Michigan Street, Indianapolis, Ind. 
Joseph F. Valentine, Commercial Tribune Building, Cincinnati, Ohio 
W.D. Mahon, l~ East High Street, Detroit, Mich. 
T.A. Rickert, 175 ~Jest W~hington Street, Chicago, Ill. 
Jacob Fischer, 222 East Michigan Street, Indianapolis, Ind. 
~ .. 
Matthew Woll, COtmcU National Defense, Hashington D.C. 
Mrs Sara Conboy, 86-87 Bible House, New York City 
William H. Johnston, A.F. of L. Building, Washington D.C. 
Paul Scha.rrenberg, 525 Market Street, San Francisco, Calif. 
John H. Donlin, A.F. of L. Building, Washington D.C. 
M.F. Tighe, House Building, Smithfield and Water streets, 
Pittsburgh, Pat 
Representatives of Railroad Brotherhoods 
H.E. Wills, for the engineers 
Timothy Shea, by P.J. McNamara, for the firemen 
H .G. Lee, for the trainmen 
L.E. Sheppard, for the conductors 
Representatives of National Industrial Conference 
Frederick P. Fish, chairman National. Industrial Conference Bon-d, 
patent attorney. ex-president American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
Boston, Mass. 
J.W. O'Leary, secretary-treasurer Arthur J. O'Leary & Son, manu-
facturers iron and steel products, president National Metal Trades 
Association, Chicago, Ill. 
S. Pemberton Hutchinson, president Westmoreland Coal Co •• 
Philadelphia,. Pat 
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Edwin Farnham Greene, treasurer Pacific Mills, Boston, Mass. 
L.F. Loree, J2 Nassau street, New York City 
Reuresentatives of Railroad Managers 
R.H. Aishton 
Carl R. Gray 
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APPENDIX 2 
President's Second Industrial Conference 
Chairmanz William B. Wilson 
Martin H. Glynn 
Thomas W. Gregory 
Richard Hooker 
Stanley King 
Oscar S. Straus 
Henry C. Stuart 
William O. Thompson 
Frank W. Taussig. 
Vice-chairmanz Herbert Hoover 
Samuel W. McCall 
Henry W. Robinson 
Julius Rosenwald 
George T. Slade 
Henry J. Waters 
George W. Wickersham 








Abernethy Doyle Lozier Robsion Ky. 
Allen Eagan Lyon Romjue 
Allgocxi Evans Mont. McLintic Rubey 
Almon Favrot McKeown Sabath 
Arnold Foster McReynolds Salmon 
Ayers Frear McSwain Sanders Tex. 
Bankhead Fulbright McSweeney Sandlin 
Barbour Fulmer MacGregor Schafer 
Barkley Funk Major Ill. Schall 
Beck Garber Major Mo. Schneider Berger Gardner Ind. Manlove Seger 
Black N.Y. Garner Tex. Mansfield Shallenberger Bloom Garrett Tex. Martin Sherwood 
Boies Gasque Mead Simmons 
Bowling Gilbert Miller Wash. Sinclair 
Box Glatfelter MUligan Sites 
Boylin Greenwocxi Minahan Smithwick 
Brand Ga. Griffin Montague steagall 
Briggs Hammer Mooney Stedman 
Browne Wis. Hastings Moore Ga. Stevenson 
Browning Hayden Moore Va. Summers Wash. 
Buchanan Hill Ala. Morehead Sumners Tex. 
Buckley Hill Wash. Morrow Swank 
Bulwinkle Holaday Nelson Wis. Swing 
Busby Howa.rd Nebr. Nolan Tague 
Byrnes S.C. Huddleston O'Brien Taylor Colo. 
Byrns Tenn. Hudspeth O'Connell N.Y. Ta.ylor ~~. Va.. 
Ga.nfield Hull Iowa. O'Connell R.I. Thomas Ky. 
cannon I Hull Tenn. O' Connor La.. Thoma.s Okla. 
Carew Ja.cobstein O'Connor N.Y. Tillman 
Carter James O'Sullivan Tucker 
casey Jeffers Oldfield Underwocxi 
CelIeI' Johnson W.Va. Oliver Ala. Vinson Ga. 
Clancy Jones Oliver N.Y. Vincen Ky. 
Collier Keller Parks Ark. Voigt 
Collins Kelly Peavey r,': a tk ins 
Connelly Tex. Kent Peery 'o'leaver 
Cook Kindred Pou Wefald 
Cooper Oh. King Prall l,.[eller 
Cooper Wis. Kopp Quayle Williams Ill. 
Coming Kvale Quinn Wilson Ind. 
Crisp LaGuardia Ragon Hilson Miss. 
Croll Lampert Rainey Wingo 
Crosser Lanham Raker Holff 
Cullen Lankford Rankin Woodruff 
Davey Lazaro Rathbone Wooorum 
Dickinson Mo. Lee Geo. Reed Ark. '~right 
Doughton Lilly :leid Ill. 
Dowell Lindsay Richards 
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NAYS - 181 
Ackerman Fish Little Stephens 
Aldrich Fisher Longworth strong Kans. 
Andrew Fitzgerald Lowrey Strong Pa, 
. Anthony Fleetwood Luce Sweet 
Aswell Fredericks McDuffy Taber 
Bacharach Free Mcfadden Temple 
Bacon Freeman McKenzie Thatcher 
Beedy French McLaughlin Mich. Thompson 
Beers Frothingham McLaughlin N e br. Timberlake 
Begg Fuller McLeod Tincher 
Bixler Garrett Tenn. Ma.cLaff ert y Tinkham 
Black Tex. Gibson Madden Treadway 
Bland Gifford fo'agee N.Y. Underhill 
Blanton Goldsborough Magee Pa, Vaile 
Boyce Graham Ill. Mapes Vincent Mich. 
B:re.nd Oh. Graham Pa.. Merritt Wainwright 
Britten Green Iowa Michener Watres 
Browne N.J. Griest Miller Ill. Watson 
Brumm Hadley Mills Welsh 
Burdick Hardy Moore Ill. Wertz 
Burtness Harrison Moore Ohio \'ihite Kans. 
Burton li4ugen Moores Ind. White Me. 
Butler Hawes Mudd Williams Mich. 
cable Hawley Nelson Me. Williams Tex. 
Chindblom Hersey Newton Minn. Williamson 
Christopherson Hickey Newton Mo. Tllilson La. 
Clague Hill Md. Paige Winslow 
Clarke N.Y. Hoch" Parker Wyant 
Cleary Hudson Patterson Yates 
Cole Iowa Hull Morton D. Perkins Young 
Cole Oh. Hull William E. Phillips 
Colton Humphreys Porter 
Connolly Pa. Johnson S.D. Purnell 
Cmmon Johnson Ky. Ramseyer 
Crowther Johnson Wash. Ransley 
Darrow Jost Reece 
Da.vis Tenn. Kearns Reed. N.Y. 
Deal Kendall Roach 
Dempsey Kerr Robinson Iowa 
Dennison Ketcham Rogers Mass. 
Dickinson Iowa Kiess Rouse 
Driver Kincheloe Sanders Ind. 
Dyer Kurtz Sanders N. Y • 
Elirnonds Larsen Ga, Scott 
Elliott Larson Minn. shrieve 
Evans Iowa Lea Calif. Sinnott 
Fairchild Leatherwood Smith 
Fairfield Leavitt Snell 
Faust Lehlbach Speaks 
Fenn Linthicum Sproul Ill. 
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NOT VOTING - 51 
. 
AMerson Greene Mass. Morris· Swoope 
Bell Hooker Murphy Taylor Tenn. 
Clark Fla •. Howard Okla. Park Ga. Tilson 
Connery Johnson Tex. Perlman Tydings 
Cummings Kahn Rayburn Upshaw 
Curry Knutson Reed W.Va. Vare 
Da.llinger Kunz Rogers N.H. Vestal 
Davis Minn. Langley Rosenbloom Ward N.Y. 
Dickstein Lineberger Sears Fla. Ward N.C. 
Dominick Logan Sears Nebr. Wason 
Drane McNulty Snyder Winter 
Drewry Michaelson Stalker Wood 
Gallivan Morgan Stengle Wurz'oach 
Geran Morin Sullivan Zihlman 
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AoPPENDIX 4 
PRESIDENTIAL VarE OF 1924 BY STATES AND 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
state Republican Democratic Progressive other Total 
AJ.a "brclI!JS, •••••• , 4,5,005 112,966 8,084 569 166,624 
Arizona •••••• 30,516 26,235 17,210 73,961 
Arkansas ••••• 40,564 84,795 13,173 138,.532 
California ••• 733,250 105,514 424,649 18,365 1,281,778 
Colorado ••••• 195,171 75,238 69,945 1,906 )!-2,260 
Connecticut •• 246,322 110,184 42,416 1,373 400,295 
Delaware ••••• _"52,441 33,445 4,979 20 90,385 
Florida •••••• 30,633 62,083 8,625 7,813 109,1,54 
Georgia •••••• 30,300 123,200 12,691 386 166,577 
Idaho •••••••• 69,2'79 24,2.56 54,160 148,295 
Illinois ••••• 1,453,321 576,975 432,037 7,744 2,470,077 
Indiana •••••• 703,042 492,245 71,700 5,403 1,272,390 
Iowa ••••••••• 537,635 162,600 272,2if3 4,482 976,960 
Kansas ••••••• 407,671 156,319 98,461 662,4.51 
Kentucky ••••• 398,966 374,855 38,465 3, ~+6 815,332 
Louisiana "if ,j'. 24,670 93,218 4,063 121,951 
ft1a.ine •••••••• 138,440 41,964 11,382 406 192,192 
tAaryland ••••• 16Z,414 148,072 47,157 987 350,630 
ft1a.ssachussetts 703,489 280,831 141,284 4,311 1,129,915 
Michigan ••••• 874,631 152,359 122,014 11,415 1,160,419 
Minnesota •••• 420,759 ' 5.5,913 339,192 6,232 822,146 
Mississippi •• 8,546 100,475 3,494- 112,515 
Missouri ••••• 648,4t'36 572,753 84,160 2,536 1,307,925 
Montana •••••• 74,138 33,805 6.5,876 604 17L~,423 
Nebraska ••••• 218,585 137,289 106,701 1,594 L(64,169 
Nevada ••••••• 11,243 .5,909 9,769 26,921 
New Hampshire ,98,575 57,201 8,993 164,769 
New Jersey ••• 676,277 298,043 109,028 4,706 1,083,0,54 
New York •••• 1,920,0.5.9 950,796 474,905 18,172 ),263,931 
New Hexico ••• 
.-.54,745 48,,542 9,.543 112,3JO 
North Carolina 191,753 234,270 6,651 13 482,637 
North Dakota • 94,931 13,850 89,922 370 199,031 
Ohio ••••••••• 1,176,130 477,883 357,948 4,271 2,016,237 
Oklahoma. •••••. 226,242 255,790 41,141 5,2;/t- 52S,41.5 
Oregon ••••••• 142,579 67,539 68,403 917 279,423 . 
Pennsylvania. 1,401,481 409,192 307,567 26,479 2,144,719 
Rhode Island • 125,2Q6 76,606 7,623 595 210,1.55 
South Carolina 1,123 49,008 620 50,751 
South Dakota. 101,299 27,214 751355 203,26c3 
Tennessee •••• 130,382 153,537 . 10,656 200 300,275 
Texas •••••••• 130,023 4-34,605 42,231 657,509 
utah ••••••••• 77,327 47,001 ~2 662 156,990 ../ , 
Vernont •••••• 80,498 16,124 5,9(jJ, ~"6 102,912 
..I'" 
Virginia. ••••• 73,3.59 139,797 10,379 191 "2'"' ""6 0::. ,),1_ 
Washington ••• 220,224 42,342 150,727 7,756 421,.5'-i-9 
West Virginia 288,635 2,57,232 36,723 1,072 533,662 
Wisconsin •••• 311,614 63,115 453,678 7,419 340,326 
Wyoming •••••• 41,853 12,568 25,174 79,900 
United Sta.tes 1.5,725,016 8,.386,624 4,330,478 157,013 29,099,131 
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APPENDIX 4 (i) 
Democratic Percentage of the Total Vote for President 
in Selected Metropolitan Areas, 1920-36 
1920 1924 1928 1932 
l3oston 36.3 35.5 66.8 - 67.1 
Providence 35.3 38.6 52.9 57.4 
New York 
Bronx 24.4 33.6 67.7 70.4 
Kings 25.9 31.9 59.5 66.9 
New York 29.1 39.6 60.8 66.9 Queens 25.7 31.0 53.4 61.5 
Richmond 33.2 42.0 - 53.4 61.1 
Buffalo 25.6 21.3 44.9 46.3 
Rochester 24.7 20.5 41.2 44.8 
Newark 25.0 22.3 41.0 45.6 
Jersey City 36.7 47.0 60.2 71.9 
Philadelphia 21.5 12.1 39.5 42.9 
Pittsburgh 20.1 8.7 42.4 52.9 
Cleveland 30.5 9.1 45.6 50.1 
Detroit 17.6 7.1 36.8 57.2 
Chicago 22.1 20.3 46.5 55.2 
MUwaukee 17.8 9.7 53.7 65.6 
Minneapolis 20.6 6.3 38.8 54.8 
St. Paul 30.8 10.1 51.2 61.2 
Seattle 16.2 6.6 31.9 59.1 
San Francisco 22.1 6.4 49.4 64.8 
Oakland 20.3 6.1 33.6 52.1 
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